Mistakes – Where the Good Scores Come From

Happy the mishap that adds to my renown
 – from Hannibal  by Philippe Desportes (1546-1606)

Recently I noticed that my best results have been coming from mistakes – my mistakes. Of course, we all realize that we gain mostly from the opponents’ mistakes, but this was new. When you come to think about it, an unusual action, intentional or otherwise, will naturally produce an unusual result – either good or bad. Before we get to consider some successes of the renowned Italian pair, Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes, on a humbler level here are some of my mistakes that produced good board at the local duplicate.

Bob	Bela
♠ AKJ	♠ 6432	2NT	3♦*
♥ QJ9	♥ AT764	3♥	3NT
♦ K62	♦Q9	Pass
♣ AJ93	♣ T7		*transfer

Playing 2/1 our 2NT range is 20-21 HCP, but I have always found my partners have trouble after I open 1♣ and jump to 2NT, so, even though the hand is not worth the upgrade, I avoid stress and open 2NT. Partner transfers to hearts and bids 3NT, taking away any possibility of playing in 4♠ . This leads to a further mistake, because I expect him to hold length in the minors. Half-hoping for a spade lead, I pass 3NT which I regret as soon as dummy hits as it is obvious that 4♥ is the better game. A low diamond is led, and I duck in diamonds, my third mistake, as diamonds are split 4-4, so ducking can’t gain. To outscore those in 4♥ I should win the ♦Q, come to hand with the ♠ J and run the ♥Q. If it wins I can cash the ♠ AK and run the hearts to put on pressure in the hope of a defensive error leading to an extra trick in a minor. That would be a satisfactory outcome.

In the real world, I lose the heart finesse, but still emerge with 9 tricks on a successful spade finesse, which I expect to be a near bottom. Not so – we score 80% for our errant ways. This hand proved difficult for most pairs to reach game by following the standard rules for 2/1 bidding, so my whimpy play was cloaked in success. So it is some players exploit the weaknesses of standard methods by going against the field. The analytical ones will add special agreements ad nauseam striving for the elusive edge, whereas the individualistic oddball will bid on a whim and hope it all works out in the end.

Fantunes and ‘Mistakes’
Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes are one of the top pairs in the world, yet they play intermediate 2-level opening bids which are flawed in a constructive sense. The aim is to put pressure on the opposition and to induce errors. In order to attain great success it is not enough to play well, one’s opponents must play poorly as well. The intermediate two’s are merely one facet of their active approach. Fantunes like to bid when they can get in ahead of the opposition. Their 1NT bids are 12-14 HCP and include 4-4-4-1 and 5-4-2-2 shapes. The tendency is that an intermediate two bid shows a 5-4-3-1 shape, less frequently a 6-card suit. (They are less adventuresome with their defensive bidding.)

 If one plays an offbeat system, in the natural run of things it will generate some great successes to go along with some distinct failures. The following deal formed a part of their great victory over Bulgaria in the semi-finals of the 2009 Bermuda Bowl (Bulgaria withdrew). The deal was played at 8 tables in the semi-final matches for the Bermuda Bowl and the Venice Cup. At 7 tables North opened 1♥ and at 6 of these, East overcalled 1♠ , the exception being Sementa for Italy. I am sympathetic to the Italian style of passing the East hand with a topless suit, 9 losers, and Qxx in the opponent’s suit. No matter. After NS had shown their heart fit, West entered the auction and EW bid quickly to a vulnerable game in spades. Four North players took what appeared to be a sensible save in a nonvulnerable 5♥ bid, but, alas, 4♠ wouldn’t have made, and 5♥ was down a costly 500. So, another case of the 5-level belonging to the opposition, and another example of modern tactics at their worst, where a penalty double is no more than wishful thinking by the fans sitting on the sidelines.

The location of the ♠ K made it extremely awkward for the declarers in 4♠ . I see the problem as South’s raise with xxx in hearts and ♠ Kxx, giving North the wrong impression altogether. A 1NT response is closer to the mark and will serve to dampen North’s enthusiasm. Only Zia against China found the right approach – raise to 2♥ as a competitive move, then double 4♠ to suggest strongly that partner not take the push.

The one table at which North did not open 1♥ had Fantoni opening the intermediate 2♥. This changed the entire complexion of the bidding at his table, as shown below.

 

Dealer: North Vul: EW	Fantoni ♠   2 ♥   KJ9643 ♦   QJ94 ♣   AJ
Aronov ♠   A986 ♥   A ♦   KT853 ♣   973		Stefanov ♠   QJT53 ♥   Q72 ♦   A7 ♣   854
	Nunes ♠   K74 ♥   T85 ♦   62 ♣   KQT62

 

Aronov	Fantoni	Stefanov	Nunes
—	2♥*	Pass	2♠ **
Pass	3♦	Pass	4♥
All Pass	* 10-13 HCP		**asking

A quiet board, one concludes, and a negative position for Fantoni who went down 2. Nunes purposefully overbid as a possible save against 3♠ making, and, as we say at the local club, ‘no double, no trouble’. The correct attitude towards the intermediate two is to consider it as the first shot in a battle for a part score. It is normal to stop in a partial, so any game attempts by either side have to be based on extra strength. It was difficult for the opposition to enter the auction and cause problems. There was no clearly correct defensive action in the atmosphere of uncertainty created by the opponents’ system of limited bids.

Gaining a plus score in what is essentially a part score deal is not a bad result in itself, however, often one sees players sit on the sidelines during the auction then gloat when the opposition overbid in an uncontested auction, but when it comes to score the hand they are surprised at the inadequate reward that they receive for their tiny plus. If one doesn’t compete one doesn’t apply the same pressure one’s teammates are experiencing at the other table. Here the inactive Bulgarians experienced a loss of 9 IMPs, because at the other table, their teammates were pushed to the phantom save in 5 ♥, as follows.

Duboin	Karakolev	Sementa	Danialov
—	1♥	Pass	2♥
Dbl	4♥	4♠	Pass
Pass	5♥	Pass	Pass
Dbl	All Pass

The next example represents the other side of the coin – where an intermediate two incites the opponents to bid a game that others avoided after a normal 1♥ opening bid.

 

Dealer: South Vul: NS	Fantoni ♠   AJ52 ♥   T ♦   T8763 ♣   J62
Danailov ♠   QT ♥   KQ65 ♦   K42 ♣   K853		Karakolev ♠   K87643 ♥   93 ♦   J9 ♣   AQ7
	Nunes ♠   9 ♥   AJ8742 ♦   AQ5 ♣   T94

 

Danialov	Fantoni	Karakolev	Nunes
—	—	—	2♥*
Pass	Pass	2♠	Pass
2NT	Pass	3♥	Pass
3NT	All Pass

The normal auction was uncontested with NS bidding 1♥ -1♠ ; 2♥ – Pass. This contract had 6 losers, but it went down 2 in the Venice Cup semi-final when Deas led the ♣5 and later gave Palmer a diamond ruff. Catherine D’Ovidio also balanced with 2♠ , and her partner, Daniele Gaviard, let her play there. 2♠ made 140 on a passive club lead.

After Nunes opened 2♥, Fantoni left it to Karakolev to balance or not. Seemingly it mattered not, scoring 100 on defence or 110 playing in 2♠ , but his choice caused Danialov to take a further interest in the proceedings, and he punished his partner for his initiative by committing to a minus position. It is common enough that a player thinks that his initial pass somehow adds luster to his holding and makes the hand better than it really is. It is as if going to Confession makes one all the better prepared to go out and sin again. Down 3, thankfully not doubled, translated into a loss of 6 IMPs.

It is reasonable for East to balance with 2♠ , but West should judge that his aceless hand does not represent a great deal extra. The intermediate two is not a preempt, so if the opener hasn’t points in his main suit, he must have them elsewhere, presumably in the minors which may make it awkward to develop tricks outside the spade suit. Due to the internal weakness in the spade suit, in the end it was the diamond suit that doomed 3NT. Again, a Fantunes’ intermediate two bid had made something out of nothing.

Probability Considerations
If one can’t tell the true situation, one’s decision should be guided by the probabilities. Let’s compare conditions for a player who holds a top honour tripleton (A, K, or Q, denoted by H) in the major suit opened on his right and a player who hold xxx. Assume the opening bid was based on a 5-card heart suit of any quality. The probabilities of partner holding the designated number of top honours in hearts are given in the following table. The percentages are numbers that reflect common sense.

Honours Held	Hxx	xxx
0	55%	40%
1	39%	46%
2	5%	13%

Thus, if one holds Qxx in hearts, as on the first Fantunes deal, the chances that partner has no ace or king in hearts is roughly 5 out of 9. If one holds xxx in hearts, the chances are very good (3 out of 5) that partner will hold at least one top honour in hearts.

An odd aspect of these probabilities is that they apply equally to the LHO. Partner may hold the perfect hand, but it is equally probable that the opponent holds it. There is no evidence to point one way or the other. Thus, if one holds Qxx in the opener’s suit, there is a 55% chance that the LHO hasn’t a top honour, and the threat of a penalty double with the queen trapped between the ace and the king is real, but not as great as one might imagine. Of course, the LHO knows whether or not he holds an honour, so it is good tactics to get partner to bid the NT contracts, putting the opening bidder on lead. A transfer scheme of overcalls may allow for this eventuality – for example, an overcall of 1♠ over 1♥ could, without commitment, ask partner to bid 1NT with a heart stopper, 2♣ without.

With traditional methods the ambiguity is such that a defender’s first action must be descriptive, giving information rather than applying it. That may benefit mostly the LHO who gets to bid next. Sementa’s pass was non-committal, in effect a nebulous waiting bid. Apart from the Italians, patience is a virtue not much in evidence at the top level, where the prevailing attitude is that anyone who bids is dangerous. (True!) If one employs transfers, one can show suit length without promising strength, thus increasing the opportunities for interference while adding to the communal confusion and mutual merriment.