The Creatures of the Forest

August 20th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Bridge provides a constant flow of rich entertainment, especially at the inexpert level at our local club. How much more exciting can it be when at any point a player can make an expensive blunder? What the game lacks in technique, it gains in tactics. Many players can classified as Rabbits while a cunning few play the role of Foxes out to catch their timid opponents in trappy plays that induce errors. To score an average against a Rabbit is to lose ground, so misplays must be encouraged. Sometimes the Fox loses his natural advantage by being too clever, and the Rabbit escapes, as on the following deal.

Rabbit reached a normal game and Fox got off to the good lead of the ♠5, taken by Rabbit in hand in order to lead the ♣8 towards dummy. Fox went up with the ♣A and played the ♠9 to dummy’s ♠K. Rabbit took a spade pitch on the ♣K and appeared to think briefly before running the ♦T. Squirrel (‘Lofty’ to her friends, ‘Nutsy’ to her detractors) had risen with the ♦9, so Fox could see a possible advantage to holding up his ♦K: if Rabbit repeated the finesse, he would live to regret it. Rabbit’s nose twitched as he sniffed the air suspiciously. Instinct saved him, as he switched his attention to trumps and ran the ♥T, ending up with 11 tricks and an 80% score when Squirrel failed to cover.

‘Why did you take the diamond finesse?’ demanded Fox venting his frustration, ‘it was a senseless play. Finesse in hearts and give up a diamond in the end. You could have gone down in a cold contract.’ Of course, he had realized instantly that if he had taken his ♦K Rabbit with no entry to dummy would have been held to a normal, below average, 10 tricks, and Squirrel would have been spared a wrong choice.

‘I wanted to see where the ♦K was,’ replied Rabbit, and that was the only enlightenment he provided. Sometimes it just doesn’t pay to ask. On the next board it was Mouse who did something good by bidding, well, like the mouse he is.

Rabbit opened the bidding with 1♣ on a hand some might upgrade to 1NT, and Fox passed when some might make a takeout double. Timid Rabbit seldom intentionally upgrades because his is quite aware that things don’t always go well when he does, and crafty Fox prefers to wait in the bushes and see how things proceed before he makes his move. Mouse arranges to have his partners play the hands when he holds no intermediates. Without tenaces he passes the buck, so rather than make the popular response of 1NT, he decided to bid 1♦ and see if Rabbit would bid 1♥, as expected. When Rabbit bypassed hearts to bid 1♠, Mouse could see trouble looming in 1NT, so he supported clubs. In this way, by bidding against the field, he has reached the best strain.

Fox now made his presence felt with a balancing 2♥. It had all worked out nicely for him. Rabbit expected a bit more shape from partner, so raised himself on the strength of his fine suit. He had reached the par contract. However, Lofty was still to be heard from: she raised to 3♥, and was delighted when this was passed out without a double. There was much merriment forthcoming when the excellent trumps appeared in dummy after the passive ♥9 lead from Mouse. Routine defence led to down 2 for an apparently inadequate reward of +100. However, EW scored 70% on the board for many were being held to +90 in a contract of 1NT played by East.

‘I should have bid 2NT instead of 3♣’, said Rabbit, missing the point entirely.
‘You should have doubled 3♥’, snorted Mouse, ever fierce in the post mortems.

In the final deal Mouse showed his accidental expertise in dummy play.

Select (you can triple-click it) and over-write this text below the diagram.

‘Am I a mouse or a moose?’ Mouse asked himself in the pass-out position. Receiving the wrong response yet again, he reacted with a self-destructive 4♥ which Fox did not double so as not to reveal the supposed 3-0 trump split. Down 2 undoubled scores the same top as down 1 doubled; no need to provoke Lofty into pulling to 5♣ with a void. Squirrel led the ♣A and a club to Fox’s ♣K. He switched to a testing trump correctly ducked to the ♥J. Mouse has watched Fox enough times to know if you have to lose a trick it is best to lose it early, so with that thought in mind he led a low diamond from the table. Fox won the ♦J and returned the ♦5, Squirrel contributing an economical ♦T. Knowing the value of speed, Mouse quickly drew trumps and led the ♠3 with 6 cards remaining.

Having given count in the spade suit, Squirrel had kept 3 clubs. To the unobservant Mouse there appeared to be just one hope: South might have remaining the ♠QJ tight. He led the ♠3 and when the ♠Q appeared, his heart beat faster, but hope was extinguished when the ♠J didn’t drop under the ♠K on the second round.

‘Sorry, Partner, it looks like down 2,’ observed Mouse resignedly. ‘I was hoping for a bit more from the dummy. ♦8, please.’ When Squirrel perforce won the ♦K, she found she had to give a ruff and a sluff, restoring the score to down 1 for an average result.

‘Wait a minute,’ squeaked Squirrel, ‘you conceded down 2. I’m going to call Director Bear.’
‘I didn’t concede,’ claimed Mouse, ‘I made an observation to my partner and called for the diamond. You can’t concede tricks you can’t possibly lose.’
‘Don’t call Bear,’ ordered Fox wearily, ’it’s your own fault for not unblocking the ♦K.’
‘Don’t fret,’ soothed Rabbit, ‘things don’t always turn out well, no matter what you do.’
‘Haw!” commented Kibitzer Crow, ‘just another average board. I think I’ll fly over to the visitor’s car park and watch the seagulls practice their synchronized dive bombing routine.’

Conclusion What can we learn from this (largely) truthful account? Although the location of the cards is of paramount importance, the best strategy to pursue depends on the condition under which the game is played. No matter the degree of uncertainty, in theory to act optimally is to act according to the probabilities given the information available, however, expert versus expert is vastly different from novice versus novice, or novice versus expert, because the degrees of uncertainty are different. Foxes, aristocrats of the forest, needn’t take risks against Rabbits: it’s good enough to gather easy pickings against their inferior opponents at minimum cost. Rabbits, uncertain of what is transpiring, assiduously apply general rules regardless of circumstances at hand. The information their bidding and play provides often lacks specificity, so it is an error to read too much into what they do. Caution is advised in competitive auctions especially.

Hand Evaluation

July 18th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  10 Comments 

In a world where everything is relative it is a mistake to think in terms of absolutes. Nonetheless, some players are wedded to the ideal of high card points as a means of evaluation of their hands. They think that in order to make a normal opening bid one needs points that translate into tricks whether one declares or defends. That is a comfortable thought, but sometimes a hand comes up that can take many tricks on offence and few on defence. It pays to open such hands.

The number of tricks one can associate with a given deal is huge. There are 5 strains and 4 potential declarers for each strain, 13 tricks for each contract. Some are not worth considering, but there may be a fair number remaining that can be usefully subjected to a double dummy analysis through the application of Deep Finesse. The remaining cases of interest can be multiplied by the number of different possible outcomes that arise from the bidding process. It is not surprising that there are few deals played in the same contract with the same number of tricks taken at every table. The result on any deal has to be thought of as a statistic outcome subject to random variation.

It was the genius of Jules-Renè Vernes that he came up with the Law of Total Tricks to reduce the mass of possibilities to 2 main outcomes, the number of tricks played by each side in its best contract. It is a simplification, of course, but it got players to thinking about the variability of the value of queens and jacks, useful on defence, but potentially worthless on offense. To be valuable on offence, they must be matched happily with cards held by one’s partner, or be part of a long suit that can serve as trumps on its own. Here is an example from last week where lonely queens, accompanied by their ladies in waiting (ten’s), were upgraded purely because of their offensive value.

The ♣K was led, RHO following with the ♣2. The opening leader was very surprised when I ruffed this. I played a trump to the ace, felling the king, making 11 tricks. The opponents had missed a good save in clubs. The number of Total Tricks available was 21 and the number of total trumps, 20, so the outcomes were well approximated by the Law and would have been exactly predicted if I hadn’t dropped the singleton king.

On sorting my hand my first reaction was to open 1♥, but then I had some second thoughts. In this (mostly) friendly game among seniors would it be fair to my current opponents to open 1♥ in first seat on just 8 HCP when every other South would be passing? I don’t like to psyche bid and ruin an opponent’s game as a result, but here I was not deliberately misrepresenting values, I was giving a true description of the offensive value of the hand, as I saw it. Of course, the HCP total alone did not do that. One has to take into account the distribution points, as Goren recommended. In the Zar points scale I had 18 distribution points and 8 HCP, for a total of 26, enough to justify opening 1♥.

My second thought was to open 2♥ as the 8 HCP fell within our announced range of 6-10 HCP, but I rejected that approach. A 6-loser hand is too good for a preempt, the probable effect of which would be to embolden the opponents in a search for a game in spades. Opening 1♥ gives my LHO an easy entry into the auction, but my ♠A may act as a deterrent to high adventure. On the other hand, the chance of finding a fit in one of the red suits in partner’s hand was high. So it turned out. Few reached 4♥, none scored 650.

Although I bought a good dummy it would be wrong to think I was extremely lucky in that. Partner had a 4-4-3-2 shape with more black cards than red cards. With 22 HCP placed in the 3 other hands, I could expect on average that he would hold 7 HCP. With 10 control points missing, on average he would hold 3.  Bad splits with extreme distributions all around the table are against the odds. The chance that partner held at least 4 red cards was over 70%. The odds favour the bold bidders: at least an 8-card fit was likely.

I made reference to Zar Points, but I am not a great believer in any points system. It is better to think in terms of the basic probabilities, on which the efficiency of a point systems depends. Where points may be useful is in the design of bidding systems. The greatest threat to light opening bids comes not from opponents, but from partners whose expectations may be lifted by a vulnerable opening bid on garbage. One needs a way to distinguish between strong flat hands and weak shapely ones. The following hand is also characterized by 26 Zar Points, but this time with the reverse composition: 18 high card points and 8 distribution points: ♠ K65 ♥ AQ43 ♦ A32 ♣ 864. This hand may not play well if there are no control entries in the dummy to facilitate finesses, whereas the previous hand can play well opposite a couple of fillers. This property is reflected in their respective loser counts: 8 for the flat hand, 6 for the shapely hand.

 On the hand where declarer was able to make 11 tricks in 4♥, responder gave a limited raise on a flat hand, which left declarer in control of the auction. With the 4-3-3-3 hand it is better if partner determines the degree of fit, which he can do by asking the right questions. With such a wide range of possibilities for an opening bid, some form of a Drury bid is needed to sort out the mixture of the points. In a way this is not fair as the opponents have no way to discover whether or not an opening bid has any defensive potential, whereas a responder can always ask if he so desires. The best the opposition can do is act upon the probabilities based on the small amount of information available to them. Obviously, they may have to enter the auction in order to provide their own information, and the auction then becomes competitive. The trick is how to do this in an efficient manner. Generally the captain of the side is the one with a shapely hand.

One effect of light opening bids upon the defenders is that the takeout double is used on a greater variety of hands than previously allowed. With opening points and a flat hand one has to make a noise if in danger of being shut out early. With shape one overcalls on a garbage suit in the hope of finding a fit. This need to act sooner rather than later annoys some conservative observers who feel they have to change their systems to cater to undisciplined bidders. My answer is this: do what you have to do.

Let’s return to the above hand and assume that my LHO doubled instead of overcalling.

Rather than put the emphasis on a bad suit, if my LHO had doubled to bring clubs into the auction, his partner may have dredged up a 4♣ bid. Once we reached 4♥, my LHO could have raised to 5♣ as a 2-way shot on the assumption that his partner must be short in hearts. Now with his balanced hand Bela would have to show some defensive values with a double, leaving me with a tough decision. The void tells me to bid 5♥, a contract that is in jeopardy. What was their problem has become my problem.

Information Content
Which of these 3 rounds of bidding give the blindfolded observer the greatest amount of information concerning the placement of the cards around the table?

A) Pass 1♠ Pass 1NT (forcing)
B) 1♥ 1♠ 3♥ Pass
C) 1♥ Dbl 3♥ 4♣

I think you would agree that the auction C in which all 4 players made a bid is the most informative. This in spite of the fact that 1♥ and Dbl may be wide-ranging and somewhat poorly defined. There is a wide difference between a narrowly defined bid and a pass. By reducing the difference we improve overall performance of the bidding system being employed, even though there is a loss of definition in the individual bids being made. Only with auction C will the players have a fair chance of achieving the par result, 6♣* minus 1 for -100. So one should not be put out by the fact that 1♥ is light and Dbl is off-shape. At least they have opened the gates for the partners.

On the other hand it is not an objective of the bidding process to guide the opposition to their par contract. The aim is to beat par, so one must be selective in what information one passes across the table. This week in a team game I was dealt: ♠ KJT43 ♥ QT9865 ♦ 54 ♣ —. I passed in opening seat, LHO opened 1♣ on 9 HCP without ♠AQ. Partner bid 1NT. Eventually I reached 4♥ opposite: ♠ 75 ♥ AK3 ♦ AQJ ♣ AJ874. Twelve tricks were made, but 12 IMPs lost. The player with my hand at the other table opened the bidding with 1♥. His partner eventually took charge and bid 6NT, defeatable only on an impossible club lead. My teammates fumed until I confessed that I was very close to opening the hand myself. I lied, as I am just too disciplined – only 24 Zar Points! Actually, I blame my partner for underbidding 1NT with 19 HCP and 7 controls, then simply raising to game. Major suit slam are worth bidding at 50% Plus.

A further loss occurred when the opponents bid a slam missing 2 aces, which we doubled for down 1. The loss occurred when our teammates went down 2 in the same contract. We gained when our teammates stopped in game and we defended a slam from the right side for down 1 after the auction 2♣ – 2♥ (2 controls) – 6♥. Declarer tried for a strip and endplay when a simple finesse would have worked. The game was looking less and less like a Jeff Rubens’ Swiss Match LXXIX, but I am happy to report successes followed. Partner made 3NT when my RHO led the ♦K, in the suit his partner had overcalled – declarer held the ♦AQ. Good defence capped by a necessary, albeit unintentional, Crocodile Coup against 4♠ produced a happy ending for our side.

Transferable Values
Aces, kings, KQ combinations, think of these controls as being transferable values useful on offence or defence. On the other hand small cards in a long suit can be valuable as trumps, and worthless on defence. Their value may never be realized if one doesn’t get into the auction and submit them to partner for consideration. That’s it in a nutshell. The overcall is the classic action which can be made on few HCP. Why wait? If one can overcall on 7 HCP without feeling guilty, why not open light on the same cards? The light opening bid, like the overcall, doesn’t promise transferable values. In fact, it has become common that these actions don’t even promise a good suit. If an opponent assumes otherwise, so be it.

The question one must consider is how to operate in an atmosphere of uncertainty in a competitive auction where everyone (else) is talking nonsense. As the auction develops probabilities change according to what the other players have bid. The less information one can draw from such actions, the more one must rely on the a priori probabilities. Rather than rely on the opponents to tell one what one needs to know, it is better if partners get it together as the auction develops. Showing a limited, flat hand is important in the process of estimating the number of total trumps. Also, it indicates the presence of transferable values useful on defence. The flexible competitive double can be usefully employed towards that end.

The Puppet Pass

July 16th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  9 Comments 

In our recent blogs we have been looking at the effect of the wide-ranging takeout double that is becoming common among players of all ranks. We have noted the importance of taking into account the variability of the action, and the need for the opening side to resolve uncertainty by passing or doubling cooperatively with flat hands. We shall proceed along these lines for auctions that include a takeout double followed by a redouble.

In their 1989 book, ‘Partnership Bidding at Bridge’, Robson and Segal suggested an extension of the forcing pass condition from game forcing auctions to auctions in competition for the part score. Unfortunately it is unclear exactly when the forcing pass applies. The simplest example of a forcing pass is the pass by the opening bidder after a redouble by partner. The redoubler must either double the opponents for penalty or make a constructive call. Details of the standard approach are provided by Eddie Kantar on his website. A similar approach is discussed in detail by Eric Crowhurst in his 1987 book, ‘Acol in Competition’. The methods are geared towards extracting a penalty when the opposition gets into trouble at a low level.

For some the inclination to penalize is strong. One of Bertie Wooster’s most vivid memories of his schooldays is being given six of the juiciest by the headmaster after a midnight raid on the cookie jar. Perhaps it is an English characteristic that they have a strong penchant towards punishment for slight transgressions. As evidence consider the effort that here received its due punishment for being overly eager to inflict pain. It comes from the 2012 European Seniors’ Championship, Italy versus England.

Only the English duo tried to extract a penalty, giving up a score of 670. Many EW pairs played in 4♠, but one sees that their best game is 5♣. One pair reached that fine contract when East offered 3♣ over 2♥, another when West balanced with 3♣ over the forcing pass. It doesn’t matter which partner bids clubs constructively, but it has to be one of them if they are to find their 9-card fit. It is not a question of HCP, but of Total Tricks, and the number of honours held in the respective suits. Between them in the red suits (8-card fits) NS hold ♥KQT9 and ♦ AKQT. In the black suits EW hold ♠AKQJ and AKQJT. This abundance of honours in their main suits is going to increase the number of tricks available on the deal. (11 in clubs, 8 in hearts).

We can see that Vivaldi did well to bid 2♥, respecting his partner’s takeout double. One South passed the redouble forcing his partner to bid 2♦ , which lost the chance for a big score.  There is enough blame for each EW player to share in it. Neither player could be said to have a flat hand. Redoubling with a 5-card suit then suggesting penalty is not recommended with 10 HCP in the black suits. Who was in charge? In their system was Hallberg expected to respect the double, regardless, or could he pull if unsuitable?

A Simple Example from Eddie Kantar
Competitive bidding is truly complex with all 4 players at the table involved, so we begin by looking at a very simple case. If we can’t solve the simplest case, what hope is there going ahead?

The usual mantra is ‘after a redouble the opponents are not allowed to play in a contract undoubled.’ Which will it be – a double or a suit call? If East doubles he is telling partner that the penalty will outweigh the game bonus. How can he tell? He can’t, unless some information ts being passed by West that suggests rather than commands. Kantar suggests that opener pass on any flat hand, weak, strong, or in-between. That would help responder decide what is best on a guess as to the division of sides.

Here is my suggestion: let a pass ask partner to double unless he has an exceptional hand, say, a limit raise in hearts. Let’s call it a ‘puppet pass’. After partner doubles, opener will pass or bid a suit, forcing, to show a good hand unsuitable for a penalty. This is consistent with the classic ‘pass-and-pull’ option to show extra strength. If opener bids a suit immediately it is non-forcing, leaving further action to the redoubler. A direct double is cooperative, saying, ‘I don’t have a good double of clubs, but you can pass if your hand is largely defensive.’ Let’s look at the situation in more depth to see the basis of this approach in comparison with Kantar’s suggestions.

To Kantar Hand A is a clear double and he expects partner to pass for penalty. We pass with this hand expecting partner to double which we shall pass. If the takeout doubler bids diamonds or spades, partner may double for penalty, and we can pass because of the overall defensive nature of the hand.

Hand B is 3=5=3=2, with good controls in hearts, so we double with a balanced hand to give partner an option. He will need some quality length in clubs in order to make a double profitable. If he passes the double, we have a good lead in hearts and a later entry in spades to support a ruffing defence. Passing with this hand as Kantar suggests can give rise to greater uncertainty. Is partner’s double a command or a suggestion?

Hand C has 6 controls and a good minor, prime values. It has great offensive potential. Game should be available and 6♦ is possible. We treat ‘pass-and-pull’ as strong, so we need only to bid 2♦ after the double to force. With longer diamonds we can jump to 3♦ , and with a singleton club we can cue bid.

In these cases where the opponent bypasses spades, thus denying a fit in that strain, it is possible for the redoubler to make a good guess at the opener’s shape – the more spades the redoubler holds, the more likely the opening bidder is short in spades and so has length in one of the minors. If opener puppet passes he probably has long clubs and is short in spades (Hand A); if opener doubles cooperatively, he should hold a doubleton club and length in spades or diamonds (Hand B). Responder checks his spade suit to confirm the impression. With Hand C opener will bid diamonds regardless so it doesn’t matter what his partner does, but whatever he does will provide more information.

Total Trick Analysis
Methods should cover the most likely scenarios. Here is a table of the trumps available by both sides for the most common distributions where a cooperative penalty double is most attractive, namely, on misfit hands.

In Case I opener may pass to invite penalty and responder will double because he sees there is no fit in the red suits.
In Case II opener doubles cooperatively and responder has a choice which depends on the quality of his clubs. With length in spades, he can expect to have a diamond fit.
In Case III opener will be inclined to bid hearts, sooner or later (pass and pull).
In Case IV opener may have to bid 2♦ immediately to show weakness. If he doubles with defence outside clubs, responder will leave it in as he will know there is no fit in diamonds. Shortage in opener’s hand is less critical than shortage in responder’s hand, so the opener is able to suggest a penalty with just a singleton but with good defensive values otherwise. If opener were to pass as suggested by Kantar and responder doubles with 4 clubs, opener will be reluctant to pass for penalty. Here is an example.

Responder’s clubs look especially useful for defence. His length in spades, and the doubler’s failure to correct to spades or diamonds, indicates opener may be short in clubs, but that doesn’t much matter. He expects a club lead, and he has an entry in diamonds for a play on hearts or a further round of clubs. To generate tricks in 3NT opener’s intermediate hearts have to be good, and possession of the ♦ T might be critical.

In Summary
We know what makes a good, cooperative penalty double – a low number of Total Tricks with defensive values in the opponents’ suit(s). Ideally the hand should be a misfit. Of course, all this is known, so the methods adopted should be aimed at revealing this basic configuration. It helps if at least one of the players has limited his HCP range and at least one player has advertised a flat hand. It is dangerous to double for penalty with a hidden 5-card suit in the redoubler’s hand.

Footnote to Chaos

July 11th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

I pride myself that over my bridge career seldom have I gone for 800 in a part score deal. My declarer skills are such that I usually can hold it to 500. I have to admit I slipped up last week on the deal below, but it didn’t cost even 1 matchpoint. Usually idiotic performances contain little of interest to the thinking public, unless large amounts of money are involved. Money adds excitement to all facets of life. A Rolex makes even 5 past 3 in the afternoon seem exciting. Money enlivens a game of poker and adds to the tension in PGA golf tournaments – the more money involved the more poignant the short putt missed. I wonder if the same is becoming true of sex – the more it costs the more exciting it becomes for spectators and participants alike? (I believe the Supreme Court has ruled paid-for sex is allowed under the pursuit of happiness clause in the Constitution but subject to federal tax in every state but Utah, where any heterosexual act is considered to be, de jure, matrimonial, so exempted.) Money generates interest.

Any poker player who bets only according to the quality of the cards he holds is a bad player. That assessment has spilled over to bridge, where once it was assumed that a good player bids strictly according to what he sees in his hand. Past participants felt entitled to reliable information, but now it’s everybody for himself. Following established principles of Zen, professional coaches are teaching experts do what dumb players do naturally, create chaos. I attribute this, and most current human disasters, to the world-wide trend to self-centered individualism. Instead of stumbling in the dark, we can solve most problems collectively if we put our minds to it, competitive bidding included.

As noted in the previous blog, one approach to unreliable takeout doubles is to ignore them and bid as if they had not occurred, with the exception of the redouble which is reserved for showing strong hands with interest in game or penalty. So if the bidding goes, 1♦ – dbl – 1♥, this is a normal response with no immediate interest in game or penalty. It doesn’t even promise a 5-card suit. This is the expert approach to ‘competitive bidding in the 21st century’ according to Marshall Miles in his book of that name (p148f).

I was delighted to be given an opportunity to put this idea to the test. My partner, Thomas, opened 1♦ and my RHO doubled. She is a player who doubles on anything, so here was the perfect experimental set up – I ignored the interference.

I was too sanguine. The vulnerable opponents were out of their depth: 2♠ undisturbed would have been down 2, for 200, a top score. 3♦ if allowed to be played by the doubler would have been down 1, perhaps doubled. Thomas saw thing differently, thinking that the opposition held a good fit in spades, so there was a need to proceed with a presumed 9-card heart fit. Too bad I wasn’t able to go around the table and bid his hand for him. What would I have bid if I were my own partner? I would pass as quickly as is ethical. It always helps if you can see all 4 hands, besides which I don’t trust me so far as to double.

If West passes, he can lead a heart against 2♠ undoubled to set the contract by 2, in which case East’s 1♥ bid will not have proved disastrous. If West passes and North bids 3♦, will it be passed by South or will she think it is a cue bid in support of her spades? Against 3♦, perhaps sportingly doubled by West, East must not lead a heart, and is unlikely to do so.

One call that West must not make is 3♥. Bidding to the 3-level with the vast majority of points in the black suits and a badly held advertised suit is unwise, even if one hopes partner holds a singleton spade. Don’t support with support this time. As you have opened the bidding, your above average point count has been announced. The hand is balanced. If partner is short in spades and has a moderately good hand, he will bid again. Even if partner has 5 hearts, and he has not promised that number, can declarer stand a bad split in his trump suit? Clearly Thomas’s thinking is stuck way back in the 20th century.

The reader may feel Bob got no more than he deserved for his weak bid, which even Marshall Miles would find to be too much. Maybe, but I took into account the known unreliability of the opposition. We had reached a good position. Consider this: if I had the ♦Q or the ♣K to add to my defensive arsenal, bidding 1♥ would undoubtedly be the recommended action, after which raising to 3♥ would be an even worse decision.

Cooperative Doubles
In the above example one may assume for the purposes of defining a system, that NS have found a fit, even if they haven’t. In such cases a double by West is a cooperative double, showing extras and suggesting a penalty but not insisting on it. In the past it would be strictly for penalty. The more uncertain the bidding around the table, the more flexibility is required. So, North can be thought of a merely promising an opening bid of some sort, East has a hand that would respond 1♥ without interference, and South has spades and, perhaps, little else. West needn’t assume NS have in fact a spade fit, as the example shows. At best, he can offer an opinion, so he doubles on suspicion and substance. With length in spades, East can pass the double, if it comes to him, which it won’t. When North pulls to 3♦, the hand becomes an open book.

There is no compulsion to compete to 3♥ on the auction, as by not redoubling East has expressed no interest in game. Consider the uncontested auction: 1♦ – 1♥; 2♥ – Pass. Neither partner has gone beyond 2♥. If the opponents come in belatedly, there is no obligation to bid over their 2♠. Of course, one would strive to do so, but it would require something more than minimum opening bid and a minimum response, namely, shortage.

Thinking Numerically
One may discuss many examples of large swings due to random, chaotic actions and not get far, but that does not mean that chaos is not a fit subject for analysis. To make a science of competitive bidding we have to put numbers to it. In areas of high uncertainty probability is the key ingredient.  High card points lose much of their relevance, and shape takes over in the form of the division of sides, and its attribute, the number of total trumps. In the above disaster the division of sides was 8-7-6-5, so it was unsafe to compete to the 3-level, vulnerable. EW can make 7 tricks in hearts and NS can make 8 tricks in diamonds, so the Law of Total Tricks is close to the right number. The major difficulty in the bidding is that Thomas thinks there is a 9-card fit in hearts with a singleton spade opposite, making the probable division of sides 4=9=7=6 with a Total Trick Count of 18. If he passes NS may have stolen it at 2♠. They haven’t.

A blind guess can’t justify bidding to the 3-level on a flat hand. The general rule is that the player with shortage in their suit is the one who should make the decision as to whether or not to move to the next level. Let’s look at some numbers.

Case I  Total Trumps equal 16, so don’t proceed.
Case II Total Trumps equal 17, but NS have only an 8-card fit.
Case III Total Trumps equal 17, but EW have only an 8-card fit.
Case IV Total Trumps equal 18 with double fits, so advance.

With no shortage in either hand it is best to go quietly without extra controls. West might consider bidding 3♥ in Case III on the assumption that East holds 5 hearts, but he can’t be sure. East knows there is no diamond fit. Only in Case IV can one say bidding to 3♥ is likely to pay off, and it is East who should make the move after West passes to show a flat hand. He can gauge the goodness of fit better than West. If there is no heart fit, there will be a diamond fit. He can bid 2NT for takeout. Another link to probability: passing to show a flat hand tells partner your hand is among the most probable of possibilities.

The Logic Box, the Computer, and the Chimp

July 9th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  7 Comments 

In recent interview on the BBC in reference to the upcoming London Olympics, a British sports psychologist claimed the minds of competitors can be thought of in terms of 3 components: the Logic Box, the Computer, and the Chimp. Mostly athletes act like chimps, he asserted, so the trick for the psychologist is to train athletes to control their chimp brains through logical processes using data from the Computer (experience). From interviews of athletes shown on the TV we see no evidence to deny the Chimp analogy, but it seems a very traditional, not to say outmoded, view, overly influenced by the discoveries of Charles Darwin.  Cycling coaches know that in a race there occurs a critical moment where a rider must make his move. If he hesitates, he loses. Hesitation in the face of uncertainty is due largely to a fear of losing. Fear of the future, the psychologist says, must be replaced by the joy of the moment. Competitors must remind themselves it is the process, not the result, which is under their control. Their preparation must be directed towards maximizing the probability of success by minimizing their irrational fears.

It is easy to see that the same ideas apply to bridge competition. So often it is evident at the table that he who hesitates loses. If one’s aim is the control of the emotions, it follows it is the aim of an opponent to provoke the Chimp within so as to degrade the thinking process. In a BBO article about France’s participation in the recent European Team Championships, Thomas Bessis gave us some insight into the wide application of the theory of chaos to bridge. The French team had as its coach the Polish expert Krzysztof Martens, who also coaches the Monaco team. Martens’ creed is that in order to win IMPs players must go out of their way to create chaotic situations that put pressure on the opponents. For example, he feels that disciplined weak two’s are a waste of good bidding space, because they are too easy to compete against, thus are not preemptive enough. As Bessis notes, this attitude is against traditional French practices which have had conservative, constructive base. Despite their attempts at adopting a chaotic style, the disciples of Descartes did not qualify for the world championships.

According to the theory of chaos, a small change can have disastrous consequences in an inherently unstable situation. If we think of atmospheric conditions, a small rise in the global temperature may not have a great effect this year or the next, but there may come a time when a small change will tip the balance of nature and produce irreversible global changes. In the bridge world we can see how a simple, seemingly harmless action can work to create catastrophic changes. Here is a recent disaster from my local game.

This is how I imagine we would have reached the top spot. Even 6♣ would be acceptable with most pairs stopped in 4♥ , making 680. This not what happened. The lady on my left doubled my 2♦ transfer to hearts, a seemingly harmless noise based on ♦KJT65 and 2 outside jacks. John passed to show just 2 hearts, and passed my 3♣ continuation, sharing a bottom at +170. Without the double, 3♣ would be unmistakably forcing, but after the double John interpreted 3♣ as showing a weak 2-suiter. If he himself had doubled 2♦ missing the AQ, he would have had a good hand, so that is how he interpreted it. This is dangerous – opponents sometimes do crazy things, as they should. The solution is simple if one thinks about it: redouble to show this type of hand.

The damage comes not from the content (‘double shows diamonds’), but from the illusion (‘and opening points’). In fact, doubling with 6 HCP is safer than doubling with 14 HCP, because in the first case, 2♦ doubled and redoubled makes 9 tricks, not nearly enough to compensate for a missed slam, whereas with 14 HCP the intervention could be relatively costly, allowing the opposition to bid and make game based on the useful information provided. So it makes more sense to bid on nothing more than diamonds.

Over the years we have seen conventions come and go. They have success initially because our chimp brains overreact to the unusual. Gradually players become accustomed to them, calm down, and even go so far as to adopt them. Then their effectiveness fades. If they are sound, they persist, if not, they become obsolete. One of the players at our club is known for her eccentric bidding style. Her bids are unusual, but, like the double in the above case, they make good sense when viewed in the right light. Her fellow members are by now well acquainted with her tendencies, so locally the effectiveness of her approach has been reduced. However, if she plays far afield, among strangers, she invariably does well. She engenders chaos.

Countering Uncertainty
If one can gauge the information content of a bid, the Logic Box can devise counteractive measures. During post mortems one often hears sentences that begin, ‘I should have…’ Seeing all 4 hands, no one disagrees. To create chaos at the table one aims to evoke an emotional upset. Any unusual action may trigger panic in the Chimp. So how should one react, given the information content of the interference is unknown? As far as the Logic Box is concerned, ‘garbage in, garbage out’.  Drawing the wrong inference from an opponent’s bid can lead logically to the wrong decision. Most often it is better to assume minimal information with maximum uncertainty. Why? Because the more conditions one attaches to a bid, the less likely it is to have occurred. The Computer takes over and a player guesses according to probability. Consider how the 1NT opening bidder might react to the double of 2♦ under various assumptions.

If he assumes that the double shows good diamonds and an opening bid, he may decide that the best option for his side lies in competition for the part score. Under that assumption the bids may be defined as follows:

Rdbl I can compete in spades
2♥ nonforcing
2♠ transfer to clubs (2NT likes clubs, 3♣, drop dead.)
Pass you decide

This fits in with John’s evaluation, as he passed 3♣, however, the underlying assumption is wrong, and The Logic Box churns out the wrong reaction. If one makes the minimal assumption that double doesn’t promise anything other than diamonds, one must take care not to miss a big score from a penalty double, a game, or a slam. The Logic Box churns out a different scheme. Redouble is now serious- ‘I think we got them’. Pass is forcing – responder escapes to 2♥ with a bad hand, otherwise the lights are lit.

Many methods are devised on the assumption that interference is based on genuine values. When the interference is based on worthless holdings, those methods will let you down. Here is successful reaction from the same session.

To the traditionalist the bidding appears all wrong, yet 4♠ is the correct contract with a possible 11 tricks available. Without interference the auction would have proceeded normally to 4♠ at all tables, yet few reached that contract. Just getting there with 13 opposite 12 HCP on a 4-4 fit was worth a 70% score. The key to understanding the bidding is to realize the doubler is known for her eccentric takeout doubles. Here she held: ♠ J4 ♥ KJ65 ♦ AJ84 ♣ Q94, so it was not established that she possessed a 4-card spade suit for her action.  Perhaps this has become common practice.

In classic Precision redouble merely shows 12+HCP. It is a nebulous game try. All other bids tend to be competitive in nature. My doubling for penalty at the one level was optimal, with 1♥ * going down 3. My conservative 1NT bid described my limited hand to partner – not a minimum by our standards, flat, with the semblance of a stopper. It would seem natural for John to bid diamonds at this point, but he tried for game in spades with only 4 despite the double which would normally promise that suit. 3NT (making 9 tricks) was still a possibility, but my raise pointed in another direction.

Ignore Them
A calm reaction to added uncertainty is to respond as without interference, 1♠ promising only a 4-card suit, keeping in mind that the great majority of points must lie with one opponent, but otherwise assuming little about shape. To ignore the opponents’ bidding is to surrender to the idea that their action contains no usable information. Treating a takeout double as if it were a pass is less than optimal, however, one is in danger if one reads too much into it. One is negligent in not attempting to extract what information there is to be had for free.

In competitive situation partners must act cooperatively to reduce uncertainty when the hand clearly belongs to their side. One player does well to show the nature of his hand so that his partner can assume the role of captain and incorporate reliable information into his decision making. Showing a flat distribution with limited strength can be especially useful: it confirms the most probable situation and prevents partner from getting carried away by the hope of a rare combination. In the above auction, my 1NT showed a flat hand with a heart stopper and 13 HCP. My partner could use this precise description in the subsequent rounds of bidding. Rather than employing 1NT, a competitive double could have been better used to provide this description with an even better result possible.

In a recent tournament report in The Bridge World, Michael Rosenberg commented that the younger generation of players often plays poker against each other. He was hinting that the strategy of bluff and counter-bluff was spilling over to the bridge table. Yes, their matches often appear to be the latest episode of Chimps vs Chumps, where the psychological element predominates. Apparently they are having fun doing it that way. In poker one has no partner so there is greater scope for individual initiative in the cause of misinformation. I remember that 30 years ago I was soundly criticized by an opponent for opening 2NT with a singleton ♣K after I scored a top when he underled his ace. ‘You’re playing poker’, he accused bitterly, and called the director who gave me a warning. Nowadays the ploy is commonplace. It is true that it is more exciting if one bids whatever strikes one’s fancy, but in the long run one has to be concerned about one’s partner. Why take him out of the game? If one wants to play poker, play poker. Of course, that’s not the way it is going. The modern bridge player must face up to a distinct loss of information in the bidding process; one is left with playing for what is most probable in an uncertain situation. Probability trumps logic.

Insulting Your Partner

June 22nd, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

The ACBL Bulletin is geared understandably towards the vast majority of the members and most of the articles can be enjoyed by beginner and expert alike, however, the articles aimed at beginners especially can be annoyingly simple, and simply annoying. One such appeared in the June issue with the highlighted statement, ‘when you compete with an offfshape double in the direct position, you’re insulting your partner.’ First I think it is a bad psychologically to cultivate the idea that players are hostile towards their partners. I have never felt that a partner’s act is directed toward me personally. I believe a partner is trying to the best of his ability to get us a good score. Some just can’t help but bid and play badly, and we all make mistakes with the very best of intentions. It helps if one has been given a solid grounding on which to base one’s actions, by which I mean basic theoretical training, not just a set of rules to blindly follow.

Getting to the technical details, what are the requirements for a takeout double? Let us say for arguments sake that the double is defined as showing a hand with opening points and ‘support or tolerance for all unbid suits.’ That is just one way to play it, and not necessarily the best. We must now ask what constitutes support. Again, we know from experience that a double of 1♦ doesn’t give any guarantees with regard to the club suit, and often a doubleton club is held. So the restriction on shape is often compromised. If one waits for the perfect 4-4-4-1 shape, one will not double often enough.

Suppose we loosen the definition of the takeout double to include all balanced hands with opening points. This is becoming standard practice among even senior experts who otherwise bid conservatively. As noted on a previous blog, Michael Rosenberg doubled 1♦ on the following collection with no 4-card major: ♠ A53 ♥ J72 ♦ AK84 ♣ Q64. The idea behind lifting the shape requirement is the Law of Total Tricks. Most of the time a partnership will have an 8-card fit and wish to compete for the part score. It is deemed safer to enter the auction early, and try to sort it out later in a competitive setting. It could well turn out that the hand belongs to the opponents, but the interference may have had the side benefit of throwing them off, and perhaps providing the opportunity for preemptive action by partner.

With a good balanced hand in second seat, one has the option of passing or doubling. From the point-of-view of information theory, there is information contained in both bids. The more restricted a double, the looser the pass; the more information in double, the less information in the pass. So if one wishes to be informative on average in this situation, the more one doubles the better, as that increases the average information transmitted. In that context one might say that passing a good hand insults partner by keeping him the dark about the combined assets. Passing a second time adds  injury to insult.

The double upon which scorn was heaped was not unlike the Rosenberg hand: ♠ AT74 ♥ 982 ♦ AK76 ♣ J3, and the division of side was 7=7=6=6. In fact, this hand is more worthy of a takeout double because it contains 4 spades, the boss suit. Just like Rosenberg, a penalty of 300 was inevitable, and matters were made worse when the doubler corrected his partner’s escape, a violation of partnership trust. Despite this result, one can excuse it on the grounds of frequency as 7-7-6-6 is a rare division of sides, and often the opponents can make 3NT if partner has little to contribute, in which case, a double at the one-level constitutes a good sacrifice.

The game between experts is different from the game between lesser players. Some may argue that it is better to keep it simple for beginners, because as time goes by they will learn from experience how to ‘lie’ like an expert. Fair enough, but it is bad to give beginners the wrong start – some trusting souls never recover from being taught concepts that are simply not true. It is the general concepts that need to be taught properly and retained. Once they are grasped, methods follow naturally and the learner is equipped to change with the times. Rules are made to be broken. A player should be able to take a perfectly reasonable action when the situation calls for it without thinking he may be lying or insulting his partner.

The Unilateral Approach
The more precise a bid, the more information transmitted and the more leverage is given to partner. Obviously if a takeout double is offfshape, a partner will be less certain on how to proceed. Follow-up methods have to reflect the uncertainty; one has to tread lightly, bid cooperatively, and rely on likelihood estimation. If a bid is narrowly defined, a partner is in a better position to take charge and guess without further consultation. This approach suits the individualist who likes to be in a position to make the decisions. Here is an example from the USBF 2012 Seniors’ Trials Final as reported on BBO.

Jacobus opened a well-defined 1NT (14-16 HCP) and Wold had a choice of ways to proceed. His hand indicated that 4♥ would be as good a game as 4♠ , so he blasted using a Texas transfer. One sees that he could have reached game on a 4-4 fit in spades if he had chosen to explore by obtaining more information via a 2♣ Stayman bid. Although there is potential for 12 tricks in spades it would require some inspired play to gather them in, and the auction might not bring to light the JT combinations that make slam a fair possibility. So the BBO experts agreed that Wold’s approach was  best – given the narrow definition of 1NT, he could judge on the basis of his heart intermediates that 4♥ was likely to be the best contract.

The critics would be less kind if the opening bid had been a natural 1♣ (or a Precision 1♦) and Wold had blasted to 4♥ , to play. Although the result would have been the same, the lesser amount of information in the opening bid makes a unilateral decision less sound, and Wold would be criticized for ‘masterminding.’ It is a matter of degree. In the case of a Precision 1♦, one might assume on the basis of probability that opener has a balanced hand with about 12 HCP, so 4♥ is not such a bad gamble. However, the refined auction sifts out what is likely but isn’t from what is unlikely but is. Sooner or later in the auction a decision must be made based on what is probable, given what one knows.

Jacobus and Wold are an active partnership who follow the current trend of getting in early and often. Their bids are not closely defined, so the information content is low, and the damage is often psychological, which works both ways. The mainstays of the opposing Schwartz Team, the eventual winners, were John Schermer and Neil Chambers who may be classified as neo-conservatives. They buck the trend by believing in sound, therefore informative, opening bids. Their wait-and-see approach is akin to the methods of the Goren era, but their methods are modern as they encompass intermediate weak 2’s in the manner of the world’s leading pair, Fantoni and Nunes. Here is an example of the contrasting styles in action. The hand is a Standard American Bastard, too weak for 1♥ , too strong for 2♥ , vastly inappropriate for 3♥ with a 4-card spade suit on the side.

Modern players don’t believe in passing or preempting on a 6-loser hand, so what can one do? Chambers was able to open a systemically approved 2♥ : 10-13 HCP with a 6+-card suit. One sees the hand is actually below the bottom of the stated HCP range, but it is within bounds when one adds 3 points for a void. The losing trick evaluation (6 losers) makes it a bit strong for the action, but partner is always there to give a boost when appropriate. That is the theory. Not this time. One might say that it is rather unlucky that responder’s controls are in spades, not clubs, where Chambers would expect them to be most often than not. Of course, further bidding might disclose that, but here the 2♥ bid was self-preemptive and was passed out.

Wold could have opened a Precision 1♥ without great distortion, but, on the basis of probability, on average he would find partner with 2 hearts and 10 HCP, in which case 4♥ is the place to be, spade fit or no spade fit. Thoughtfully he removed the burden of bidding from his partner by opening 4♥ , giving full value to his void. As so often happens, (in accordance with expectations),  partner dutifully provides some useful cards, so 4♥ makes for a gain of 7 IMPs. The score is 129 to 102 after 54 boards.

The Gods’ Merry Jest
As we all know, Western Gods are infamous for setting up rules that are hard to follow, then putting an irresistible temptation in the way of the faithful to test their resolve. Some gods are known to do this just for the fun of it, in which cases the consequences of succumbing to temptation may not be as dire as one might otherwise expect. Let’s jump forward to Board 86 where the score has tightened up with Schwartz a mere 5 IMPs in the lead with 5 hands to play. Chambers has been dealt a 6-loser hand with which many would open: ♠ AK973 ♥ 86 ♦ 3 ♣ KT763 – the Rule of 20 and all that. This is not a sound opening by his partnership standards, but certainly the opponent will open it, so what harm can there be if just this once …The Gods are laughing as he thinks it over.

The auction proceeds smoothly along natural lines, a normal ♥ 2 is led, but when the dummy appears, Schermer sputters, ‘you have always talked about openers and you do this!’ Tsk-tsk, John, sarcasm gets you nowhere; even among seniors ever bright and cheerful is the way to go no matter what you feel down deep. Above all, avoid voicing displeasure until all the results are in. The Gods had arranged things such that 3NT rolls home on a sum total of 22 HCP. Ha-ha. Let’s see you get to 3NT opposite a passing partner.

At the other table Wold does open 1♠ , a normal bid in Precision, but Jacobus, pre-warned by experience of a possible dearth of real values opposite, timidly avoids 3NT to reach a hopeless 5♣, down 2. Thanks to Chamber’s unusual action in direct contravention of partnership agreements, Schwartz picks up 11 IMPs with 4 boards to play.

Back to Insults
The point of this last hand is that Chambers was in no way acting to insult his long-term partner; he was trying his best to win a close match. Sometimes the rules get in the way. The modern game allows players to satisfy their primal urges by bidding on garbage hands. It is a sign of the times that no one feels guilty about acting in a selfish manner and overvaluing the flimsy assets they bring to the table. Style outweighs substance. We have lived through a real estate bubble, and now we are having a bidding bubble.

There is a golden mean where the fundamentals take precedence over conventionally accepted behavior. The individual has to be given scope to apply his best judgement under particular circumstances, while for the most part bidding informatively according to preset rules when it is partner who is in the best position to make the final decision. Precision is a system that allows for this distinction as it clearly sets the captaincy in constructive bidding sequences. Standard 2/1 methods are terrible in this regard.

The big problem still to be solved is how to act in competitive auctions in which the takeout double is often the first shot fired by the defenders. If the opponents’ bids are wide-ranging, thus intrinsically untrustworthy, one must depend on one’s partner to provide accurate and useful information on which to base a decision. On the other hand it pays to get in early. The question of captaincy in competitive auctions is considered in the next blog.

The Second Law of Total Tricks

May 16th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

Bridge players are quick to quote the Law of Total Tricks to bolster their excuses for overbidding. In fact, this Law has become the foundation for a new approach to bidding which makes little reference to the high card content of the hands being bid. Of course, it is known that The Law is subject to many conditions and restraints, a major proviso being that the trumps suits represented are well stocked with honours, which they usually are on the basis of probability. On the occasions where they are not well stocked, The Law may overestimate the total number of tricks available. That has been the observation of experts, including Larry Cohen. On that basis we propose a Second Law of Total Tricks, subject to verification that goes as follows.

The Second Law: The more controls one holds in the opponents’ trump suit, the lower the expected number of total tricks.

That appears to be common sense, but the history of science has taught us not to put too much faith in common sense and logic. First and foremost one must collect and examine the data. The key word is ‘expected’, implying Law2 is not always true, but that it is true more often that not. I suspect it is most appropriate when both ‘best’ trump suits are 8 cards in length. Think of it as akin to the observation, ‘gentlemen prefer blondes’. Not always true, of course, but generally something a girl can work with.

We shall examine the effect at work in hands played in the recent 2012 USBF Trials. First a deal where NS bid and made game missing the AKQ of trumps. With inescapable losers in the trumps suit, the HCP evenly divided at 18 to 22, and a division of sides of 8-7-6-5 one would expect that there was no way declarer could emerge with 10 tricks.

Dealer: South Vul: NS	North ♠   AQ ♥   KJ642 ♦   8 ♣  JT432
West ♠   T632 ♥   AT9 ♦   AKJ62 ♣  K		East ♠   J974 ♥   84 ♦   T9 ♣  AQ986
	South ♠   K85 ♥   Q73 ♦   Q7543 ♣  75

In theory the game should be defeated with a heart trick added to the 3 certain trump tricks, but on the auction that defence is impossible to find. Hamman at some point has to lead a heart away from KJxxx. He began with the ♣J and Hampson failed to rise with the ♣A in order to pitch a heart from his hand. He won the ♣K and led a trump. Hamman still had time to play a heart, but he continued with a second club expecting to give Zia a ruff. Surprise! An impossible game made against a credible defence.

The point of this demonstration is that there is a difference between theory and practice. Players bid and play according to the odds one encounters in practice. The bidding has a great deal to do with the outcome, as the bidding provides the information on which the decisions of the defence largely depend. Logic doesn’t work in a vacuum.

One may consider Hampson’s choice eccentric, but experience has shown that opening 1NT with a singleton ♣K can win points. It is a common practice in China, where Hampson may have picked up on it. Perhaps more significant is the poor defensive bidding by Hamman-Zia. As we discussed in a previous blog with regard to a 2♣ overcall, the effectiveness of  certain bids depends on the efficacy of countermeasures available. If Zia had been given a chance to show heart support, the heart lead would have been easier to find. Suppose Hamman had bid an Astro 2♣, showing hearts and a minor, and Zia had bid 2♥ over a Greco double. Then there would be no story to tell.

During the Trials we observed many pairs making game on a major 4-4 fit missing high honours in their suit. It didn’t appear to be a concern. As in the above example, success often depends on having a good minor suit to provide discards. Here is another.

This looks bad for whoever wins the contract. The spades are missing AKJ, the hearts are missing AKJ, the diamonds are missing AKQ. Only the clubs have a high degree of quality. We guess Zia’s game bid in spades was based primarily on his holding in clubs. The division of sides is 9-8-5-4, with the expected total trumps being 18. So what are the total tricks according to Deep Finesse? West can make 1♥, 7 tricks and theoretically South can make 10 tricks in 4♠. The Law appears to be fairly accurate despite the disparity in HCPs, however, to avoid 3 trump losers, Hamman playing in 4♠ must lead a low trump from dummy and put up the ♠Q when East follows low. In practice Lall went up with the ♠K from AK3 on the first round and gave Hamman no choice but to make his doubled game.

What is most significant about this deal is that Zia-Hamman had no means available by which to punish 4♥, down 3, against a dubious 4♠. How much better if in a forcing pass situation Zia can bring himself to pass with bad spades so Hamman can double 4♥ and make it stick.  Otherwise, a double must of necessity cover a wide range of holdings, and a game bid becomes a shot in the dark. Here is another example from the Semifinals of a 4-4 major fit missing top honours being used successfully as a trump suit.

This time Zia-Hamman’s 4-4 major fit was missing ♥AKT, and the Lall-Milner 4-4 major fit, ♠AKQJ. Despite the lack of controls, and in the face of Milner’s double which presumably promised 4 hearts, Zia jumped to game on ♥Q432. The bidding was the same at the other table where Rodwell doubled and Justin Lall put Bathurst in game. From this we gather that the experts don’t put much weight on the need for a good trumps suit –  any 4-4 fit will do, provided one has a long minor that hopefully will provide tricks. In fact the heart game is better than 3NT which is vulnerable to an attack on the diamonds. The heart trumps provide protection in that area, while the club suit provides tricks.

Takeout doubles are non-descriptive these days, that is, they don’t promise favorable distribution. That is why they tend to be ignored by the opponents who bid their own values regardless. Here is an example from the Round of 16 featuring a solid citizen where getting into the auction with AK in an opponent’s suit proved expensive.

Dealer: West Vul: None	North ♠   A53 ♥   J72 ♦   AK84 ♣  Q64
West ♠   KT76 ♥   A9 ♦   QT73 ♣  A73		East ♠   QJ ♥   KQ854 ♦   J92 ♣  K52
	South ♠   9842 ♥   T63 ♦   65 ♣  JT98

Although one may opt to play in a trump suit missing the top honours, it is another matter to attempt to declare a hand when the main feature of one’s hand is controls in the opponent’s suit. Although it may be said that the doubler was unlucky to find the division of sides to be 7-7-6-6, the North cards are highly unsuitable for immediate action. After the redouble the scrambling began with nowhere to go.

The amazing feature of the deal was that the same double was employed by Justin Lall at the other table. He and Kevin Bathurst were successful insofar as they managed to play in a 7-card fit at the 1-level, rather than at the 2-level. Their -300 constituted a good save against a potential 3NT making 4. Bidding 3NT by EW is wrong in theory as the Total Tricks maybe less than 14 – the unexpected 3-3 heart split helps immensely.

A bad bid is less dangerous than it should be if the opponents are making the same bad bid. We see this effect time and again when both sides play the same flawed system. One of my favourite bad bids is 2NT by an opponent. It is a big winner in the long run for the side that can avoid it. Recently in a 7-board Team Match we won 23 IMPs on consecutive 2NT opening bids on my right, and there was nothing lucky about it. In one case the opponents reached 6♥ with 2 inescapable trump losers; in the other, 3NT with ♠x opposite ♠Jx, after a Puppet Stayman auction that failed to reveal the fatal flaw. Our teammates followed a different path and were successful in reaching 5♥ and 5♦, respectively. In the latter case, our teammate opened 1♦ because she didn’t fancy opening 2NT with a doubleton spade. A spade overcall then steered the partnership to the right contract. Information, information …. As David Burn so aptly put it, ‘where there is ignorance there is hope’, but actions shouldn’t be based mainly on hope.

Practical Percentages
It is obvious that there was a lot of hopeful bridge being played during the 2012 Trials, and it wasn’t until the latter stages that good bridge dominated. Earlier the bidding was largely ‘psychological’ in the opinion of a trans-Atlantic observer; it was a demonstration of style over substance. I equate the performance to that of a hedge-fund manager – praised when lucky, condemned when not. Justin Lall in a BBO conversation with ‘Mr Woolsey’ commented that he had learned from Kit’s articles that one should always play the percentages. We assume that his double defined above was considered to be the percentage action. The percentages take into account the possible reaction on the part of the opponents. If the opponents have no efficient way to cope with ill-defined bids, or misinterpret the bids, then the chances of getting away with bad bidding is increased.

A nebulous takeout double has low information content. The same applies to overcalls on bad suits. This means that the competitive bids on the opposition have to be flexible enough to cope on their own merits. One cannot count on the opposition having bid accurately and act according to that. Uncertainty has become their weapon. We see this effect in the hands above where players ignored the implications of a takeout double and bid their major 4-4 fits regardless. Ignoring the opponents’ bidding is not the best way to react – we need better methods than that. Flexibility is the key. I suggest an extension of the ‘forcing pass’ concept to part score bidding. In general that’s not the way it went, with partnerships snatching at games for lack of anything better to do.

The 2 Club Overcall and the Law of Limited Resources

May 9th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

When Edgar Kaplan famously noted, ‘we lost the club suit in the 1950’s…’, he was referring to the proliferation of artificial 2♣ bids that served as asking bids in a constructive auction, 2♣ Stayman being the chief example. In the modern era the natural 2♣ bid has come into vogue as an overcall. Whereas in a constructive auction the 2♣ bid is a space-saver, in a competitive auction the 2♣ overcall is a convenient way to remove the opponents’ space with a minimum danger to oneself, or so it seems to many.

At one time bridge authors advised not to overcall with 2♣ without a 6-card suit and opening points, otherwise it was deemed too dangerous. Nowadays it is too dangerous to pass with an average hand containing a 5-card suit. The 2-level has become the battleground for the part score, as many average players have learned for themselves through experience. You needn’t understand a disease in order to catch it – exposure is enough. It’s the cure that requires understanding.

I prescribe two changes to the classical counteraction: first, limited negative doubles to be freely employed for flat hands with the primary aim to compete for the part score; second, transfers (2♦ and 2♥) to be employed at the 2-level to disclose a long major, and (2♠) to show a balanced hand game try, stronger than the negative double. This scheme is a simple application of methods that are being adopted by many expert pairs.

Slush Doubles
Negative doubles, according to Marty Bergen, are a way to transfer the captaincy to the opening bidder. In his book, Negative Doubles, he states, ‘Once the responder has shown some values, the road is paved for opener to investigate the possibility of game.’ Today the primary aim is not to get to games, rather it is to win the part score battles. At teams, if game is anywhere near close, pairs will bid it regardless of the niceities.

One may conclude that slush doubles cover a range of 8-11 HCP. What of the dangers of getting caught at the 2-level if the advancer redoubles? Opener may ‘escape’ to the suit in which he opened. That might work. If with a bad card combination one fears the effectiveness of a redouble, one is not forced to double, but if one has the inclination to compete, one has a method a partner understands.

Uncertainty shouldn’t be scorned, as sometimes it acts in one’s favour when the opposition thinks you have found a good fit at the 2-level. Overbidding is less of a problem than underbidding. If you don’t overbid occasionally you won’t generate many tops.

Transfers in Competition
In his 2002 book, ‘Double! New Meanings for an Old Bid’, Mike Lawrence returns to an old problem which is this: what does responder bid after 1♦  (2♣) with these hands:

1) ♠ KJT84  ♥ A7 ♦ J53 ♣ T94    and  2) ♠ A6 ♥ KJT63 ♦ J63 ♣ T63 ?

His general rule is that responder with ‘the wrong shape’ can’t make a negative double unless he holds 11 points. He admits that he would lie and double with hand 1, as he can correct partner’s 2♥ rebid to 2♠. What will partner make of that? Lawrence would PASS with hand 2, because he has no safety if partner responds 2♠ to a double. As we have found from our own sad experiences, there is no reward for missing a 9-card fit. It is quite possible your side holds the majority of the HCP as well as a 9-card fit.

Hands with a long major can’t be ‘the wrong shape’ when one is competing for the part score, especially so when the overcaller’s values are questionable. A solution to an old problem is to transfer to the major. This gets both hands 1 and 2 into the auction, a very important attribute, and removes them from the double category. We remove the problem of whether a new suit at the 2-level is nonforcing, forcing to game, or forcing one round, a problem mulled over by Lawrence in his earlier book, ‘Contested Auctions.’  It also removes the problem of losing a major fit because one had to double with hidden length.

Example from a Recent Sectional
First we show how an overcall on a lousy club suit had the effect of removing a partner from the auction with the result that a good 4-4 major fit was missed.

Dealer: South Vul: BOTH	North ♠   AJT ♥   JT983 ♦   A8765 ♣  —
West ♠   Q542 ♥   Q542 ♦   K42 ♣   Q7		East ♠   K973 ♥   AK ♦   9 ♣  K85432
	South ♠   86 ♥   76 ♦   QJT3 ♣  AJT95

The auction proceeded without fireworks to the optimum contract. When the dummy appeared East, a retired math teacher who knows what he is doing, commented, ‘I guess you were hoping for a balancing double, Bob.’ I replied that I had given up such hopes long ago. The truth is that a balancing double may not improve the situation for NS. EW can escape to their best contract, 2♠, which is makeable. So the overcall opens up an otherwise dull prospect to some exciting possibilities.

From the point of view of the opening side, one might think that any action that ends up with an average score when an alternative action would have produced a big pickup should be considered a failure. This is too narrow a view, one that many adopt when all 4 hands are visible.  North could have made a balancing double, but the outcome it not certain.  Down 2 in 2♣* is quite possible, but it is also possible that 2♠* would make producing a bottom score for NS. North holds a 2-suiter, so does best to bid his suits. The void in clubs is a defensive liability. Also, if partner chooses to defend it is best if one holds top honours in the suit one has bid, which is the suit partner is most likely to lead.

The Law of Limited Resources
We have a simple observation that applies to the 2♣ overcall, which these days can be said to guarantee only 10+ HCP and 5+ clubs. We call it the Law of Limited Resources, a grandiose name for a simple arithmetic calculation that many ignore.

The more points you hold in an opponent’s long suit, the more points he holds in his short suits, and the lower the expected number of total tricks.

The above deal demonstrates this. South holds 5 HCP in clubs, and West holds 7 HCP in North’s heart suit, his announced trump candidate. South can assume North and East hold in total a minimum of 22 HCP. He holds 8 HCP, leaving West with 10 HCP. Clearly this is a part score deal where clubs are a bad fit for EW and hearts are a bad fit for NS. South can happily pass and await further action.

Opener is Allowed to Pass
 Responder may pass and hope for a balancing double from the opening bidder, but if there is no score to protect, a simple pass may be effective, as in the following specimen.

Dealer: East Vul: NS	North ♠   Q97 ♥   42 ♦   AJ2 ♣  AJ852
West ♠   AJ ♥   AK3 ♦   843 ♣  AT743		East ♠   5432 ♥   QJT965 ♦   95 ♣  6
	South ♠   KT86 ♥   87 ♦   KQT76 ♣  K9

On the previous board we had seen West overcall in hearts with ♥ K7632, so we had had a rehearsal of his style. John led ♦A – ♦J, which I overtook to switch to the ♣9. When the smoke cleared West was down 3. +150 was worth all 38 matchpoints for us.

I had opened on a minimal hand, and when partner passed it appeared we didn’t have a score to protect; even +100 might be OK. As I had the ♣K, if partner had values in clubs and wanted to see me double, there were many EW points scattered about in the majors. Who holds the hearts? Obviously, not NS. If 2♣ were going down, it would be unnecessary to double it. Yes! 3♥ would have produced 9 tricks for EW.

‘Why didn’t you double?’ complained my partner grumpily.
‘Why didn’t you bid hearts?’ complained the disgruntled declarer.
It’s a rare deal where both sides are unhappy.

On the next deal we missed our 9-card fit. A slush double would have helped immensely.

Dealer: WEST Vul: NS	North ♠   KJ ♥   AT5 ♦   KQ7532 ♣  52
West ♠   Q98754 ♥   QJ86 ♦   J9 ♣  K		East ♠   A6 ♥   9732 ♦   T6 ♣  AQT73
	South ♠   T32 ♥   K4 ♦   A84 ♣  J9864

Letting West score 110 was worth 2 out of 38 matchpoints, and setting 2♠* by 1 would have been worth 8. It can’t get much worse than that, a disaster at IMPs as well, as NS can make 3NT in a straightforward manner. It was not a question of whether I should have entered the auction, but when. In general, the sooner one enters the auction, the better, but using the old rules, I could not double 2♣ negatively without a 4-card major. The classical criterion for the negative double does not fit the requirements of the modern game. This is why a filthy 2♣ overcall so often presents problems to major suit orientated systems. It is better if a double of 2♣ states simply, ‘I would have bid below 2♣, either 1♥, 1♠, or 1NT’. There are more bids to come, and if you would have bid without interference, you should be determined not to get shut out by a dubious overcall. One’s methods must reflect that attitude.

From the USBF 2012 Final
Having considered the problem before the USBF 2012 Trials, I was pleased to witness the following deal which turned out to be one of the most amusing of the 120 deals played.  A poor 2♣ overcall provided Meckwell with a gain of 6 IMPs.

Dealer: WEST Vul: NONE	North ♠   AT ♥   K8 ♦   J732 ♣  AT652
West ♠   974 ♥   62 ♦   AKQ84 ♣  K74		East ♠   KJ32 ♥   AJT953 ♦   965 ♣  —
	South ♠   Q865 ♥   Q74 ♦   T ♣  QJ983

As West, Rodwell opened a nebulous Precision 1♦ as did his counterpart at the other table.  Moss felt a 2♣ overcall was in his best interest although he had no particular final destination in mind. As we shall see he was most unfortunate to find his partner with excellent support. Meckstroth was able to transfer to his best suit, planning, no doubt, to follow up with an exploration of the spade situation. Gitelman applied pressure with a 4♣ raise of the mixed variety; his major suit queens representing defensive potential. Forced to make a decision at the 4-level, Meckstroth happily chose game in his long suit. Perhaps he reasoned, ‘if they have a 10-card fit, we must have a good fit, too.’

Gitelman lead a diamond and got his diamond ruff, a reasonable plan, but that defence proved counterproductive as it cleared away declarer’s losers and left him with winners. Meckstroth had little difficulty wrapping up 10 tricks, even though the ♣K was a wasted value. A good guess, or was it routine given what the opponents had told him?

At the other table Hamman and Zia as NS passed throughout missing their 10-card club fit. Good for them. Without their help Hampson-Greco could got no higher than 2♥, making 170. If one provides information more useful to the opponents than to one’s partner, it is better done in a suit ranked above the one they are likely to bid next. A 2♣ overcall shouldn’t shut you out, and it may help a lot.

A Great Declarer in Action

April 24th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

What makes a great declarer? In a recent club game I watched my partner, John (or ‘Doc’), go about chewing up the local field to the tune of 87 out of 108 over 9 hands (81%). He does it time and time again. Later at home in an attempt to improve my own play, I looked through the hands to see how he does it. This is part of what I found.

First, there is an element that cannot be taught – the killer instinct. Here is my favourite.

Some would open 1NT on this hand, which I hate. My 3♣ cue bid showed general strength, not necessarily heart support. 3NT showed the texture of the hand, so 6NT was an easy bid given the limited nature of opener’s hand. A club was led. John later said, ‘I was about to claim 12 tricks, when I thought I should play it out and see what happened.’ As he ran the hearts, North discarded the ♠3 early. At trick 12 John played the ♠A and dropped the ♠K which North had bared from ♠K3 ♥ 6 ♦ T9643 ♣ Q8753.

As you can see, North was a player who bids on garbage, even vulnerable versus not. She calls Precision, ‘a crazy system’. As Sir Francis Bacon noted, the crafty abhor science, the wise use it. Even today there are those who would fight science with silliness. Left to their own devices, most EW pairs preferred to play in 6♥, so even a silly bid contains useful information if declarer is prepared to use it. Strange to say, 2 others achieved the same 1020, so it was not an isolated incident. Nuisance bidding that allows the eventual declarer to place the cards is counterproductive, provided that the declarer has the nerve to pull it off. John has nerve in abundance, an attribute that others lack.

Usually just being in the right contract is enough of an edge. Declarer has to realize he is in a favorable position and not take risks that might jeopardize a good result.

The field plays 1NT as 15-17 HCP, so West opens 1♣ and gets to play in 3♣, making 110. Thus 1NT has the potential of being a good contract if one can score 8 tricks. The defenders led 3 rounds of spades giving up a trick to the ♠Q. Declarer immediately led to the ♦K, which won. Thereafter he did not court disaster by repeating the diamond play. He cashed his 8 tricks and collected 10 out of 12 matchpoints. I would have repeated the diamond finesse and would have scored 9 tricks, this time. My profit would be small, my risk, great. Doc got the timing right and took no chances.

Some deals are played in a variety of contracts, so that any plus score is good. The result may reflect the inadequacies of competitive bidding as currently practiced. Here is such a deal with the HCP divided  21 -19 where any EW plus scored above average.

Dealer: North Vul: EW	North ♠  A5 ♥   AT7 ♦   KT42 ♣   A843
West ♠   J7532 ♥   53 ♦   Q86 ♣   KQ7		East ♠   KT4 ♥   KJ864 ♦   AJ53 ♣   J
	South ♠   Q98 ♥   Q92 ♦   97 ♣   T9652

 I avoid non-informative competitive bidding systems that make it easier for the opening side to get it right and for partner to get it wrong. An overcall that takes up no bidding space has to have a lot going for it otherwise. I detest a 2♣ overcall that can be misdescribed as showing ‘a one-suited hand’. This makes it easy for South to double to show clubs even on a poor suit. After asking some pointed questions about the meaning of my Astro-type bid, our South passed. John’s 2♦ bid told me, ‘I prefer diamonds to hearts’. North led a trump, and John played it well on the expectation that North held the 3 missing aces as well as the ♦K.  Yes, we missed our best fit in spades, but most NS pairs scored 110 in 3♣, their best fit. I can guess what happened at those tables.

The opening lead is often critical and the information provided by the auction may make a difference. This is fair, as it works both ways. After the Precision auction 1♦ – 1♠; 2♥ – 3♣; 3♦ – 3NT, what is your opening lead from ♠ QT93 ♥ JT8 ♦ K3 ♣ AT62 ? Next question, would it be different if the opponents were playing 2/1 where 1♦ followed by 2♥ is a strong reverse? Here is the full deal.

Dealer: East Vul: Both	North ♠   QT93 ♥   JT8 ♦   K3 ♣   AT62
West ♠   AT52 ♥   K9 ♦   T5 ♣   KJ973		East ♠   — ♥   AQ543 ♦   AQ9872 ♣   84
	South ♠   KJ864 ♥   762 ♦   J64 ♣   Q5

The information conveyed by the Precision auction is vastly different from what would be conveyed by the same auction under 2/1 rules where it normally shows 4 hearts, 5 diamonds, and 17+HCP. With Precision it can be 6-5 in the reds. I am not sure there is general agreement as to what 3♣/2♥ means. Those using 2/1 often apply Lebensohl 2NT after a reverse, so 3♣ would be natural and forcing as it was in our simple auction. To complete the description of my distribution I could have bid 3♥, but I felt on the evidence of a misfit a cautious 3♦ bid was better, a nonforcing bid that did not rule out reaching the optimum contract of 4♥ if partner were to bid again. 3NT had possibilities.

The opening lead was the ♥J run to the ♥K. This came from a player long familiar with Precision methods who has developed a liking for leading from 3-card heart suits against 3NT. Perhaps he thought it best to lead through the second suit bid by dummy. The ♦T was run to the ♦J. South could see the danger in leading a spade and giving declarer a free finesse he could not have taken for himself. He led the ♣Q to the ♣K and the ♣A. North continued clubs and declarer had the rest of the tricks. What made the defence difficult is that the spade honors were split between the 2 defenders, one holding ♠QT9 and the other, ♠KJ8. This is a possibility that defenders cannot ignore, even though it is difficult to project. Perhaps South should have overcalled.

The Bidding Advantage
From these hands I learned nothing that has not been written thousands of times in books and magazines: accurate card reading and good timing produce good results time and time again. Where do the tops come from? In theory one doesn’t score a top unless a defender makes an error. Not to be too negative about it, there is a skill in inducing such errors. There are successful predators who lie inertly on the sea bottom waiting patiently for a little fish, unaware of the danger, to swim by and get gobbled up. Camouflage is an essential component. That is not John’s way. Think ‘Jaws’. By way of contrast, good bidding constitutes an active approach that can generate tops regardless of the quality of the opposition.

In a recent article in the ACBL Bulletin about an international individual event, the winner, Chris Willenken noted, ‘With everyone playing a simple and uniform bidding system, … there were no random swings because of method. Matchpoint were generally gained and lost through bidding judgment and technical card play…’ I object to the tone of this statement. Because of the poor quality of the information provided by a simple system, such as SAYC, randomness is increased through lucky guesses in the face of high uncertainty. Swings can be generated by familiarity with the tendencies of one’s partner and/or the defects peculiar to the system itself. Let’s look at a deal where the Good Doctor demonstrated that great judgment and skill can be employed through straightforward use of an efficient bidding scheme. No guesswork was involved.

The Precision bidding was simple. 1♣ was strong, 2NT was limited and promised a flat hand, 3♠ showed spades, and 4♠ was intended to simplify the auction, a minimum raise, leaving further action to the stronger hand. John employed RKCB despite his void in hearts. The key card shown had to be the ♠A.  Why? Because with the ♥A and spades support, partner would have made an advanced cuebid of 4♥ – he wouldn’t be showing a long suit. 5NT asked for kings up-the-line, and the ♦K filled in declarer’s suit. There was enough information available to bid the Grand. Trump-wise the dummy may have been a bit of a disappointment, but the spades were strong enough to survive the normal 4-2 split. While drawing trumps John was careful to retain all 4 clubs in dummy. This proved necessary when the clubs split 4-1 with the ♣J onside. So, all-in-all, a fairly simple hand to play, but 7♠ was worth 37 out of 38 matchpoints at the recent Victoria Sectional.

I am not sure how one could get to 7♠ using SAYC, but I venture to say it would involve a great deal of chest-thumping masterminding. No pair reached 7♦. Reaching 7♠ was not sheer luck, for without the ♠J Doc would have employed a 3♣ ‘Stayman’ bid over 2NT to obtain more information concerning responder’s shape while keeping alive the chance of a 4-4 minor suit fit. In practice the 5-2 spade fit was superior to the 4-4 diamond fit, both candidate suits containing AKQJ.

Many pairs reached 6NT, making 1020, when the opening leader failed to take his ♥A, which serves as a poor demonstration of skill all ‘round. Should we laud the players who reached 6NT after an uncertain auction that induced a defensive error? Was John’s 7♠ to be considered a random disruption of normal events, or did it demonstrate that at least one player was able to reach the obviously correct contract by a not-too-arduous but subtle route?
It is wrong-headed to maintain that bad bidding promotes good card play. It might better be claimed that bad bidding promotes desperate card play. A good bidder is a good declarer who can project how the play may be pursued to a successful conclusion under a variety of possible conditions.

Slammin’ at the Sectional

April 18th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

It is acknowledged that Precision excels at slam bidding. Late in a session at the Victoria Sectional an acquaintance remarked to John and I, ‘you must be doing well, because there were so many slams.’  We were, ending a distant third. It is not well understood why Precision produces better results time and again. One of the main advantages is in the assignment of the captaincy, a weakness in 2/1 methods. When one partner takes charge, the chances of screwing it up are halved. Here is a failure in that regard.

The abnormal aspect of the hands is that the long major suit holdings do not include top honors. Responding 1♠ would be bad, one of the worse starts, the reason being that the priorities have not been established. Under that circumstance cooperative bidding practices may not be successful, as each player will downgrade because of the poor quality of his own suit, rather than upgrade because of his great support.

I supported immediately with a space consuming splinter, John made a mild slam try with a ‘Last Train’ 4♦ . I was happy to reveal my void, which acted adversely. John signed off, and I passed on fear his high card values were in diamonds, not spades. Believe it or not, taking 13 tricks resulted in a dead average board when everyone should have reached 6♥ .

I take the blame. As responder I can see it will be difficult for my partner to envision a slam when he is missing AQJT in the trump suit, therefore, rather than make a descriptive splinter, I have to take charge. My initial response should have been a takeover Jacoby 2NT, after which partner is obliged to describe his hand to me. I then decide.

This is crude, but sometimes crude gets the job done. 3♣ shows a 6-loser hand. There is no getting away from it, despite the bad heart suit. 3♦ and 3♠ show aces. It is much easier for opener to bid spades below game than above it. 4♦ shows second round control. Although the knowledge of opener’s hand is not perfect, responder knows enough to bid 6♥ . Precision limits the opening bid to at most 15 HCP, so it appears there are not enough spare controls lying around to attempt a Grand Slam. This is unlikely to be wrong, but if it is, we tip our hats to the better bidders, of which there were none.

The next deal was a bit of a mystery as getting to an obvious slam was worth 35 out of 38 matchpoints. The strong hand took charge and made the final decision.

West opened normally, so it seems initially that the slam depended on the happy placement of the ♣K, however, the chances are better than that; the opening lead can help. Indeed, the opening lead was a heart won by the ♥ K. West tried to cash the ♥ A, and the hand was over. Both minor suit kings were onside, so it merely saved time.

This result had nothing to do with Precision, but note the assignment of the captaincy. This is the way when a player opens a Big Club, which provides a partnership with a great advantage over those who have to share the responsibilities on an equal basis. A closely defined limited response can prove to be a great advantage.

This sequence is not going to win a bidding contest, but it scored 31 out of 38 matchpoints when the diamonds split 4-0. John said at the time, ‘it is the first time I was hoping for a bad split.’ If one thinks along the lines that 17+13 adds up to 30 HCP, then one is definitely off the track on this one. To bid the Grand Slam declarer needs to know is how many of those 13 HCP are wasted in spades. Finding out will not be easy. That is why so many players give up too easily on potential Grand Slams – they know that most will not get there, even if it makes. This is a sad state of affairs. Grand Slam bonuses should be increased to encourage the improvement of bidding methods.

We employ cooperative methods when called for. The captaincy can be resigned by the Big Clubber when he is at a loss of how to continue. I am good at that.

This time we bid a bad slam that made on imperfect defence. When opener doesn’t support responder’s suit immediately, we resort to ‘natural’ cooperative bidding. When John repeated spades, he was showing a 6-card suit, which I could support. I believe in the adage, ‘support with support’. This does not rule out the possibility of reaching 6♦ on a 4-4 fit, although admittedly it makes it harder. All-in-all it is better to bid simply early in the auction, and leave the clever stuff to later. John took over with RKCB.

The opening lead was a trump – some people never learn. Trumps were drawn using a diamond entry to dummy, and it was down to running off some spades hoping for a phantom squeeze or something nice happening in diamonds in a 7-card ending.

The ♦ 3 was played to the ♦ 8, losing to the ♦ J. The ♣A won the club return and the last spade was played in the hope that a squeeze may be taking effect. Judging from the accurate discarding that it had not, John discarded the ♥ 9 and played a diamond to the ♦ K. When these proved to have been dealt 3-3, he had 4 winners remaining, 12 in all.

No factual history is complete without its tragic event. It is part of the Theory of Chaos that a small slip can lead to a great catastrophe. Think of Tiger Woods: he would still be winning major tournaments if he hadn’t carelessly left his cellphone lying about the house. Here I slipped up by over-ruling the captain’s decision.

The major difficulty arose from the fact that my high-card controls were placed in my short suits. It is unusual for an 11-point hand to have 5 controls, the equivalent of 17 HCPs. The 1♣ opener usually delivers 6 controls, and with 7 controls opener is expected to make some move towards slam. I assumed our trumps were solid, partner held significant extras, and was inviting slam. Wrong. That would be normal, but good bidding is about revealing what is, not assuming what should be. I had shown my all and should have passed like a good member of the crew.

A heart was led and declarer had to decide which defender to play for the ♠QJ. Being conveniently in the dummy he finessed the ♠T, losing to the ♠QJ tight. Grrrr. Even if he had picked up the spades, he would have had to play his RHO for the ♣Q doubleton. The Goddesses of Bridge may be willing to favour you with an advantageous placement of the cards, but you still have to take advantage of their generosity. So the winning line was: ♥ A, ♠A, ♠K, ♠T, ♣A, ♣K, claim. Easy. Deep Finesse got it right.

Table Talk

Bob: I wonder why Phil Mickelson takes all those crazy chances.
John: You should know because you do the same.
Bob: That’s right! The difference is he is successful.
John: That’s one difference.
Bob: And the public loves him!
John: That’s another.

Lady; Do you play golf?
Bob: No, but I like to watch, just as I like to watch women, but take no action.
Lady: You’re showing your age.
Bob: I no longer feel the need to hide it.

Bob: I don’t see your husband playing today.
Lady: No, he was bending over in the garden and hurt his back.
Bob: He should know better by now, I mean, he is the unbending type.   (No laughter)

Man: You said you played Precision, but you didn’t alert any of your bids.
John: They were all natural.
Bob: Perhaps we all should start alerting those as well.
Man: True. (Laughter)

John:  That was one of my former patients who is still alive.
Bob: Not much longer – his wife will kill him if he keeps playing that way.

John: I wonder what the others are doing on that board.
Bob: Don’t ask, otherwise you may end up thinking just like them.