Queen from AQ

April 9th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

In The Dictionary of Suit Combinations by J.-M. Roudinesco there are tables that tell you how to play various card combinations to best effect. Here is one such combination:

JT86     opposite    AQ73

Both for safety and profit the best play is to run the Jack, guarding against length in front of the tenace. One might say that only a fool would lead the Queen towards the Jack-Ten. Call me a fool, but I once made this winning play in a team match, and was so happy with the result that I continue to do so whenever the opportunity arises. If the finesse is 50%, half the time it won’t cost a trick, and it can have the effect of opening the communications to the dummy while preserving control when there is a need to do so. There are 2 hands from the 2012 Vanderbilt that show fools are wise sometimes. The question is: when?

The 1♦ opening was Precision 1♦, 11-15 HCP, and 2♦ showed decent heart support – at the Vanderbilt a player will jump to 3♥ on the slightest of excuses. North had a maximum opening bid with a good spade suit, so he did not hesitate to jump to game despite the often unlucky 4-4-4-1 shape. The ♥2 was lead to the ♥A and hearts continued, ruffed in hand with the ♠3. Declarer played a club to dummy, winning, and led the ♠J in the approved manner hoping to escape a spade loser. Unlucky! East won the ♠K and played ♣A and a club promoting the ♠9 in his partner’s hand. Down 1. Here is the full deal.

Dealer: WEST Vul: BOTH	North ♠   AQ73 ♥   8 ♦   KQ75 ♣   KJ63
West ♠   942 ♥   AQT9 ♦   JT32 ♣   82		East ♠   K5 ♥   K6432 ♦   9 ♣   A9754
	South ♠   JT86 ♥   J75 ♦   A864 ♣   QT

Circumstances change priorities. Note that East was correctly in violation of the so-called ‘Garozzo’s Law’ when he failed to lead his singleton. If he had done so, we can be pretty sure declarer would not win with the ♦A and run the ♠J from dummy. More likely he would win in hand and cash the ♠A to guard against the ruff. He can afford to lose 1 spade trick, and with the alarm bells ringing it is safer to do so immediately.

When the lead is a normal heart and hearts are continued it is more difficult to foresee danger in the trump suit. If the game were Matchpoints, one might make 11 tricks by playing as declarer did. Presumably he hoped to save a trick in trumps if the spades split 3-2 with the ♠K onside. Let’s look at 3 possible distributions of sides, the actual one in the middle. The probability weights are given along the bottom.

Condition I is the most likely distribution of sides, so the matchpoint play of taking the spade finesse has likelihood on its side. The NS communications are fluid, so even if the finesse loses the hand is safe for 10 tricks. We know what can happen under Condition II.

As the BBO commentators constantly remind us, making one’s game is priority #1 at IMPs, so giving up a trick to increase the chances of making 10 tricks makes good sense. Under Condition II, playing the ♠Q from hand at trick 2 preserves the communications and keeps control even if East wins the ♠K and exits his singleton diamond. Declarer wins the ♦A in dummy, ruffs a heart, play the ♠A and gives up a club. That also covers the case of spades splitting 4-1 with the ♠K with West (Condition III), but only if West unwisely takes the first trump lead. ‘Beware Greeks bearing gifts’, and all that.

The reader might think, ‘West will not be so foolish’, but if you don’t give an opponent a chance to go wrong, he won’t. At the other table here’s what happened: West won the first trick with the ♥A and returned a trump, being somewhat in a hurry to get to a break, I assume. That gave declarer an easy road when he ducked to East’s King.

There are hands where declarer needs a break. When there are several possibilities, he has to choose the right one, usually the one with the greatest odds in its favor. Here is a hand from the final where a successful play was made: Queen from Ace-Queen.

After winning the ♥6 lead in hand with the ♥K Thomas Bessis faced a familiar problem – how to develop tricks quickly without letting South on lead to play a heart through. There are 3 Kings missing and 2 of them of necessity have to be in the North, not as bad odds as it may seem. If one assumes the ♦K is in the South, that is roughly a 1 chance out of 3, whereas if one assumes the ♦K is in the North, that is roughly a 2 in 3 chance.

The losing declarer hoped for the ♦K in the South hand. He played ♣A followed by the ♣Q, ducked. A diamond finesse would see him home if he could get to the dummy. Relying on a favorable placement of the ♠K, he continued with the ♠4, losing to the ♠K. Now the hand fell apart and he ended up down 2. Here is the full deal.

Dealer: EAST Vul: NONE	North ♠   T85 ♥   A876 ♦   K54 ♣  KT6
West ♠   AJ4  ♥   KQ5 ♦   AT86 ♣  AQ2		East ♠   Q63 ♥   94 ♦   QJ32 ♣  J953
	South ♠   K972 ♥   JT32 ♦   97 ♣  874

Bessis played for the ♦K in the North. He began with the ♦A, giving himself the slight chance of dropping the singleton ♦K while opening up communications in the diamond suit. He continued diamonds, the ♦T to the ♦J, and there he was in the dummy in position to take the club finesse. No need to do that, as he could put North on lead perhaps to lend a helping hand. He exited a diamond to North’s King. The ♠T was led: ♠T – ♠Q – ♠K – ♠A.  He might have gone to dummy with a diamond and finessed for the ♣K, but he didn’t. Instead he played the ♣Q to preserve his options. Yes, Q from AQ.

North’s defence was revealing as well as non-challenging, and Bessis read the cards correctly. Bessis won the spade return cashed the ♦Q in dummy returned to the ♣A poised to take a finesse for the ♣T if necessary, but the clubs were 3-3 and the ♣T popped up giving him his 9th trick. From the first he had seen the potential in dummy’s ♣J9. If the declarer at the other table had continued with a 3rd round of clubs and had not relied on a favourable location of the ♠K, he, too, could have succeeded, although on a less elegant line of play.

Decisions, Decisions, Decisions
There were some exciting hands being played that in the end determined the outcome of matches, but the most interesting hand for me was played early at the 1-level. Why the interest? Because each player at the table had a critical decision to make. It took some time in the playing, but I was on the edge of my seat through it all.

Dealer: SOUTH Vul: NS	North ♠   95 ♥   643 ♦   AJT85 ♣  T75
West ♠   7643 ♥   J85 ♦   76 ♣  AQ86		East ♠   KQT ♥   KQT ♦   Q9432 ♣  32
	South ♠   AJ82 ♥   A972 ♦   K ♣  KJ94

Fantunes play on the Zimmerman team (Monaco). At the other table Multon, in loyal samurai fashion, as North had sacrificed himself in 2♦, down 2 for -200. At this table Bathurst, displaying a keener feel for self-preservation, after much thought passed his partner’s 1♥ rebid. Perhaps Zagorin felt a bit peeved at this turn of events for he held a quite promising hand. Now it was Fantoni’s turn to give the situation much thought. At Matchpoints a player would be reluctant to pass this out despite the threat of a 7-7-6-6 distribution of sides, but this was Teams. Perhaps he thought, ‘I didn’t move to Monaco just so’s I could spit in the sea from my balcony’, or maybe, ‘I can’t wait to see Claudio’s face when he sees this dummy!’’ Either way, he balanced with a double. Zargorin expressed an opinion, Nunes bid what he thought Fantoni had promised, and Bathurst passed hoping the bidding had come to an end without his having to get further involved. No, Zargorin wanted blood, so Bathurst, after another pass, had to come up with the killing lead in what was now a tight situation.

BBO commentators thought that a trump lead should be automatic, and, indeed, it was the killing lead, but Bathurst decided to lead his partner’s suit, often a commendable act, but not here as it gave Nunes a chance. He won with the ♣Q and led a heart to open communications. Zargorin won the ♥A and continued hearts. Nunes ducked a diamond to the ♦K and Zarogin played a club. It wasn’t until the 8th round that trumps were belatedly led by the defence. In the 4-card ending declarer held ♠ 76 ♣86 with the lead in a dummy of ♠Q ♦Q43.  The play of the ♦3 assured him of 2 trump tricks in front of Zarogrin’s ♠ J8  ♣ K9. By playing insightfully to make his contract, Nunes had held the loss on the board to 1 IMP. Despite his Herculean effort, Monaco eventually lost the match. It was one of those hands where one had to be watching in real time to experience the tension and capture the full flavour of the battle of wits. Thanks, BBO.

Slammin’ at the Vanderbilt

March 27th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Before we look at some slam hands from the 2012 finals, we should again remind ourselves that the donor of the cup, Harold Vanderbilt, was a pioneer who invented the first bidding system that employed 1♣ as the opening bid with strong hands. Of the 8 pairs playing in the finals half were employing a Big Club system.

After several days glued to the screen watching the exciting matches played with great skill by the experts, my head began to ache. By the time the finals were in progress my brain whirled with the instructive details often presented by the BBO commentators – all in good faith, mind you, but in my fatigue the question arose – were the bidding details all that significant? Bob Hamman had said his victory in the Platinum Pairs little involved the bidding systems being employed at the tables at which he was engaged. In a sense that’s understandable. Suppose an opponent gets to a reasonable contract based on the information provided by the bidding around the table. Success or failure will depend more on the placement of the cards around the table than on the route by which he arrived at the contract. Bidding a good game doesn’t mean he will make it, and bidding a bad game doesn’t mean he will not. Having noted that, we still claim that success may very much depend on the route taken. We present evidence later.

With my head in a whirl of confusion there suddenly appeared on my screen a simple statement of fundamental truth that blew my mind. It was like in the old biblical movies when the sun burst through the parting clouds and a voice speaks to the sandal-clad hero, played by Charlton Heston or some other muscular goy, who is in a state of frustrated confusion. In my case the revelation came not from the Almighty but from 2 Canadian commentators, Andre Vallée and Allan Graves, who keeps to the basic truths.

A.G.  ‘Bridge is a gambling game first and foremost……they would easily have this auction on a different set of boards with similar values and end in a very good contract.’
A.V.   ‘Distribution is nearly always the determining factor.’
A.G. ‘Yes, and the location of the high cards for the fit.’

So there you have it in a nutshell – Plato and Socrates. If we are going to watch hundreds of hands being bid and misbid by experts with their exotic bidding agreements, we should keep these truths foremost in our minds. Furthermore, when we go to play bridge we should employ methods that facilitate the disclosure of the fundamental requirements for success. Thereafter, let the Fates decide. Here is an example from late in the Finals, where the winners got it right. We simplify their Precision bidding.

The 3♦ response is an old-time Precision bid showing shape and a good hand.
3♥ asks for controls in hearts and spades.
3NT promises an Ace and a King in the majors.

At this point opener know partner holds the ♠A and a major K, more likely in hearts. No matter, it is reasonable to bid 6♠ and no more. The major point to note is that opener holds a decent trump holding greatly enhanced by the presence of the ♠T&9. It is unlikely the opponents will lead a trump, but if they do a club finesse may be needed to provide an extra chance. In the event the lead was a heart and declarer was able to crossruff for an easy 12 tricks when the defender short in hearts was unable to over-ruff.

One might say the result was a lucky one as it depended on the location of the ♠K. Yes, partly true, but declarer had a reasonable chance of making his slam on a variety of hands and opening leads, a gamble based on the information made available by the auction which gave distribution exactly and the location of controls partially. In the end the player with the trump intermediates (Joe Grue) made the final decision.

Let’s contrast this success story with the slam failure that our 2 commentators were discussing. Here are the hands as bid at the table using 2/1 methods.

The slam depended on the club finesse and some luck in the trump suit. In the end it was down 2. The fundamental flaw in many slam contracts in a 4-4 fit is the quality of the trumps. One may get away with AK only in a 9-card fit, but in an 8-card fit, the quality has to be there in close contracts. On the hand discussed above, the trumps were no better, but the distribution was such that declarer might escape having a trump loser without having to depend on a club finesse. Such was not the case in this 6♥ contract.

So we must ask where in the auction was the opportunity to discover the trump situation? Can we put the blame on declarer? His trumps look good enough. Is it then wrong for the responder to react so emphatically with Qxxx when QJxx would be much better? A jump to 4♦, systemic or not, takes away the bidding space needed to discover the critical situation, and RKCB is not the solution. So 4♦ can’t be right for both Qxxx and QJxx.

As Allan Graves noted, the slam might make on a happier placement of the defender’s cards, but that avoids the problem of how to bid the hands so as to extract critical information on the trump holdings. The real question is this: is this the best auction available to describe the placement of the cards as held by the declaring side – an action over which the players have full control? As noted above, one might bid beautifully to a reasonable slam only to face a bad situation during the play, but that is not under one’s control. Getting there is. Let’s see the successful auction at the other table.

The purpose of the 2/1 rule (forcing to game) is to give more room below game for slam exploration. Thus Bessis was able to bid a comfortable 3♥ in a game forcing auction. Del’Monte was able to show some slam interest by an artificial 3NT bid that limited his hand while promising a spade control. The pair exchanged cue-bids then decided indirectly that their trump suit lacked inner strength. This is what we may term ‘psychological’ bidding, in which each partner has a chance to show enthusiasm by evoking RKCB. Bessis in the end didn’t value his good spade holding above his poor heart support. Good judgement in support of good practice gained 13 IMPs on the board.

When it appears to be merely a question of being in game or not, there is less need to exchange information. If the bidding were in Precision-style where the opening bid was limited to at most 15 HCP, it might go 1♠ – 2♣; 2♥ – 4♥. Responder has shown a club suit and 4 hearts, enough to gamble out a game on the chance that opener won’t lose 3 tricks in the trump suit. He would consider himself unlucky either to go down in game or to make slam, either of which is possible, both of which are unlikely.

Players who bid this way using standard methods don’t generally win the long contests. These types, often referred to as ‘good rubber bridge players’, have enough savvy to clobber the suckers, but don’t prevail against those who can control their own destinies within the limitations chance allows. The less control one exerts over the auction, the more one relies on the benefits of uncertainty.

During the recent PGA tournament, the commentator referred to Tiger Woods unflatteringly as a ‘control freak’. Tiger was spending considerable time before making his shot to the green, and stepped away from the ball when a gust of wind came up. Tiger, it seems, doesn’t like to shoot into the breeze which introduces an extra random element into the game. A bad player might think, as he hacks away without hesitation, ‘what-the-hell, the wind might straighten out my slice’. It might, but a player who has his game under control wants to minimize the element of chance. In practice, the trick is to control what you can, play aggressively, and calmly leave the rest to chance.

Unlike golf, bridge is a game where the opponents may purposefully introduce randomness and uncertainty. The more random the environment, the cruder the methods, and the more reliance must be placed upon normal likelihood. The winning strategy tends towards one of caution. Nonetheless, competitive auctions can still be approached with the same eye towards control, but the process is more complex, therefore, more interesting, at least for the players involved. Spectators may quickly tire of watching purely random swings from one side to the other. It would be like watching a series of meaningless scoreboard racing events as often seen during a late inning break.

The A Posteriori Par

March 12th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

Often one reads references to the ‘par result’, which is the optimum result obtainable when one can see all four hands. The bidding is not part of the calculation which depends only on the lie of the cards. There is also a practical par which derives from actual play after the opening lead is made and dummy appears. One might term this the a posteriori or conditional par. The odds have changed from the a priori values and the optimum result may have changed as well. That is what counts and what we must play for.

Imagine you are a pro playing in a PGA event. Your ball is on the edge of the green with the hole located 30’ away on a dangerous downward slope. Lying 2, the task before you is to get the ball in the hole with 2 putts. This is true whether you are playing a par 5 hole or a par 3 hole. On a par 5 hole it would be wrong to think, ‘I mustn’t putt too hard and overshoot the hole’ – that might lead to a cautious 3-putt and a lost opportunity.  On a par 3 hole it would be wrong to think, ‘I need this putt to make up for my error’ – that might lead to ending up on the fringe at the far side. In short, one has to put aside the idea of an a priori optimum result and deal with the real and present situation as best you can.

Everyone realizes they should take advantage of the favorable situations that arise, but not everyone knows that we have to play for the conditional par in what may appear to be an unfavorable circumstance. I know that is true because I am one of those who tend to get disheartened when it appears they may have missed a chance at the theoretical optimum result. My most costly errors come at that time. This is a bad habit, for one’s score depends not on the par result but on what the field can achieve under the limitation of uncertainty. Here is a recent example where my false assumption cost us a tie for first place in the final standings.

Dealer: West Vul: All	North ♠   987632 ♥   8 ♦   K6 ♣   J832
West ♠   J5 ♥   T963 ♦   T854 ♣   AQT		East ♠   AKT ♥   KJ ♦   A9732 ♣   K54
	South ♠   Q4 ♥   AQ7542 ♦   QJ ♣   QJT

It was with great foreboding that I opened one of a minor with 18 HCP. This seldom works for me when I play 2/1 methods, so I began with negative thoughts, always a bad start. The lead was the ♥5, and when dummy appeared I could see that we had misbid this hand badly. Surely all Wests would raise to 2♦ over the 1♥ overcall and East would bid 3NT with a better than sporting chance of making it. So it looked like a bottom score unless 3NT went down on an absolutely filthy break in diamonds.  Continuing to think negatively, I led a second heart to set up the ♥T in dummy, and achieved my objective, +120 on a sequence too painful to recall, must less to admit to. That is what comes from reading too many bridge books where a perfect double dummy result magically appears when one flips the page.

This 120 was a clear bottom. Only one pair reached 3NT, and that declarer made only 9 tricks. If I had kept my cool, I could have made 11 tricks to achieve a score of 10 out of 12. It is safe enough to go to dummy and lead a diamond, ducking on the unlikely event of North playing the ♦K. When North gets in with the ♦K on the second round of diamonds, he has no heart to return. I avoid the spade finesse, and the ♠Q falls in the end giving me 11 tricks in a contract of 1NT. What would be a disaster in theory, in practice would be a good result that was there for the taking on a simple line of play.

When the dummy appeared, I could judge only on the evidence at hand. Even if I had opened a Precision 1♣, there is no guarantee that we would have reached the theoretical par contract. This combination is better bid using 2/1 methods, given that South will bid as she did, but at other tables South may have preempted 2♥ making it more difficult to reach 3NT. The point to remember is that seeing the dummy I could judge accurately the a priori par result, but I was unable to judge accurately the conditional par result which depended on the bidding at the other tables.

There is another par contract to be considered at matchpoints, which is the most frequent contract achieved by the field. I call this the mode contract. Arriving at this contract is the objective of many players. They feel they can outplay their opponents so by this means they will gain on a majority of the hands. In a good field the mode contract may yield the a priori par much of the time, but in a poor field with few tables the two may not match that often. Accurate defence against a normal contract may condemn a declarer to a below average score. Against the weaker elements it is better to overbid to a high scoring contract and hope for a poor defence, just as one does in a team game.

Ensuring a Bad Result
At matchpoints, playing safe is like taking out life insurance: someone else ends up the benefits. Most of the time it pays to adopt an aggressive attitude and focus on what can go right. You might say that fortune favors fools. Here is an example where I took out some insurance, and the opponents collected the matchpoints.

The AKQ in hearts were a bad placement for half of my 18 HCP, and the 4333 shape further reduced my expectations, so I decided to open 1NT (15 -17 HCP), something an expert would never do. When dummy appeared, I formed a plan, which at our club mostly entails lining up the finesses and arranging to take them in the proper order. I saw that optimistic bidding might have led to 3NT which appeared to have good chances of coming home if the diamonds were favorably located. With a silent curse, I won the ♠Q with my ace and led a diamond towards the dummy hoping for a revealing honor – and I got it, the ♦K! How should I have proceeded from there?

The average player might think to finesse twice in clubs assuming that the percentages favour split honours.  Not me. The appearance of the ♦K marked the LHO with 4=4=1=4 shape or, more likely, 5=3=1=4, so my LHO held 4 clubs and my RHO just 2. It was against the odds she held the ♣Q, but if she did 3NT would make on the club finesse. Pessimistically I thought of what might happen in the likely event I lost a finesse to the ♣Q: a heart would come back, and a defender could hold up on the ♣K so I would be forced into having to play disadvantageously from my hand. 

To avoid an endplay in hearts, I played off the top hearts and exited a spade hoping to force my LHO into breaking the clubs. Making 120 should score well against 3NT going down. The endplay came to pass, but unfortunately the ♣Q was doubleton on my right, so 150 was available if I had gone for it. That would have been an average score as in 3NT some were making and some were going down.

As one cannot beat any pair in 3NT making, one must concentrate at matchpoints on beating those who like oneself are playing in a part score. Although it was against the odds for the ♣Q to be onside, it was even less likely that the defenders would come up with the perfect defence I feared.  That wasn’t Bob Hamman in the red dress and earrings on my left. At matchpoints, if the tricks are there for the taking, you have to take them.  If the opponents defend perfectly, what can you do but tip your cap to them?

Virtue – a Dubious Reward
Last week my humility was given a great boost. The hands did not suit me. In one session we were on opening lead 12 times and scored above average only once, that time being when the opponents were in 2NT making 5, not a top for us as some were in 6NT off 2 aces. One hand stood out as the most interesting I have encountered in some time. Partner opened 1♦ and the RHO opponent overcalled 1♥. What is the virtuous bid with the following cards: ♠ A94 ♥ 9632 ♦ JT ♣ A975?

There are hands which are difficult to get right. One may be virtuous at the beginning but there follow too many chances to go wrong, and one bad decision in a series of choices from either side of the table may lead to an embarrassing result. It may be better to take risks that force the opponents into making the final (bad) decision than it is to bid virtuously then find your defence lets you down. One thereby reduces the problem to a single decision on which success or failure depends.

I was delighted at having been given a chance to test the theory that tells us there are moderate hands where it is best to pass early and await developments. One only gets into trouble, the theory goes, if one pretends the hand can be reconfigured to fit one of the available categories. Partner can balance if distributional, but if he passes with length in hearts you may have virtuously avoided a bad situation – a misfit hand with nowhere to go. So it came to pass, and I was on lead against 1♥. When defending at the one-level the aim can hardly be to defeat the contract, so it is not the time to pursue an active defence. Both defenders will get a chance, perhaps several, to make the correct switch…. or both players will get a chance to screw it up. Remember, partner may not expect you to have many points. What is your lead?

Dealer: South Vul: NS	North ♠   KQ5 ♥   AKT74 ♦   Q4 ♣   J32
West ♠   76 ♥   Q85 ♦   AK32 ♣   Q864		East ♠   A94 ♥   9632 ♦   JT ♣   A975
	South ♠   JT832 ♥   J ♦   98765 ♣   KT

The ♣A would have been a killing lead, but I missed that double dummy choice when I went with the passive ♦J. In the confusion that followed West did not get his spade ruff. Interestingly, West must not cover the ♥J when it is led from dummy. Still, despite very bad defence that allowed 8 tricks, we scored 5 out of 12, above average for us on the day. Most Wests failed to open on their 9-loser 11-count, leaving it to hyperactive NS to bid to a failing contract. At least we beat the sensible ones who stopped in 3♠ making 140.

At matchpoints it is not right to play for averages, so in retrospect I feel my pass was impractical. This hand was going to be tough for most pairs, so NS could do with a push in the wrong direction. A nebulous negative double might have got a 2♣ response from partner (it makes) without increasing the danger that NS would find their productive spade fit. It would also have given the defence a better chance to succeed against a higher heart contract. Which raises the question: should West balance with 2♣ after my pass? The problem there is that my pass with values is a rare occurrence, so West does not relish giving North a second chance. And what of South’s timid pass which allowed no opportunity to improve the contract? So there you have it, contracts at the 1-level are often the most interesting as there are critical choices to be made all ‘round the table.

The Guessing Game

March 5th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

In a constructive auction one strives for accuracy by exchanging precise information with one’s partner. There is value in accuracy when the hand belongs to your side. It can be a different matter when the auction becomes competitive. If it is a battle for part score, or an attempt to steal a game, there is value to be got from uncertainty. This applies to both sides. Some bids are what may be termed two-way bids, representing either good sacrifices or possible makes. Part of the mix are ‘negative’ doubles – calls that represent a wide variety of conditions dependent on the previous actions.  Let’s look at one such auction that occurred last week at our club to illustrate the extremes which can be reached.

Partner opens 1♠, nonvulnerable versus vulnerable, the RHO doubles, and you have to find a bid with fine support the spade suit: ♠ AQ94 ♥ QJ3 ♦ 54 ♣ T984 – 8 losers. What is your bid?  Does it help if I tell you that in theory they can make 3♦ and your side can make 2♠?  Without interference I have an easy 3♠ limit raise showing 8-10 HCP, 4 spades and 8 losers, a perfect description of my hand under our rules, however, after interference can we be sure that the same rule applies? Is the proper bid 2NT, showing a limit raise, leaving 3♠ to show a weaker hand? That would enable the LHO to bid her minor after which I would have to bid again giving them a second chance. I ‘solved’ this problem by bidding 4♠ on the assumption that even down 2 would be better than letting them play in 3 of a minor, making 110. Here are all 4 hands.

Dealer: West Vul: NS	North ♠   K6 ♥   T9864 ♦   KQ972 ♣   A
West ♠   JT8752 ♥   AK ♦   T63 ♣   K6		East ♠   AQ94 ♥   QJ3 ♦   54 ♣   T984
	South ♠   3 ♥   752 ♦   AJ8 ♣   QJ7532

Against 4♠ North led the ♣A, South signaling with the ♣7. Perhaps thinking this might have suit preference implications, he switched to the ♥T. This provided declarer with a diamond pitch after he took the necessary spade finesse. This woeful performance was repeated at 4 of 13 tables. Putting 4♠ down 2, or 1 doubled, would have been a top shared with just 1 pair. Now let’s look at how the auction might have proceeded in a reasonable manner when East cautiously bids what his hand is worth.

In this setting South has enough to push in clubs, and North corrects to 3♦. His negative double methods allows for the possibility of an Equal Level Conversion. In other words, his negative double does not fit the normal requirements. If the opponents are fooled, so much the better. East can bid 3♠ showing signs of reluctantly taking the push.  Now if North can get the defence right, down 1, even undoubled, will result in a good score for NS ( 9 out of 12). He leads the ♣A and South signals for a diamond switch. The ELC auction has told the story, and the chance of getting the defence right has been greatly improved. Only one EW pair made 140 (♣A, ♦K, ♦A and a club ruff?)

We conclude from the results that the auctions were not informative enough for NS to prevail.  East players who try to bid accurately 2♠ then 3♠ are going to be punished, so most, but not all, players have learned not to bid in this pathetic manner. My 4♠ was a bit much, but my partner kindly commented that if I had bid 3♠, he would raise regardless of what 3♠ was supposed to convey. This is what I mean by a two-way bid: either it is a good save or it makes. By giving away less information, we improve our chances. Another way of getting a good score is if South over-reacts and bids 5♣ on the assumption that North for his double must hold 4+clubs. She knew her partner well enough not to attempt that.

Here is an example where the negative double can do damage to both sides.

Dealer: West Vul: NS	North ♠   J ♥   AQ93 ♦   J6 ♣   AKJ976
West ♠   AQ987 ♥   — ♦   A7532 ♣   853		East ♠   K ♥   T762 ♦   KT94 ♣   QT42
	South ♠   T65432 ♥   KJ854 ♦   Q8 ♣   —

I don’t like doubling on a bad 4-card major, but here it had the effect of keeping NS out of their heart fit; NS can make 140 in 3♥ and one made 620. Going down 1 was worth an average score. I had my chance to double for penalty when North, an aggressive type, raised himself unilaterally to 3♣. This is the situation where a penalty double can really pay off. There is a danger though: if South, seeing that 3♥ can hardly be worse, bids it, all will be well for NS. In practice my best tactic was to pass, and hope partner will allow us to defend. Scoring 300 in 3♣ undoubled will be a tied top. A balancing double is not advisable with the West hand – he knows they have a better heart fit. On the other hand if South takes out my double to 3♥, we can always get to diamonds at the 4-level and still make the same average score that we achieved without having any chance at doubling for a huge score. At IMPs scoring I think East should double and live with the consequences.

The point here is that if the opponents are in a bad contract, it may not be necessary to double for penalty allowing for an escape to a better spot. We often see writers adopt an attitude that one must punish the opponents severely in order to achieve a big swing on the board, but that is an approach that applies more to Teams than Matchpoints, and even then it may not be the best strategy. One example of this approach is the penalty double applied to overcalls of 1NT. It must produce a big swing occasionally, or players wouldn’t still be using it, but I can’t remember many occasions where it has worked either for or against me. One thing appears certain: it doesn’t deter players from making silly bids against 1NT, so the occasions for penalties are there, but they are not accessible with the double-for-penalty approach.

A better approach is the negative double after 1NT is overcalled. A player passes the overcall with values in that suit, but doubles negatively when he can expect partner to pass or double cooperatively any escape. Strictly on the basis of frequency, negative doubles are superior. Of course, if you can’t double for penalty and partner passes, your side may have missed a big score, but the loss is only a potential loss; on the actual result there may be a small swing either way – annoying but not critical.

Marshall Miles has some ideas on the subject of doubles of overcalls of 1NT, which he expressed in his work, Bridge at the Top, Book 1. After Partner’s 1NT is overcalled with 2♥, he suggests one should double on this hand: ♠ K42 ♥ Q97 ♦ K54 ♣ 8432.  One can classify this double as one showing cards, but less than the normal requirement for insisting on game, and flat with 7-9 HCP. Miles calls this an ‘optional penalty double’. I don’t like it, as it risks a game swing against a part score. There is no evidence here that the overcaller is in real trouble. It would be better to double with ♠ K432 ♥ 97 ♦ K54 ♣ 8432. Opener can pull to either black suit, but if he wants to pass for penalty there is scope for that option: ♠ A76 ♥ KJ84 ♦ AJ2 ♣ Q65,  a 7=6=6=7 division of sides. Opener can rely on there not being an 8-card fit in spades. We would not double on this hand with a suit worthless for defence: ♠ K43 ♥ 97 ♦ KQ3 ♣ 87432, a 6=6=6=8 division. One other point: if responder has a fistful of hearts, it may not be a tragedy to play in 2♥ undoubled when there is no game available, although it could be an opportunity missed.

There are now many popular methods of entering the auction over 1NT, and players do so with little fear or reservation. They prefer methods that introduce uncertainty, so lack specificity. DONT is one such method: showing the suit named, and a higher suit. With 2♣ there are 3 unknown suits, with 2♦ there are 2 unknown suits, so a negative double will be much more frequent than a penalty double in these cases. Also, some play that 2♣ shows ‘a single-suited hand’, which is a misdescription, as I have seen it bid with 5-4-3-1 shape. Nonetheless one doesn’t want to double 2♣ to show clubs, as this is premature – you’d rather double 3♣, wouldn’t you? So on some hands you can afford to pass and await developments, but with others it is better to double negatively, saying ‘I can’t double clubs, but I may be able to double another suit or support it, as the case may be.’

A defect of methods that require advancer to bid is that responder gets 2 chances to bid –  he can always pass and await developments being pretty well assured of a second chance to make his presence felt. One of the most dangerous situations for the overcaller is when he has a good hand, as in the following deal from a computer test of Lebensohl.

Dealer: North Vul: None	North ♠   AK ♥   KT65 ♦   QJ94 ♣   K96
West ♠   QJ532 ♥   943 ♦   8 ♣   7542		East ♠   T7 ♥   A8 ♦   AT7652 ♣   A83
	South ♠   9864 ♥   QJ72 ♦   K3 ♣   QJT

East has a fine hand for offense, so wants to get into the auction and stir the pot with a vague 2♣ ‘one-suited’ overcall. If South makes a negative double, West can pass to show tolerance for clubs and await developments. Opener may then bid 2♥, for a mediocre result. In such an auction the overcalling side has gained an advantage from the opening sides’ bidding. In the beginning South had the advantage, because he knows more about his partner’s hand than West knows of his partner’s hand.

If South has the patience to pass, West is obliged to bid 2♦ as his side may have a major suit fit. Over 2♦ South comes into the auction with a balancing double, and he doesn’t much care what North does at this point. North passes as there is no indication of a good heart fit – South might have doubled initially with a good offensive hand with the majors. The delayed double indicates values in clubs. The result of a pass is that East goes down 3 for a very bad score, and the defence can hardly go wrong. If West takes out to 2♠, he escapes for down 2, but there is also the possibility that North will now bid 3NT and make that. East would have done better to pass initially and defend a normal 2♥, making 3. If after East’s 2♣ bid, NS merely end up in 2♥, they have not taken advantage of a favorable situation which should have become evident from the competitive auction. The blame for that should rest largely with South.

Short Suit Leads

February 16th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

I blame television for the current epidemic of lying and deceit that has swept through our bridge club like a run of the latest ‘flu. The bids and plays have largely become emotionally motivated and erratic rather than coolly reasoned and structured, as they should be. What can one expect when most seniors have spent decades in front of the screen exposed to ads that appeal to our baser instincts? TV has got to the stage where the importance of the manipulative ads far outweighs the importance of the events on display. Game conditions have become irrelevant – a World Series played in a blizzard, a Stanley Cup final played in sweltering heat? You know it’s more that just a possibility. Stadiums are named after companies, and in future we may hear home-team fans cry ‘let’s go Weyerhaeuser Paper Products!’, or even, ‘Come on China Ploughshares.’

The ACBL should get on board and name the Nationals after sponsors’ products. How about the Amazon Dot Com Series or the Wells Fargo Games? Furthermore, we have to emphasize the Battle of the Sexes angle and arrange to have teams with names like the Purina Sexy Chicks and the Gillette Big Boys face each other in the finals. No more of this Cayne versus Nickell stuff! Games would be pre-recorded and shortened for TV viewing without the boring pauses for thought. I suggest hiring Nora Ephron as a witty and lively commentator, and Gore Vidal as special guest star to recall at half time the foibles of the famous during the golden age of Eisenhower, an avid bridge player, praised by Nixon as being ‘far more complex and devious than most people realized.’ After each big play participants would be called aside to describe their emotions: ‘I just said a itty-bitty prayer that the jack was onside, and the good lord took a likin’ to me’ or some other rot equally appealing to the masses. Before long we might see a handsome, clean shaven Justin Lall demanding a fee of $5 million per appearance, and getting it.

A Ju-jitsu Move
Bridge is a game of uncertainty. Before the action begins we have expectations based on the probable distribution of the cards as dealt. As the action proceeds, we obtain information that reduces the uncertainty. The information transmitted by the choice of the opening lead is of primary importance as it will be used by declarer in his planning, so if the lead is in some way deceptive he may start off in the wrong direction. Ideally a deceptive opening lead should mislead declarer to a greater degree than partner, who is also forming a plan. We begin a case where a short suit lead didn’t have this quality.

The principle of ju-jitsu combat is that one attempts to turn an opponent’s force against him. Similarly, if one is playing against a partnership known for their dubious actions, one plays on the resulting uncertainty felt within the partnership. Here is the situation.

As the reader may have noted, I ‘up-graded’ my 14 HCP to 15+ HCP. I am not a great believer in the 4-3-2-1 point count. The hand contains 5 control points, an equivalent far in excess of 15 ‘normal’ points. In fact, I was reluctant to pass the invitational 2NT, and when the dummy appeared with a 5-card minor, I feared we may have underbid this one.

On the bidding a major suit lead would be routine, but it was a surprising ♦T. A straightforward line was available: win the ♦J in dummy, play off the clubs and lead towards the spade tenace. This is flawed as one may end up in one’s hand eventually forced to break hearts, so the lead could prove a bit awkward. As the LHO had a history of making deceptive leads, an alternative plan came to mind: accept the inevitable and immediately lead a second diamond myself to see what happens. The ♦Q held!  Now I ran the clubs to apply the pressure and South discarded a diamond winner from an original holding of ♦98764. She had been taken in by her partner’s lead from ♦AT9. On a normal lead of a spade from ♠8652 I would have had to do some pretty good guessing to make 9 tricks. As it transpired the opponents had to do the guessing, and my +150 was worth 70%. This time deception for its own sake backfired. It works best when it is not merely habitual but has a plan behind it.

The Importance of Timing
In his article in February issue of the Bridge World, August Boehm, whom I greatly admire, advocated that a defender should adopt an attitude of ‘doing no harm’. Some interpret such advice as ‘do nothing’, which is wrong. Many sacrifice good timing in the name of safety. Boehm also notes, late in his essay, ‘to win tournaments one must take advantage of errors.’ I would carry this idea further and say that to win often a defender must create situations in which a declarer is most likely to make an error. Here is recent personal success story to illustrate the point.

Dealer: South Vul: None	North ♠   AJ98742 ♥   73 ♦   AQT2 ♣   —
West ♠   QT5 ♥   KJ854 ♦   K5 ♣   Q97		East ♠   8 ♥   6 ♦   J9643 ♣   AT8432
	South ♠   K3 ♥   AQT92 ♦   87 ♣   KJ65

The bidding was, shall we say ‘inelegant’, but it got the job done with South capable of taking 11 tricks in her optimum contract. The bidding forced Rob into choosing a short suit lead, the ♣7. I won the ♣A and switched to the ♦4 towards the double tenace in dummy in the hope of upsetting the timing. Rob put up the ♦K won by the ♦A in dummy. Perhaps thinking that 2 chances are better than 1, declarer played off the ♠K and ♠A, hoping for a 2-2 split. If the spades had split 2-2 she would have had 11 easy tricks, and maybe one more on a triple squeeze. Failing that intriguing possibility, she fell back on the tried and true method of finessing for tricks. The ♥T, lost to the ♥J. Rob returned the ♦5, declarer putting in the ♦T, losing to the ♦J. A club came back, the ♣J losing to the ♣Q. The ♠Q was cashed and a club returned to declarer’s ♣K. We still had a heart winner waiting in the wings, so in all we took 4 tricks more than our due: 2 clubs, 2 hearts, a spade, and a diamond for down 2. Declarer’s play was inelegant, but this was matchpoints where one error sometimes snowballs when declarer tries to recover from an early, costly misjudgement.

‘I decided to stay out of the auction this time,’ said Rob, normally an aggressive bidder.
‘Judging from the result,’ I replied, ‘you should try that more often.’

This amusing result shows that declarers do possess daemons and that it is our job as defenders to give those daemons full reign to create havoc. The potential of my diamond return was easy enough to recognize with the dummy in full view. It is more difficult to achieve when one is faced with making an opening lead, nonetheless, one may form a picture of the full deal based on the information provided by the bidding, and act accordingly, sometimes achieving a double dummy defence. This is rare. A more modest and realistic aim is simply to create a problem for declarer, as in the next example.

Creating a Problem
In a recent ACBL Bridge Bulletin Mike Lawrence was at pains to show that a lead from KJxx against a suit contract can be the logical choice. I agree with Lawrence: in the absence of a clear choice, one first chooses the suit, then chooses which card to lead.

The passive approach is to lead a trump and leave it up to declarer to make his way unaided by any impetuous action on our part. The diamonds will be held in check, and in the fullness of time one may hope to score the kings separately, the chance of being endplayed appearing remote. The alternative approach is to lead away from a king and hope for the best – just the sort of action that August Boehm has warned us against. First we count our points and calculate what can be expected from partner. He should have about 8 HCP, enough for an ace and some stuffing in a side suit. Inspired by Lawrence’s article I went even further. Deciding that hearts were most likely to be partner’s best suit, I chose the ♥7, not wanting to be too encouraging in that direction. Normally I would be leading through strength in the dummy. Here is the full deal.

Dealer: South Vul: None	North ♠   A95 ♥   AQT6 ♦   8 ♣   T5432
West ♠   T87 ♥   K73 ♦   T542 ♣   K86		East ♠   42 ♥   J942 ♦   A763 ♣   Q97
	South ♠   KQJ63 ♥   85 ♦   KQJ9 ♣   AJ

As far as the bidding goes, the situation was as expected: declarer had bid spades and diamonds and in those 2 suits sat the most of his points. Dummy held hearts in depth. I am not sure what declarer made of the heart lead; maybe he thought I was more likely to underlead a jack than a king as he played the ten losing to partner’s jack. A club came back and we were able to take 3 tricks on defence for a 75% score. One may say this was unduly lucky, but declarer was under pressure on the opening lead and got it wrong. If one doesn’t create a problem one is depending on declarer’s getting it wrong all by himself, but it is natural for him if left to his own devices to finesse with the ♥Q. One further note: with the ♥KJ7 to lead a heart under these circumstances would be ineffective as declarer could hardly go wrong and it is likely to cost a trick. Less can be more when partner is there to make up for a deficiency.

Solving a Problem
Given my penchant for short-suit leads, I was surprised at my irritation when my partner tried the same thing by leading the ♠J on the following deal, and failed.

Deep Finesse tells us no lead beats 3NT. This does not mean that the choice of lead is immaterial. Very often when the lead doesn’t matter in theory, it does in practice. I have never had any luck with speculative spade leads – the opponents might have explored more extensively with worries in that direction, and with 10 HCP or so partner made no move over 1♥ when he might have with a good spade suit. The ♠J lead gives up 3 tricks in spades on a routine holdup play (♠A743 opposite ♠K65) and, worse yet, gives declarer a tempo. When spades were continued futilely, declarer, who had started with just 6 tricks, had no problem in setting up 2 tricks in the minors and safely finessing in hearts. Giving up 9 tricks was worth a lowly 20% so some declarers didn’t have the contract handed them on a plate. I imagine they received a normal heart lead, and I see no reason for rejecting it.

On lead myself I wouldn’t expect to develop tricks in hearts, so with deception as my aim I would choose the ♥8 trying to look like someone trying not to give away a trick by leading through strength. (Dummy held ♥KQT6.) This may not fool declarer but is unlikely to give away something that declarer can’t get for himself. With partner holding some high cards declarer has work to do as my queens and jacks and tens are going to make it awkward enough for him.

In conclusion, we can agree with August Boehm while at the same time disagreeing. Be flexible, I say. When conditions call for it, go active. I have made many bad leads, but not every one of them has cost tricks, and many have gained in unexpected ways. The point is that we go with a plan based on the probable distribution of the cards as revealed by the bidding. Partner is aware of the implications of the bidding and should adjust his expectations accordingly. A lead that does not conform to those expectations must be given special attention. We try to please partner and create problems for declarer.

January 30th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Thomas Jefferson, the second richest president in US history and a slave owner, declared that all men are born equal and have an unalienable right to pursue happiness. What happens next is less certain. We know now that what his pen proclaimed publicly his penis applied privately through many an undiscriminating congress. The Jeffersonian paradox pretty well summarizes the current conflicted state of the union where the super rich can chase after pleasure in private jets while most citizens are stuck in the slow lane of a happiness highway that is greatly standin’ in the need of repair. Before the South Carolina primary I hadn’t realized that for powerful fat cats there are loopholes even in the Ten Commandments. Not being a great believer in elections I recall that Pontius Pilate called a snap election and Barabbas won it hands down. Let’s face it, even today slogans like ‘drive out the moneylenders’, ‘turn the other cheek’, and ‘render unto Caesar’ are not likely to garner many votes.

Call me a Socialist, but, as an individualist, I believe bridge partners were put on this earth to lend a helping hand in times of greatest need. To paraphrase Barack Obama, who is sounding more and more like a late entry into the GOP race, a partner is there only to do what a player cannot do for himself. They fulfill their responsibilities by providing trustworthy information through their bids and defensive signals. Exchanges of information may at times prove costly, but, as with the maintenance of a middle class through the education of its Youth, the short term costs are outweighed by the long term benefits. Good habits learned early pay off, whereas undisciplined behavior never produces lasting progress. So it is not a matter of humanistic principle, it is a matter of self-interest that principally drives such expenditures.

Let’s illustrate the current state of partnerships with some hands recently played at my local club. As North in fourth seat, both vulnerable, you hold this hand: ♠ AKT42 ♥ 8 ♦ Q74 ♣ K632. What would you bid after the sequence in front of you of 1♥ – Dbl – 1♠ ? What is your aim? Here was the full bidding sequence as it occurred and what North saw when the dummy appeared. It was obvious that something had gone horribly wrong.

NS had missed bidding a grand slam in any of 3 strains. The director was soon called and it transpired that my partner had bid 1♠ (and later bid 3♥!) on the following collection:  ♠ Q8 ♥ JT7542 ♦ 932  ♣ 84. This constituted what I would classify as an Obligatory Psych. If a famous sponsor bid that way, it might be termed ‘fanciful’ and if a great player did so, based on the final result it might be termed ‘brilliant’.

The interesting point about the hand is that North, an experienced player, never caught on and felt aggrieved. In my view, the reason this fake bid succeeded is that North could not trust her partner’s takeout double. In the old days a double of 1♠ was devoted to revealing the classical psych of this kind, but today one cannot rely on the nature of partner’s initial takeout double. Indeed, South’s double doesn’t appeal to me with all the points in the minors. Nonetheless an advance of 3♣ doesn’t get the job done with 2 cue bids available to show immediately the strength of the hand. Aren’t 12 HCP enough?

On different day I became the innocent victim of my own naivety with regard to takeout doubles. I opened 1♦ on ♠ KT5  ♥ KQ3 ♦ KQJT52 ♣ 8, overcalled with 1♥ on my left. Partner doubled, RHO passed and I was called upon to find a second bid. Your choice?

On the assumption that partner had shown the black suits by his double, I thought 1NT would play well, but I was wrong. The LHO led a club and the opponents ran off 5 club tricks, holding me to +90, when +130 was available in a diamond contract. Partner felt his double promised 4 spades and nothing else. It was a case of diminished responsibility – I was the one who was promising a club stopper along with a heart stopper. I myself with his hand would have bid 2♦ over 1NT. Why? Because if the opening bidder has a minimal flat hand with a club stopper and a heart stopper, where are the tricks to come from? Generally, holding aces I tend to opt for suit contracts – here anticipating spade ruffs in declarer’s hand and club ruffs in mine. Also note the ♥A with a heart stopper opposite should give rise to suspicions concerning the quality of the overcaller’s suit.

As with politicians, when my partners tell me something I want to believe them, even though I may have serious doubts. Here is a case where my partner didn’t follow that rule.

When the LHO opened 1♦ in 3rd seat it was obvious to me that her points lay elsewhere. A double followed by a NT bid shows my type of hand. The opponents kept bidding going, but that didn’t deter me in my quest for perfection. The remedy to overly active bidding on worthless suits is to place the contract in NT. Partner had other ideas. 2♣ was fair warning and would have made, but not 3♣. My feeling is that once you have warned partner and he persists, you should accept his decision, especially when you hold 3 HCP and he holds 19 HCP –  yet another example of where it is best to let the strong hand decide. Chances are partner heard you the first time. Another point: those 3 HCP are not in clubs, they are in spades where they are bound to be useful in a NT contract.

Similarly if one has adequately described one’s holding and asked partner to make a choice, stand by that choice. In other words, don’t second guess without just cause.

Partner made a nice balancing double, and should have passed 3♥, the optimum contract, as he had not promised any better hearts than what he had. 4♥ going down was a bottom.

So far we have shown examples that point to the fact that the trusting one’s partner should be, but isn’t, the cornerstone of today’s game of unleashed competition. To accept fully the opponents’ bidding is akin to buying poisoned assets. Not to say we are not in the market with our own flimsy offerings (as shown above). Call it the spirit of the times, but if we are to trust anyone, we should trust our partners. Next we see where inferences can be drawn from a partner’s defensive signals.

	North ♠   Q954 ♥   K32 ♦   K82 ♣   AT2
West ♠   AT83 ♥   Q6 ♦   T97653 ♣   J

Against a contract of 3♠ West leads the ♥Q which holds the trick, East playing the ♥8 and South the ♥7. EW are employing upside-down attitude, so the ♥8 discourages a continuation of hearts. What should West lead next? East is probably void in spades, so he holds a 2-suited hand and around 10 HCP. On the evidence of one’s own length in diamonds it is more than reasonable to assume he holds clubs and hearts. He can’t want a ruff in diamonds, so he must be encouraging a club switch. That appears a good choice as West’s ♠A controls the trumps. So the ♣J it is, won by the ♣A in dummy. A spade is led to West’s ace, as, sure enough, East discards a discouraging ♣2. A heart is led to partner’s ten, and he gives a club ruff, leading ♣3 his lowest remaining club. This is a superfluous suit preference signal indicating the ♦A to make up his 10 HCP. A diamond to the ace leads to a further club ruff. That defence would yield a decent score of +200 in a field where a contract of 4 hearts was rarely reached.

Unfortunately in practice West did not pause to draw inferences from the ♥8; he continued with a heart to the ♥T and on the ♥A discarded his ♣J as South ruffed in. The ♦A provided an entry to East’s hand and 1 club ruff was obtained, but not 2. Down 1 was an average result for a mediocre play. Although one may state that defensive signals are ‘suggestions, not commands’, they are suggestions that must be taken seriously. It is worthwhile to try to fit them into the context of the action so far and judge accordingly. A Republican might say that West should have got it right without a signal, while a Democrat could argue East should have signaled extravagantly with the ♥J. It is possible they are both right.

Now we come to my most recent harrowing experience at the bridge table. It had to do with a lead out of turn. Across North America there are self-proclaimed capitals of the world – the Fruitcake Capital of the World (Claxton), the Underwear Capital of the World (Knoxville), the Bird Dog Capital of the World (Waynesboro), the Safe Capital of the World (Hamilton), and the Cherry Capital of the World (Linden) are but a few of the undisputed ones. I propose my hometown be dubbed the Lead-Out-Of-Turn Capital of the World. I have contributed my fair share, but this time I was on the receiving end.

In the third round of a Victory Points Swiss, we needed a big score to get back into contention. On the last hand of the set the opponents bid to 7NT on the following auction: 2♣ – 2♠ (3 controls); 3♥ – 3♠; 4♦ – 4NT; 5♥ – 6NT; 7NT – Pass, and it was my bid holding the following hand: ♠ J87 ♥ 6 ♦ J632 ♣ AT872. I rechecked the bidding cards. Yes, it was certain my lead of the ♣A would defeat the contract and there was no way they could escape, so I doubled with a rare smile on my lips.  Imagine my horror when I looked up from the bidding cards to see my partner reaching into his hand for an opening lead. ‘No!’ I exclaimed firmly, but this was misinterpreted as meaning, ‘No questions, go ahead and make your lead’. Here is yet another example of making your intentions as clear as possible to a sleepy partner. It seemed as if in slow motion partner’s card turned in its transition from hand to tabletop. I could see it was the ♣9. One could admire the choice but not the manner in which it was exercised.

‘Stop it!’ I screamed too late, turning heads at neighboring tables. This was clearly an infraction of the Zero Tolerance Protocol, where one is supposed to say something like, ‘thank you, partner’, even when one is appalled, however, I feel that, just as with homicides, there are justifiable exceptions. No jury would find me guilty, if I could afford a good lawyer. The director was called, and she said, ‘you all know the options, so what will it be?’ Declarer forbade the lead of a club, and I was left to choose an alternate killing lead. Could there be more than one? I chose the ♥6 and this dummy appeared.

	Dummy ♠   KQT ♥   AKQT7 ♦   AKQT4 ♣   —
Me ♠   J87 ♥   6 ♦   J632 ♣   AT872

My hopes rose when declarer took a long time before playing the ♥T, losing to partner’s ♥J. Clearly declarer had chosen the wrong option. ‘Ah,’ I thought, ‘thanks to partner’s gaffe, we are now going to put this down 2.’ Unfortunately my partner must have felt the restriction against no club lead still applied, as he returned a spade into dummy’s tenace. Declarer quickly claimed 12 tricks as he held 5 spades and the ♥9. No problem, as our teammates were in 5♥ making 11 tricks, so we gained the much needed 20 VP. What happened next is another story.

With a result like that one can see why some experienced club players advise never to bid a grand slam no matter what. So why bid 7NT? It appears to me to be mainly a problem of psychology, as a counting of controls would have revealed that a black ace was missing. Perhaps he slipped a clog with 7♦ on his mind. With such an imbalance of power, this problem would have been avoided if the strong hand had methods by which he could maintain control of the auction, determine the lie of the cards, and make the final decision. The control response was a good beginning, but the clash of wills in the cooperative setting that followed led to an avoidable conflict over which player would make the final decision.

PS  I awoke this morning to hear that one of the GOP candidates has suggested putting an American colony on the moon within the next 12 years. This is not as crazy as it seems on first hearing. It is a Utopian proposal for the fulfillment of American Dream, a high-tech version of Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, as it were, only this time there are no indigenous populations standing in the way of progress and immigration can be more tightly controlled. Wall Street reacted favorably. The moon colony provides an answer to the difficult question of where to move to after Florida runs out of real estate. As with the Internet the US government would cover the development costs, so it would be a great investment opportunity for those who get in early and buy before the Chinese get their hands on it. Besides that, therein may lie the source of a breakthrough towards a Two-State Solution. All that needs be done is to persuade the Palestinians to trade peace for land on the dark side of the moon, which, I am told, closely resembles large tracts of the Gaza Strip during a blackout. Of course, water and mineral rights and right of access thereto would be retained by the USA and its allies, as reasonably one can’t be expected to give up something so valuable and get absolutely nothing in return.

When Silence is Golden

January 20th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Recently my wife has been experiencing times when she can’t find her glasses, or forgets where she parked her car, or even why she has wandered into the bedroom in the middle of the afternoon.
 ‘What can I do to slow the aging process?’ she asked her doctor.
’Take up bridge,’ was the quick answer.
‘Oh, no! I won’t do that,’ she replied, ‘my husband has been complaining to me about bridge for 30 years and I don’t think it is something I would like to do.’

Fortunately there are many older ladies who have heeded their doctor’s advice and play a remedial game in the afternoons. Their participation has kept the game alive in my area. Naturally the best strategy against a pair of forgetful foes is not the same strategy one would employ against Meckwell. Mostly it pays to follow Jeff Rubens’ advice to try not to lose and leave it to others to hand over top scores. The pairs with the most plus scores have a good chance of coming out on top. Here is hand where my partner of the day scored a top by passing throughout where others found a bid or two along the way.

Dealer: West Vul: EW	Bonnie ♠   KJ54 ♥   KT8643 ♦   T ♣   94
Me ♠   AT962 ♥   Q ♦   AQ2 ♣   QJT8		Eustace ♠   3 ♥   AJ95 ♦   9643 ♣   K532
	Clyde ♠   Q87 ♥   72 ♦   KJ875 ♣   A76

The reader may criticize my doubles, but one must make an extra effort to prod a partner who occupies a warm seat beside the window on a sunny afternoon. I don’t make excuses, but note that EW can make 3NT. However, it is not about me but about Eustace who was the main architect of our top score of 12 out of 12. The opponents voiced their indignation at the result (-300), but as Eustace explained, ‘what was I supposed to do with 4-4-4-1 and no fit for spades?’ If a good result is proof of wisdom, he was wise.
That being said, there are players, who want to bid on every hand regardless of the merits of their holdings. They imitate today’s experts, and do especially well when timid opponents do not take advantage of the information on offer for free. There are women, grandmothers all, amongst the crowd who are willing by nature to risk everything on one call; these are the Lady Macbeths of our club. One is led to wonder how they spent their youth. The trick is not to give their bidding too much credence; they are not bidding as you or I or Stephen Hawking would have bid the hands, but they are not totally insane, either. Here are 2 hands from the local club where bad bidding gave declarer the clues needed to score tops. We shall present them in the form of a short quiz. Here is Problem 1. The lead is ♠2 to the ♠K. Do you see a reasonable approach to scoring 13 tricks?

Problem 2   Assume you open 1♣ playing Precision and reach 3NT as shown.

Many players are taught to preempt wildly over a Precision 1♣, but the attempt often backfires, as it did on this occasion. A low heart was led to my ♥Q, the RHO following disgustedly with the ♥8. You have been forced into 3NT when the field is most likely to be playing in 4♠. Hearts are split 6-1, so 4♠ may be defeated, but your aim is to make 10 tricks to beat any who score 420. Can you see a reasonable way to make 10 tricks? Hint: the preemptress is expected to hold the ♠A.

Problem 1 The bidding has marked the RHO with 5 spades and an ace; otherwise he hasn’t got a raise to 2♠. Because the LHO doubled for the majors, it is reasonable to assume she holds the ♥A and is short in diamonds. It is safe to get rid of the hearts in dummy by taking a ruffing finesse in spades, then drawing a round of trumps with the♦K and passing the ♣K for a ruffing finesse in the other direction. Fun!

I played the hand in a desultory fashion and took just 12 tricks, but then I was in 4♦ only.
Eustace broke his customary silence by opening 1♣ in first seat, and then fell into his old ways by passing with ♦KJxx in support. I suppose he was worried that if he bid 5♦, I would be sure to bid 6♦, and I would have done so, as taking 3NT out to 5♦ is not good matchpoint strategy. This is another case where if one opens light, one has to keep the faith that the hand is worthy of that initial assessment. By the way, only 1 pair out of 13 reached slam, 3NT being the contract of choice despite the 2 voids shown below.

Dealer: North Vul: None	Eustace ♠   — ♥   T72 ♦   KJ62 ♣   KQJT76
Lady M ♠   Q762 ♥   AJ95 ♦   3 ♣   9432		Banquo ♠   K8543 ♥   43 ♦   T94 ♣   A85
	Bob ♠   AJT9 ♥   KQ86 ♦   AQ875 ♣   —

Problem 2 The opening lead away from the ♥KJ indicates that the LHO has an entry just in case partner comes up with the ♥Q. It appears most likely she holds the ♠A, but she could hold the ♦K. To be safe, declarer can play the ♠Q hoping for a duck, but the LHO grabs her ace and continues with a second heart on which the now gloomy deuterogamist discards a club. Declarer clears away the ♣A and finesses in diamonds losing to the ♦K. A club comes back and the clubs are played to the following ending:

Dealer: South Vul: NS	Dummy ♠   T6 ♥   — ♦   A9 ♣   —
Kate ♠   — ♥   95 ♦   32 ♣   —		Petruchio ♠   J8 ♥   — ♦   K8 ♣   —
	Bob ♠   K7 ♥   — ♦   T3 ♣   —

A spade to the ♠K and a spade exit assures 10 tricks even if ‘Kate’ has been very naughty and holds the ♦Q as well. All other pairs were in 4♠, and more than half were going down, so once more a bad preempt led to a bad result. Yes, an opening diamond lead would have been best, but wild bidders are usually not great guesses: their minds don’t adapt well to the requirements of a passive defense.

Finally a problem for a defender who is in desperate straits when an Iron Lady stretches to a game that must be defeated. It is a situation where the matchpoint strategy matches the IMP strategy since letting declarer make her game results in a bottom score.

Problem 3 The 2♣ bid was 11-15 HCP with a club suit, The ♣2 is led and West (you) go up with the ♣A, dropping the ♣K from declarer. Partner can’t have much in the way of high card controls, but he might have 5 spades. Which free finesse do you choose to provide? A low club won’t fool her as that is one of her favorite ploys, a diamond looks equally dangerous, and a low heart risks losing to the ♥J in declarer’s hand.

Thinking of the problem in another way, how might West promote an extra trick in trumps? A tentative count of declarer’s hand places her with 5 spades, 3 hearts, 4 diamonds to the ♦A, and a singleton ♣K. (With 5-4 in the majors she might have given South a choice.) It may appear strange at first glace, but the only return to defeat 4♠ is a diamond. The ♦J wins, declarer cashes the ♠A getting the bad news, then leads the ♦J. West ducks this allowing partner to ruff the third round of diamonds and to return a club forcing declarer to shorten her trumps to the same length. The full deal is shown below.

Dealer: West Vul: EW	Iron Lady ♠   J9764 ♥   J65 ♦   AT94 ♣  K
John ♠   — ♥   QT3 ♦   K732 ♣  AQT973		Bob ♠   QT532 ♥   974 ♦   85 ♣  852
	Denis ♠   AK8 ♥   AK82 ♦   QJ6 ♣  J64

More on Mistakes

January 9th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  5 Comments 

Mistakes are hard to explain, because they defy reason. Picture this scene: over half a century ago proud parents gather in a one-room schoolhouse to watch their offspring perform feats of scholarship. Little Suzie Smart in a gingham dress, her red hair in pigtails, goes to the chalkboard at the behest of the teacher and writes in a fine round hand, ‘2+2=4’. Her relatives murmur approvingly. ‘Clever as her Uncle Ned’, notes her mother, ‘he always was good at arithmetic, being a success in the grocery business and all.’  Next in line comes little Tommy Trout wearing a checked shirt and corduroy pants with a patch in the seat. He scrawls on the chalkboard, ‘2+2=6’. Those gathered gasp, and red-faced parents can offer no explanation for this unjustifiable optimism. Later at home his mother wants to blame the pretty Miss Richards, but his father differs, noting little Suzie got it right. Even if the teacher was slack, Tommy might have taken the hint. One thing is agreed, the boy should not aim for a career in banking. “I see him more as a politician’, says his father. While many can explain why Suzie thinks 2 plus 2 is 4, no one can explain why Tommy thinks it is 6. Maybe he was thinking of 3+3, but that is merely a conjecture.

When it comes to the analysis of bridge hands, many can explain successful decisions that conform to reality, but they cannot see the reasons behind bad decisions that are matched poorly to the evidence at hand. Here is a hand from the 2011 French National Championships for which we may ask the reason why a veteran French champion took the wrong view.

Dealer: East Vul: EW	Fantoni ♠   AJ82 ♥   QT2 ♦   A76 ♣   KQ5
Levy ♠   KQ6 ♥   KJ84 ♦   KJ ♣   T874		Mari ♠   T753 ♥   A9763 ♦   — ♣   AJ32
	Nunes ♠   94 ♥   5 ♦   QT985432 ♣   96

It has been said repeatedly that success begets success as money begets money (Nicholas de Chamfort 1741-1794), so it is with Fantunes who have gained a reputation as one of the most successful pairs in the world. They are fiercely competitive, but the cards lie as the cards lie, and too often they can be seen to overstep the boundary of safety – seen that is by those who can view all four hands in play. At the table it is a different matter. Can we blame Christian Mari for bidding too high on the basis of his void in diamonds? Fantoni’s 3NT could have been pure bluff, but why assume that?

The fault lies in the agreements that the veteran pair employ. Disraeli observed, ‘as a general rule the most successful man is the man who has the best information’. This is demonstrably true in warfare. (The battle of Midway, the decisive battle of the Pacific War, was won largely because the American navy had broken the Japanese code.) We adopt the observation to bridge by claiming, ‘successful bridge decisions are made mostly by those who possess the best information’. How nice it would be if Mari could double to say, ‘partner, I want to bid 5♥’, and for Levy to pass, saying, ‘no you don’t’.

Fighting Uncertainty with Uncertainty
Fantunes’ Intermediate Two Bid show 5+card suit in an, unbalanced, limited hand (10-13 HCP). This agreement takes away a level of bidding available to players employing a natural bidding system. That has to be disadvantageous when partner holds a hand worthy of game exploration, but lacks the space in which to explore. The gain comes when the opposition overreact and treat the Intermediate Two Bid as they would a preemptive, Weak Two Bid. Many times they bid to a hopeless 3NT.

A reasonable competitive approach is to enter the bidding with unbalanced distribution with the main objective being to win the part score battle, much as one would compete over a strong NT opening bid. The emphasis must be on the major suits, especially with 2-suited hands. So, the strategy used against a Big Club can be adapted to: ‘Double for the Major(s), NT 2NT for the Major – Minor(s)’ It is futile to attempt to recover information capacity lost due to the higher than normal opening bid.

As an example let’s assume the opening bid is 2♣, a bid that has a great deal in common with the Precision 2♣, but which is more wide ranging in shape. A simple scheme of competitive bids is as follows.

Dbl both majors
2♦ strong takeout
2♥, 2♠  natural
2NT    diamonds and a major
3-level bids are transfers.

Similar schemes can be devised along the same lines for the other Intermediate Two’s.  If this seems too simple, let’s look at a key hand from the last segment of the 2005 Bermuda Bowl Final with Italy leading the USA by 10 IMPs with10 boards to be played.

Dealer: South Vul: Vul	Fantoni ♠   K86 ♥   KQ ♦   Q6432 ♣   QJ7
Soloway ♠   AQT92 ♥   J9753 ♦   75 ♣   2		Hamman ♠   3 ♥   AT842 ♦   KJ9 ♣   8643
	Nunes ♠   J754 ♥   6 ♦   AT8 ♣   AKT95

At the other table Rodwell opened the South hand with a Precision 1♦ and Versace bid 2♦ for the majors, as who wouldn’t. Lauria raised to 4♥ which made. The fact that Nunes was able to open at the 2-level inhibited Soloway, so he never go into the auction, losing 12 IMPs at this critical stage. If he could have doubled for the majors without promising game interest, Hamman would be in position to bid the game as did Lauria.

The hands on which one must take care are the balanced half-empty, half-full hands, such as the one held by Rodwell in the same 2005 BB Final.

Dealer: South Vul: Both	Rodwell ♠   J9 ♥   AKT4 ♦   K43 ♣   K976
Nunes ♠   AKT642 ♥   97 ♦   A62 ♣   54		Fantoni ♠   8 ♥   QJ8 ♦   QJ9875 ♣   QT2
	Meckstroth ♠   Q753 ♥   6532 ♦   T ♣   AJ83

Results at the other tables confirmed that 2♥ was make-able (8 tricks), but not 3♥. 2♠ was down 2, (6 tricks) for -200. The best fit for EW is in diamonds (8 tricks). At the other table Italy played in 2♥, so Rodwell’s decision to double 2♠ was a minus action costing 5 IMPs, a swing of 8 IMPs against 2♠ passed out. Meckwell had done well against Fantunes through the years by bidding aggressively in competition, but here I question the double opposite a passed hand. It is true that bidding has more ways to win than passing, but forcing partner to declare at the 3-level is overly optimistic, especially a partner who can open lighter than most. Note also that Nunes might hold only 5 spades.

We can test the second-seat action simply by examining the effect of an exchange of the East and South hands, which yields an equally likely configuration. Now as a 2-way shot East will raise to 4♠, which makes, and South may be tempted to save in 5♦, down 2 for a possible profit of 3 IMPs, the same gain one would obtain by passing in the real situation. There is a smaller profit from the bigger risk of bidding at the 5-level. In memory of kindly Miss Richards I award Rodwell a C+ for his effort.

The difficulty experienced by the opponents to the Intermediate Two is that their expectations rise unjustifiably because the bid is at the 2-level rather than the 1-level. It is largely a psychological problem in an atmosphere of uncertainty that must be overcome. Opening at the 2-level doesn’t make the hand better, and the result can be worse for Fantunes as they may be about to declare in the wrong strain.

The Power of Preempts
Fantoni play an aggressive-constructive system and are known to stick to their agreements, leaving it to their system to make the mistakes. Consistency is a major reason why they have done so well over the years. Because they use Intermediate Two’s, they cannot open a Weak Two, which cost them on this deal from the 2011 European Championship Cup Final.

Dealer: South Vul: None	Helness ♠   T2 ♥   K62 ♦   AJ5 ♣   QT942
De Wijs ♠   876 ♥   AJT874 ♦   62 ♣   J5		Muller ♠   KJ54 ♥   Q ♦   KQ83 ♣   A763
	Helgemo ♠   AQ93 ♥   953 ♦   T974 ♣   K8

West bid a descriptive 2♥ preempt with a decent suit and nothing of value outside. East made a disciplined pass with defensive values and a misfit in partner’s primary suit. Helgemo has one of those flat hands with enough HCP to tempt players to compete with the hope that partner will not bid 3♣, even though that is the most likely outcome. It is a reasonable expectation that partner will come up with 10 HCPs, which, indeed Helness possessed, but this was one of those deals with a 7-7-6-6 division of sides.

The winning bid by North is 3NT, which is hard to make as West may have an entry outside his heart suit. East gave North a second chance when he doubled 3♣, but Helness didn’t take the hint that the bulk of the points were with East. He might have thought, ‘in for a penny, in for a pound.’ So we may say that the great Norwegian pair lost the psychological battle on this deal. 3♣ went down 2 for a loss of 300 points.

West at the other table was Fantoni, who could not open a preemptive 2♥. He passed and Nunes opened an artificial 1♣, a stronger than normal bid. Fantunes ended up in 2♥, down 1, when NS passed throughout having been given sufficient warning of a misfit by the Fantunes auction. That could have been a triumph for Fantunes’ methods, if their teammates had been able to bid to the optimum 3NT contract. In the atmosphere of uncertainty created by the preempt, they couldn’t accomplish it.

There are 2 points to be made. First, balanced hands with scattered points can be valuable against a Weak Two, but their value is diminished against an Intermediate Two where the opening bidder probably has an outside entry, ruling out 3NT as a viable contract. Second, it is unproductive to talk of mistakes made by our top players in competitive situations where the information available is sketchy and/or misleading. It is better to consider risk versus gain within the context of what is probable based on what is known at the time at the table. That is how we should arrive at our own decisions. If we are to progress, it will come through better means of communication with one’s partner in competition that allow for changing conditions. There are limits to what can be achieved, of course, so uncertainty will remain an attractive and intriguing feature of the game.

Mistakes – Where the Good Scores Come From

January 4th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Happy the mishap that adds to my renown
 – from Hannibal  by Philippe Desportes (1546-1606)

Recently I noticed that my best results have been coming from mistakes – my mistakes. Of course, we all realize that we gain mostly from the opponents’ mistakes, but this was new. When you come to think about it, an unusual action, intentional or otherwise, will naturally produce an unusual result – either good or bad. Before we get to consider some successes of the renowned Italian pair, Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes, on a humbler level here are some of my mistakes that produced good board at the local duplicate.

Playing 2/1 our 2NT range is 20-21 HCP, but I have always found my partners have trouble after I open 1♣ and jump to 2NT, so, even though the hand is not worth the upgrade, I avoid stress and open 2NT. Partner transfers to hearts and bids 3NT, taking away any possibility of playing in 4♠ . This leads to a further mistake, because I expect him to hold length in the minors. Half-hoping for a spade lead, I pass 3NT which I regret as soon as dummy hits as it is obvious that 4♥ is the better game. A low diamond is led, and I duck in diamonds, my third mistake, as diamonds are split 4-4, so ducking can’t gain. To outscore those in 4♥ I should win the ♦Q, come to hand with the ♠ J and run the ♥Q. If it wins I can cash the ♠ AK and run the hearts to put on pressure in the hope of a defensive error leading to an extra trick in a minor. That would be a satisfactory outcome.

In the real world, I lose the heart finesse, but still emerge with 9 tricks on a successful spade finesse, which I expect to be a near bottom. Not so – we score 80% for our errant ways. This hand proved difficult for most pairs to reach game by following the standard rules for 2/1 bidding, so my whimpy play was cloaked in success. So it is some players exploit the weaknesses of standard methods by going against the field. The analytical ones will add special agreements ad nauseam striving for the elusive edge, whereas the individualistic oddball will bid on a whim and hope it all works out in the end.

Fantunes and ‘Mistakes’
Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes are one of the top pairs in the world, yet they play intermediate 2-level opening bids which are flawed in a constructive sense. The aim is to put pressure on the opposition and to induce errors. In order to attain great success it is not enough to play well, one’s opponents must play poorly as well. The intermediate two’s are merely one facet of their active approach. Fantunes like to bid when they can get in ahead of the opposition. Their 1NT bids are 12-14 HCP and include 4-4-4-1 and 5-4-2-2 shapes. The tendency is that an intermediate two bid shows a 5-4-3-1 shape, less frequently a 6-card suit. (They are less adventuresome with their defensive bidding.)

 If one plays an offbeat system, in the natural run of things it will generate some great successes to go along with some distinct failures. The following deal formed a part of their great victory over Bulgaria in the semi-finals of the 2009 Bermuda Bowl (Bulgaria withdrew). The deal was played at 8 tables in the semi-final matches for the Bermuda Bowl and the Venice Cup. At 7 tables North opened 1♥ and at 6 of these, East overcalled 1♠ , the exception being Sementa for Italy. I am sympathetic to the Italian style of passing the East hand with a topless suit, 9 losers, and Qxx in the opponent’s suit. No matter. After NS had shown their heart fit, West entered the auction and EW bid quickly to a vulnerable game in spades. Four North players took what appeared to be a sensible save in a nonvulnerable 5♥ bid, but, alas, 4♠ wouldn’t have made, and 5♥ was down a costly 500. So, another case of the 5-level belonging to the opposition, and another example of modern tactics at their worst, where a penalty double is no more than wishful thinking by the fans sitting on the sidelines.

The location of the ♠ K made it extremely awkward for the declarers in 4♠ . I see the problem as South’s raise with xxx in hearts and ♠ Kxx, giving North the wrong impression altogether. A 1NT response is closer to the mark and will serve to dampen North’s enthusiasm. Only Zia against China found the right approach – raise to 2♥ as a competitive move, then double 4♠ to suggest strongly that partner not take the push.

The one table at which North did not open 1♥ had Fantoni opening the intermediate 2♥. This changed the entire complexion of the bidding at his table, as shown below.

Dealer: North Vul: EW	Fantoni ♠   2 ♥   KJ9643 ♦   QJ94 ♣   AJ
Aronov ♠   A986 ♥   A ♦   KT853 ♣   973		Stefanov ♠   QJT53 ♥   Q72 ♦   A7 ♣   854
	Nunes ♠   K74 ♥   T85 ♦   62 ♣   KQT62

A quiet board, one concludes, and a negative position for Fantoni who went down 2. Nunes purposefully overbid as a possible save against 3♠ making, and, as we say at the local club, ‘no double, no trouble’. The correct attitude towards the intermediate two is to consider it as the first shot in a battle for a part score. It is normal to stop in a partial, so any game attempts by either side have to be based on extra strength. It was difficult for the opposition to enter the auction and cause problems. There was no clearly correct defensive action in the atmosphere of uncertainty created by the opponents’ system of limited bids.

Gaining a plus score in what is essentially a part score deal is not a bad result in itself, however, often one sees players sit on the sidelines during the auction then gloat when the opposition overbid in an uncontested auction, but when it comes to score the hand they are surprised at the inadequate reward that they receive for their tiny plus. If one doesn’t compete one doesn’t apply the same pressure one’s teammates are experiencing at the other table. Here the inactive Bulgarians experienced a loss of 9 IMPs, because at the other table, their teammates were pushed to the phantom save in 5 ♥, as follows.

The next example represents the other side of the coin – where an intermediate two incites the opponents to bid a game that others avoided after a normal 1♥ opening bid.

Dealer: South Vul: NS	Fantoni ♠   AJ52 ♥   T ♦   T8763 ♣   J62
Danailov ♠   QT ♥   KQ65 ♦   K42 ♣   K853		Karakolev ♠   K87643 ♥   93 ♦   J9 ♣   AQ7
	Nunes ♠   9 ♥   AJ8742 ♦   AQ5 ♣   T94

The normal auction was uncontested with NS bidding 1♥ -1♠ ; 2♥ – Pass. This contract had 6 losers, but it went down 2 in the Venice Cup semi-final when Deas led the ♣5 and later gave Palmer a diamond ruff. Catherine D’Ovidio also balanced with 2♠ , and her partner, Daniele Gaviard, let her play there. 2♠ made 140 on a passive club lead.

After Nunes opened 2♥, Fantoni left it to Karakolev to balance or not. Seemingly it mattered not, scoring 100 on defence or 110 playing in 2♠ , but his choice caused Danialov to take a further interest in the proceedings, and he punished his partner for his initiative by committing to a minus position. It is common enough that a player thinks that his initial pass somehow adds luster to his holding and makes the hand better than it really is. It is as if going to Confession makes one all the better prepared to go out and sin again. Down 3, thankfully not doubled, translated into a loss of 6 IMPs.

It is reasonable for East to balance with 2♠ , but West should judge that his aceless hand does not represent a great deal extra. The intermediate two is not a preempt, so if the opener hasn’t points in his main suit, he must have them elsewhere, presumably in the minors which may make it awkward to develop tricks outside the spade suit. Due to the internal weakness in the spade suit, in the end it was the diamond suit that doomed 3NT. Again, a Fantunes’ intermediate two bid had made something out of nothing.

Probability Considerations
If one can’t tell the true situation, one’s decision should be guided by the probabilities. Let’s compare conditions for a player who holds a top honour tripleton (A, K, or Q, denoted by H) in the major suit opened on his right and a player who hold xxx. Assume the opening bid was based on a 5-card heart suit of any quality. The probabilities of partner holding the designated number of top honours in hearts are given in the following table. The percentages are numbers that reflect common sense.

Thus, if one holds Qxx in hearts, as on the first Fantunes deal, the chances that partner has no ace or king in hearts is roughly 5 out of 9. If one holds xxx in hearts, the chances are very good (3 out of 5) that partner will hold at least one top honour in hearts.

An odd aspect of these probabilities is that they apply equally to the LHO. Partner may hold the perfect hand, but it is equally probable that the opponent holds it. There is no evidence to point one way or the other. Thus, if one holds Qxx in the opener’s suit, there is a 55% chance that the LHO hasn’t a top honour, and the threat of a penalty double with the queen trapped between the ace and the king is real, but not as great as one might imagine. Of course, the LHO knows whether or not he holds an honour, so it is good tactics to get partner to bid the NT contracts, putting the opening bidder on lead. A transfer scheme of overcalls may allow for this eventuality – for example, an overcall of 1♠ over 1♥ could, without commitment, ask partner to bid 1NT with a heart stopper, 2♣ without.

With traditional methods the ambiguity is such that a defender’s first action must be descriptive, giving information rather than applying it. That may benefit mostly the LHO who gets to bid next. Sementa’s pass was non-committal, in effect a nebulous waiting bid. Apart from the Italians, patience is a virtue not much in evidence at the top level, where the prevailing attitude is that anyone who bids is dangerous. (True!) If one employs transfers, one can show suit length without promising strength, thus increasing the opportunities for interference while adding to the communal confusion and mutual merriment.

Fantunes’ Intermediate Two’s

December 21st, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

When considering hands in the range of 8-11 HCP, Zar Petkov found justification for opening distributional hands expressed in a Zar points scale that included substantial contributions for shape. It is possible to define opening bids at the 2-level that accommodate these hands.  The system of Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes (‘Fantunes’) have opening 2-bids for shapely hands, but these are defined to be in the range of 10 to 13 HCP. As these hands would be opened normally at the 1-level, there are no additional hands being accommodated by this definition.  One is curious to see how this could be of value, so let’s look at some hands where such opening bids were employed without success. First, here is a hand from the 2011 Reisinger BAM finals.

Dealer: North Vul: None	Doub ♠   J743 ♥   7 ♦   Q92 ♣  KQ853
Nunes ♠   AQ6 ♥   J863 ♦   J8543 ♣  A		Fantoni ♠   952 ♥   AQT2 ♦   KT6 ♣  T62
	Wildavsky ♠   KT8 ♥   K954 ♦   A7 ♣  J974

The result at the other table was 3♦ making for 110, so Doub would have had to have been defeated by 2 tricks in order for Fantunes to win the board. One sees the Total Tricks (TT) add up to 17, but EW have a double fit which improves the chances for 18 total tricks. So, if 2♠ is down 2 (6 tricks), the Law of Total Tricks indicates EW can make game.  That is hardly a realistic assessment with the passed hand in the East.

In reality, 9 tricks can be made in clubs, diamonds, or hearts, so TT are 18. Should Nunes have pulled his partner’s double, and if so to what contract? I maintain that the problem was inherent in the opening bid on the given hand which has a very large departure from the expected distribution of 3-4-5-1 HCP. The departure of 13 is due to the fact that the 2 shortest suits contain 10 of the 12 HCP. EW were on track to get it wrong. As the cards lie 2NT by Nunes would have survived, even on a club lead, losing 4 clubs and the ♦A. The shapely distribution was offset by the unusual placement of the controls.  Here is a rearrangement of the HCP more in keeping with expectations.

Dealer: North Vul: None	Doub ♠   KJ43 ♥   7 ♦   Q92 ♣   KQ853
Nunes ♠   Q76 ♥   KJ86 ♦   AJ854 ♣   4		Fantoni ♠   952 ♥   AQT2 ♦   KT6 ♣   T62
	Wildavsky ♠   AT8 ♥   9542 ♦   73 ♣   AJ97

Now West can make 9 tricks in diamonds and hearts, while North can make 9 tricks in spades and 10 tricks in clubs. A penalty double of 2♠ is even farther offline, however, West has a hand for which the temptation of passing the double is greatly reduced.  The diamonds are rebiddable, and even a 3♥ bid has appeal. That is normal, but it is difficult to recover from circumstances that don’t fit the expectations.

 Another point to make is that the original West hand can be opened 1♦ in standard bidding and the 4-4 heart fit will not be lost, as it was after the space-consuming 2♦ bid. It is a drawback when responder hasn’t enough stuff to risk asking for clarification. If we allow a ‘light’ 1♦ opening bid on 26 Zar points, we will not miss our heart fit and will have a greater chance of landing on our feet in a competitive auction. With a lesser hand we can pass or preempt 2♦, defined as showing 8-10 HCP rather than 10-13 HCP.

With 12 HCP one is more or less obliged to open the bidding. If the system demands we open at the 2-level, we have no choice but to do so, even if the hand is not well described by one bid. It is self-preemptive, as we have less chance of being able to make a descriptive rebid. Here is an example from the 2009 Bermuda Bowl Finals.

Both declarers can make game, but only Meckstroth bid game. The opening bid needs refinement in its definition, and Rodwell was able to provide that, whereas Fantunes didn’t get it together. Nunes’ 2♠ was an artificial asking bid, and Fantoni showed his second suit in a (presumed) 5-4-3-1 shape. The fact that there was little wasted in hearts didn’t come across, so Nunes passed. Spades as trumps never entered the picture.

Useful Uncertainty
The Precision 1♦ is called ‘nebulous’ because the diamonds can be short. Information concerning the relative strength of the diamonds within the context of the hand is hidden. The Fantunes 2♦ shows at least 5 diamonds, presumably the opener’s best suit, but as we have seen, even though the length of the suit is confirmed, the strength of the suit is subject to variability. Which approach is better? In the cases where the search is on for a major suit fit, starting low is better. When the nature of the diamond suit is uncertain, the uncertainty may work in the opener’s advantage in a competitive auction, as the following deal for the 2009 Bermuda Bowl demonstrates in spectacular fashion.

Dealer: West Vul: NS	Katz ♠   875 ♥   8543 ♦   J862 ♣   93
Nunes ♠   T2 ♥   AJ972 ♦   97 ♣   K742		Fantoni ♠   964 ♥   T6 ♦   AKQT3 ♣   J86
	Nickell ♠   AKQJ3 ♥   KQ ♦   54 ♣   AQT5

Here Fantoni’s points lay in the suit he bid. Good! His 2♦ bid provoked the opposition into overbidding, the psychological advantage that such a bid may carry to overcome in part its constructive defects. Nunes has decent values, but could not see his way to doubling the final contract of 4♠, nonetheless, +200 seemed to be a decent result. Surprisingly it represented a loss of 5 IMPs. Here is the auction at the other table.

Meckstroth’s 1♦ could be as short as 2. Versace conveyed his power with a 2♦ cuebid, hitting his partner’s best suit. Although the diamond support was adequate the rest of the dummy was a disappointment. Down 4 translated into a loss of 400 points … the rest is not translatable. One might say that this was a once-in-a-partnership mix-up, but problems are common in the realm of uncertainty and not always solved satisfactorily.  Both results defy reason. Opposite a passed hand Fantoni hoped his 2♦ bid would cause discomfort, and it did, but so did Meckstrorth’s nebulous 1♦, and with less risk.

The Precision system allows 2♣ opening bids with 11-15 HCP and long clubs. Originally a 5-card club suit with a 4-card major was allowed, but it has been found that the competitive auctions are better treated if one requires the clubs to be at least 6-cards in length. An alternative bid of 1♦ is available. With the Precision 2♣, 2♦ is an economical ask, whereas the Fantunes 2-level bids are disadvantaged in that regard. So the Fantunes 2♦ bid which allows 5 diamonds and 4-card major is not likely to be successful.

Directing the Wrong Lead
If diamonds are one’s best suit, then opening 2♦, as Fantunes do, should prove beneficial when they end up on defence. That may not be true in the cases where the suit is thinly stocked with honours, as in the following hand from the 2009 BB Final.

Three Norths bid to 3NT and 3 Easts led a club, the result being down 2, -200. The exception was Fantoni. Nunes had opened 2♦ which influenced his partner to lead his singleton diamond, the result being 3NT making 4 for a loss to Italy of 13 IMPs. Generally Fantoni is committed to singleton leads in his partner’s suit (as recommend by Garozzo?) even though the opponents may hold more cards in the suit than partner does. On such a weak hand and with such a weak suit as this where the opponents are likely to bid spades, I prefer the options of passing or opening 1♥ in third seat.