What Do I Need to Know?

Why, might we ask, is 2/1 a popular system? Primarily the concept is easily grasped: ‘you open at the one-level, I respond at the 2 level, and we can’t stop below game.’ This doesn’t mean it always works, but bidding bad games sometimes pays off when the defenders slip up after an uninformative auction. The requirement of having 12 HCP for a 2/1 response is a restriction that implies 3NT will be played in preference to 5 of a minor, where distribution may be a critical factor. Guided by this general principle, players continually aim for 3NT from the start and neglect minor suit contracts. The average player benefits from this simplification, but good players don’t need to be continually reminded of the facts of life. To aim for a minor suit contract under unusual circumstances is to bend the system so as to overcome its built-in bias.

When one plays a system diligently one is accepting the priorities set by the system designer. This means one accepts the predetermined limitations based on prior probabilities. There should be no crying over spilt milk. If one bids against the system because of particular circumstances, one is more flexible and judgment comes into play, for better or worse. Bending the system to better fit what one sees in one’s hand degrades the information content of the exchange, because partner is misinformed. Let’s examine some examples of where judgment overcame systemic restrictions.

The Effects of Uncertainty
In a recent Swiss match I played Standard with a veteran who prefers a primitive natural style. Basically he bids what he thinks we can make. A consequence of this approach is that he never temporizes. That can work well at Teams where one wants to play in game whenever it is remotely possible to make it. The less information exchanged, the better the chances. The effects are familiar to club players and are becoming more so among experts.

I upgraded to 1NT mainly on the basis of my 5 controls, partner applied Stayman, and not finding a 4-4 heart fit, bid what he thought I should be able to make. He felt there was nothing to be gained by passing information about the long diamond suit with at most 29 HCP available in the 2 hands. The ♥2 was led, to the ♥Q, ♥K and my ♥A. I lost to the ♦A on my left and the spade shift was obvious. In the time honoured manner I ran off the diamonds, cashed the top clubs and, based on the discards, finessed in hearts successfully to collect 12 tricks after my LHO had been forced to choose to guard either the ♥T or the ♣Q. I hoped to gain an IMP.

The overtrick didn’t matter because the opponents had stopped in 3♦, making 150. Their auction had begun 1♦ – 1♥, both bids being ill-defined, making it easy to overcall 1♠ in fourth seat holding ♠KJxxx and ♥Kx. Interference of any quality changes perceptions. Neither opponent was confident enough in his spade holding to suggest 3NT. Thus, a simple overcall, even on a bad suit that takes up no space, can be damaging when neither player has expressed his strength. Uncertainty here made it unnecessary for me to bid a close minor suit slam at the other table.

. I would have preferred to play in 5♦. If I had held ♦AT75 in a hand with 16 HCP, 6♦ would have been the correct contract. Partner’s bidding was crude, but what I didn’t know didn’t hurt me this time. Here is an example of our successful slam bidding style.

This time I was within the 15-17 NT range, but too many missed slams have convinced me that a control-rich 17 HCP is too strong for a 1NT opening bid. With a wonderful fit in diamonds Pard expresses the hope that I could make 5♦.  As I held an extra ace, I bid 6♦, my fear being that we might be missing a grand slam. I was right there, but it didn’t matter that much as the opponents stopped in 3NT, after the auction 1NT – 2♦*; 2♥ – 3♦; 3NT – pass. The opening bidder preferred to show his club stopper rather than raise diamonds to the 4-level, which might get passed.

One might say the gain had nothing to do with system and was due simply to superior hand evaluation, but both auctions are ugly. If I had been playing Precision and opened 1♣ I am sure I would have reached 7♦ after a largely natural auction in which diamonds got to be bid along the way, but what is the need if the opponents stop in 3NT?

Here is one more example from the same Swiss Teams event. I employ a weaker-than-usual strong 2♣ bid with control responses which allows me to open 2♣ on hands with good distribution. It always has worked for me, this time in a strange way.

Fearing that I might be asked to pass a 3NT bid while holding a 3-loser hand, I decided to take control with a 2♣ opening bid despite having only 5 controls. The possibility of 6♠ loomed large. Pard showed 4+controls, which usually is enough for slam if a decent fit emerges. Subsequently he thought he could make 6NT, and who was I to say 7♠ would be better?  He made an overtrick after the ♣J lead. Diamonds were never mentioned. I am not proud of my 2♣ bid, but it served the purpose of putting me (temporary) in charge of the auction. The control response served to set the goal. Playing Precision I would be able to open a normal 1♣ without having to distort the system, and a natural sequence thereafter would put 7♦ on the map at the 3-level.

At the other table they did stop in 3NT after the auction: 1♠ – 2♥; 2♠ – 2NT; 3♦ – 3NT. I suppose responder thought 3♦ was suggesting 3NT without a club stopper, consequently he had no comfortable response. The trouble is that the system is unstable. It is very difficult to carry on after a partner signs off in 3NT. Usually, next stop: Slam. Surely it would be an improvement if 4NT were treated as natural and invitational, and 4♣ were treated a slam try in diamonds with 4NT a possible resting place.

Who Decides?
If partner opens a strong 2♣, what are the options for the responder? Some play that 2♦ is waiting and unlimited. This means the opener must now describe his hand in detail, giving the responder some authority in the subsequent auction, even if the pair adopts a Kokish 2♥ relay. That is the wrong way around, although one might recover if opener limits his hand with a 2NT rebid. Others play that responder initially shows controls. That is better as it passes specific information and keeps the opening bidder in control.

I have often claimed that in a complex auction the stronger hand should make the final decision. From the weaker side there appear to be too many things that can go wrong. In the spirit of democracy many have disagreed with me – thinking that the weaker hand has a right to make his opinion known under all circumstances. They are wrong, of course, which was made obvious by the comments that arose during the following hand played in Segment 5 of the 2014 USBF Semi Finals. It demonstrated that bad bidding is not confined to the local clubs. In 2 matches the same result was achieved: the Big Clubbers in each match gained a slam swing when the weaker hand in a 2/1 auction decided to stop in game without describing his primary asset, a 6-card club suit. Here is one auction.

Rosenberg was able to describe his shape and responder promised non-minimal values with his 2NT bid. As he put down the dummy, Willenden apologized for possibly missing 6♣, but an apology wins no points. The player with the weak hand made the final decision without conveying essential information about his shape.

The BBO commentators missed this point entirely. They excused Willenden because from his side the ♠KJxx appeared to be wasted. They speculated whether 6NT was makeable on double dummy play that overcame the lack of entries to the long clubs. The ♦Q seemed to hold great significance, whereas it was irrelevant in a 6♣ contract. In fact, all that the opener needed to know was responder’s shape. Lew Stansby and Bart Bramley showed how it could be done in a Precision context.

When Bramley bid 4♣, it appeared to be ambiguous to the commentators. Were hearts set as trumps with 4♣ merely showing a control? No matter, Stansby simply showed clubs, and Bramley, with ♣AKQ was sufficiently informed so as to be able to make the correct decision. It is wrong to argue that the same information was available to Willenden as to Stansby, and that he, too, might have bid 5♣, as clearly he was thinking of doing. The point is that the 2♣ auction was fundamentally flawed, putting the shoe of the wrong foot and keeping it there.

The Bramley-Stansby auction was not ideal as too much discretion was allowed the weaker hand. Bramley did the describing early, leaving Stansby to make the critical bid of 5♣ in uncertain circumstances. Well done Stansby, but was it necessary to put the pressure on responder in this way? Does opener need a self-preemptive 2♥ jump to describe his hand to the weak 1♦ responder? In classical Precision Bramley could have bid 1♥ as forcing, possibly canapé. This saves space, and allows for exploration with asking bids of responder’s size and shape. Clearly this is the way to go. The 2♥ bid should be specific, setting trumps in a 4-loser hand while asking responder to bid a control. In this context responder need not consider other alternatives, leaving the Big Club opener in charge.