You Gotta Have Style

It was good to see Meckwell return to the top at the 2014 Vanderbilt. Things have not gone as well as expected for the Nickell team after the addition of the highly esteemed Levin-Weinstein partnership, although it is hard to feel sorry for a team seeded #2. Given their outstanding success over the past 30 years it is surprising that Meckwell’s influence on American bridge players has not been greater. To understand why this is so, we take a look at recent history.

American heroes generally are the lucky ones who succeed by overcoming steep odds. True, there are a few charismatic losers tossed in, such as Bonny and Clyde, and the like. In the latter half of the 20th century 2 men rose from humble beginnings to become Presidents of the United States: Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan. Americans liked Ike, but they loved Ronnie, still do despite all the scandals. It is a matter of style. Eisenhower spent a lifetime behind a desk learning the ins and outs of the administration of a large, diverse organization. He coordinated the Allies’ victory over Nazi Germany. As President he sent the 101st Airborne into Arkansas in a just cause, but he gave the impression a dour grandpa whereas Reagan was the rich uncle from Out West. Ronnie was a cardboard cowboy who learned as an after-dinner speaker how to spin dubious tall tales that nonetheless appealed to his well-heeled audiences. He created a winning style out of little other than unlimited ambition. Reagan’s policies did more to bring down the American middle class than to bring down the Berlin Wall. It leads me to wonder whether the Supreme Court in future might pass a law so that Mickey Mouse can become the first corporate-sponsored cartoon character to occupy the White House, despite his advancing years. (On the plus side Mickey is black and speaks fluent Spanish, rare for a Republican candidate.)

We see a similar trend in bridge history. Meckwell have developed an elaborate, tightly defined system that depends for its success on accuracy, yet the playing public persists in playing a 2/1 system that resembles those of Meckwell’s frequently defeated foes. I characterize 2/1 by its 4 F’s – for Fuzzy, Fussy, Fudgey, and Fanciful. The underlying approach is individualistic with each partner being enabled to take charge and make decisions irrespective of relative strengths. It’s the freedom loving style that appeals to most. It is an American belief that the general good is best served with everyone acting in a spirit of narrow self-interest, so they cherish the right (or even the obligation) to make decisions without restraint based solely on their personal perception of what is best. That is akin to believing America would be a safer place if every law-abiding citizen carried a concealed firearm to discourage purse snatching, abrupt lane changing, and the like.

Levin and Weinstein are more to the popular taste, so it will not be surprising if they are proclaimed the heroes of the day in the next ACBL Bulletin. Let’s look at 3 examples of them at work against Monaco in the Vanderbilt final. What would you open with this hand: ♠ AKQJT73 ♥ 9653 ♦ Q3  ♣ —? The Eisenhower approach is to open 1♠ and proceed cautiously from there step-by-step to a successful conclusion just as in the European campaign. After all, seven hearts could be the correct contract. The Reaganesque approach is to open 4♠, which represents an irrational expenditure of limited resources on an ill-prepared plan that has no obvious pay out, characteristics in common with the dreamy Stars Wars missile defence system.  Here is the full Weinstein-Levin auction.

Levin was not happy stopping in a small slam with 13 tricks available off the top in 7NT. He commented, ‘well, I certainly didn’t think you had any kings.’ Weinstein replied.’ I’m not showing queens unless we discuss it.’ Obviously opening 4♠ had an inadequate follow-up plan. Levin has commented that he is averse to incorporating conventions into his system, preferring to rely on experience and superior judgement. (The upshot of this off-the-cuff approach is that his partnership needs 200 pages of system notes to cover the special agreements for situations that have proved awkward in the past.) At the other table Fantoni opened a limited 1♠ and Nunes took charge with a 2♣ response. He had the room and the methods available to uncover the ♦Q, so they reached 7♠ and gained a rather easy 11 IMPs. I suspect Ike would have got there, too, as it is not especially difficult to reach to uncover the prime assets while conserving bidding space.

Grand Slams are not eagerly pursued in cold climates, although Alan Truscott thought that they should be bid if the trumps were solid and the 13th trick depended at most on a finesse. That implies that there should be 2 ways to succeed, and that failing the one, there is a finesse to fall back on. Here is a board where both declarers avoided the Grand, but made 13 tricks in 2 different ways.

BBO commentators exchanged views on whether 7♠ should be considered a good contract.
Kit Woolsey: ‘very easy small slam to reach, it’s the grand that’s in question.’
Joey Silver: ‘These boys bid too well to get to 7.’

This proved ironic in the light of the subsequent winning action by Levin which we shall get to later. Ira Chorush saw that there were 2 chances to make the 13th trick: first play off the ♣AK to see if the ♣Q dropped, then take the heart finesse. This seems to satisfy the Truscott criterion, but are we convinced? Alternatively, Woolsey suggested, one might try to drop the ♥K tripleton, keeping the club finesse in reserve. So there are ways to succeed on a double dummy basis, but none is as good as what happened at the tables. Nickell led a club, giving up the 13th trick immediately. Against Levin a diamond was led, but Helness covered the ♥Q with the ♥K for the same result. These actions are quite possible even among world champions, so they must be considered in the light of the information exchanged during the auction. Maybe Truscott knew that being close often proves good enough in the presence of uncertainty.

Now let’s consider the actions taken on Board 58 on which Nickell, down by 16 IMPs, gained 17 to take a lead they didn’t relinquished.

At one table scientific bidders faced one another. The information exchanged was extensive and accurate. Meckstroth considered his hand worth a vulnerable preempt on a 7-card suit – we can recognize it as such. Nunes showed the black suits with a leaping Michael’s jump and Rodwell got his diamonds into the picture cheaply. Fantoni showed a good raise to 4♠, and Rodwell was able to emphasize his long suit without danger. When the bidding came back to him at 5♠, he was in a position of being able to make a logical decision based on what was known. He had shown his values, he had a good idea of Meckstroth’s values, and he knew that if he bid 6♦, the result would be he would have to make another guess over 6♠. His pass of 5♠ avoided further problems. Was it courageous, or middle-age prudent? No matter, it was logical based on the evidence.

At the other table the auction was much less informative. Levin opened the bidding with a standard 1♣. Helgemo had to choose whether to bid his values directly, or double to elicit more information from his passing partner. A bid of 5♦ might work, but that would give up on 3NT which might be the best place to play. His double gave Weinstein the space to make a weak 1♠ response. Helness forced the action with a supposed 11-card heart fit, but this didn’t discouraged Levin. Having hidden his main asset Helgemo had to come clean with a 5♦ bid, which encouraged Weinstein. Levin had undisclosed extras in clubs, so momentum pushed him to 6♠, and Helgemo was forced to take the sacrifice in 7♦. To double and collect 1400 would have been good bridge, but it wouldn’t have been winning bridge. Instead, Levin bid 7♠ more or less on general principles and table feel.

 In theory there was zero chance of success, so Helgemo’s badly defined takeout double seemed to have been a brilliant stroke, until BBO commentators began to wonder if this wasn’t a good move as it left Helness with the problem of what to lead. This is what they should have been thinking on all the previous close slams, but here a critical point at been reached for all to see. Did Weinstein’s pass of 7♦ show a void? Of course, we would have led partner’s bid suit, but Helness led from his Broken Heart suit. So a huge swing resulted from the uncertainty in the auction. Often aggression pays off, especially when it puts the opponents in the position of having to make a critical decision on the basis of little solid information. Their decisions become more psychological than logical, and harder to explain.

It helps to be a brilliant card player like Bobby Levin, but he knows that winning bridge requires more than what meets the eye on the double dummy sheets or on the convention cards. Sports heroes are not afraid to take chances late in the game. Think of Bubba Watson on the 17th fairway leading the Masters by 3 shots, but refusing to play safe and taking a big risk because he was ‘in the zone’ and couldn’t imagine failure. You gotta have heart to win, sure, but you gotta have style that stands out a mile to catch the public’s fancy.