More on Mistakes
Mistakes are hard to explain, because they defy reason. Picture this scene: over half a century ago proud parents gather in a one-room schoolhouse to watch their offspring perform feats of scholarship. Little Suzie Smart in a gingham dress, her red hair in pigtails, goes to the chalkboard at the behest of the teacher and writes in a fine round hand, ‘2+2=4’. Her relatives murmur approvingly. ‘Clever as her Uncle Ned’, notes her mother, ‘he always was good at arithmetic, being a success in the grocery business and all.’ Next in line comes little Tommy Trout wearing a checked shirt and corduroy pants with a patch in the seat. He scrawls on the chalkboard, ‘2+2=6’. Those gathered gasp, and red-faced parents can offer no explanation for this unjustifiable optimism. Later at home his mother wants to blame the pretty Miss Richards, but his father differs, noting little Suzie got it right. Even if the teacher was slack, Tommy might have taken the hint. One thing is agreed, the boy should not aim for a career in banking. “I see him more as a politician’, says his father. While many can explain why Suzie thinks 2 plus 2 is 4, no one can explain why Tommy thinks it is 6. Maybe he was thinking of 3+3, but that is merely a conjecture.
When it comes to the analysis of bridge hands, many can explain successful decisions that conform to reality, but they cannot see the reasons behind bad decisions that are matched poorly to the evidence at hand. Here is a hand from the 2011 French National Championships for which we may ask the reason why a veteran French champion took the wrong view.
Dealer: East Vul: EW |
Fantoni ♠ AJ82 ♥ QT2 ♦ A76 ♣ KQ5 |
|
Levy ♠ KQ6 ♥ KJ84 ♦ KJ ♣ T874 |
Mari ♠ T753 ♥ A9763 ♦ — ♣ AJ32 |
|
Nunes ♠ 94 ♥ 5 ♦ QT985432 ♣ 96 |
Levy |
Fantoni |
Mari |
Nunes |
— |
— |
Pass |
3♦ |
Pass |
3NT |
Dbl |
4♦ |
4♥ |
5♦ |
5♥ |
Pass |
Pass |
Dbl |
All Pass |
|
It has been said repeatedly that success begets success as money begets money (Nicholas de Chamfort 1741-1794), so it is with Fantunes who have gained a reputation as one of the most successful pairs in the world. They are fiercely competitive, but the cards lie as the cards lie, and too often they can be seen to overstep the boundary of safety – seen that is by those who can view all four hands in play. At the table it is a different matter. Can we blame Christian Mari for bidding too high on the basis of his void in diamonds? Fantoni’s 3NT could have been pure bluff, but why assume that?
The fault lies in the agreements that the veteran pair employ. Disraeli observed, ‘as a general rule the most successful man is the man who has the best information’. This is demonstrably true in warfare. (The battle of Midway, the decisive battle of the Pacific War, was won largely because the American navy had broken the Japanese code.) We adopt the observation to bridge by claiming, ‘successful bridge decisions are made mostly by those who possess the best information’. How nice it would be if Mari could double to say, ‘partner, I want to bid 5♥’, and for Levy to pass, saying, ‘no you don’t’.
Fighting Uncertainty with Uncertainty
Fantunes’ Intermediate Two Bid show 5+card suit in an, unbalanced, limited hand (10-13 HCP). This agreement takes away a level of bidding available to players employing a natural bidding system. That has to be disadvantageous when partner holds a hand worthy of game exploration, but lacks the space in which to explore. The gain comes when the opposition overreact and treat the Intermediate Two Bid as they would a preemptive, Weak Two Bid. Many times they bid to a hopeless 3NT.
A reasonable competitive approach is to enter the bidding with unbalanced distribution with the main objective being to win the part score battle, much as one would compete over a strong NT opening bid. The emphasis must be on the major suits, especially with 2-suited hands. So, the strategy used against a Big Club can be adapted to: ‘Double for the Major(s), NT 2NT for the Major – Minor(s)’ It is futile to attempt to recover information capacity lost due to the higher than normal opening bid.
As an example let’s assume the opening bid is 2♣, a bid that has a great deal in common with the Precision 2♣, but which is more wide ranging in shape. A simple scheme of competitive bids is as follows.
Dbl both majors
2♦ strong takeout
2♥, 2♠ natural
2NT diamonds and a major
3-level bids are transfers.
Similar schemes can be devised along the same lines for the other Intermediate Two’s. If this seems too simple, let’s look at a key hand from the last segment of the 2005 Bermuda Bowl Final with Italy leading the USA by 10 IMPs with10 boards to be played.
Dealer: South Vul: Vul |
Fantoni ♠ K86 ♥ KQ ♦ Q6432 ♣ QJ7 |
|
Soloway ♠ AQT92 ♥ J9753 ♦ 75 ♣ 2 |
Hamman ♠ 3 ♥ AT842 ♦ KJ9 ♣ 8643 |
|
Nunes ♠ J754 ♥ 6 ♦ AT8 ♣ AKT95 |
Soloway |
Fantoni |
Hamman |
Nunes |
— |
— |
— |
2♣ |
Pass |
2♦ |
Pass |
3♣ |
All Pass |
|
|
|
At the other table Rodwell opened the South hand with a Precision 1♦ and Versace bid 2♦ for the majors, as who wouldn’t. Lauria raised to 4♥ which made. The fact that Nunes was able to open at the 2-level inhibited Soloway, so he never go into the auction, losing 12 IMPs at this critical stage. If he could have doubled for the majors without promising game interest, Hamman would be in position to bid the game as did Lauria.
The hands on which one must take care are the balanced half-empty, half-full hands, such as the one held by Rodwell in the same 2005 BB Final.
Dealer: South Vul: Both |
Rodwell ♠ J9 ♥ AKT4 ♦ K43 ♣ K976 |
|
Nunes ♠ AKT642 ♥ 97 ♦ A62 ♣ 54 |
Fantoni ♠ 8 ♥ QJ8 ♦ QJ9875 ♣ QT2 |
|
Meckstroth ♠ Q753 ♥ 6532 ♦ T ♣ AJ83 |
Nunes |
Rodwell |
Fantoni |
Meckstroth |
— |
— |
— |
Pass |
2♠ |
Dbl |
Pass |
3♥ |
All Pass |
|
|
|
Results at the other tables confirmed that 2♥ was make-able (8 tricks), but not 3♥. 2♠ was down 2, (6 tricks) for -200. The best fit for EW is in diamonds (8 tricks). At the other table Italy played in 2♥, so Rodwell’s decision to double 2♠ was a minus action costing 5 IMPs, a swing of 8 IMPs against 2♠ passed out. Meckwell had done well against Fantunes through the years by bidding aggressively in competition, but here I question the double opposite a passed hand. It is true that bidding has more ways to win than passing, but forcing partner to declare at the 3-level is overly optimistic, especially a partner who can open lighter than most. Note also that Nunes might hold only 5 spades.
We can test the second-seat action simply by examining the effect of an exchange of the East and South hands, which yields an equally likely configuration. Now as a 2-way shot East will raise to 4♠, which makes, and South may be tempted to save in 5♦, down 2 for a possible profit of 3 IMPs, the same gain one would obtain by passing in the real situation. There is a smaller profit from the bigger risk of bidding at the 5-level. In memory of kindly Miss Richards I award Rodwell a C+ for his effort.
The difficulty experienced by the opponents to the Intermediate Two is that their expectations rise unjustifiably because the bid is at the 2-level rather than the 1-level. It is largely a psychological problem in an atmosphere of uncertainty that must be overcome. Opening at the 2-level doesn’t make the hand better, and the result can be worse for Fantunes as they may be about to declare in the wrong strain.
The Power of Preempts
Fantoni play an aggressive-constructive system and are known to stick to their agreements, leaving it to their system to make the mistakes. Consistency is a major reason why they have done so well over the years. Because they use Intermediate Two’s, they cannot open a Weak Two, which cost them on this deal from the 2011 European Championship Cup Final.
Dealer: South Vul: None |
Helness ♠ T2 ♥ K62 ♦ AJ5 ♣ QT942 |
|
De Wijs ♠ 876 ♥ AJT874 ♦ 62 ♣ J5 |
Muller ♠ KJ54 ♥ Q ♦ KQ83 ♣ A763 |
|
Helgemo ♠ AQ93 ♥ 953 ♦ T974 ♣ K8 |
De Wijs |
Helness |
Muller |
Helgemo |
— |
— |
— |
Pass |
2♥ |
Pass |
Pass |
Dbl |
Pass |
3♣ |
Dbl |
All Pass |
West bid a descriptive 2♥ preempt with a decent suit and nothing of value outside. East made a disciplined pass with defensive values and a misfit in partner’s primary suit. Helgemo has one of those flat hands with enough HCP to tempt players to compete with the hope that partner will not bid 3♣, even though that is the most likely outcome. It is a reasonable expectation that partner will come up with 10 HCPs, which, indeed Helness possessed, but this was one of those deals with a 7-7-6-6 division of sides.
The winning bid by North is 3NT, which is hard to make as West may have an entry outside his heart suit. East gave North a second chance when he doubled 3♣, but Helness didn’t take the hint that the bulk of the points were with East. He might have thought, ‘in for a penny, in for a pound.’ So we may say that the great Norwegian pair lost the psychological battle on this deal. 3♣ went down 2 for a loss of 300 points.
West at the other table was Fantoni, who could not open a preemptive 2♥. He passed and Nunes opened an artificial 1♣, a stronger than normal bid. Fantunes ended up in 2♥, down 1, when NS passed throughout having been given sufficient warning of a misfit by the Fantunes auction. That could have been a triumph for Fantunes’ methods, if their teammates had been able to bid to the optimum 3NT contract. In the atmosphere of uncertainty created by the preempt, they couldn’t accomplish it.
There are 2 points to be made. First, balanced hands with scattered points can be valuable against a Weak Two, but their value is diminished against an Intermediate Two where the opening bidder probably has an outside entry, ruling out 3NT as a viable contract. Second, it is unproductive to talk of mistakes made by our top players in competitive situations where the information available is sketchy and/or misleading. It is better to consider risk versus gain within the context of what is probable based on what is known at the time at the table. That is how we should arrive at our own decisions. If we are to progress, it will come through better means of communication with one’s partner in competition that allow for changing conditions. There are limits to what can be achieved, of course, so uncertainty will remain an attractive and intriguing feature of the game.
On the first “so called” mistake by Mari:
If Double = “I want to bid 5H”, then Pass = “I want to double”. No ?
Do we really want that ?
Yes!
The situation is that a game has been bid against a pair that is taking semi-preemptive action. This makes it a forcing pass situation, that is, one cannot leave 5 diamonds undisturbed. So, a pass requires Levy to take action.
I think this is called the Inverted Double.
Right in that logic, but is this really a Forcing Pass situation ?
Did Mari-Levy understand it like that ? Maybe they don’t play Forcing Pass in that situation – partner has promessed nothing and Fantoni can have a monsterhand – and now Mari has to take this difficult one-sided decision to bid 5H.
True enough!
But in competition one has to rely on partnership agreements. There is an old saying: the 5-level belongs to the opposition. Mari has a void, for sure, but only Levy can judge the defensive potential of the combined assets.
The success of pushy bidders is based largely on the lack of agreements of their opposition which is really the point I want to make. Defence is 2-handed.
Right.
4H by Levy shows values, after Mari’s initial pass…