Hooray for Matchpoints

December 18th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  17 Comments 

In the Dec issue of the ACBL Bulletin a letter writer, Bob Chambers, took exception to the statement by Joel Wooldridge that ‘matchpoint scoring is not real bridge.’ Bob pointed out the many technical challenges that a matchpoint game presents, in particular the need to play to the hilt in order to maximize the score on each and every hand. Conceptually this is true enough, but matchpoint players do very well by bidding towards the middle of the field and taking their tops where they come, either through clever play or gifts from the opponents. It’s the scoring that Wooldridge refers to, and I think he is wrong on that point as well. At matchpoints it is up to the individual whether or not he wishes to follow the field and bid like a dozo.

At IMPs one can get lazy and toss away overtricks without much concern. Recently I misdefended against 3NT, making 520, which was a tie board. My partner and I bid to 6♣, making 940, losing 1 IMP to the pair in 6♥. The punishment for declaring in clubs and missing this cold Grand Slam was a pittance. It would have scored a deserved zero at matchpoints. There are rewards for bad bidding. Over 28 boards my partner and I bid 3NT on 5 occasions, going down 3 times, but gaining 9 IMPs overall, because one of the games lucked through. At matchpoints these terrible bids would receive scant reward.

Recently my Precision partner and I achieved a score of 70%, which clearly represents a miracle by Enrico Fermi’s statistical standard. As we were the only Precision players in the field, one can claim that we were bidding against the field on many hands, even though we never opened with our strong 1♣ bid. We played in 3NT 3 times, achieving a score of 34 out of 36 without the benefit of an overtrick. I put this down largely to superior bidding methods, not to wild gambling such as we encounter in Teams. Of course the advantages of 3NT are ever present. We defended 3NT 6 times and achieved a 55% average on those boards, thanks largely to one occasion when the contract was set 7 tricks for the rare score of 700 when declarer tried frantically to make 9 tricks.

The strategy in a matchpoint game is like the strategy of a major league baseball team trying to make the playoffs – tie on the road (when defending), win big at home (when declaring). One won’t score many tops against the good pairs, so we have to make up ground against the others. Against the 4 best pairs in the field, we scored a miserable 44% over 8 boards, but against the lesser lights we did exceedingly well. One may talk disparagingly about ‘gifts’, but errors are a part of the game. One must be in a position to score well against the errors that inevitably occur, which means one must push to the limit on every hand possible, especially against the weaker pairs against whom an average result is tantamount to falling behind the field.

Many players think they are playing at IMPs where a penalty double of a partial is all but unheard of.  We scored 45 out of 48 matchpoints by doubling part scores: 1♥, 3♣, 3♥ and 4♣. At Teams we wouldn’t double any of these, and the results would have been insignificant on the Victory Point scale. Of course there were risks, but when we push to the limit and beyond we have put ourselves in the position of maximizing the gain when we are right. This is one of the weaknesses of IMP scoring – there is little punishment for overbidding outrageously. The most interesting matchpoint double came on the following combination and it didn’t depend on an overbid for its success.

My reasoning may have been faulty but it worked. My book bid is 2NT, going down 1. Even an underbid 1NT doesn’t look profitable as it won’t score well on the marked heart lead. As partner might have balanced with 1♠or 1NT, we can assume declarer’s points lie largely in the heart suit, leaving partner with stuff in the minors. Playing to put declarer down 1 is especially risky, but as the opponents are vulnerable +200 would be a great score for us. So it transpired: declarer had 6 tricks off the top and we had 7. It would have been a bottom for us if declarer’s shape had been a more suitable 3=5=3=2 instead of 3=5=2=3. However, one zero is tolerable, and we would still have scored 70% out of our 4 doubles of part scores. Partner was understandably perturbed by my pass, but we can only hope this doesn’t deter him from balancing doubles in the future.

It is worth noting that the division of sides was 8-7-6-5 with a Total Trump count of 16, a exact predictor of the Total Tricks available. If partner had had 1 more club and 1 less  diamond the division of sided would be 7=7=7=5, a Total Trump count of 15, but declarer would make 7 tricks unless we were smart enough to cash 2 top clubs before attempting a trump promotion on the 4th spade – not an easy defence – impossible after my trump lead. I think this illustrates the excitement one may create in a matchpoint game. The requirement is there for accurate play and defence that would not be a factor at Teams, where I would be obliged to grope for a game just in case one of them was making. (In fact, a Moyesian 4♠could come home, but no pair achieved that result.)

The Adventure of the Four Nines
There is no great merit in playing to avoid disaster. It is akin to converting your paper money to gold coins and burying them in the backyard, as Samuel Pepys did during The Great Fire of 1666. Very often at Teams one declares a hand in a plodding fashion which appears to represent the safest route to making a contract. Here is an example of a hand that was turned into an exciting adventure, not always the best approach.

After partner’s 1♦ overcall, which promises good value, I explored alternative contracts with a cue bid of 2♣, not guaranteeing a fit with diamonds. The jump to 3♦ was unwelcome, and I was endplayed into bidding the ubiquitous 3NT. When the dummy appeared I noted the absence of the ♦9, the curse of Scotland. Not being superstitious and keeping in mind that at matchpoints one should play for as many tricks as may be made on a good day,  I planned to set up the diamonds. I had the entries.

At Teams I should ignore the scant possibility of setting up diamond tricks and play to make 3 tricks in spades – win the ♣A and overtake the ♠9 and plug away expecting to have an entry both in clubs and hearts. Boring!  At Matchpoints I put in the ♣9 hoping that would provide an additional entry to dummy from which to play a low diamond towards the hidden hand. No such luck as the ♣9 was covered by the ♣T and my ♣Q. Maybe the ♣7 would provide some protection.

The next step was the lead a diamond towards dummy hoping to drop the ♦9 in 2 rounds. The quick appearance of the ♦K gave me pause. I ducked and a club put me back in dummy. I played the ♦A pitching a spade, but the ♥9, not the ♦9, made its unexpected appearance on my left. Interesting card. The bad news was that the RHO had diamonds to cash, but hopefully with no entry. So now we had to revert to overtaking the ♠9 and hoping for some help from the LHO who seemed to have all the opposition’s points outside diamonds. Here is the full deal.

Here was the position when South took the first spade.

South, who scored 50% on the session, went for the quick kill by cashing the ♣K hoping to drop the ♣J from either hidden hand. The uninformative cuebid added to the confusion as I might have been dealt a 5=4=1=3 hand. When that failed she found she had endplayed herself. If she had exited a heart I would have played 3 rounds ending in my hand before playing another spade. The play of the hand had turned into an adventure akin to Around the World in Eighty Days full of misadventures and suspense but with a happy ending albeit one lacking the bracing presence of Shirley Maclaine.

There are 2 points to make.  If I had played safely from the start I would have achieved the same top score that required a defensive error and a double thrown-in. With half the field in 3NT it had appeared initially that overtricks were important. Not so. This was a difficult hand to play, so being competently careful would have been enough. Secondly, resting in 3♦ making 130 would have scored 80%, so there was no need for heroics. One needn’t imitate the field in its errant ways. It’s like the stock market: by getting it right one profits when the market is going down as well as when it is going up. Proper hand evaluation is the key, and bidding solely according to HCP is not it, but when all’s said and done the contract was fun to play, which is what counts most.

When compared to Matchpoints Team equals Tame. One must be careful if for no other reason than consideration for one’s teammates. Bidding with abandon without fear of punishment, never doubling contracts on the off-chance they might make, playing as safely as possible in anticipation of bad breaks, avoiding good slams, all these practices make for a boring game. A long match against experts can be a good test in which psychology plays a part, but a matchpoint game against variable opponents requires a finer judgement that varies with the circumstances. Hooray for Matchpoints.

What Happens When We Increase the Retirement Age
Announcement: Passengers are reminded for their own comfort and safety to speak loudly and clearly when addressing the cabin crew.
Passenger: Steward, please bring me a bottle of plain, distilled water.
Steward: Another? You must be part camel! Say, aren’t you Doris Day?
Passenger: Ma’am, I’d like a tuna salad sandwich on half-rye, no pickle.
Stewardess: Fine, but go and wash your hands first, young man.
Stewart: Nancy, how about you and me getting together after we land?
Stewardess: Thanks, Larry, but I got to baby-sit my granddaughter’s kids.
Pilot to Co-Pilot: Remind me again, what’s our destination?
Co-Pilot: Hold on, I wrote it down someplace.

Highly Defective Bids and Plays

December 10th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Frank Stewart is a respected bridge columnist whose work appears regularly in the ACBL Bulletin. In the Dec 2012 issue Frank turns angrily upon a fellow contributor who had the audacity to describe as highly effective a weak 2♥ on the following collection: ♠ 8642 ♥ KJT865 ♦ QJ4 ♣ —. He writes, ‘it distresses me that some players would embrace….flights of fancy that disrespect the partnership nature of the game’, and ‘I question the tendency to bid when no bid is descriptive.’ At least he recognizes that there is method in this madness where an advantage is being sought through chaotic actions that leave everyone in the dark, including one’s partner. He simply doesn’t like it. It’s against the law of political correctitude to question any strongly held belief however misguided, and I hope he sets us an example by getting away with it.

We sympathize with Stewart’s oft expressed view that bridge is a game of logic and discipline which acknowledges that one has a partner who is entitled to use his judgment based on the accurate information provided him. That is an approach that is becoming rare in today’s bridge environment. Increasingly players adopt an individualistic approach. My impression is that whenever I make a highly unusual bid very often I generate a good matchpoint score, and the worse the action the better the result, on average. Of course the tendency is to forget the bad boards. Be that as it may, there are circumstances in which partner for good reason needn’t be told everything.

The chaotic approach is scientific – behind it stands the science of statistics which deals with accumulated random events. One may play with the field patiently waiting out the process by playing for averages and accepting the tops when they are presented. If yours is an average pair in a field of 13 pairs you may have to wait a long time for your turn to win, which requires more patience (and time) than many possess. Alternatively one can strike out against cruel fate and throw the dice playing for tops and bottoms thereby increasing the variability of your end results. You’ll win more often and look bad more often, being on average just your average selves. It’s easier than thinking long and hard. As for long-suffering partners, they have to learn to bear with an errant co-conspirator who is merely doing his best (or worst) to secure a top.

To reasonable folk the strategy of misinformation detracts from the game which doesn’t need more randomness than it legitimately possesses. To such players I present the following case of payment come due. How do you play the following hand on the lead of the ♦T with the bidding as shown?

Playing 2/1 I shudder when I pick up a beautiful 18 HCP hand rich in controls. The bidding promises to be a nightmare. West bids 2NT without a club stopper and East has no accurate way to describe the nature of his powerful support. EW have reached a sub-optimum contract when 12 tricks are available in either major, but, not to worry, at matchpoints overtricks count for a lot in a mixed field. Suppose declarer ruffs the opening lead and finesses the ♥J losing to the ♥K. The ♦9 is ruffed in dummy, South dropping the ♦K. The ♠J is finessed, losing to the ♠Q. The ♦8 is returned, ruffed by South. A heart is ruffed by North.  Somehow declarer has managed to go down 1, but as the saying goes, he has company, 6♠ being bid by some zealots. The passive defenders as usual take only what they are given, but here that was plenty. At our table a crazy preempt got in the way and I found myself as East playing in 4♥.

It looks as if the preempt has done its work, and confusion reigns. Why didn’t Pard bid 3♠?  Anyway, the ♦K is led. Doesn’t that ring alarm bells? North’s penchant for undisciplined preempts is burned in my memory and this looks like one of those as he has a long suit headed by the Queen at best. I play low and ruff in hand to lead towards the ♥AJ6 in dummy, putting up the ♥A dropping the ♥K. Outside honour #1 has just made its appearance. I lead a club to the ♣A and lead a second heart to the ♥9 and ♥J, winning when North shows out. Hmmm. This is looking extremely fishy. So there follows the ♠A and the ♠K dropping the ♠Q, outside honour #2. I had been planning to discard a spade on the ♦A, playing for the clubs to be 3-3. Instead I discard the ♣6 on the ♦A and lead a club from dummy. The ♣Q appears, outside honor #3. A heart exit to the ♥Q and a spade back means I lose 2 trump tricks. Not optimum play to be sure, but a tie for top with the wimps who played 4♠ for maximum safety. Here is the full deal.

It certainly appears the contract would be better played by West in 4♠ (or 6♠), so the preempt seemed to have served its purpose, but a little knowledge goes a long way when facing a player whose errant tendencies are familiar. Prior knowledge is part of the information package we bring to the table, but what if we are facing unfamiliar opponents? Now we must rely on partner’s bidding to reveal the nature of the overcall. Standard methods tend to show overall strength without specific reference to the overcaller’s suit, with the result that 3NT can be missed when each player holds honours there. The natural assumption is that the overcaller has values in his suit. This is no longer guaranteed. It helps to known just how bad the overcaller’s suit is.

Suit Combinations
The Friends of the Forest Handbook contains this advice on the very first page: ‘if the occasion for taking a finesse presents itself, take it.’ Later on it states, ‘losing a trick unnecessarily to rectify the count is just what it says, unnecessary.’ Here is a suit combination discussed under the category of easy decisions: ♥A94 opposite ♥KJ6. ‘The best way to make 3 tricks in the suit is to cash the ace and finesse the jack’. Alright!

Contrarian that I am, I want to prove the book wrong, so playing in 2NT  on a club lead, I win and duck a spade with ♠AKT94 in dummy. Later a heart discard from ♥ KJ6 sets up a triple squeeze in spades, hearts, and diamonds. Being clever may not to be smart – most made more tricks by finessing the ♥J on a heart lead from the Queen and playing the spades off the top. The point is that the best play in a suit often depends on the external circumstances: not everyone is going to make the same lead.

Here is an example where I can show the full deal. How do you play this spade suit for the maximum number of tricks in 3NT: ♠A7 opposite ♠QT654? Suit Play advises playing the ♠A and finessing the ♠T. Love those finesses. Duncan Smith, our local expert on suit combinations, played the ♠A and the ♠Q making 4 tricks in the suit. When questioned by his brother Matt, the internationally respected director, he claimed this was the textbook play. The result was another total top for the Smith brothers.

Personally, at the table I never question a winning play, preferring to think there had to be a good reason behind it. Why dim the warm glow of success? Back home I question everything. The Dictionary of Suit Combinations makes a distinction on which opponent is more likely to hold the ♠K. If the LHO, play the Queen; if the RHO, play the ♠T. There must have been something in the play that suggested to our expert the right course of action, something he was not eager to reveal. Here is the full deal.

The opening lead was the ♣7 to the ♣9-♣T-♣Q. There was the clue. A lead of declarer’s bid suit when there is no sequence behind it, even when that suit is clubs, indicates a tough choice had to be made. Of course, a spade would never be led, but why not a red suit? The tea leaves indicate poor holdings in the red suits, and a possible entry in spades in case the club lead proves successful.

Well, one can see that I missed my chance when the ♠A was led at trick 2. Do you see it? I should have dropped the ♠J. Now Roudinesco recommends declarer duck a spade all ‘round, so I would make my ♠9 and Pard his ♠K. But that depends on declarer buying my having a doubleton ♠KJ. That doesn’t quite fit, although it’s worth a try.

What is the best lead? Recently there has been discussion on short suit leads against 3NT inspired in part by the computer studies of Tad Anthias presented in the book Winning Notrump Leads co-authored with David Bird. It is one of those deceptions that can fool declarers and partners alike, but if one hits a good suit in partner’s hand the deception applies to declarer only. Low from a doubleton is the current practice, so with this hand the ♦2 might do the trick. Now when declarer plays the ♠A and the ♠J drops under it, there is more reason to think it could indicate ♠KJ doubleton with the opening leader holding ♠9832. It might work against a clever declarer who knows what he is doing, but readers of the F-o-t-F Handbook will not be deterred from finessing the ♠T next. The instinct for self-preservation is a wonderful thing. The result can be no worse than the zero we received. I find that I am saying that a lot.

What America is Coming To
Tonight’s sports break is brought to you by  Squeeky Sneakers:
Chicago Bulls 119, San Antonio Spurs 109
……late in the third quarter
I am Barak Obama and I approve this message.

Pass or Bid?

November 27th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

It is generally acknowledged that the side that opens the bidding gains an advantage. That attitude has spread to the side that faces a light opening bid – it is better to get into the auction early than it is to see what transpires before making a move. The result is that bids have become less informative as the traditional restrictions have been lifted, with the result that auctions today intentionally involve more guesswork. Inferences are less certain. It follows that competitive bidding is an increasingly important aspect of winning bridge. Before we get into that, let’s have a brief look at some factors affecting the decision as to whether or not one should open the bidding ‘light’. Here is a deal from the recent English Premier League Match 7-7 broadcast over BBO where the commentators expressed mixed feelings as to whether West should not have passed initially.

The hands possess a 8-7-6-5 division of sides with a trick total of 16 in accordance with the Law of Total Tricks. NS can make 110 in 2♥, EW 90 in 2♦. The optimum contract for NS is 120 in 2NT. Both sides should go down in a contract at the 3-level.

The South hand is clearly worth an opening bid on the power of the 14 HCP held. The West hand has just 9 HCP, but if we add 3 points for a void, the resultant sum of 12 points qualifies the hand for an opening bid of 1♦ under the guidelines advocated by Charles Goren. Under the Zar point method the West and South hands are equally qualified. The difference in quality is that composition of points for the South hand is predominantly in ‘transferable’ power points, whereas the composition of points for the West hand is dominated by shape. The West hand may generate many tricks if a fit is found in diamonds and/or spades, which is not guaranteed, but not improbable.

Pass Now, Pass Forever?
At one table the West player seemed to gain an advantage by passing throughout.

In 3rd seat opposite a passing partner Osborne made a protective preempt on an inappropriate hand. Jason Hackett reached the optimum contract for NS, but his brother, Julian, aimed higher. Hinden led the ♦4, won by the ♦J. Unaware of the situation, declarer led a heart to dummy to set up tricks in that suit, won the club return, and unblocked his ♦A before leading a spade from his hand. Hinden won with the ♠K and cleared the diamonds with the entry to cash them later.  This resulted in down 2, an extra undertrick that would be very valuable at matchpoints, but which stood to gain little at IMPs. The major factor in the NS loss was the exuberance of the North player, which is understandable as no one chooses to play in 2NT these days.

At the other table the West player entering the bidding at a later stage, but that led indirectly to a big loss. Psychology played a part.

Once again, in 3rd seat a player felt the need for action, but the lower level gave South the chance to bid under less pressure. Having passed initially, King felt the diamonds were worth a bid within a constructive context. Allerton might have bid an invitational 2NT on values, but went for the game bonus. King felt his hand was worth a great deal on defence opposite a questionable opening bid from partner. Which side would benefit most from the information exchanged?

Jagger won the lead with the ♦J, but unlike Hackett he began by playing a spade towards dummy. Of course, he had been made aware of the danger in the diamond suit. A spade to dummy, a club finesse, followed by a second spade allowed West to win the ♠K, take his 3 tricks in spades, and exit with a diamond. Here was the 6-card ending where declarer was stuck in his hand having to yield the setting trick to East for a tie board, but a strange thing happened.

South led the ♥2 to dummy, but East ducked! This error enabled declarer to cash the ♦K squeezing East in hearts and clubs, so 3NT* made for a gain of 12 IMPs. The reason this lapse on defence holds our interest lies in the question as to what extent it was caused by the unusual bidding of the West player. In theory East should have had all the information needed to come up with a simple conclusion. As with many errors that don’t make sense, we have to look to the surrounding circumstances. This error might have been avoided if West had followed Hinden’s example and passed throughout, or better yet, opened 1♦ and let the auction take its natural course. The double of 3NT punished partner’s initiative with no partner-proof opening lead to back it up. East, not at his best, may have suffered from the pressure.

The Psychology of Multi-Source Messages
If this were an isolated example one might dismiss it as totally random event of the kind that shouldn’t have happened but did. There is more to it than this as it is not uncommon even for experts to err egregiously during and after a competitive auction.

Normally the more sources of information the better, but that doesn’t work out well when the sources are putting out different messages. (The US intelligence community has proved that once again in the Benghazi incident.) When conflicts arise one has to choose how much credence to give to each source. It is easier to evaluate the information given by one player than it is to collate information from 3 participants. The mind may become overloaded with information with all players active, giving their own self-interested interpretation of reality. So, just the fact that all 4 players are bidding can cause unwarranted confusion as the players’ circuits get overloaded. There are computer programs that can extract the message from the noise. One must train the brain to do the same, but it is made much harder by reactions of the mind to a variety of stimuli, a necessary function in times of danger. For example, in broad daylight one happily ignores background noises, but home alone in the dark, one is sensitive to unusual sounds. Later, given time to reflect, one can calmly draw the correct conclusions, but at the time one’s mind was playing tricks by over-reacting to what was harmless ambient noise.

From this one concludes there is always something to be gained from entering the auction if for no other reason that to generate the confusion inherent in multi-source communication. This is quite apart from transmitting a desire to compete for the contract. An example of how this works comes from the 2012 European Champions Cup.

East-West were the Russian pair Mikhail Krasnosselski and Eugenyi Gladysh who proved fair game for the psychological ploys of their famous opponents. Helgemo made an innocent-looking vulnerable overcall on a decent spade suit with a second major suit available in an emergency. It was lacking in other respects. Krasnosselski doubled rather than show where his main hope lay. Helness added to the noise with a featherweight raise that ate up bidding space. The Russian bid their suits without implying extras with the result that they stopped in game. That would be a reasonable conclusion if NS held 12 HCP or so, but their opponents at the other table, Zimmermann and Multon, were able to bid and make 7♥. Obviously the Russians didn’t have the methodology at hand to counter trivial interference; they were unable to turn on the lights, as it were.

Let’s consider what information must be made available for EW to reach slam, then we might find methods for getting there.  West would like to known East’s holding includes: ♠A  ♥ Q ♦ K ♣ AKQxx . East would like to know West’s holding includes: ♥AKxxx ♦ A ♣ xx. It is easier for East (the stronger hand) to get the necessary information. So West has to bid hearts early, show his 5 controls, and deny shortage in clubs. This is actually quite easy to do, as follows.

The essential first step is that Krasnosselski has to show a game forcing hand with a long heart suit, the main feature of his hand.  Gladsyh has a heart fit, so needn’t fool around with clubs directly: he asks for key cards, disclosing the fit. 4NT asks for more information on the way to slam. 5NT agrees to slam without a specific feature to show, the 2 jacks being undisclosed positive attributes. Gladsyh knows enough to bid the grand. He expects to take 1 spade, 5 hearts, 2 diamonds, and 5 clubs. The appearance of the ♣J is a welcome sight, otherwise he might have had to rely on a minor suit squeeze.

Of course, Gladsyn doesn’t know everything, so he cannot guarantee 13 tricks in 7NT. He does know what is probable. It helps that Krasnosselski is given the opportunity to express general encouragement. That could be based on a 6-card heart suit, or perhaps, the ♦Q. Whatever it is appears to be enough. The opponents bidding of spades was helpful in that EW could confine their interest to the quality of the other suits.

General Guidelines for Competitive Bidding
If the opponents are going to hand out extra bids, one should use those extra bids efficiently to transmit trustworthy information that distinguishes between power points and distributional values. The more unreliable the opponents the more accurate must be a partnership’s constructive agreements. Show your good suit(s) early and use doubles to show flexibility. Have a way of asking for key cards cheaply below game. Use 4NT to elicit partner’s opinion. Use cue bids as a general game forcing bid with the implication that 3NT may be a viable alternative. A cue bid may be used to initiate a cooperative effort when the opening bidder hasn’t enough in the way of controls to take charge unilaterally. It is not necessary to limit the bid to being a raise to game in responder’s suit. For example:

Bridge bidding has the charm that there is underlying the exchange of information a reality that will be revealed in its entirety when the last card is played. The lie of the cards is the focus of endeavor, be it to resolve the uncertainty, or to increase it. In the end one cannot speak comfortingly of a compromise between two subjective versions of the truth, yours and mine – there is only one irrefutable truth which eventually becomes apparent for all to see. The partnership whose perception is closest to the truth in the essential details operates with a distinct advantage – simple as that.

Specificity and Probability

November 19th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Normal English conversation tends more towards vagueness than specificity. ‘What exactly do you mean by that?’ is considered an impolite challenge to the speaker. The requirements of mathematics demand exactitude; the primary tasks of a mathematician are to define his terms and to limit his frame of reference. Unlike in political discussions hand waving appeals to general principles that may or may not be applicable to the matters under consideration are to be avoided. Unfortunately, common usage applied to mathematical problems may sometimes mislead the untrained mind along the wrong path. This is especially so with regard to probability, as words like ‘probably’ and ‘likely’ are vaguely understood. When asked for a definition of ‘a miracle’, Enrico Fermi replied, ‘anything with a probability of less than 20%’. Whether of not you can agree with that, it does present a firm basis for discussion.

Here is an example that illustrates how specificity can mysteriously transform probabilities. The key conclusion is that probability in card play depends not only on combinations, but also on permutations in play, or as we put it, ‘plausible plays’. Suppose we have two packs of cards. From each we draw a card at random. The question is: what is the probability that 1 red card (r) and 1 black card (b) have been drawn? Most will know that the probability of that occurring is 50%. Both red and both black draws each have a 25% chance of occurring. Let’s look at the 4 possible permutations in the draw.
b-b b-r r-b r-r
 Checking the r’s and b’s we can see how the expectations are manifest in the possible draws.

Next we ask the question, ‘if one of the cards is red, what are the chances that the other card is black?’ Note we have added information by restricting the results of the draw. Without much thought one might conclude that the other card stands to be red, because the a priori odds of b-b was only 25% whereas the odds of one black and one red was 50%. The ratio of 50 to 25 is 2:1. Let’s look at the remaining permutations:
b-r r-b r-r
Sure enough, there are 2 permutations for mixed colours and only one for the same colour.
One might conclude that the information provided has not changed the probabilities one iota. On this basis many bridge writers wrongly tend to rely on a priori odds in their analysis of card play.

Let’s now be as specific as we would at the card table and say that one of the cards is the ♥ Q. What is the probability that the other card is black?  A false argument is that it doesn’t matter which red card was drawn from the one deck, the draw from the other deck is independent of that, so the odds must not be affected. This is where Galileo got it wrong. To get it right look at the possible permutations:
b-♥ Q ♥ Q-b r-♥ Q ♥ Q-r
The chances that the other card is black is now 50%. What has happened? The r-r permutation has been split into 2 equally probable draws: ♥ Q on the right and ♥ Q on the left. If the ♥ Q has been drawn on the left, it is 50-50 that a black card has been drawn on the right, and similarly if the ♥ Q has been drawn on the left. It is obvious that the probability of a black card being drawn is 50%, provided you think of it in the proper way. The surest way to the correct answer is to consider the possible permutations in the draw. Specify.

Specificity in Card Play
With reference to the previous blog, let’s consider the case of declarer playing a club to his ace when the opponents hold 5 clubs. We shouldn’t think of the cards as ♣QTxxx, we have to be specific: ♣QT842. Next we assume the defenders would not follow with a club honour unless they have no choice, but that the other cards can be played equally at random. Consider the case where the clubs are split 2-3. There are 10 combinations for 6 of which the ♣Q on the right and for 4 of which the ♣Q is on the left, so the odds are 3:2 the ♣Q was dealt to the RHO. Here are those combinations.

Suppose that on the first round of clubs the LHO has followed with the ♣4 and the RHO has followed with the ♣2. The 7 combinations listed on the right are no longer possibilities, leaving us with just 3 possible combinations listed on the left. Before play in the suit they were equally likely. Is it still so? That depends on the probability that the sequence ♣2-♣4 would have been chosen at random. With the first 2 combinations, the RHO could have equally played the ♣8 or the ♣2, so there are 2 equally likely permutations in the play ♣8-♣4 or ♣2-♣4. With the third combinations the RHO was obliged to play the ♣2, but the LHO could have played the ♣8 instead of the ♣4, so again there are 2 equally probable permutations in the play. All 3 combinations have 2 possible variations in play to choose from, so they can be treated as equals in the calculation of the probabilities. The probability of ♣Q on the right is now twice the probability of  ♣Q on the left, because there are 2 equally probable combination of that sort to 1 of the other.

A False Argument
Let’s now put forth a false argument of the kind one might encounter at a casual post mortem in the pub. Let the clubs be designated as ♣Qxxxx, where x represents a low card. On the first round of clubs the RHO and LHO follow with low cards. That leaves us with 3 possibilities remaining: Q opposite xx (1 case) or x opposite Qx (2 cases). So it appears the chance of ♣Q on the right is twice that of ♣Q on the left. This was true when the cards missing included the ♣T and the number of plausible plays is the same for each combination remaining, but it is not true for ♣Qxxxx. Let’s lift the play restriction on the ♣T by converting it to the ♣6. Again there are shown on the left the 3 combinations still in the running after one round of clubs is played.

With the first possible combination the RHO could have equally chosen to play any of 3 low cards, so the chance of seeing ♣2-♣4 is 1 in 3. With the other 2 combinations, the RHO had 2 equal choices and the LHO had 2 equal choices, so all together there are 4 available permutations (plausible plays) to choose from, so the chance of seeing the ♣2-♣4 is only 1 in 4 for each. The fewer the number of choices available the greater the probability that a specific choice has been made. As a consequence, the existence of the first combination is greater than the second or the third in the ratio of 4:3. However, there are 2 combinations with the ♣Q on the right, so the probability that the ♣Q is on the right is 3:2, just as it was before a club was played.

This demonstrates that under the circumstances the play of 2 low cards has not changed the a priori odds that the ♣Q was dealt to the RHO. To achieve this result we had to consider the number of plausible plays for each combination, otherwise we might conclude wrongly that odds have changed to 2:1. On the other hand, if the number of plausible plays is the same for the remaining combinations then a direct comparison of the number of combinations remaining is a valid procedure for obtaining probabilities.

Consequences
The a priori odds are subject to change. If one is to calculate the a posteriori odds on the location a queen, it is not sufficient to compare solely on the number of combinations remaining for the queen on the right and the queen on the left. It is necessary to allow for the number of plausible plays available for each combination. Only if the number of plausible plays is the same for each combination can a direct comparison be made.

A Best Laid Plan

November 8th, 2012  ~  admin  ~  10 Comments 

The following problem was suggested by mystery man Jim Priebe who in a team game defended a slam in which both declarers went down.  The problem involves a fundamental probability calculation after a number of cards have been played. It illustrates the difference between a priori probabilities and a posteriori probabilities.

In order to calculate probabilities in 2 suits after something is known about the other 2 suits from the bidding and play, we assume a random distribution in the unplayed suits. This means that probabilities can be calculated exactly form the numbers of possible card combinations. This relates to the probability of the deal. Sometimes a refinement must be added that complicates matters as on the following example where the distributions of spades and hearts become known, and a decision must be made on best play in clubs and diamonds when there is a wide discrepancy in the number of vacant places.

North leads the ♥J heart, ruffed in dummy. Declarer leads the ♠7 towards his hand and is much surprised to see South show out. He wins in hand finesse in trumps, cashes the ♠A and return to hand with a club to the ♣A in order to draw the last trump. South has discarded hearts throughout. When he draws the last trump he shall have to discard a card from a minor suit in the dummy, so before that he must decide how he will play the minors for 1 loser. There are 2 apparent choices:
play North for at least one of the missing diamond honors, roughly a 75% chance a priori;
play for the clubs to have been split 3-2, a lesser a priori probability .

Let’s see if the bidding and play have changed the preference for the play in diamonds. The discards by South indicate he began with 5 hearts, leaving North with 6 hearts. North had 4 trumps, so the vacant places available for the accommodation of the 11 minor suit cards is 3 in the North and 8 in the South.  These are the possible splits remaining.

Now we must take into account that one round of clubs has been played in which North followed with a low club, but not just any low club, but with the ♣2 specifically. This means that the only possible remaining 1-4 club split is  ♣2 opposite ♣QT84.
Furthermore, suppose South has followed with the ♣4 so the remaining 2-3 club combinations have been reduced to just 3 in number: ♣82  opposite ♣QT4, ♣T2 opposite Q84, ♣ Q2 opposite ♣T84. At this point the combinations remaining are as follows:

To simplify the calculation we assume that South would have played differently if he had been dealt 6 diamonds to go along with the 5 hearts, so this possibility can be neglected, leaving us with 2 cases to consider. The club play will fail for all 15 combinations with a 1-4 club split, but will succeed for all 18 combinations with 2-3 splits.

If South had been dealt 4 diamonds, the best decision would be to play on diamonds hoping for split honours there. The numbers of successful conditions for leading the ♦J from hand planning to run it if North plays low are given below.

The number of combinations for which the diamond play will succeed is 15, so the club play is favoured in the ratio of 6:5. Note that taken in isolation the chance of the diamond finesse succeeding when the diamonds split 2-4 is not 75%, it is only 60% (9 out 15 possible combinations), so it is dangerous to generalize from the a priori expectation.

There is one further refinement to be considered, and that is the number of plausible plays in the club suit. The plausible plays determine the probability that the plays of the ♣4 and the ♣2 would be chosen by the South and North players under the various conditions shown above. It so happens that there are 2 plausible plays for each combination shown, so a direct comparison of the number of club – diamond combinations is justified in the determination of the relative probabilities. This comes about because neither defencer would part with either the ♣Q or the ♣T if there were an alternative play available. Thus we are in a restricted choice situation, and what I have called the Extended Kelsey Rule can be applied. (That is, in the calculation of probabilities it is correct to compare combinations directly when there is equality in the number of plausible plays.)

The Unexpected Ending
It remains to give the solution to the real-life mystery: the winning play at the table was to go for split honours in the diamond suit. Against the odds clubs were dealt ♣QT84 to the South, the only losing combination for the club play. Here are the hands in full.

It might be said that the declarer who played on clubs, not diamonds, like Brutus at Philippi, could feel he’d earned the right to fall honourably upon his sword.

Instant Matchpoint Competitive Auctions

November 7th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

In general the practices of the average player are lacking in the efficient use of a competitive double. It is rare to find a partner who can perform this amazing feat. As a result such players restrict themselves in the competitive auctions that are becoming more frequent month by month. One has to change with the times, and that means we can’t stick with the old meanings and expect to compete adequately – the opponents won’t let us. As Larry Cohen emphasized in the booklet of the 2012 ACBL Instant Matchpoint Game, these days everyone is opening on most flat hands with 12 HCP, which means someone has to rewrite the book on 2/1 methods.

The ‘light’ opening bid in a minor is a feature of the Precision system which allows for it. When playing Precision I found that in an uncontested as responder I should force myself to bid to 3NT on a flat 12 HCP hand, even though the combined holding could be as low as 24 HCP with no 5-card suit in sight – and the sooner I did the better. It doesn’t pay to worry unduly that game might fail. The picture is not so rosy when game will be played in a 4-4 major fit. One needs a decent loser count in order to succeed, and that involves shape and controls. Trump quality is especially important when there is no long minor suit to act as surrogate trumps. The upshot of this is that with 12 opposite 12 with 2 flat hands and a 4-4 major fit, it is not always right to insist on reaching a major suit game. Here is an example discussed by Cohen from the aforementioned booklet.

If EW are playing a true 2/1 system East will pass initially and EW may play in a heart partial. Making 140 on a diamond guess will be worth 83%. In the old days commentators might gloat that sensible bidding and good play (playing to the ♦T) were justly rewarded. Note that the loser count predicts the result.

If East is allowed to open his garbage hand and South passes, West may have a method for stopping in 3♥. The bidding could proceed as follows: 1♣ – 1♥; 2♥ – 2NT; 3♥ – Pass. As a heart fit has been established, 2NT is a probe that shows West’s hand type and allows East to sign off in 3♥. East will not accept the invitation to game, because of the poor trump quality, the 4-3-3-3 shape, and the lack of controls.

If South overcalls 1♠ as shown above, EW can find their 4-4 fit comfortably, but West must now have a way to probe. 2NT carries more weight in this circumstance, so it is better to use a cue bid of 2♠ as a forward going probe, rather than blast away to the upper stratosphere. Given his terrible opening bid, East will tread as cautiously as possible.
This is an example of an invitational cue bid. West might have a better hand and later insist on game, but more often he merely wants the opening bidder to give a further description of his holding. This makes allowance for the ‘normal’ bad opening bid on a flat hand with a high loser count and permits a stop in 3♥. Of course, this would not be necessary if East was guaranteed to have a normal 7-loser holding for his opening bid.

Silence is  Leaden
It is generally recognized that the worse thing a partnership can do is to fail to bid. With this in mind recently I tried an experiment based on the assumption that if a hand is good enough to open it is good enough to make a takeout double. That seems to be the way it’s going. When the gentleman on my right opened 1♣, I doubled on  ♠ QT4 ♥ KJ6 ♦ KQJ3 ♣ 932 – just the kind of hand with which Larry Cohen says everyone must open these days. The lady on my left bid 1♦ which was passed out. The opponents had missed an easy 3NT (she had better clubs, than diamonds.) When she complained, my RHO explained that because she had not redoubled, he took her for less than 10 HCP. He was expecting me to balance.

What does this prove? Nothing, but it does show that when the opposition interferes you have to have methods for coping against an inane action. Here a method was in place – redouble to show a good hand. The requirements for a redouble are simple – it is not necessary to have a particular shape, and you might even be able later to support your partner’s suit with a limit raise. My LHO tried to be tricky and failed. Of course, a partner has to take into account that both the doubler and the opener may be bidding on thin air, but someone has to come clean.

On another hand I held ♠ AJxx ♥ xx ♦ Kx ♣ KJ9xx, clearly an opening bid, but my RHO got in first with a third seat 1♥ opening. These 5-4 hands in the black suits don’t qualify for a  2-suited overcall, so normally one passes. Suppose I had passed and my LHO had raised to 2♥ passed back to me. I would have to double, because making 110 in 2♥ would constitute a great matchpoint score for my opponents. On the other hand a delayed double could be very dangerous as the opponents having limited their hands would be in a position to double my partner’s takeout to 3♦. Thinking thus, I doubled immediately, my LHO raised to 2♥ as anticipated, but partner bid 3♦ and played there going down 3 for minus 150. Holding it to -100 would have been good for us.

It was a rare 7-7-7-5 division of sides with 15 total trumps. I am still amazed that the opponents were unable to double for penalty, a necessity if partner had guessed right. I can’t recommend the method, but I do see that it is not as dangerous as it appears at first glance. First, the third seat opening bid could be garbage on a 4-card suit, and the raise over a double could be aggressively made on a doubleton honour. The opponents have no way of knowing to whom the hand belongs. Neither trusts his partner’s bid enough to suggest a penalty. In an atmosphere of huge uncertainty everyone is guessing and anything will work at least part of the time. Second, if the hand clearly belongs to the opponents they will usually bid on rather than attempt a penalty double. Didn’t a 2/1 idealist once say that good matchpoints is bad bridge? Well, here I can paraphrase Ovid who commented mockingly, I approve of what’s best, but I do what’s worst.

Overcalling in a Minor Suit
 Players are reluctant to overcall in a minor suit when they hold a 4-card major as well. The emphasis on reaching major suit contracts is so predominant that players tend to double, a call which encompasses a wide variety of hands, both flat and distributional.  This can be carried too far as in this combination for which Cohen can offer no clear suggestion. Can it be that normal methods are poorly conceived? (Yes!)

East doubles because he can always convert a 3♣ bid to 3♦ to show this kind of hand – the equal level conversion agreement, another Cohen patch. Clearly West has no compelling reason to act over 3♠, so the danger is that NS will steal the hand for -100, and EW will score 17%. A penalty double would yield an EW score of 86%, but it nearly impossible to achieve. It is clear that if EW can’t make a penalty double, they must bid on and buy the auction at 3NT( 89%), 4♦ (47%), or 4♥ (93%), so which will it be? The solution as I see it is that East should overcall 2♦ rather than double, showing where his power lies. Doubling hoping to get the hearts in the picture is premature, and, in this case, unnecessary.

If I pick up the East hand I see primarily a great diamond suit and a spade stopper, so 3NT is a prime objective. Playing in a 4-4 heart fit is secondary. Overcalling 2♦ shows this fine suit and doesn’t deny hearts, which can be brought back into the picture on the next round. The informative overcall leaves open the possibility of 3NT, as follows.

This is a much safer approach, and gives West all the winning options. West’s holding of 2 aces is a critical contribution. As is so often the case in competition after a preemptive raise, 3NT brings in all the marbles. The worst option for West is 4♦, which nonetheless yields an average result. In cases where South merely raises to 2♠, if East has doubled West can make a responsive double. Fine, but if East has bid 2♦, West should be able to double 2♠ competitively when he has a known resting place in a diamond contract. This has the effect that the competitive double in the auction is made by the partner with a flat hand. This is an important consideration.  If it comes to that, playing in a 4-3 heart fit is not the worst thing that can happen with the diamonds providing tricks.  

Really, is this hand as difficult as it is made out to be?

A Religion, not a Science

November 6th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

I didn’t play in the ACBL 2012 Instant Matchpoint Game, but I did pick up a booklet by Larry Cohen’s comments on the hands. There are usually some good pointers to be got from the analysis of the individual hands, however, the older one gets the grumpier one gets, and I can’t say that I derived much satisfaction from what I read – quite the contrary. Cohen was talking down to the great majority of players who don’t really know very much about hand evaluation apart from point counting, so his comments were not intended to educate the public. Standard American with a 2/1 base is a religion, not a science, and it was basically a matter of comforting the believers in their distress.

In his introduction Cohen makes the point that a player doesn’t need a lot of conventions to do well. That’s comforting to some, but so what? There are games in which the worst pair in the club comes out the winners, but that is not a justification for ignorance and bad methodology; it is merely a demonstration that randomness can play a large part over the short term. Using superior methods pays off in the long run, and those based firmly on logic are not that difficult to remember once one grasps the reasoning behind them.

A major theme repeated throughout was that players should open flat hands with 12 HCP, and that opening with 11 HCP is optional. This is an approach that goes back over 40 years to the introduction of Precision methods, with the major difference being that Precision as a system was designed with this in mind, whereas 2/1 is based inconsistently on solid opening bids.  Here is a deal that gave the 2/1 apologist problems.

Playing Precision I would have no qualms about opening the North hand with 1♦. This bid doesn’t promise more that 2 diamonds, and is intended primarily as a foray into to finding a 4-4 major suit fit. Cohen suggests that 1♦ is the right call even with 2/1. There is a hidden advantage to be had –  the promised diamonds are so poor that the opponents may be disadvantaged in the bidding and play. South has an easy 1♥ response and North an easy raise, but now it becomes rather fanciful as South contents himself with a jump to game opposite a hand that on the bidding could have slam potential. South has a 6-loser hand, but Cohen makes no note of that refinement. As we can see, there may be no wastage in diamonds, so the normal bid by South is a natural and exploratory 3♣. As we noted above, Cohen’s aim is not to describe better methods, but to provide the reader a simple route to an adequate resting place.

One concern expressed was that if North passes, South may pass and the hand gets passed out when 12 tricks are available in a heart contract. That was a problem back in the 50’s. Nowadays South in third seat unashamedly opens 1♥ with his 6-loser hand. What now? Well, Cohen doesn’t recommend methods in general, but here he advocates the Drury convention, a much needed patch, in what form we are not told. If North can show 4-card support, inventive bidders may get to the optimum 6♥ , but it is not necessary as scoring 680 will result in an 82% score. As Cohen notes, ‘apparently the field doesn’t reach 20 HCP games’, or didn’t back when these hands were first played.

On another board he comments, ‘if the side with the cards just does something resembling normal bridge, they get a decent score.’ This is in contrast to his recommendation on the following deal, which demonstrates what separates the good bidders from the field is mainly a matter of ignoring the rules effectively.

If we consider the loser count we conclude that normally EW should play in 4♥ on their solid 9-card fit. If we consider the HCP ranges, we conclude they shouldn’t. It would be nice to be using Bergen Raises, but, remember, we are pretending we don’t need them. It is not convincing to talk up the East hand to 10 points, as Cohen does. It makes sense to assign it 8 losers, subtracting a loser from the heart suit. With 6 losers and 2 heart honors West has an automatic raise to game. Playing ‘normal’ bridge using HCP evaluation EW will score 46% for making 170, whereas a 620 gets them to 81%. Myself, I don’t consider 46% a decent result under these circumstances, but as Ovid noted those many years ago, one marches most safely in the middle of the crowd.

With regard to results, when playing in a common contract there is a great benefit to a declarer in arriving there with the minimum exchange of information. Imprecision has its value when it makes for a helpful opening lead. Sometimes bad bidding pays off. There are occasions when a player with a strong hand can get the information he needs without telling much about his own holding. This is a question of system design, so system does make a difference. Board 19 provides us an example.

Cohen envisions a bidding sequence that begins 2♣ – 3♣, after which it proceeds with 6 rounds of bidding along cooperative lines to 7♣, when even 6♣ is in jeopardy. Perhaps this is a whimsical effort that mocks the folly of elaborate bidding techniques. The average result was 660. A score of 690 was worth 78%.The opening lead is critical, whether in game or slam.

In the proposed action West immediately informs East unambiguously of his 3 controls. East bids 2NT as convenient way to get distributional information from the weaker side. He does not bid hearts, as that information will be of little value to West, who will not be making the final decision. West shows his minor suit concentration, and East can sign off in 3NT if he holds the field in contempt. He may support clubs in order to gauge the strength of the suit. When West shows a decent club suit, East simply bids 6NT in the hope of garnering tricks from clubs and hearts. He knows a king is missing, and expects it is the ♠K.

After this auction South is on lead with ♠ KJ43 ♥ J543 ♦ Q982 ♣ J. I would think that a heart lead is probable, after which 13 tricks are likely. Of course, if East bids hearts along the way, he won’t get that lead, and declarer may have to guess the winning club play.

The Majors Factor
2/1 methods are geared towards major suit bidding from the get-go. Here is an example of a good opening bid in the minors that is passed, then becomes the basis for belatedly driving the auction in the wrong direction by misinforming the stronger partner.

The auction suggested by Cohen is horrible; West might pass 3NT when 12 tricks are available in a heart contract. The initial 1NT bid is nonforcing, but is forced upon East because he is using Drury, a convention approved by Cohen. West must jump wastefully to 3♥ leaving very little room for exploration. Can East possibly sign off in 3NT with 4 controls in a 7-loser hand and a useful singleton in spades? This is just another example of the tail wagging the dog, so often encountered with 2/1 methods. Here is an improvement that comes about when East opens the bidding without prejudice.

The argument against opening 1♦ then bidding 2♣ is that ‘it distorts the minor suit lengths’. Is that a big deal? It is a minor distortion, compared with the repeated NT bids in the previous auction that distort both the shape and the high card content. The above deal shows once more that at matchpoints getting to the right strain can be more important than getting to the right level – 4♥ making 680 scores a surprising 79%.

There is another approach that often works: start with your best suit. Surprised?

West has the stuff of which reveres are made, so he saves space by responding 1♥ . East follows the approved practice of making a 3-card raise with ruffing potential. The auction proceeds smoothly from there. West should not be disappointed with the dummy. It would be awkward if West had responded 1♠, as East would have had to bid 1NT on a singleton, but that is what he did anyway as a passed hand. He does have stoppers in 3 suits, and at matchpoints it is unlikely he would want to opt for playing in a minor partial.

Well, those are some of the hands where EW had sufficient power to bid constructively to a high level. It is strange that so many of the problems revolved around finding the best major suit fit when supposedly that is what everyone is striving to do. Getting to makeable slams is not a top priority when just getting to the right strain is problematic for most in the field. I feel one does better to bid what you’ve got rather than bidding on what you hope partner has. Does the same philosophy apply in contested auctions? We’ll consider that in the next blog that features more hands from the 2012 ACBL Instant Disaster Game.

Hercule Mouse, King of Slams

September 10th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Hercule Mouse was settling down for a quiet afternoon at home having just drunk the juice from a fermented blueberry that he has put aside for special occasions, when the phone rang. It was Ma Bear from the Friends of the Forest Bridge Club asking if he might be free to play a session with her beloved cub, Lyle, whose partner had called in with a sore paw. ‘There’ll be no charge, but you might teach him a thing or two about discipline,’ she suggested. Well, when a director invites, a wise player accepts, as it is always good to have the director on your side to assure that all fair rulings go your way.

Mouse knew that the burden of the play would rest on his shoulders, just the situation in which he thrived. Given Bear Cub’s inexperience, a 40% score could be forgiven, whereas a 60% score would all be to Mouse’s credit. The first board gave Mouse the assurance that an extraordinary effort would be required on his part.

Squirrel opened with her customary bad preempt, and Mouse did not hesitate to double, envisioning several favourable outcomes. Only when Lyle began to think did he start to have misgivings. ‘Pass’ he whispered under a blueberry soaked breath, but Lyle felt otherwise and bid 3NT. When Bear Cub went down 2 by mistakenly playing Fox for the ♣ A the partnership had got off to the worst start possible. No need to mention that 3NT was in contravention to the ‘direct denies’ Lebensohl agreement clearly displayed on their convention cards – after all, this wasn’t the finals of The World Mind Games for the Mentally Handicapped, although within Mouse’s agitated state of mind it was already beginning to feel like that.

To his credit Mouse blamed himself. Bears are not subtle. It is a mistake to thrust upon them the responsibility of deciding the final contract. Now if he had been playing with Cat, not that he would ever undertake such a partnership, but if he had, Cat would grasp the situation, take all factors into consideration (who was bidding, who was doubling), and pass. Mouse could only hope for some slam hands that were his specialty, while keeping Lyle’s involvement to a minimum. Actually Lyle subsequently made some competent defensive plays by wisely refusing to return his partner’s suit before this psychological test came along.

Peacock made a big noise after Lyle’s 1♦ opening bid. Hercule saw that Peacock felt his opponents could make game somewhere. He might pass 5♦ well content that we had missed our heart fit, but what would he do if he thought we could make slam? wondered Mouse. To find out, he bid 6♦. When Peacock bid 6♠, Mouse doubled for +800. Peahen complained, but Peacock pointed out that no one had bid 6♦, all EW’s were in hearts, making at most 5, so it was a bottom score whether he bid 6♠ or not.

Finally, thought Hercule with some satisfaction, we are above average, but thereafter they were weighed down by Lyle’s errant bidding that demonstrated all the accuracy of a piss into the wind, so much so that the auctions were often propelled in a direction just the opposite to the one intended with attendant dire consequences. They were badly in need of a well-bid slam.

Hercule’s mouse-brain had never absorbed how one should bid these terrific 5-loser hands with 7 controls. 1NT was within the point range, but surely that was a bad opening bid for such a potent collection. As is so often the case, an overbid seemed the best solution. Having never encountered the Wolff sign-off, Lyle wasn’t sure how to proceed from there, so he resorted to a time honored method of asking for aces then guessing.

For his part Mouse got excited with the prospects when his partner was preparing to go to slam. No matter the meaning of 4♣ , he felt the most effective bid would be a natural 6♣ , showing the concentration of strength in the minors while hopefully steering Lyle in the direction of 6♦. The chances of that happening were slim to none, and they reached the wrong slam with a potentially huge downside.

Frog led the ♥K against 6NT. Mouse won, cashed the ♠A, guarding against the unlikely event of a singleton ♠Q on the right, came to hand with a diamond, and held his breath as he finessed in spades. All was well this time, and he scored 13 tricks on a marked club finesse for a clear top. Only one other pair had reached slam, that in spades, making just 12 tricks on a well-conceived trump safety play.

‘How do I ask for aces?’ queried Bear Cub.
‘4♣ was fine,’ replied Mouse gracefully, ‘except we hadn’t agreed we were playing Gerbil.’
What he really thought was, my Boy, never ask for aces when you don’t know what to do next. Leave that part to me, Hercule Mouse.

With Mouse-Bear in contention the final 3-board round proved decisive.

Eagle led the ♦A, ruffed by Mouse, who was soon able to claim 12 tricks when the ♥A was proved to be onside where it should be. Badger was vexed by the result.

‘Why did you double?’ Badger demanded. ‘If you pass I can double to tell you not to lead a diamond. A lead of the ♥A beats it.’
‘Not double! Don’t be ridiculous – I’ve got 3 quick tricks in my hand plus the queen of trumps.’ retorted Eagle. ‘For your part, it’s better not to bid when you don’t have anything. I bet no one else is getting to slam.’
‘No one’s getting to slam because it should go down,’ answered Badger, his sideburns bristling.
Fur and feathers, thought Mouse, feathers and fur. The signs were auspicious.

Although not a slam deal, the final board was another triumph for bad bidding.

Both bidders held 6-loser hands, but no game was makeable without help from the defenders. Badger led the ♣ 6 and Lyle went up with the ♣ A in dummy to lead the ♥K, covered by Bald Eagle and ruffed. Now 2 diamond ruffs, the ♥Q, and 2 further heart ruffs left this position with the lead in the West hand.

Eagle ruffed the ♣ K with the ♠8 and sighed, ‘you got me,’ as he cashed ♠A dropping his partner’s Queen. ‘What!’ he exclaimed, ‘2 singleton queens of spade in the same round, in the same direction! What are the odds of that? This wouldn’t happen with computer dealt hands.’
‘These were computer dealt hands,’ noted Badger wearily lifting himself from his chair.

When the scores were posted, Bear Cub ran to his mother, exclaiming, ‘Ma, I won, I won!’
‘You young fool,’ replied his mother affectionately, ‘don’t you think I know that. Go and thank nice Mr Mouse, who I’m sure taught you a thing or two about discipline, patience, and winning bridge.’

Carpe Diem

September 4th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

What does it take to win against a good team? I observe that the winners are most often those who are willing to seize the opportunities when they arise. They take chances. It is a pity that so many BBO commentators find this objectionable. During the 2012 world championships one expert commented about a top pair along these lines: ‘They bid two 50% slams that came home, so now they deserve to go down on this one.’ This is wrong-headed. If a pair bids a 50% slam in an attempt to gain IMPs, they are just as likely to lose IMPs. So the opponents by doing nothing have been given a chance they don’t deserve to win IMPs. There is no law of probability that says that the result on the next hand depends on the hands before, so each 50% chance remains just that, 50%. It is not a question of being right but of getting it right. Wall Street gamblers take the opposite view: that if one takes high risks one deserves to gain from them. That, too, is wrong. If you risk your shirt on a bad gamble you must be prepared to lose it. (The trick there is to bet someone else’s shirt, or even a shirt that doesn’t exist.)

There are the players who strive to optimize their gain when they are right rather than minimize their loss when they are wrong. When one falls behind in a match, one tends to play aggressively to maximize the possible gains. When one is ahead the tendency often is to minimize the possible losses in order to stay ahead. This usually results in a come-from-behind win. As a case in point let’s look at hands from the final session of the 2012 Transnational Teams where the winners, behind at the beginning, bid aggressively to higher scoring contracts and gained enough on 2 boards to win going away.

The ♠ K was offside, but 10 tricks were there for the taking, which is in line with the losing trick count. Meike Wortel took a positive view when she passed in first seat. Later, judging that her partner had a balanced hand with 2 hearts in a 7-loser hand, she bid the game. The holder of the Yang hand diagnosed the fit after the Yin hand had been limited. This is the best arrangement when shape and controls are of primary importance. In first seat at the other table Judith Gartaganis preempted with 3♥ on her 6-loser hand and played there. Preempting against the opponents’ minor suit fit is not a productive approach, and got the result it deserved, as the only one preempted was her Yin partner. It was a question of attitude as well as evaluation. The 7-4-1-1 hand was worth an opening bid on the Zar points scale, or, in this case, worthy of a wait-and-see pass.

A jaundiced observer might comment that Wortel was lucky, but on the bidding her partner could have had a control-rich hand (♠ QJx ♥ xx ♦ Axxx ♣ Axxx) that produced 12 easy tricks. Here is a slam hand that was bid by the winners and not by the losers.

On this auction South was able to show 3-card support for North’s 7-card spade suit. When the opponents conveniently made it clear they held strength the diamond suit, Lall gave full value to his 5-loser hand, which opposite a normal 7-loser opening bid can be expected to produce 12 tricks. It was a question of attitude as well as counting losers.  The ♥ J had potential value, but in the end it was a matter of playing the heart suit to be split 3-3. The NS action at the other table was less ambitious.

Wortel’s double brought both minors into consideration and was less specific than the 2♦ overcall. Pszczola’s 2♣ call was less frantic than Gartaganis’ preemptive raise to 4♦, that had served the opposition well by focusing attention on the one suit while advertising the opposition’s weakness. Whether it was North or South who should have taken charge is an open question. South’s sign-off in 4♠ appears especially timorous, as a forcing pass wouldn’t risk going to the 5-level if North were weaker than shown.  

In the Open Championships Sweden beat both leading contenders, Monaco and USA, on the way to a convincing victory. Most analysts assert that the best strategy is to bid boldly and play carefully. So we see players taking huge risks during the bidding while exercising extreme caution during the play. Both actions are against the odds, the difference being that one may recover or even profit from a bad bid, but seldom will one recover from a bad play. In the following hand a young Swedish player showed that he was willing to take a risk for a maximum score when the opportunity presented itself during the play as well as during the bidding. This was the winning attitude.

The Swedes throughout showed a determination not to be intimidated by their famous opponents despite the risks. Meckstroth’s preempts may include some outside strength, as here. Rodwell had enough scattered values in the majors to make 3NT appear viable. Per-Ola Cullin had his say, and Meckstroth showed extras given his preempt. Peter Bertheau didn’t want to be left out, so he contributed a double on general principles. No one lost his nerve, and everyone courageously stood his ground.

The defence began well with a heart to West’s ♥ A and the ♠ 6 through North’s vulnerable spade holding. Cullin won the ♠ K and cashed the ♥ K. There matters stood for a long time as he contemplated his next move. If the opposition were in 5♠ going down at the other table (as they were), he would be assured of a gain on the board if he cashed the ♠ A at this point. That was what the BBO commentators expected him to do. Did he think, ‘This is risky. I’ll take a sure plus and maybe win the match on one of the next 13 boards. If not, there is always next year’? If so, he put such thoughts aside.

Rather than assume the worst, he decided to go for the maximum on defence and play partner for the ♥ Q. If partner didn’t have the ♥ Q he might have given some indication on his heart play – the ♥ 5 appeared normal from ♥ Q5, but abnormal from ♥ 85. Trusting his partner to have played helpfully, he led a heart to Bertheau’s ♥ Q. The spade return set up the long spades, so the contract went down 7 for a score of 1700, and a gain of 18 IMPs to Sweden, who had taken the lead.

Don’t blame Rodwell for this disaster; give the Swedes some credit. Clearly, 4NT* was an abnormal contract, but Sweden and USA had been engaged in a psychological slugfest, an adult version of the schoolboy game of ‘Chicken’. For Rodwell to opt for a contract of 5♦* would constitute a loss of face. Those who pull a doubled NT contract to a long minor are labeled, ‘chicken’. Down 2 in either 4NT or 5♦ was the normal expectation, and there was always the chance Cullin would pull or misdefend. If one habitually anticipates a perfect defence, one would never take a chance, which is a sure way to lose.

At the other table the Swedish South, Johan Upmark, did not preempt with a good suit and an outside ace: he considered it the stuff of which opening bids are made. When Hamman jumped to 4♠ , which makes, Upmark carried on to 5♦, no chicken he. Zia having passed once, was not about to pass twice, even though he had not been invited to the party, and Nystrom, with his Yin hand, flat shape and scattered values, felt he could contribute significantly to the defence. This latter approach was successful.

Preempting on good hands with honors outside the trump suit has become a feature of the psychological game. I am glad to see it fail when it does fail. The aim of these bids is to beat par by generating an abnormal result. Very often this works against the preemptor’s side when his partner ends up with a tough decision. Wrong decisions can turn out to be especially costly with distributional hands where the number of total tricks is high (19 in this case). Upmark with a singleton spade bid in a way that protected his partner by removing an option against 4♠ . The pressure was transferred to his LHO where it belonged. One notes the mismatch: a Yin hand held by a Yang personality.

Conclusion
To be sure, the outcome of a deal depends on the lie of the cards. The players whose actions best correspond to the actual lie of the cards stand to win. The best approach is to try to make the most of the conditions as they are seen to exist rather than to avoid disasters in the face of uncertainty. There is the human factor as well, and winners aggressively pursue the maximum. This may end in disaster on any given hand. In the 2012 European Championships Fantunes scored -1400 on a part score deal and still prevailed at the end. Against Sweden Meckwell lost 1700, but were still just 1 IMP behind with 13 boards to play. It’s part of the game.

Meckwell regained to lead on science only to lose the match on a deal where Meckstroth opened a vulnerable 3♣ on a genuinely preemptive hand: ♠ J3 ♥ 974 ♦ 8 ♣ KQJT872. Rodwell opted to play in 3NT, which was defeated due to a lack of entry to the clubs, whereas at the other table the contract of 5♣ bid by Nystrom made exactly. I like it.

As Time Goes By

August 22nd, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

An entertaining feature of the bulletins of the ACBL Nationals is a short questionnaire put to well-known bridge personalities. Questions include ‘what is your favorite movie?’ and ‘who are your favorite actor and actress?’ The bridge community shows its age through the frequency of the answers: Casablanca, Humphrey Bogart, and Katherine Hepburn. Men like Bogey as a guy who likes dames, not necessarily to marry them. We admire the amorphous Hepburn, but wished she looked more like the Lana Turner, who probably couldn’t count trumps if her life depended on it – not that we’d care at first.

What I find surprising, given the popularity of Casablanca, that more men don’t favor Ingrid Bergman. If Rick is a Yang, Ilsa is a quintessential Yin. The character of Yin is like water – it takes the shape of the vessel that contains it. All the men in Casablanca, find Ilsa attractive, with the possible exception of Colonel Strasser, and even he might be brought around given time. Although she says she loves Rick, she can’t make up her mind. ‘You decide for both of us’, Ilsa says to Rick, who doesn’t find that approach irresistible. He decides to deal her out. Well, there is a lesson here for bridge players.

Hand types can be divided into distributional hands (Yang types that play best in their long suit) and flat hands (Yin types that can fit in anywhere). A Yang with a Yang can be trouble when the hands don’t mesh. A Yin with a Yin has a low number of total trumps and slam is remote possibility hard to reach. The perfect combination is a Yang with a Yin that has the right stuff in the right places. In an auction a distinction should be made, hence we have this comment from Bobby Wolff in the bidder’s forum of the August 2012 issue of Bridge Magazine:

‘As I get older, the same fundamental things apply, bid no-trumps as early as possible, to clue partner in as time goes by. But that reminds me of Casablanca.’

The competitive double can be applied to the same purpose without the promise of a stopper. The method at hand is obvious: with distribution bid a suit, without, double or bid NT. This means that much of the time one will be doubling to show values in a flat hand with no suit worth bidding. This is a Yin action, asking partner to decide. The exact nature of the values shown will depend on the preceding auction, and this is where the competitive double falls out of the hands of the average player, as he cannot distinguish the various cases. Confusion arises, even though there is a simple rule to follow: all doubles are competitive at the 2-level, optional at the 3-level.

Here is an auction I experienced recently at the local club after opening a strong 1NT.

1NT –Pass – Pass – 2♥;
Pass – Pass – 2NT?

It turned out partner was suggesting 2NT as the final contract. It was a Yin bid opposite a Yin opening bid. I said he should have doubled to show such values. He countered that double was for penalty (Yang), so ♥QJ3 within 8 HCP was not a sufficient holding. I stated that a direct double after 1NT – 2♥ showed a strong holding in hearts behind the bidder, but that a balancing double in front of the 2♥ bidder was merely a suggestion that could be passed or converted. (He held ♠J9xx, I held ♠AKQ.) Sadly my opponents agreed with him. So, you see, one cannot expect the concept of an optional double to be well understood by the average Yangful player. It turned out the 2♥ call was made on 4 hearts to the AK, which shows that one can bid anything and get away with it if the opposition has no way to adapt and carries on blindly as if nothing has happened.

Yin and Yang on Defence
Most often an opening lead is Yin, passive and informative – the 4th highest from the longest and strongest being the prime example. An attacking lead is more specific in its intent. It indicates urgency. The passive approach is appropriate when the hands are flat and declarer has a suit in which he will be forced to make a play sooner or later. However, as declarer I welcome a passive defence when I have bid on distributional values and the defenders give me the timing to set up pitches for my otherwise inevitable losers in a side suit. Distribution is the key indication of the best strategy. With a 7-7-6-6 division of sides defenders do well to adopt a safe passive lead. Declarers, too, should act accordingly in a passive manner letting the opponents break new suits. However, with distributional hands where losers can disappear, an active approach is needed.

The importance of an informative opening lead and subsequent signaling was shown on a recent demoralizing disaster experienced by Levin and Weinstein in the 2012 Spingold Final against Team Monaco. On Board 58 they were 25 IMPs behind when this opportunity arose to gain 13 IMPs.

Weinstein’s Rdbl was classical; the division of sides was 7-7-6-6, so suitable for a penalty try against vulnerable opponents at the 1-level. The lead was the ♠Q which Levin ducked. Weinstein won the ♦T with his ♦K and continued spades. Levin took 3 spade tricks and Weinstein had to find 2 discards. He signaled with the ♣J (top of a sequence), then pitched a heart. Mystified, Levin switched to a club. This was fatal, as Helgemo could take 4 hearts, 2 clubs, and the ♠K to make his redoubled contract, scoring +670 instead of -1000. As four of the world’s leading players were involved, one should conclude that there is a fundamental flaw in the methods being used – by both sides.

Let’s concentrate on the defenders who had been handed a golden opportunity. Information was the essential ingredient and timing was the key. Weinstein could hope for 4 tricks in spades and 2 in diamonds, so the defence needed at least 1 more trick in a rounded suit to set the contract. The greatest hope lay in clubs, so with a sequence in that suit it appeared both safe and prudent to start with the informative ♣J. This is a Yin approach opposite what reckoned to be Yang hand. With 2 sure entries in hand, Weinstein can switch to spades later. In that way the coming-and-goings for the defence would be promoted. Balancing Yin and Yang is usually a good approach. From the start Levin would have a clearer idea of how the defence should proceed.

Yin Strategy in Competition
Players at all levels of expertise shy away from employing a Yin strategy. They prefer the straightforward Yang approach. This leads to problems late in a competitive auction, especially after an overcall which by it nature is Yang. Players at the lower levels of expertise have few methods for exchanging information ‘to clue each other in’, as Wolff would put it. Here is an example played by the creatures of the forest in our neck of the woods.

When Fox opened a limited 1♥ and Rabbit passed, Mouse was feeling he was in a very exposed position. If he passed or bid 2♥ it would be very easy for Owl and Rabbit, holding the majority of the points, to enter the auction cheaply and find their fit in spades or clubs, or both. He decided to try a forcing 1NT and hope for the best. Near-sighted Owl bids what he sees in front of him, the easy choice of 2♣. This left open the question of a possible spade fit. Quick-minded Fox could sense something was up. Neither Mouse nor Owl had advertised spades, so there was a good chance that Rabbit held length in that suit, which left Mouse with long diamonds. Fox decided to bid the suit rather than wait for his partner to hesitate later over 2♠ and bar Fox from bidding later.

Rabbit has a hare-brained habit of not bidding where his points lie, so he was happy to by-pass his fine 4-card spade holding and raise clubs on ♣Txx. Mouse was tempted to bid 3♦ over 3♣, but decided that 3♥ was less likely to get doubled, because it looked like a limit raise. Indeed, 3♥ was passed out without further ado everyone having bid what he had wanted to bid. Mouse was not held accountable for his bad bidding.

3♥ down 2 is hardly a triumph at IMP scoring when the opponents can make only 140 in 3♠, but at matchpoints it represents a fine result. The question is this: how can NS find their spade fit? While Owl can hardly be blamed for bidding his fine suit, Rabbit should find it in his heart to double to bring spades into the picture. This is an easy decision – if one is willing to bid to 3♣, then it is not a stretch to double at the 2-level in the hopes of finding the 4-4 spade fit. If the opposition push onto 3♦ or 3♥ it would be easy to double them for a clear top. The North hand epitomizes the passive-aggressive essence of Yin.

For many conservative players, the main objective of bidding is to get to game. If game is unlikely, they ease off and let the opponents play the hand in a part score. Of course, they will balance, but they will not push hard. For those players, a double is either penalty or takeout, never optional. If the meaning is not clear, they are content to forego the double. Let’s suppose Owl is one of those players, and that his partner (not Rabbit) doubles to show spades with clubs in reserve. Owl might well pass the double, reasoning, ‘I have my bid, a good suit and opening points. Why, I even have the ♦A.’ It will be a big disappointment when West makes his doubled contract. So the competitive double is dangerous when put into the wrong hands.

If North can’t double to show spades, he has to ‘lie’ and bid 2♠ directly. Some call it lying but I see it as commonsense in action. He can deduce that EW have no spade fit, so can count on South for spade support and goes directly to the contract which gives him the best chance at a good score. This is safe as he has passed originally, so can’t have a ‘natural’ spade overcall. If South corrects to 3♣, that will be fine as well. It works if partner doesn’t hold one accountable, and Owl is wise enough not to get excited when holding 4-card spade support. The flaw in this approach is that generally everyone will be guessing, ‘what next?’ So it is better to have a much needed agreement about the Yin nature of the double and follow up accordingly.