Low Level Doubles in a High Level Match

In the 2013 USBF Trials the young and vigorous Kranyak team came out triumphant. One of the features of their style which sets them apart from the older players is their penchant for doubling part scores, an old idea in a new setting. Over half a century ago S.J. Simon pointed out in his great book, Why You Lose at Bridge, the most lucrative doubles are those where neither side holds a predominance of power. He felt that a low level double could be taken as a suggestion to partner, so that a partner can feel free to pull the double or leave it in knowing the sort of hand the doubler was promising. Until now this idea was not taken up in the modern game. For years experts have been entering auctions on minimal values without fear of being doubled in a part score, while commentators on the sidelines have been pointing out a multitude of missed opportunities. Of course, we observers have the benefit of seeing all 4 hands. The problem is not the concept of doubling on misfit hands, but how at the table to determine when to double.

The results from the recent 120-board matches provide us with the material to study hands where penalty doubles were employed successfully. Patterns emerge. Not surprisingly the best penalty doubles come on hands where neither side has an 8-card fit, that is, on deals with a 7-7-6-6 distribution of sides. The number of total trumps is 14. We can expect such hands at a frequency of 1 in 10 deals. Another prime candidate for punishment is a deal with a distribution of sides of 7-7-7-5. One side has an 8-card fit, the other doesn’t, and the total trumps number 15. Taken together such deals occur with a frequency of 1 in 6. The occurrence is fairly low, so not a great deal of attention is given to the possibilities by system designers, leaving partnerships to come up with their own devices as the difficulties arise. A player may see warning signs in the pattern of cards in his own hand, 4-4-4-1 or 4-3-3-3 shapes, but it requires partnership cooperation to guess with accuracy the division of sides. The primary indication is the absence of an 8-card fit.

When play on Board 26 began during their semi-final match, Kranyak held a 24 IMP lead over Nickell, enough to encourage an adventure in the part score domain. Here was the auction, both vulnerable.

At the other table Frank Nickell passed as dealer but later reached 3NT, makeable on a double dummy basis.  He mistimed the play and failed to bring home 9 tricks. John Kranyak started low and found partner didn’t have a 4-card major. If Wolpert had jumped to a limited 2NT, Kranyak would have raised to 3NT, but here he passed to await further developments on a deal he suspected was of the 7-7-6-6 variety. Levin took the bait and balanced aggressively on points, not shape: ♠ K98 ♥ Q74 ♦ Q5 ♣ KJ653. There was no escape and 1♠ went down 3, vulnerable, for -800 and a loss of 14 IMPs. If Wolpert had reached 3NT he might have made it and gained 700 points in the traditional manner, so doubling 1♠ could have led to a lesser gain, but it often pays to take your plus at teams.

On Board 33 a similar situation arose: Kranyak-Wolpert could make 3NT, as Meckwell had done at the other table, but Kranyak chose to go for the throat with neither side vulnerable. He gained 11 IMPs by defending on a misfit.

Weinstein bid a robust 2NT takeout on ♠ KQ ♥ K8654 ♦ AJ975 ♣ 6, certainly nothing to be ashamed of. It was against the odds not to find a haven at the 3-level, but, unfortunately, this was one of those 7-7-6-6 deals. The main criticism I would make is that his bid was preemptive primarily against spades, a suit in which he held the KQ. In that sense he was too strong to preempt, as this increased the chances Levin would get doubled. Indeed, with nothing in spades and length in diamonds, Kranyak was delighted to double and Wolpert could pass comfortably with his 4-4-4-1 shape and values in the other 3 suits. One might even go so far as to claim this was obvious, but only if one thinks of it first. As with the previous hand, the naturalness of the 1♣ opening bid was an important feature of an auction that became competitive.

By Board 42  Kranyak led by 46 IMPs. The scene shifts to a table where both sides are playing Precision. With both vulnerable Bathurst opens a weakish 1NT with defensive values. As responder Dwyer has a good, balanced hand, but not good enough to invite game, so a perfect hand for doubling.

Meckwell’s division of sides was 5=7=7=7, so Bathurst-Dwyer had an 8-card fit in spades. At the other table their opponents played in 2♠ making. Here the uncertainty with regard to Meckstroth’s takeout reduced the temptation to find a major fit. 2♦* making does not represent a game, so Bathurst was willing to take his chances on extracting a penalty. Meckstroth went down 4, for a loss of 14 IMPs on a part score deal. He had balanced with a weak diamond holding: ♠ 72 ♥ KQ875 ♦ J843 ♣ K2. Not really a 2-suiter, is it? The hanging ♣K is a bad feature. Double dummy analysis concludes 2♥ is better, being just down 1. Of course, it would be much harder to double 2♥, a contract that might produce a game.

By Board 49 the lead was up to 63 IMPs. This board is played in a doubled contract at both tables. With a good 6-card suit, both East players opened a preemptive 3♦ on ♠ J86 ♥ T ♦ KQJ864 ♣ T3. Both Souths doubled protectively with 18 HCP and no 4-card major. Meckwell attempted a vulnerable game whereas John Kranyak tried the effect of a penalty pass. He was right, as the division of sides was 7-7-6-6, and 4♠ was too high.

The double of a 3-level preempt must cover a wide variation of hands, nonetheless it is normal for the doubler at least to have tolerance for the spade suit. For the sake of safety one might take out the double to 3♠ hoping to be left to play it there in peace. Kranyak thought aggressively. With no game in sight he passed Wolpert’s double hoping to extract a doubled undertrick or two in a part score deal. There was little chance that 3♠ would make. He judged well, finding his partner with a doubleton diamond, hence, the desirable 7-7-6-6 division rather than an 8-7-6-5 division. His expectation of down 1 in 3♦ was greatly exceeded as the contract went down 4 for a score of 1100. The key to the defence was to score 3 tricks in clubs, one by ruffing.

In order to opt for a double into game one must trust that partner’s double is backed by full values. Here Wolpert held 3 aces which provided good transportation. To guarantee full values, at times one must pass on moderate values and trust partner will balance freely when appropriate. Light takeouts preclude playing for penalties later. At the other table Rodwell took out the double to 3♠, but Meckstroth raised to 4♠, subsequently doubled, down 2 for a loss of 300. In total the Nickell team doubled at both tables lost 15 IMPs on a part score deal.

The Law of Total Tricks can serve as a guide in these situations. If one thinks one might make 8 tricks in spades, but not 9, and if the division of sides is the expected 8=7=6=5, the number of total tricks rates to be 16. Thus the opponents may make only 8 tricks in their 3♦ contract. If the division of sides is 7-7-6-6, the total tricks number 14, so if one can make 8 tricks in spades on a 4-3 fit, the opponents rate to go down 3 in 3♦.

At the halfway point, 60 boards played, the Kranyak team led by 79 IMPs, 52 of which were gained on the 4 part score doubles discussed above. The effect of these doubles might have been even greater than the numbers indicate, as there is a psychological advantage to be had if one cannot compete with the same confidence one has knowing one won’t be doubled in a part score. Could it be that the pendulum is swinging back towards less presumptive competition? The success of these penalties doubles were no fluke. In our next blog we’ll see how Kranyak on aggregate gained 37 IMPs on part-score doubles against Fleisher in the USBF Final, a significant portion of their overall winning margin of 68 IMPs.