Bob Mackinnon

The Pendulum Swings

In the USBF Final the Kranyak team of 4 young players came out victorious against the Fleisher team of 6 seasoned veterans. When I first played a team game, an experienced teammate advised, ‘bid your games and slams, and don’t double part scores’. That was good advice, and most experts have been following that path with the result that players have been entering the auctions without fear of being doubled for penalty and games are bid on a hope and a prayer. This may be about to change due to the successful doubling of the poster boys.

As in the semi-final match against the Nickell team, the younger players had a penchant for doubling part scores for profit, although in this match the effect was not as great. Nonetheless, they came out ahead on such doubles by a margin of 37 IMPs, a significant portion of their overall margin of victory, 68 IMPs. Here is an example from early in the match. The division of sides was 7-7-6-6 making it an ideal situation for a penalty double against a vulnerable contract even at a low level.

 

 
29
Both
North
N
Kranyak
K8
62
K8543
KQ85
 
W
Zia
AQ109
1098
J9762
6
 
E
Martel
74
A543
A10
AJ1042
 
S
Wolpert
J6532
KQJ107
Q
973
 
W
zia
N
Kranyat
E
Martel
S
Wolpert
1
2
Dbl
All Pass
 
 
 

 

Overcalling 2 used to show a good 6-card suit within a good hand, but the standards have fallen considerably as one must act quickly in case the opening bid was light, which it certainly was. With shortages in diamonds and spades, Martel could reasonably sure there would be more bidding to follow. Wolpert’s double showed affinity for the majors. Kranyak could see there was no major suit fit. In fact he could conclude that there was a high probability of a 7-7-6-6 division of sides. Leaving in the double might not be successful if South held 3 or more diamonds, a chance Kranyak was willing to take. His pass resulted in a score of +500. At the other table the auction took a more traditional turn.

W
Bathurst
N
Rosenberg
E
Dwyer 
S
Willenken
Pass
1NT
Pass
2
Pass
2
Pass
Pass
2NT1
Pass
3
All Pass
 
 
 
(1) *

Rosenberg shunned opening on a 6-loser hand that was short in the majors. Dwyer, playing Precision, opted for a lumpy 1NT. EW found their best 7-card fit, 2 was makeable, and Rosenberg found himself in a good position for balancing into a minor. Willenken had no option but to bid clubs. Mercifully he wasn’t doubled, however, the penalty for playing in the same suit in both directions was a whopping 13 IMPs.

Late in the match Dwyer showed the same tendency as had Kranyak in seeking a vulnerable penalty at a low level.

 
108
Both
North
N
Dwyer
1072
J10974
KQ1085
 
W
Zia
QJ96
Q864
653
32
 
E
Martel
K3
10932
KQ
AJ964
 
S
Bathurst
A854
AKJ75
A82
7
 
W
Zia
N
Dwyer
E
Martel
S
Bathurst
Pass
Pass
1
Dbl
All Pass
 
 
 

Dwyer’s pass of the double was based on good trumps as well as an apparent lack of a fit in the majors. Doubling on a trump stack may mean that the opponents can escape to a better strain. The division of sides was 8-7-6-5 so it was possible for EW to escape to their 8-card fit in hearts where 7 tricks were available, but they stayed fixed for a loss of 500 on the board. One could say that Martel paid the cost of opening a natural 1 with a good suit and nowhere to go – a rare occurrence. The doubleton kings were a bad feature indicative of wasted values. At the other table all went according to custom.

W
Kranyak
N
Rosenberg
E
Wolpert
S
Willenken
Pass
Pass
1
Dbl
Pass
1
Pass
1
Pass
1NT
Pass
2
Pass
3
All Pass
 

Once again Rosenberg did his bidding later rather than sooner, reaching the optimal double dummy contract in their 8-card fit while losing 9 IMPs in the process.  On Board 103 Fleisher got some of its own back by doubling part scores at both tables for a gain of 13 IMPs. Were the old dogs learning new tricks? If so, it came too late.

An Early Game Swing
The opportunities for penalty doubles are few and far between, whereas the opportunities for game swings are common. Throughout the match of 120 boards there were 22 swings of 9 or more IMPs, due to one pair bidding and making a game or slam missed at the other table. These were evenly divided between the teams. Some triumphs were due to inaccurate defence, some were justifiably bid on a double dummy basis. Board 38 provided a simple bidding problem that one pair solved and the other didn’t due to a difference in approach. I think the difference holds significance for us all as it involves a choice between bidding shape or showing suit strength.

W
Martel
AK9743
96
964
A10
 
E
Zia
J6
AKQ108
KQ3
432
Martel
Zia
1
2
2
2NT
3NT
Pass

Many would consider this a perfect auction in a 2/1 context; only the outcome was bad.
Unlucky? Both players were able to bid out their shapes without revealing the fatal flaw in the club suit. Over 2NT Martel might have opted for 3 of major, but why should he? If Zia had doubts about 3NT, he might have corrected to 4. But why should he? On a different lie of the cards and a different lead they might have got a magnificent matchpoint score.

There are fundamental features of the auction that need to be considered. It is a happy coincidence when a 2NT bid actually shows stoppers in both unbid suits. With 3-3 in the minors it is usual that honours in the minors be evenly divided between them. With the same honour composition the following hand is more likely than Zia’s: Jx AKxxx KQ3 Q43. Naturally one wants one’s partner to act according to what is most probable given the information one has provided him, and the Q location was unusual.

Often bidding shape can help a declarer as it may give the opening leader a losing option when a weakness has not been revealed. Uncertainty can work in declarer’s favour. In this case a lead in a minor was marked and a diamond lead would have let the game through. Thus bidding 2NT had chance in its favour, but it was not sufficiently informative with regard to the placement of stoppers.

At the other table a Precision pair reached the best contract in a manner that provoked an observation from a system-sensitive commentator.

W
Dwyer
AK9743
96
964
A10
 
E
Bathurst
J6
AKQ108
KQ3
432
Dwyer
Bathurst
1
2
2
3
3
3
4
Pass

It was pointed out that Bathurst’s auction was not shape-revealing, as it was consistent with 3=5=4=1. Bathurst’s priority was to show where his points lay. 3 showed values in diamonds and denied values in clubs. It was more informative than Zia’s all encompassing choice of 2NT. When neither player could bid 3NT with confidence, 4 became the final contract.

There was difference in approach due to the fact that Dwyer’s opening bid was limited to at most 15 HCP. That put the onus on Bathurst as responder to seek the correct contract as the cards lie. Revealing shape was not a top priority as responder could hardly expect a slam to be in the making. One might reveal a 4-card minor, but where would that lead? Was that information relevant when the real choices lay between 3NT or 4 of a major? Whether or not responder was short in clubs was not the issue it might have become in a slam exploration. No, the useful information that needed to be transmitted was the weakness in the club suit, regardless of the length held. After the 3 bid, all realistic options were explored in a cooperative, informative manner so the opening bidder was able to make the winning choice in comfort.

It pays to keep in mind how partner will interpret one’s responses. A system is geared to the most likely scenarios, so making the system bid may actually be deceptive if the hand doesn’t match expectations.  After partner opens 1, natural, what is your bid on this collection: Q53 QJ43 T85 K32? In a recent club game, the winning choice was 1NT, limited, showing a flat hand, scattered values, and club support. Some players, thinking the system required it, responded 1, which I think was wrong. If opener has a strong hand responder will hear from him again, and the fact that your 1NT bid has implied club support will be useful in a competitive auction. It may well happen that the opposition will not take full advantage of their 8-card fit if they have one. In fact, the division of sides was 7-7-6-6 with the HCPs evenly divided, so 1NT was high enough. A 7-7-6-6 division of sides is much rarer than 8-7-6-5, but one should be prepared to react appropriately when it does occur, and not blindly follow along a preordained path. That is the example the Kranyak team has set for us.

By way of contrast a non-systemic overcall on a 4-card major (a Marshall Miles favourite) can work wonders. During the same local duplicate game, my RHO opened 1 when I held the following collection: A42 AKQ7 T8754 9.  Action was called for, but there was no systemic bid available. An overcall of 1 worked wonders. In the ensuing auction partner raised hearts on 3-card support and the opposition misread the degree of fit in hearts. Partner was able to double 3 profitably on another 7-7-6-6 division of sides. No pair was able to reach the makeable 4.


2 Comments

MichaelJuly 8th, 2013 at 12:27 am

Good read. However board 29 South had 14 cards.

bob mJuly 8th, 2013 at 6:04 am

Thanks. Remove heart ten from South

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