It’s a Mad, Mad, Bridge World

January 14th, 2014  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  12 Comments 

Reading through the Bridge World is like watching CNN for an entire morning. Apart from the commercials, TV content is mostly bad news that only adds to the depression of its couch-bound clients. No announcement is made advising the viewer to get up, turn off the set, and go for a long walk with a friend in the fresh air. Instead the overly bright commercials feed a false hope of improvement through acquisition of name-brand drugs despite the obligatory warnings of their dire side effects. The same attitude is promoted in BW articles that try to sell you’re a better brand of aspirins for your life-long bidding headaches.  With regard to the Master Solvers’ Club some readers are hopeful that by studying the thought processes of experts they can improve their judgment without changing their convention cards. Acceptance of the systemic restrictions is a given. There is little attention given to fundamental change, the main thrust being on how to cope with a system we have been tinkering with for ages. Incremental self improvement is the aim. Fair enough.

The major difficulty is that there is little agreement among experts on how to cope with the common and reoccurring problems within a critically flawed system. One may admire Eric Kokish’s evasive approach, or Bobby Wolff’s direct acceptance of responsibility, but there is little reason to expect that they will agree on any given problem and form part of a consensus.  Besides which, there is often a feeling that the opinions from the podium are different from the actions at the table, understandable from those whose approach is often psychological. As with presidential elections, the votes depend more on personality than on merit. So, where does that leave you? Are you a Republican, a Democrat, or a Flipper-of-Coins, a Tosser-of-Darts?

One of the fundamental flaws to which we allude is the unlimited nature of opening bids. From this beginning many unsolvable problems arise. Decades ago Howard Schenken recognized this after playing against the formidable Blue Team. He refined the innovative ideas of the great American founding father, Harold S. Vanderbilt. For many years thereafter the world scene was dominated by the Nickell team in which there were 2 expert pairs playing a Big Club system. The obvious seems to have gone unnoticed as Americans at large fail to build upon what made the country great. 

Damage is created by the cramming of hands into a limited category to which they don’t belong (usually 1NT) in order to avoid a potential problem on the next round and to take advantage of a clearly defined structure laden with conventions. A second harmful side effect is bidding non-suits as a mark-time device – Al Roth’s solution to getting partner to bid again and provide concrete information. (Somehow I am reminded of the phrase, ‘The Bridge to Nowhere’ which featured in the 2008 presidential campaign.) First, let’s see what in the Dec 2013 Bridge World the reliable Eddie Kantar had to say about a deal that came up when he was playing with the legendary Yvonne. It demonstrates a typical attempt to overcome a self-generated problem by applying a conventional patch.

A slam was available in diamonds (and presumably in hearts), but 3NT went down when 5 club tricks were taken off the top. Kantar’s solution for this, if it ever happens again, is to make 2♠ a conventional forcing bid after the transfer. (Yvonne must have a terrific memory having survived Eddie’s version of RKCB.) To do so requires giving up Garbage Stayman, a trashy approach beloved by many fans. This is a recurring theme in the Master Solvers’ Club – so many bids are relegated to the preemptive bin that pressure is put to bear on a responder who wants to show he genuinely has a good hand that cries for elucidation. American bidding, like TV commentary, has so much spin it becomes difficult to judge the true situation. Conventions, if nothing else, curb a partner’s creative impulses, Roy Welland being the notable exception to this rule.

The true solution to Kantar’s problem is radical: play Big Club and open a strong 1♣. Responder will bid a game forcing 1♥, showing a 5-card suit, and declarer can continue easily with 2♦. Problem solved! If one must play BW Standard my suggestion is simple – with terrific diamonds open 1♦, which should guarantee you won’t miss your diamond fit. Critics may scoff at this simple-minded suggestion, noting that this, as they say of Congress, merely kicks the can down the road. They may well ask, ‘What do you plan to bid when responder bids 1♥, also unlimited?’ OK, I admit I would bid 1♠, a mini-reverse, reserving 1NT for a weaker range. Is this so bad with 15 of the 16 HCP concentrated in the two suits bid? I don’t call that balanced. Responder is free to sign off in 1NT if he has the semblance of a club stopper.

For most this is not acceptable. The spades suit, unlike the club suit, is sacrosanct, thus, bidding 1♠ without 4 spades is an anathema, even though responder can easily avoid a 3-card raise. I hope partner knows how much I abhor being allowed to play in 1♠. Passing is what I call ‘playing small bridge’, the baseball equivalent being a first inning bunt.

Support with Support (Majors Only)
Recently we have delved into a response structure after a Jacoby 2NT major suit raise. We found that a simple, accurate scheme based on control asking bids could be devised if the response is limited to a flat hand with 4 trumps, 4+ controls including at least one ace, and 12 HCP. If responder goes outside these limits, opener may have problems of evaluation in the slam zone. So what do we make of a Jacoby 2NT raise on this collection: ♠K ♥ K642 ♦ AQ854 ♣ K85? This is a 5+-loser hand with 15 HCP and 5 controls, so the chances of making slam are excellent, even opposite a normal 7-loser opening bid with 2 aces. The ♠K might be doubly useful, as a singleton and as a filler.

Director Danny Kleinman recognizes that the standard follow-ups after a 2NT raise puts responder in charge (an attractive feature for egoists), but won’t provide him with the information about controls that is needed to evaluate accurately the slam potential.  The flaw is a fundamental one of hand evaluation in a system based on high card points.

Ten panelists voted for 2♦, while 9 voted for 2NT and 4 voted for something else. One of the big arguments for a 2/1 game forcing system is that it gives more space in which to explore slam, but here paradoxically a majority of experts are reluctant to bid 2♦ because subsequently they won’t be able to extract the right kind of information (namely, controls). It shows how bad things have become when you consider a simple 2/1 response as being fraught with difficulty, even though it is pretty obvious from the start the only question is ‘4 or 6?’ One panelist didn’t want to bid 2♦ for fear the opponents would start bidding spades. It is bad policy to act out of a fear that far outweighs the reality, be it with bridge or in foreign affairs, as this invites a self-destructive over-reaction. A silly spade overcall might actually help by giving one a couple more bids to play with.

Opener Jumps to 3♣ – What Does it Mean?
One of my fondest memories of a feisty student of mine was the time she invented the forcing 3♣ jump rebid on ♣AJ doubleton after the start 1♦ – 1♥. Loud were the protests at the pub after the game, but we were the only pair to get beyond 3NT and reach the diamond slam. Many insisted that she needed a 4-card club suit for that move, but they had no suggestion for an alternative other than 2NT, as 3♦ was nonforcing and she wasn’t dealt a 4-card major that would justify a forcing reverse. Unfortunately her game subsequently deteriorated as she adopted standard practices and became confused.

Problem E involves responder’s action after the same start when holding ♠ Q543 ♥ 76542 ♦Q ♣ KQ2. Typically Eric Kokish stalls with 3♦, whereas Bobby Wolff shows a willingness to sacrifice himself for the common good by bidding 3NT, following the rule he taught a former partner many years ago. One difficulty is that many panelists think opener has clubs worth raising, 3 of them even raising to 4♣ immediately. Moving past 3NT is mad, unless one is going for slam. A large majority voted for 3♦, because the ♦Q may fill in the suit, even if it doesn’t provide any ruffs. They categorize this as a false preference, implying clubs are a viable alternative. What else can opener do with 3=1=7=2? (Don’t think, ‘rebid 1♠’, and don’t consider opening a space consuming 2♣.)

The main virtue of 3♦/3♣ is that it saves space and gives the opener some room to describe the origins of his jump. Does that duck help? Opener should be informed and not be required to invent a bid at the 3-level. With 9 HCP this is actually a pretty good hand under the circumstances and a 3NT response tells of the general nature of the hand without promising the double stoppers that may be needed. If opener is going to jump in this manner he (or she) has assumed the captaincy and must be prepared to take the consequences of a forced bid within the confines of the bidding space below 3NT. How much better off you’d be after a Big Club start.

The Tarnished Virtue of  Natural Bidding
Novices are taught the virtues of natural bidding, but they soon learn that at the bridge table, as at a White House news conference, virtue is often a matter of convenience that needs careful interpretation. Opening 1♦ doesn’t mean diamonds are longer and/or better than clubs. Many experts feel opening 1♦ is correct on this hand:  ♠ 5 ♥ KT7 ♦ K765 ♣ AKQJ9. Wow! There is method in their distortion. The problem with opening in the best suit (that also happens to save space) is that one faces a rebid problem after partner, as expected, responds an unlimited 1♠. Otherwise, after opening 1♣ does one have the resources promised for a reverse into 2♦, a rare bid that best describes the distribution? The panel is almost evenly divided between rebids of 2♣ (Wolff) and 2♦ (Kokish). Too frequently a rebid of 2♣ promises garbage, so this time I am stuck with Kokish’s ‘nauseating’ choice.  He is worried about his next bid. (Canadians are worriers.) Indeed, he suggests avoiding the problem by opening 1NT!  (Didn’t I tell you!) Now that would really worry ME.

Sometimes it is better to imply nothing about clubs. The Precision bidder has opened this hand with an artificial 1♣ showing 16+HCP and awaits responder’s description with equanimity. Maybe the response will be 1♦, which says nothing about diamonds!

Caught between Too Much and Too Little
We have been told repeatedly of the shining virtues of the 2/1 approach, but somehow the advantages fade on closer inspection. Here is a problem where half the experts don’t know whether or not they are in a slam auction. The opening bid is 1♠ on this collection: ♠ A6432 ♥ AT ♦KQJ83 ♣ 9, 14 HCP, 5 controls and 5 losers. Partner gives us 2♣, so what do we do next? Things are looking up, but we have to stay calm and bid 2♦, just as we would with a garbage hand. Maybe partner can describe his holding and let us take charge, always the hope of the mastermind. Darn! He bids a game forcing but nebulous 2NT. What does that mean? It means he has turned the tables, assumed the NT high ground, and wants us to describe our hand so he can make the decision! Drat!

Here is the full auction to the point of decision: 1♠ – 2♣; 2♦-2NT*; 3♦ – 3♠; 3NT – 4♣; 4♥ – 4♠; ??   Ten bids and still there is confusion as to what is going on. Some are willing to stop in 4♠ while others jump to 6♦. Kokish makes the most perverse bid, 5♦, with the admission he loves this kind of bidding; presumably he wants it to last a few more rounds (maybe stopping in 5NT would bring real joy to his heart?) Intellectually he is correct, as usual, but unfortunately he can’t be his own partner. The idea is that we start the bidding with a general description, and that each round of bidding narrows the possibilities by adding information. After 5 rounds one partner or the other should have a pretty good idea of what he faces. Also, the more bidding, the greater the requirement for detail, so the more likely it is that partner is looking for a slam. Rejecting the sign-off in 3NT is evidence this is the case here. Not everyone agrees, as ten fed-up panelists passed.

Today, as Kleinman noted, strong jumps are taboo. A jump bid is descriptive, and allows partner to take charge. Most prefer instead to dilly-dally and coyly maintain their status as a potential decision-maker during an indistinct auction. If I held the given hand while playing old-fashioned Precision, I would open 1♠ and rebid 3♦ over 2♣, showing 5-5 with 14-15 HCP. This consumes space and gives up the captaincy, but at least I’d feel we’re getting somewhere fast. 3NT looms large, but an informed partner knows best.

So, if we read it the right way, the Master Solvers’ Club is a good advertisement for Big Club methods, because it bares the problems that standard methods will never overcome. It is a retelling of America’s worst recurring nightmares reminiscent of Edgar Allan Poe’s horrific tales of endless confinement. That is why, like CNN reports on preventable disasters, it provides entertainment, year after year, without advancing the idea that something real can be done about them.

Cryptic Controls

December 12th, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  10 Comments 

In a previous blog we discussed an opener’s reaction to a 2NT Jacoby raise and suggested that 3♣ should be defined as an asking bid. The subsequent auction can be geared towards hiding as far as possible the holding of the eventual declarer. Potentially the greatest advantage over natural bidding comes when neither partner has enough strength to insist on slam even though together they hold 10 controls. If opener has 5 controls and responder has 5 controls, there are missing either an ace or 2 kings. Here is the asking bid structure when responder bids 3♦ to show 5 controls, either AAK or AKKK.

If opener holds 2 aces he knows his side holds all the aces, so it is a matter of the missing kings. If opener has 3 kings and just one ace, there is an ace missing, and he can find out which one by using the 3♠ asking bid. The CRS responses show 2 aces of the same colour (4♣), rank (4♦), or shape (4♥). Opener will know which ace is missing, but one defender will not, and that defender could be on opening lead, as in the following deal where declarer manages to make slam of 15 HCP opposite 12.

The bidding is crude, but opener knows the red kings are missing. The trumps will come home 50% of the time. Any further exploration may be counterproductive, decreasing the chances of making 12 tricks. A diamond lead would be inspired, but if one were led, the hearts must come home, after which declarer has a choice of how to play the spades to gain a diamond pitch. The computer lead was the ♣J, the ♥K was onside, but the spade finesse failed. No matter, the diamond switch came too late, and 12 tricks were taken.

On a double dummy basis one might argue that this is a bad slam that just happens to make, but this is not a good way to think about the contract, as the success of the contract depends on the opening lead. It is improbable that the killing lead will be found on every occasion, and the less information transmitted, the greater the probability that it will not be found. For example, on the above deal an opening lead from a diamond honour might be considered too dangerous.

When slam is bid, declarer doesn’t know which intermediate cards, if any, are held opposite. There are several possibilities that can help, for example, if responder holds the ♦Q, declarer is protected against a diamond lead. If responder holds the ♣Q, there is no club loser, and the slam is at worst on the trumps coming home. So, there are situations where declarer would like to ask about queens. This is more often the case when an ace is missing. Here is a case where the trump ace is a sure loser, so declarer needs the timing to avoid a second loser.

When responder shows the minor suit aces, opener knows he has a pitch for the third diamond, so it is largely a question of the strength of the trump suit. If 5♥ can be interpreted as asking for the ♥Q, responder will raise to slam.

Distributional Probabilities
Opener does not know partner’s distribution in detail, but he may assume a 4-3-3-3 shape with 4 trumps. This is the single most likely shape, and the most conservative with regard to hand evaluation as ruffs in the dummy will be hard to come by. In that situation side-suit queens are prime assets. If 4-4-3-2, the side suits are most probably aligned with the 2-card suit opposite opener’s longest side suit and the 3-card suit opposite declarer’s shortest. This is a happy situation as ruffs may be available in both hands. In addition opener may be able to arrange for an elimination and endplay.

As the bidding proceeds and controls are shown, the probabilities associated with the length of suits chance. It is likely that revealed controls come from the longer suits. For example, an AK is more likely to come from a 4-card suit than from a doubleton. This is the companion to the standard situation where a player who shows a long suit is more probable to hold honours in the suit than not.

To illustrate this point we look at a computer hand where opener held a 3=5=4=1 and responder showed the AK of clubs. It is reasonable to assume the controls shown came from a 4-card suit.

Before the 3♣ asking bid the single most likely distribution in responder’s hand is 3=4=3=3, but nearly as likely is 3=4=2=4, which would allow for diamond ruffs in the dummy. However, the bidding changes the expectations. From the bidding opener can place 3 cards in partner’s hand (♣AK, ♠ Q) and 3 cards in the defenders’ hands (♠ K, ♦Q, ♣Q), so the remaining cards may be placed in the current vacant places as follows.

The former 3=4=2=4 (long suit – short suit match) has been transformed into the most even split (2=2=2) and is now twice as likely as the former 3=4=3=3. Opener can be hopeful of being able to avoid the diamond finesse, losing just 1 spade trick, and he just might get a diamond lead.

It  is disappointing when dummy emerges with 2=4=4=3 shape, the odds being nearly 6:1 against that shape relative to 3=4=2=4. A passive trump is led and declarer must decide whether there is a better play than the 50% diamond finesse. Well, there is. After drawing trumps and discarding a spade on a top club, and ruffing a club to eliminate the suit, declarer plays off the top diamonds hoping to exit a diamond to a defender who has to lead away from the ♠ K. There is an additional chance: that the ♦Q is doubleton, which raises the chance of success well above 60%. Such was the case with the ♦Qx offside.  A spade lead followed by a diamond finesse would have resulted in defeat.

This deal illustrates that when trumps can be drawn easily, the timing is on declarer’s side. There may be more than one way to make 12 tricks and declarer must try to make use of the various possibilities. Besides which, sometimes he guesses right.

More Cryptic Controls
When responder shows 6 controls by bidding 3♠ /3♣, he holds either AKKK or AAKK.
To place the controls opener need only bid 3NT to ask if partner holds a suit that is topped by a king. 4NT is the response that says there are either none or 2 such suits. Opener will know which applies and is fully informed. With only one such suit, responder bids that suit. The answer tells all, while the defenders are kept largely in the dark. Here is an example.

Opener deduces that responder for his 6 controls must hold the ♠ A and the ♣A, therefore, 2 kings, one of which tops a suit, either the ♦K or the ♥K. When responder admits to the ♥K without the ace, opener knows the ♦K is missing. He may hope for a black queen, but the ♣Q is denied by the 5♦ response to 4NT, queen-asking, as queens are bid up-the-line. Opener signs off in 5♥ after showing slam interest, hoping responder can bid 5♠ to show a doubleton or 5NT to show the ♠ Q.  Responder should assume his partner knows where the controls lie, so there is no need to bid again when one has shown everything of interest there is to show.

In this manner slam is avoided, but if responder is in charge of the auction, as he would be in a standard Jacoby auction, he might get overly excited and use RKCB getting too high. This demonstrates the disadvantage of an embarrassment of riches in the trump suit when bidding to a slim slam – the ♠ J would be potentially more useful that the ♥J.

Bridge World Sub-Standard
It is oddly coincidental (as are so many happenings) that the Dec edition of the Bridge World’s Challenge the Champs feature presented these hands with the suggested Jacoby 2NT auction given below, where the standard bid of 3♣ shows shortage.

It is difficult for responder to evaluate upwards with 8 losers and wasted values in clubs, even after opener overbids 3♠ on a junky 3-card suit. Sadly, this is typical of standard bidding that one must lie in this manner just to keep the auction alive. Responder, accustomed to being poorly informed, is reluctant to proceed. Obviously the hands should be bid to 6♥, and it is possible to achieve this if the opening bidder takes control with a 3♣ asking bid on the off-chance he will hit pay dirt. The subsequent bidding works out fine.

On seeing the 4♦ bid, opener must refrain from shouting ‘Bingo!’

Jacoby 2NT – Concealment and Disclosure

December 12th, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

Beginners love 4NT Blackwood because it asks a simple question and gives a simple answer. What a relief that is. Of course, the answers don’t guarantee the right contract will be reached. One may ask for aces, bid a slam that should go down, and make it because of the uncertainty with regard to which aces are held. Declarer isn’t aware of any deficiency, but he bids on the probability that the missing ace and king(s) are in different suits. The odds on declarer’s side are improved, when the opening leader doesn’t know, either. There are methods for locating specific aces, but the ordinary player doesn’t like to assume the extra memory load, besides which uncertainty is often advantageous.

There have been developed forms of Blackwood where the answers depend on what has gone before. RKCB is an example where the responses are geared to an agreed trump suit. Exclusion Blackwood operates below 4NT while identifying a suit of no concern. In a response structure to a Jacoby 2NT, it is possible to use all three modifications: ace identification, adaptive answering, and asking bid displacement with the aim always to retain a degree of uncertainty in the minds of the defenders, while giving enough information to the declarer to arrive at a reasonable slam others may miss. The keys are the losing trick count and the number of controls held, not the number of HCPs. The former are the more relevant measures when a 9-card fit is known to exist.

The Jacoby 2NT is a bid favoured by many, including the late Marshall Miles, because it immediately announces a good hand with 4-card support for opener’s major and no shortage. In the classic version, opener is required to bid a short suit if he has one, but that does not limit his hand. There sometimes arises the problem of whether it is better to bid a second suit descriptively rather than the short suit. Furthermore, if opener is allowed to open light with an 8-loser hand he has to let partner know how bad his opening bid was in order to avoid getting too high. With an 8-loser hand opposite an 8-loser response it may be wiser to stop in 3 of the major or 3NT. We can do better.

A Simple Scheme
Here is a scheme based on losing trick count for the rebids after 2NT.

 3♣                  6 or fewer losers without further disclosure
new suit          a help-suit slam try with a 5-loser hand
3 of the Major minimum 8-loser hand
4 of the Major 6-card suit, no slam interest, 7-losers
jump suit         singleton in a 7-loser hand
3NT                 a flat 7-loser hand

The above scheme provides opener with the following six options: 1) sign off in game with no slam interest; 2) show a minimum without insisting on game; 2) indicate that a lack of controls makes 3NT more attractive than 4 of the major; 4) show a normal opening bid based on shortage in a minor; 5) start the exploration of slam without disclosure of specific assets;  6) issue a descriptive slam invitation. One of the major advantages is that opener may open light and avoid being punished by the responder.
Monaco vs Italy
Here is an example where one of the great pairs came a cropper because opener was unable to limit his hand after 2NT. By Board 20 in the 2013 Bermuda Bowl Final, Italy led Monaco by 24 IMPs when Helgemo and Helness, who tend to open light, bid to slam going off 2 when Versace and Lauria stopped safely in game. The Norwegians use 2NT as a forcing raise, but opener doesn’t seem to be able to limit his hand immediately, so his partner was encouraged to overbid to slam on an 8-loser hand.

Helgemo was at the 4-level before he revealed his short suit. Helness expected a better hand opposite, so he pushed to slam with no wastage in diamonds. The ♥Q was onside so the heart finesse worked, the ♣K fell singleton under the ♣A, but there was too much work to do with the trump split proving to be 4-1. Down 2 was the result. Under the above scheme Helgemo would have rebid 4♦ immediately, an aggressive Helness might have overbid a desperate 4♥ on 8 losers before respecting partner’s signoff.

Italy stopped safely in 4♠ when Versace opened 1♠ and rebid 2♠/2♣ to limit his hand and curb Lauria’s enthusiasm.  He never revealed his shortage as it was unnecessary to do so in a situation where game was the limit of the hand.

A Grand Slam
In the slam zone information is golden, but it is not about HCPs. The key bits of information have to do with losers and controls, as in the following computer example.

The losing trick count indicates the hand should be played in a Grand Slam. One needs to know that the controls are in place. Once opener suggests 5 tricks in hearts, responder can take the hint with his control-rich hand.

3♣ as an Asking Bid
Devotees of the losing trick count needn’t be given more examples like the one above to convince them of how good the system works when everything falls into place. What we do need are methods to place the necessary controls. We shall demonstrate how concealment and disclosure go together in the response structure to a 3♣ asking bid. To make this work we require certain restrictions on the definition of the 2NT response: 4-card support, 12+HCP, at least 4 controls (not KKKK), not more than 6. (With more than 6 controls, responder takes charge.) The initial responses to 3♣ are in accordance with the number of controls held.

When 2 aces are shown, the responses are in order of colour (4♣), rank (4♦), and shape (4♥), so it is expected that opener can identify exactly which aces are held. As 12 HCP are required initially, responder holding only 2 aces can be expected to hold 2 queens or an equivalent JTx combination, so slam may be a live possibility still.

After a response of 3♦ opener may wish to investigate slam by locating the controls in responder’s hand without revealing his own. In the case where opener has 5 controls, he knows there are missing either 2 kings or an ace. He has two possible asking bids, the most suitable choice depending on what he can see in his own hand. If he has 1 king (and a minimum of 5 controls), he must have at least 2 aces in order to ask, so he asks for kings by bidding 3♥, the responses to which are 3NT (AAK),  or 2 kings: 4♣ (colour), 4♦ (rank) and 4♥ (shape). If he has 2 kings, he knows responder has 2 aces and a king. He may ask which 2 aces are held by bidding 3♠, the responses to which are 3NT (max), 4♣ (colour), 4♦ (rank) and 4♥ (shape). 

Miles’ Examples
These responses cater for the situation in which opener with 4 controls is seeking a slam missing an ace and a king, at best a 50% chance if opener has no shortage. If he has an undisclosed short suit, slam is still possible if there is no wastage in that suit. Note that relays do not guarantee all aces are held, so responder is reduced to answering the questions reliably. This might have angered Marshall Miles who liked giving responder freedom of choice. Here are 2 examples he proposed in  Bridge from the Top – Book I to demonstrate responder’s flexibility after opener rebids 3♠ to show a singleton spade. Here is our treatment of these examples.

4♠ asks which king is held. If the spades and diamonds are interchanged in responder’s hand, the response is 4NT and one has to stop short of slam.

The Question of Shape
Once the controls are set in place, there may still remain the question of shape. This is the reverse of natural methods that deal first with the details of shape and later with controls. Certainly responder could help in that regard, but it is rather too late in the game for descriptive bids as opener does not guarantee that all aces are held. Opener can investigate above game when seeking the necessary third round controls by bidding 4NT.

After the 3♥ response showing AKK, opener knows which kings are held, so he relays to 3♠ to ask which ace. Finding the ♥A leaves the ♦A at large, but ♦KQ are adequate safety against a diamond lead. Slam might fail if responder holds ♥Axx. It behooves opener to ask for third round control of hearts, his main worry. Opener doesn’t care whether it’s the ♥Q or a doubleton. With classic methods opener has to rebid 3♦/2NT to show his singleton, and responder is at a loss what to do next as the ♦K appears to be a wasted value within a minimum response on 12 HCPs.

The Obamacare Syndrome

November 25th, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

Well, here we are again with congressmen grilling a government official about the failure of a project over which she had little control and about which the accusers understand very little. One wonders if these people could write even 5 lines of working code. Get rid of Sebelius, they imply, and the sun will shine once more across our fair land. Of course, it is a systemic error which they are trying to lay at the feet of an accused individual. Over 80% of the large government software contracts fail after completion, which requires an additional large expenditure to fix. To start, the government, in its role of welfare agency to large corporations, spreads the money between several contractors who provide pieces that are guaranteed to succeed in their allotted tasks, but once put together don’t often produce to required outcome. The government simply hasn’t the resolve or the resources to provide the necessary oversight. That’s how the blame game works.

We can apply the same analysis to the bidding and play of a bridge deal. The 4 players are like computer programs that are doing their assigned tasks according to the definition of their individual responsibilities. If the play ends in failure, the critics are out trying to lay the blame after the fact when it may not be any individual’s fault, but a systemic malfunction.  The key is how information is shared between the participants.

In the previous blog we discussed an auction during which a player missed the chance of making a takeout double of a natural 1♣ opening bid when holding modest values with 4 spades and 3 hearts. The cast has changed on this deal played recently for the Lederer Trophy by world-class experts during which a very similar situation arose. The end result was far from optimal. Who, if anyone, made a mistake, do you think?

Allfrey’s 1♣ opening bid was systemic, as a 1♦ opening bid would require at least 5 diamonds, so highly regarded is that lowly suit by some. Just because you can doesn’t mean you should. In years past players didn’t feel the need to advertise an average holding, because that was what your partner would assume you had. In fact, this is a below average holding that doesn’t contain the normal component of 3 controls and has 10+ losers. Its Zar Points (19) don’t come close to the requirement for an opening bid (26).

To most experts Zia’s collection barely qualifies for a takeout double of 1 of a minor, even though it does not include 4 cards in both majors. This is a moot point to which we shall return later. However, we can count 9 losers, and one of the suits is clubs, the suit named by the opening bidder. If NS can make even 8 tricks total, North would have to have a 7-loser hand, the normal requirement for an opening bid, as well as the cards to make up an 8-card fit. He might be tempted to overbid, but the mood of the times is to bid first and escape the consequences later.

A lesser player than Robson might bid 3NT as this point, but Robson is the wait-and-see type. He sees 13 HCP in his own hand, gives partner and Zia 12 each, leaving his LHO with approximately 3 HCP. If the opposition is going to hand out information, why not take advantage by listening quietly? Bakhshi shows hearts after which Robson takes charge and maneuvers Allfrey into being the declarer in 3NT, putting the strong hand on lead. The question is this: has the exchange of information been more helpful to Allfrey or Zia? Certainly it has ruled out a spade lead and invited a heart lead.

Zia led the ♥2 to ♥5-♥K- ♥8.  Bakhshi had already made a potentially fatal mistake, according to Deep Finesse. With no entry outside of hearts he has to duck the first trick in order to get back to his hand to cash winners. Of course, he had every right to expect Zia to hold 4 hearts. Or did he?

Allfrey now sees what Robson anticipated at the very start – Zia probably holds all the remaining aces and faces. Declarer’s mind turns to a strip and endplay. A heart has been lost, and there remain 2 aces to lose. The ♠Q may be another loser, and perhaps another heart. One too many it seems. So how to engineer an endplay to reduce them to 4?

Allfrey took the heart return with dummy’s ♥A and worked on diamonds. Zia won the ♦Q with his ♦A and cleared the hearts. Playing on the minors, declarer reached the dummy with the ♣ K with 6 tricks won and 2 in hand:

Allfrey’s choice was to play a club and duck Bakhshi’s ♣ T, hoping that Zia had been caught with the bare ♣ A.  The result was down 2, when he would have made his contract by leading a spade from dummy. He was playing Zia for his double to have 4=4=2=3 shape rather than 4=3=2=4. I don’t see there was any clue in the play of the heart suit to guide either side. On winning the ♥K Bakhshi returned the ♥4, not his original fourth highest ♥6. This would have been an occasion to inquire about partnership agreements. That was painful, as East at the other table passed initially and subsequently was able to play safely in 3♦ making 110. 

We have a bad result that is not attributable to any of the individuals, so it comes down to considering whether there was a systemic fault. The quality of information available to North and East was not good enough for either of them to make the correct plays. Let’s take a top-down approach by setting the goal and then consider ways it can be reached. The objective is to maximize the gain, not reach the safest part score. Two balanced hands with 24 HCP and no 8-card major fit are the stuff of which a vulnerable 3NT is made. This is the essential information which EW must transmit.

The system should provide information in a way that gives the best chance of avoiding the killing lead. If one considers the East hand as one that demands an opening bid, then I suggest that Allfrey return to his ACOL roots and open an upgraded weak 1NT (12-14 HCP). This will most likely get him to 3NT easily made on a spade lead. Of course, the vulnerability makes the weak NT dangerous, so many would avoid that bid.

Opening 1 of a minor is not safe, either, and it will be less likely to shut out South. A wide-ranging takeout double that contains little information with regard to distribution is a nearly risk-free way to get into the auction cheaply. Over this takeout double 3NT looms large on responder’s horizon. Redouble should be limited to lesser hands that do not merit a game contract. Does it make sense that the player with the best hand at the table is constrained to pass? That is a system fault that needs fixing.

Better methods would allow East to announce game-going values while shutting out the advancer. One could define 2♦ as game forcing Stayman, just as if the opening bid had been a weak NT. It will be easier to play the hand with all the defensive power in the doubler’s hand, so one can afford to be bold. It is best if West does not describe his hand with a spade bid, as he would if South passes. It is better to seek a major fit by asking about West’s major suit holding without revealing his own. If East bids 2NT, West will raise to 3NT leaving South without input from North with regard to the best opening lead. In this way EW neutralize the effect of the takeout double and turn the interference to their own advantage.

There are other tasks we expect a constructive system to accomplish in an optimal fashion, but one of the hardest things to teach a computer is commonsense. Here is an example provided by Mike Lawrence in the November issue of the ACBL Bulletin. West opened 1♣ and East, acting like a bad piece of software, jumped to 3NT. Six heart tricks were lost off the top. Unlucky! Mike suggests the patch given below.

The system should provide a way to explore for a 3NT contract, failing which, a route to 5♣ . Let’s assume a matchpoint background. First, if the responder decides to minimize the loss if they reach the wrong contract, he may jump to 3NT. The blind odds favor the move, but if this contract fails, his loss will be small, as many HCP addicts will bid the same way. Fishing around for stoppers can lead to the loss of an overtrick. At IMPs scoring, the overtrick doesn’t matter that much, but still one wants to minimize the chances of a killing defence. The start of 1♣ – 1♦ is a fine way to invite the opponents into the auction, but is that what responder wants here?

If responder looks to maximize his gain if he gets it right while others get it wrong, he will consider 4♣ or 5♣ as the alternative to 3NT. Making a club contract when 3NT fails will score well. East is willing to exchange information towards that end, although he realizes it may help the defenders if, after all, EW end up in 3NT. Lawrence copes with this possibility by having responder lie about diamonds then lie about hearts. When opener avoids 3NT, is 4♣ a cue bid looking for a slam with diamonds the agreed suit? I find the sequence ambiguous and would fear ending up in 5♦ or 6♣ . Can responder expect opener to cooperate sensibly?

Lawrence himself supplies the solution: initially responder should bid 2♣ as a forcing inverted raise, denying a 4-card major, after which ‘you can expect a sane auction.’ (That tells the reader how Mike rates his own sequence.) There are great advantages to supporting with support at the very start. First, the defenders are shut out of the auction at the 1-level. Opener can jump to 3♥/2♣ to ask for a heart stopper in 3NT. When responder bids 4♣ , denying major suit stoppers, opener can take a shot at 5♣ , knowing that clubs represent a good fit, or he may suggest playing in a 4-3 spade fit, just in case responder holds ♠JT7. With a less promising hand, opener can pass 4♣ . So, we conclude that system does matter… a lot. The information that is exchanged should bear directly on the target contracts. Diamonds are not relevant, so there is no need to exchange information directly with regard to that suit, unless you want to add a bit of razzle-dazzle to distract the opposition.

Mistakes ‘R Us

November 12th, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

Bridge authors are prone to reporting brilliances and ignoring mistakes. Brilliances are newsworthy because they are rare. Mistakes are so common they tend to be ignored, however, it is often errors that are the more significant factors in determining who wins and who loses. Many experts concede that brilliances don’t determine winners because the opportunities to execute them are rare; avoiding non-random errors is where we should concentrate our efforts. Often the responsibility for making an avoidable error is one shared by both partners.

After the most horrific decade in human history Johnny Mercer cheered up the survivors with a song that began, ‘Accentuate the positive, eliminate the negative, …. and don’t mess with Mister In-Between’. It was a big hit. Good psychology, bad advice, as Mister In-Between usually does OK – he is a realist. The people who attacked Pearl Harbor were optimists. Yesterday at our local club game, two of our best players, both aggressive optimists, came in last at 37%. What went wrong? On checking the scores I found they had been defeated in 6 games for a total of 5 matchpoints out of a possible 72. In addition they doubled two games that made for zero matchpoints. By way of contrast, the winners at 61%, who may be categorize as In-Betweens, went down in just two freely bid games, once in 3NT with 25 HCP between them, and once in 3NT when it played better in 4♥. They didn’t defend any doubled contracts.

Taking results over several sessions, one concludes that the best approach is to be aggressively optimistic, but only to the extent that the cards will back you up. In doubtful contracts the opponents have to have a way to get it wrong.  Information is the key. We want to induce errors by the opponents, and the best way of doing that is through concealment. There is a conflict of interest – accuracy in order to get a good match with reality, and concealment in order to benefit from the errors of unaware opponents.

The withholding of information from partner is a risk, but if a normal contract is reached via a scantily informative auction, a gain may result from a misdirected defence. Here is a hand from a recent Sectional where the opening lead to a common contract was a disaster. Concealment was the key.

A crude form of Relay Precision was used to reach 3NT, as follows:
1♣    (16+HCP) 1♥ (GF, 5+ Hearts)
1NT  (shape?) 2♠ (4+ clubs)
3NT   (to play) Pass (nothing to add)

If I could have found a fit in one of my suits, I would look for slam, but the distribution appeared to be against me after John showed length in hearts and clubs, so I went directly to 3NT. As it happened John had nothing to add. This uninformative approach left responder pretty well in the dark. The opening lead was a diamond (the ‘unbid’ suit) from ♦Q95 and I wrapped up 12 tricks although 13 tricks can be taken when hearts split 3-3. No matter, 690 scored 38 out of 38. On a double dummy basis the best contract is 4♥ making 4, which no pair will reach.

A relay bidding system in which one player asks questions and the other answers is ideal for concealment. The nature of the answer is important. Here John showed his shape without making promises with regard to the quality of his suits, so the opening leader could not imagine the clubs were open to attack (♣A852 opposite ♣KQT3). If one thinks relays are unfair, consider that in a natural system one sometimes (often) bids a bad suit systematically, which may happily discourage the dangerous lead, as on this similar combination to be played at matchpoints.

Declarer will be pleased not to receive a heart lead. The question is how to capitalize on a favorable club lead. Concealment is again the key. One approach is to win in hand and finesse the ♦J. If this wins, an optimistic declarer may return to hand with a second club and finesse again. Cognizant of the recommendations in the Official Encyclopedia of Bridge for the maximum number of diamond tricks, one might think this is the best approach, however, one must take into account of the play outside the diamond suit.  By exposing the strength of the club suit declarer greatly increases the chances of a switch to hearts, a suit in which 3 tricks can be taken off the top. Even if 6 diamond tricks are taken, the number of club tricks have been reduced to 2, so 10 tricks become the maximum available.

Alternatively declarer can win the ♣Q in dummy and play diamonds from the top. This decreases the chances of 6 diamond tricks (from 40% to 33%) while it increases the chances of 5 tricks (from 55% to 63%). If playing the ♦AK drops the queen there are 11 to 13 tricks off the top, a great matchpoint result. If the ♦Q is still outstanding the third round may give the opportunity of a signal pointing to a heart switch, but this isn’t certain. A passive defender may clear the clubs, and 10 tricks are now at hand.

Having a long suit to run can catch the defenders off guard. Often the defenders do not coordinate their discards well. Thus a long suit is more valuable than just the number of tricks it provides on its own. Its power may get transferred to other suits. Having 9 tricks to run helped a lot on the following deal where two good players got it wrong.

The auction had a surprise ending. 1♦ was Precision, nebulous, so 2♦ didn’t promise more than 5.  2♥ was nonforcing (!), showing 5♠ and 4♥, the standard approach. If the system had been designed for this hand, 2♥ would be the ideal forcing bid, but bidding systems, like welfare states, cater to the less fortunate. Hoping that I held 6♦ and 4♣, John jumped to 6NT thinking there would be 12 easy tricks off the top. Mind you, 6NT missing 2 kings is not a bad situation to put yourself into, if you can run off 2 suits.

The auction had not been accurate, but the meaning of 6NT was clear enough. A passive lead was called for from this collection: ♠ KT742 ♥ KQ4 ♦ 4 ♣ T843. The ♣3 did no damage and declarer arranged his tricks wisely. He won the ♣A and ran diamonds first, then clubs. The opening leader pitched spades. It appeared to him that his partner was guarding spades, so his task was to keep hearts and a safe exit card. With 4 cards remaining John had kept ♠ AJ9 ♥ A. He finessed the ♠9 to the ♠T, won the ♥A return and played the ♠A dropping both missing honours. The ♠J was his 12th trick. Wow!

One can see the importance of being able to run off tricks at the start. It also helps to have controls in the short suits, aces and kings, which serve to discourage leads in those suits and hold everything in place for subsequent end plays and/or squeezes. Of course, 2♥ was entirely the wrong bid and contributed greatly to the confusion, however, one needs scan The Bridge World over only one session of The Master Solvers’ Club to discover experts suggesting outrageously inaccurate bids in a supposedly natural setting.

When one has something to hide, it is best to arrange the play so as to make it appear that everything is proceeding normally. Don’t telegraph weakness. If the opening lead was favourable, encourage the defenders to keep to the same path. They want to believe they have made the right move initially and will tend to follow the path of least initiative believing that switching merely adds to the cost. Consider who, if anyone, made errors on this deal from a recent matchpoint game that led to a top score for EW.

Is there an error being committed in the first 5 calls? It looks routine, but North might have doubled 1♣ to create a diversion. Not a perfect double in isolation, but it gives East pause and provides South an easy entry into the auction. The Law of Total Tricks would justify a weak jump response to 3♠ by South. This is a great contract in theory, and one South did play in 3♠ undoubled, making 9 tricks for a NS top.

North’s belated takeout double didn’t give me any problem as a jump to 3♥ was obvious. We weren’t about to let South bid spades informatively.  One might argue that 3♥ was against the Law with only 8 hearts, but there was a presumed double fit, the strength lay primarily in the heart suit, and the void in spades was valuable offensive asset.

Forced to the 3-level, South made the bid she was going to make anyway, but lost was the implication she was weak. Do you agree with Jack’s raise to game? I don’t. I think he should double after which I would raise to game on the strength of my void. The bidding on the first round allowed him to show his 4-card heart support and served to limit his hand. A double at this point should be considered to be co-operative, not unilateral. With poor intermediates in hearts and clubs and only one ace it looks like a time for suggesting a penalty (at matchpoints). If the double stands West must not lead a heart and destroy the defence’s communications.

Finally North got beyond his limit by doubling for penalty. This was the final and most costly error, but the seeds were planted by North’s initial pass and fertilized by the competitive jump to 3♥. North is counting on his partner to supply some defensive honours, perhaps the ♠A and the ♦K, but an understanding partner will not double 4♥ for penalty without the tricks in his hand, leaving it to his partner to balance with a double if appropriate. It may not be bad when East makes a normal contract undoubled. If he goes down, a plus is a plus, and NS have no score to protect.

Now to the details of the play. The opening lead was the ♥T, a strange choice, I thought. As declarer we all love trump leads. Obviously South was expecting more strength with the doubler. I ran this to my ♥J, and, as I wanted to encourage a trump continuation, I played to the ♦K losing to the ♦A, hoping to give the impression I wanted to trump diamonds with low trumps in the dummy. Indeed, a second trump was played to my ♥Q, my LHO following with the ♥9. Now we could tackle clubs in relative safety, running ♣T to the ♣A. After a third trump from my RHO did my work for me, I was in position to run the ♣9 successfully and claim 10 tricks, losing just the ♠3.

After the hand South was chastised for her bid, but I feel she made the right call as 3♠ down 3 doubled was the theoretical NS par. You don’t get there if you don’t bid. North made the point that if South had passed, Jack might also have passed 3♥ for a below average result, but she had been asked to bid by the belated double and she felt she had good reason for doing so. In turn she might have countered that if North had not entered the auction, EW might not have bid game. (Indeed, two pairs languished in 2♥.)

Very often the perception of an error lies in the result, which isn’t a fair assessment. It can be no more than a matter of style. Sometimes passing keeps one out of trouble but more often it gives the opposition too much latitude. If one is determined to take action, the best time to act is immediately. If you wait-and-see, you’ll need a bit extra in order to keep a passing partner out of trouble, the implication being that the opposition bidding has improved your hand. Good players know when to balance, and good partners know when not to punish a partner for a bid made under pressure.

The final double was a partnership error made by a pair working at cross purposes. If South thinks of North’s tepid takeout double as no more than a lukewarm assurance of already suspected values, she must pass 3♥ to avoid getting too high. Let North double 3♥ if he has a maximum allowing an escape to 3♠. If North thinks 3♠ is a pressure bid in the hopes of pushing EW too high, he must pass 4♥. If South is better than advertised she can always double on the way out to protect her plus score.

(Did you notice I was the only one not making a misteak?)

Making the Most of Mistakes

October 24th, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  8 Comments 

There is a science for operating within a faulty system which is not given enough coverage in the bridge literature. Mistakes are human. We can’t pretend they don’t exist, so what we have to do is make allowances, first by being careful ourselves, and second by gaining fairly from the mistakes of others.  Buy low, sell high, as it were.

 In Bridge, as in Real Life, not all the mistakes one makes turn out to regrettable. The regrettable mistakes are mostly due to reasonable inaction, or cowardice, if you prefer. The happy mistakes are actions from which there are derived unmerited gains. Some beautiful people are the result of a mistake by one parent or the other. With regard to bridge, the best mistakes are those that lead to big favourable swings, as on the following deal played recently in a matchpoint game at our club.

The opening bid was a Precision 2♣ , natural and limited to at most 15 HCP. 2♦ was a relay asking for more information. This is the usual route when responder wants to explore game options. My following 2♠ was natural and forcing. John had a brainstorm and thought 2♠ agreed hearts. Eventually I caught on that something was wrong, and as 5♣ would have been a worthless contract at matchpoints, I jumped to slam. The lead was the ♦7 from ♦ QT972. John ducked to his singleton ♦J and wrapped up 13 tricks.

An intriguing question is why one sometimes takes a senseless action at the table. (Ducking to the ♦J doesn’t strike me as a perfectly logical move either, but as declarer John has nerves of steel.) The previous deal had been a disaster when I insisted on playing in 3NT holding 5-5 in the majors and with a void! Don’t ask me why. So I suspect there was a carry-over effect and John’s mind was still at work subconsciously trying figure out what Bob thought he was doing. One has to forget past mistakes at the beginning of each deal. Anyway, top-for-top made for an average round.

The opening leader could not be expected to lead a spade from King doubleton, so it may be said that slam was not a bad gamble. The bidding of a worthless suit followed by a jump to slam can sometimes be a deliberate and desperate punt hoping to catch the opposition unawares. That is why we need Lightner Doubles. More frequently, we observe even experts bidding topless suits in competition and gaining some advantage from the spreading of a false impression. That has become the standard practice with preempts. Which leads us to the next deal in which a declarer missed the chance for a top.

The opening lead is the ♥T. Declarer finds himself in a contract with a good chance of a fine matchpoint score.  How should he play the trumps?  Obviously North has more diamonds than South, so the a priori odds favour playing South for the ♠Q. Declarer, looking nor further, led the ♠J off dummy and passed it to North who won the ♠Q, led the ♦Q to the ♦K, got another ruff and led the ♣ 2 to South’s ♣ K. Another ruff followed. As some NS made 3♦, down 1 was not a disaster, but making game would have been a top.

North stated he was emulating Zia by preempting with ♠ Q94 ♥ T ♦ QJT985 ♣ JT2. I think it was a mistake to preempt on such a hand, the mistake being that it drove us to a makeable game we would be unlikely to bid on our own. The result overrides my disapproval, but let’s consider declarer’s reaction to the ♥T lead. Bidding one suit, getting a raise, then leading a different suit always raises suspicions. As dummy we see things clearly, and it was clear as glass the heart was a singleton. South had promised good diamonds with his vulnerable raise, so North could hope diamonds would provide an entry. What could North be hoping to promote in hearts?  On this basis as a safety measure declarer should play the trumps from the top if he judges he is in a good matchpoint contract. If he is really hungry, he can play North for a 3=1=6=3 and finesse him for the ♠Q, making 11 tricks…but that would be overkill.

Every system has a weakness. Established partnerships should be prepared to utilize this space for rare hands that can’t be described otherwise.  What should one open with this hand which is far outside the realm of normalcy: ♠ KT3 ♥ — ♦ 32 ♣ AKQJ9862, a 4-loser hand with a solid 8-card suit? For some this is a textbook 5♣  opening bid (as suggested by Amalya Kearse in Bridge Conventions Complete). One is pretty sure the hand will be played in clubs, but if one opens 1♣ , vulnerable, one is flirting with danger coming from 3 sides. A simple agreement for the infrequent partnership is to define a 3NT opening bid as a solid minor with an outside control, but players are so intent on preempting the other side that they forbid themselves having the outside control. True, a no-control agreement makes it easier for responder, but as things turned out at least one 1♣  bidder might have wished 3NT was an option.

I avoid preempts with outside stuff, preferring the weaker variety as I feel this has the better chance of making a profit. Naturally, I would have liked having the ♥J to accompany the ♥Q98, but no hand is perfect. (Some like it hot.)  There is a rule that after one preempts one shuts up, and passing 5♣ * would have resulted in an average score, but bidding on proved better, although I had my doubts briefly after my LHO doubled.

An unusual lead tells a story. Here the opening lead was the ♦J, which told me South didn’t have any clubs. After the pitch of a club, the ♠A followed by the ♠7 set up my ♠Q. South got his club ruff, but that was all, and I made my 11 tricks. Where was the mistake? Both 5♣  and 5♥ appear normal after the fact, so the error was that South doubled on ♥KT7, the sound of the auction, and, maybe, a bit of history.

‘Good bid’, said John with a straight face, but you never know when he is joking. That was the extent of the celebration.  On another occasion after John had made a slam on a pseudo-squeeze, our expert opponent commented petulantly, ‘doesn’t your partner ever smile?’ ‘Oh, yes,’ replied John, ‘I saw him smile once.’ Once at a funeral, he might have said. I defended myself by observing that one is not supposed to smile when one has got a good result. In that case it would be extra rude to praise partner for merely taking advantage an opponent’s error.

I deplore the spreading in professional sports of the exuberant demonstration, especially when the game is not yet over. Even golf has been infected, FGS. Some say that baseball must be played with emotion, but I say emotion is what causes a shortstop to boot an easy double play ground ball up the middle, or a batter with the bases loaded to swing at an outside pitch in the dirt. Good play is a product of practice, concentration, and control. That is what sport is supposed to teach kids. Remember, greed and fear are emotions.

Often the winner is the one who makes the fewest errors. When declaring a hand, one should play in a manner that increases the chances a defender will make an error. This is true especially at matchpoints where the overtrick is important. Too often in the past as declarer I have assumed perfect defence and played for safety; now I play to induce errors even when there is some danger involved. The greatest effect comes in timing. One attempts to play on the defender’s fear that makes him grab his aces before thinking out the play in full, as on this simple part score.

The lead was the ♣ 5, and I could see I had made a mistake in opting for a heart contract when a spade ruff loomed large. Making full use of the ♣ 87 in hand, I ducked in dummy, my RHO winning with the ♣ Q (yes!) and returning the ♥T. Clearly I had created a false impression. His prime motive was not to give away anything, but that kind of play does give away something important – opportunity. I ran this to the ♥J in dummy and had to return to my hand to draw the remaining trumps. A low diamond might work, but transportation would remain a problem and I would be forced eventually to lead spades disadvantageously from dummy. I tried the effect of the ♦K. My RHO grabbed his ace, and continued his passive defence by returning a second heart, giving me free access to my hand. Now I could run off my 8 tricks in the red suits to put pressure on the defenders with the result I scored the ♠Q in the confusion, 9 tricks in all, a top instead of the bottom I deserved.

If the first trump exit can be excused, we cannot see the merit of grabbing the ♦A.  By holding up one round and receiving his partner’s high-low signal, my RHO could have led a diamond for a ruff, won the ♣ A and taken a ruff in spades, 7 easy tricks on a not-too-difficult defence. All that was required was a bit of awareness.

My opponents on that hand were seasoned veterans and frequent winners at our club, as were my opponents on the next hand played late in a Swiss Teams match. Both pairs opt for passivity for its own sake. Transportation was again the key.

Pard thought we were playing ‘drop-dead’ Stayman and I knew we weren’t. One must think positively. We were vulnerable, so making 3NT could swing the close match in our favour. The lead was the ♦4, won in dummy. This was so suspicious that I decided to play the opening leader for the missing aces and the ♠T. Accepting the gift of the entry to dummy, I made full use with a 2-for-1 finesse of the ♣ T. When I opened my eyes the ♦T had won. On a low spade towards dummy, the ♠T popped up, covered by the Jack and Queen. A heart came back, and my RHO erred by taking his ♥A in front of the ♥KJ, to continue a hopeless diamond. If he had held up, my transportation would have been threatened. The hand had become easy as I could play the ♠K to establish the ♠98 with the dummy entry safely intact. There were still 4 losers, but I had 9 tricks any which way I chose to take them. I opted for safety by not repeating the club finesse. The 10 IMPs gained were as welcome as they were unexpected, being just enough to win the event, a pleasure made all the sweeter for being shared among friends – with happy smiles all around.

Minor Suit Slams at Matchpoints

October 23rd, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

A local Grand Master examined the scores and shook his head sadly after my partner and I bid a cold 6♣ against him. ‘People just don’t bid minor suit slams anymore’, he moaned. Yes, it was an unfair result, but that is matchpoints where many players are happy to dumb-down and go with the field. Why is that, after we have been taught that one should bid a slam when the chance of its making is better than 50-50? Let’s have a mathematical look at this situation. Here is a simple example with which to start.

Opener is in the middle of the 15-17 HCP range and responder can add 14 to 17 and come up with 31 HCP, not enough for slam. He expects that opener’s diamonds are longer than his clubs, and he hopes that those diamonds include a stopper. Rather than explore the situation and pinpoint his weakness, he bids what the field will bid content in the belief that he is sure to have lots of company whatever the end result.

In 3NT there are 11 tricks to be taken, no more, so in that respect when playing in a NT contract one needn’t go beyond the 3-level. The trouble with this auction is that it is based solely on HCP ranges. The West hand contains 6 controls which are equivalent to 20 HCP and the East hand 5 controls which are equivalent to 17 HCP, so the hands have amble power to justify exploring slam in a minor.

West might open the hand with 1♣. Responder bids 1♥, and what next? A 2/1 instructor once told her audience of eager matrons that ‘sometimes you have to lie’. So a jump to 2NT would reflect the potential strength of the hand in a club contract, but it is a couple of points shy of the system definition geared to NT bids. This time with a club fit it works like a charm, provided responder knows what to do next.

The hands are a lot easier to bid in a Precision system provided that there is a distinctive response on a flat hand with 14+HCP. I play that a response of 2♠ shows such a hand, in which case we bid the slam by cuebidding as follows. After the first exchange the bidding is easily understood with both partners contributing.

If the clubs and spades are interchanged, there would be little change in Precision and even with 2/1 methods slam would be reached, perhaps as follows.

2NT is Jacoby 2NT and cuebidding gets you there. It would be foolish to open with 1NT with 6 controls and miss the opportunity to explore a spade slam.

The Field Effect
A bidding system, like cheap insurance, doesn’t cover all contingencies. There is a built-in bias of spades before hearts, hearts before diamonds, and diamonds before clubs, which applies to partials and games, but is less relevant to slams. If one chooses to bid a slam, normally one chooses the safest strain. Trying to get to a minor suit slam involves swimming against the current of popular practice.

If the previous blog we noted that in a team game one scores a zero if one ends up in the same contract as the opponents, so it doesn’t appear superficially one has anything to lose by bidding a higher scoring contract when the probabilities favor it. At matchpoints, there is the tangible loss of a near-average score that one gets by playing in a common contract. Under such conditions some players think as follows: A final score is an accumulation of matchpoints won over several rounds; winning bridge entails never risking a bottom score; if I end up playing in 3NT, I will have lots of company and may score an average; if I end up in slam, I will have little company, and may score a bottom, in which case I will fall badly behind the field; rather than trying to win matchpoints on this hand, I will wait for a situation where I can profit without risk from my superior playing skills.

Doing the Math
We assume that there are just 2 alternatives: to bid a small slam or to stop in game. Let these symbols take on the specified meanings:

SS Small Slam
PM the probability of the SS making
PG the probability the opponents will stop in game
YB You Bid the SS
YD You Don’t bid the SS
TB the opponents Bid the SS
TD the opponents Don’t bid the SS

Here are the expected scores under the various conditions.

When the SS makes
YBTB   ½ x PM x (1 – PG)
YBTD    PM x PG
YDTB    0
YDTD   ½ x PM x PG

When the SS fails
YBTB ½ x (1 – PM) x (1 – PG)
YBTD 0
YDTB (1 – PM) x (1 – PG)
YDTD ½ x (1 – PM) x PG

The difference between expected scores when you bid the slam and when you don’t gives the result: YB – YD = PM – ½ > 0, when PM> 1/2.

The condition for achieving on average a better result by bidding the SS is independent of whether or not the opponents bid it. On that basis one should bid slam when the probability of making is more than 50% just like the books tell us.

PM is a concept of convenience. Ideally PM can be calculated with a computer program once we feed in declarer’s hand and the dummy. The calculation involves the probability of the various card combinations for the opposition. One assumes perfect defence and perfect play. That is not realistic as the opening lead is often critical, but it is dangerous to bid a slam on the assumption one will benefit from imperfect defence.

At the table we have available only an estimate of PM. As the auction progresses our estimate changes as more information is received. This also affects PG as the higher the estimate of PM the less likely one is to prefer game to slam. The estimates depend on the nature and quality of the information being processed. That in turn depends on the structure of the bidding system.  It is an over-simplification to assume that PM depends solely on the HCP total, but some believe that one should bid slam only when holding at least 33 HCP, because that was what they have been taught.  Usually in a cooperative slam auction the estimated PM is related to the number of bids being made, on the basis that one player or the other will end the process if he thinks game is the limit.

In a matchpoint game, the one hand is played at several tables by different pairs, so the average score is in reference to the distribution of scores across the field on that particular board. If the field is playing the same simple bidding system it may be easier to estimate PG than PM. In a good field, the two are closely related.

In reference to the club slam given above, after a 1NT opening bid responder does not even consider the possibility of a minor suit slam because the player can judge the field is unlikely to go that route. With some confidence he can estimate PG to be at least 75%, in which case he will still score 47% when stopping in 3NT. If he were to bid the slam, he risks losing 47% for a doubtful gain. Of course, when he chooses to jump to 3NT without further exploration he doesn’t know the probability of slam making on this particular hand, but he does know the initial odds are against taking 12 tricks with most 1NT hands opposite. This woeful thought process is aimed towards minimizing the loss when one has made the wrong choice. If he stays in game when slam makes 75% of the time, clearly he has made the wrong decision, but he still scores near average.  If he bids slam but it goes down, he has made the wrong decision and scores a bottom.

The Effect of Superior Technique
PM is the theoretical probability that 12 tricks can be taken, but taking them may require a certain delicacy of technique, such a squeeze or a dummy reversal. Perhaps not all players in the field will be capable of reading the situation, so one can gain matchpoints against the inept pairs when one wrongly stays out of slam, but manages that elusive 12th trick. Let’s assume that a player knows he is a better technician than one-quarter of the field.  In the YDTD category when slam makes on a squeeze, say, he will make 12 tricks in a game, but one-quarter will hold themselves to 11. Against those he scores a full matchpoint, so the overtrick is put on the same footing as the slam bonus. This favours individual effort. Now, the break even point is achieved when PM equals ½ + (1/8) x PG.  If PG is 3/4, the slam is unlikely to be bid across the field in the ratio of 3:1, and the justification for bidding the slam requires PM to exceed 60%, even though a good player is quite capable of taking the necessary 12 tricks when conditions allow it.

Some players consider this effect to be a contamination. To deliberately play against one’s better judgment because the field contains a few inept players, and, moreover, to profit from it, degrades the game.  So say some, but is that the case? Luckily bridge is not politics, so one needn’t dumb-down to be successful. One may choose to ignore the effect of the field and imagine one is playing against the best at all times. That noble approach is not optimal. It makes good sense to vary one’s play according to what the field is likely to do on any given hand. That adds an intriguing extra dimension to the matchpoint game.

Major Suit Slams
The same mathematics applies to major suit games and slams, but there is less need for adjusting to the field. The fact that so few players reach a good minor suit slam indicates either: (1) everyone is convinced they are better players than most, so don’t need to bid slams, or (2) the 2/1 system is deficient in this aspect. I strongly suspect the latter, because the problem does not occur to the same extent with major suit slams. The system is geared towards major suit contracts and most responders know when and how to look for slam possibilities right from the beginning. That was the whole idea behind 2/1.

An exception is when opener bids 2NT with a control rich hand and a 5-card major. Puppet Stayman is available to sort out the major suit fits, nonetheless, bidding space is restricted and the onus is on the weaker hand to do the slam exploration.  With few controls he may opt to play safe and stop in game unaware of how well the hands fit. This is understandable when the field will have the same self-inflicted difficulties.

If West opens 1♥, East hasn’t sufficient values even to bid 2♣ to force to game. Some might respond 1♠ on a bad suit happily planning to bid an invitational 2NT next. Here comes Gazzilli riding to the rescue.

Grand Slam Percentages

October 15th, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

I have heard that the world championships at Bali were an outstanding success. All the better, as it was a long time coming to this enchanting location. It has been said in the past of world championships that the winners are usually those who get the slams right. Perhaps these days the competitive deals have rather taken over in importance, but slam bidding is at least an indicator of how well the nerves have stood up after the week-long round robin.

Canada had a rather good run and met USA1 in the quarter finals before losing their grip in the late stages. I am not a fan of standard 2/1 bidding so it doesn’t grieve me greatly to report the following failure. Paul Thurston is a respected, popular bridge columnist who has written a book on 2/1 methods for the masses, so he might wish to reconsider the bidding on this deal from the 5th session.

One of the arguments for the method is that a bid of 2/1 saves bidding space for the full exploration of slam possibilities. But, keeping Twitter in mind, the fact is that given that both parties are saying a lot doesn’t necessarily mean they are having a useful conversation. Content is the key: some things you needn’t know, whereas other details are critical. In slam exploration the quality of the trump suit is essential information. I think, given the method, neither party bid incorrectly on a step-by-step basis. It was wrong only in its accumulative effect. Neither side had limited his hand. Smith’s trumps looked to be adequate and the fact that partner was bidding a lot encouraged him. Thurston was criticized for his 2♠ bid, and in similar circumstances Zmudzinski for Poland jumped to 4♠/2♥. That set limits to his holding, but it didn’t stop Balicki from bidding slam, and he made it on a passive misdefence, as given time the diamonds provided for ample discards. After all the bidding exchanges, Smith was less likely to get away with it, and, in fact, he went down 3. If it must be done, let it be done quickly.

Grand Slams
Some players avoid grand slams like poison. Once they determine a small slam has good chances, they jump to it, shutting out further exploration. As Kit Woolsey has stated on BBO, it is bad practice to jump to slams. Why the rush? Well, a grand slam is thought not to be a good gamble when it is unlikely the opposition will bid it, but this is not true. What is true is that it is not a good proposition if the opponents may be stuck in game as on the following deal from the Venice Cup Final.

On Bridge Winners there is a nice interview with Migry Zur-Campanile conducted by Christina Lund Madsen. After watching Charlie Rose interview Margaret Atwood, I am inclined to the view that women should be interviewed only by a woman. Charlie, a subconscious sexist, eventually got around to the subject of sexual stimulants, a subject on which Atwood was less than forthcoming and we were left in the dark as to whether her knowledge went beyond what one reads in her books. When asked what she does when she isn’t writing or twitting, Margaret replied sweetly, ‘I do the ironing.’ She explained that concentrating hard on doing a proper job to the best of her ability helps her brain solve hidden, more troublesome, problems. Whatever you do, concentrate hard and try to do it as well as you can. No task is trivial. Will Charlie eventually take up ironing?

Migry, we learn, has red hair, a big mouth, and is a great cook. In the interview she comes across as a vibrant teammate leaving no doubt as to why she was approached to replace Valerie Westheimer who withdrew from USA2 for health reasons. Her partnership with Jill Meyers was a first-time experience, so we can be sympathetic Jill’s precipitous jump to 6♣.

There are further considerations. Is it possible the opponents will get stuck in game? We might think that in the Venice Cup Final the answer would be ‘no’, but, believe it or not, Fiona Brown opened the North hand with a self-preemptive bid of 5♣, and there she rested. So, on this basis one might say that Meyers’ jump was justified even though 13 tricks are cold. We don’t know, we weren’t there, and I suspect Jill isn’t telling.

The Open Final was a grudge match between Italy and Monaco, a team that included erstwhile Italian stalwarts, Fantoni and Nunes. In that match both teams bid 7♣. One North decided to bid it (Fantoni) and one South (Madala). Let’s look at the mathematics of bidding a grand slam when you think the other team is sure to be in a slam.

Doing the Math
We assume that there are just 2 alternatives: to bid the grand or to stop in a small slam making 12 or 13 tricks. No doubling is allowed. Let these symbols take on the specified meanings:

GS Grand Slam
PM the probability of the GS making
PB the probability the opponents bid the GS
YB You Bid the GS
YD You Don’t bid the GS
TB the opponents Bid the GS
TD the opponents Don’t bid the GS
G what one gains when one bids the making GS and the opponents don’t
L what one loses when one bids a failing GS and the others don’t

Here are the expected scores under the various conditions when you take an action different from the opposition.

When the GS makes
YBTD   G x PM x (1 – PB)
YDTB – G x  PM x PB

When the GS fails
YBTD -L x (1 – PM) x (1 – PB)
YDTB L x (1 – PM) x PB

The difference between expected scores when you bid and when you don’t gives the result: (G + L) x PM – L > 0,    when PM > L / (G + L).

Miraculously (or not) the condition for achieving a positive result by bidding the GS is independent of whether or not the opponents bid it. So one needn’t hold back just because the opponents are too conservative. If the scoring is the total scoring of a minor suit GS, nonvulnerable, G equals 500, the slam bonus, and the loss, L, for bidding a GS when it goes down is 970. On this basis one is justified in bidding a GS if PM> 66%.

If the scoring is IMPs, G equals 11 and L equals 14. On this basis one is justified in bidding a GS if PM>56% (14/25). The most important factor in estimating PM is the trump quality. With a 9-card fit, one may be able to tolerate a missing Queen, but with a 4-4 trump fit one needs to hold AKQ and the ability to tolerate a missing Jack.

If the trump Queen is missing, don’t tell the opposition, as an opponent helpfully may lead a trump. Bad bidders have the advantage there. There may be other requirements in the side suits, but often there is more than one way by which a loser can be averted, a squeeze being the most satisfying method, and a helpful opening lead perhaps the most common.

There may be further considerations during a match. If behind in a match one may wish to maximize the possible gain by bidding a making GS when the opponents don’t, or not bidding a failing GS when the opponents do.  This requires a guess at the probability they will bid it. Generally if the odds are N:1 that they won’t bid the GS, one gambles best by bidding the GS if  PM> L/ (N x G + L).

Maximum uncertainty with regard to what the opponents will do is expressed by a PB of ½, (N equals 1), in which case the maximum IMP gain on average is got by bidding the GS when PM>56%. In other words one ignores what the opponents are doing and just bids the GS according to the normal criterion. However, it makes sense that if the opponents are unlikely to bid the GS, you best chance of gaining on them is to bid it and hope it makes.

Suppose they are 2:1 against bidding the GS. The PM required to make such a gamble profitable on average at IMPs is 39%. One would have to be very desperate to bid a GS with less than a 50% chance of making, but it is a better gamble than backing the odds that they will get too high.

One final word of advice, and this comes via Margaret Atwood. Happiness comes from what you do, therefore, rather than seeking Happiness for its own sake, look for something to do that makes you happy and do it ….something like playing bridge.

Restricted Revisited

September 12th, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  5 Comments 

What is the principle of restricted choice? How should we apply it? There are two questions to be answered. The first question deals in generalities, the second with specifics. The Principle arises from Bayes’ Theorem, a mathematically precise statement relating to the calculation of probabilities after cards have been played. It can be difficult to translate from the language of mathematics into plain English as something may get lost in the translation. In his masterwork, Master Play (1960), Terence Reese put it this way:
It comes to this: that a defender should be assumed not to have had a choice rather than to have exercised a choice in a particular way.

From this we may gather that if in a suit the JT are missing and one defender plays the jack, it affords the assumption he does not also hold the ten. It is not always correct to act on this assumption. Reese knew that, but he was trying to be helpful and may have inadvertently put the wrong idea in some readers’ minds. When making decisions one should take into account all possible combinations remaining.

Here is my statement on the application of Bayes’ Theorem to card play.
After one observes a sequence of plays in a suit, the probability that the observed sequence arose from a particular card combination is in inverse proportion to the number of equally plausible plays available with that combination. The greater the number of plausible alternatives, the less likely it is that the observed sequence was chosen from that combination.

The Encyclopedia of Bridge gives the following cautionary example in the section on restricted choice: North holds A2, South, KQ9843 and E-W hold JT765. Declarer plays the Ace and then the 2. East follows with 2 low cards, but West has followed with the ten on the first round. Should declarer finesse the 9 on that assumption that West had no choice but to play the ten? No. That is not what Reese meant. Let’s look at the combinations remaining after East follows to the second round. When looking at probabilities one should specify which cards have appeared, and not state vaguely that East has followed twice with low cards. Let’s say East has played the 5 followed by the 7.
Here are the combinations remaining along with their probabilities:

We assume that West would habitually play the ‘obligatory’ false card from JTx. The single most likely combination is the 3-2 split. In total JT in the West is more likely than the singleton T in the ratio of 12:5, so it’s not even close: declarer should play for the drop of the Jack in 3 rounds.

The question arises: does the same logic apply if West follows first with the Jack? That depends on how often a player would play the Jack from JT. If he always plays the lower of two touching honors, then JT is impossible. Always playing low from touching honors is more informative than playing either honor at random. In the above example partner need not be informed, so the random approach is best. More on this later.

This scenario is unrealistic as some bids have to be made and some cards have to played before declarer gets around to leading his ace. If the vacant places are equal, as they are when the cards are unseen, the results based on the a priori odds will provide reasonably sound guidance. However, if there has been preemptive bidding by the opponents, the vacant places may be unbalanced, and this significantly affects the odds. All suits may have to be included in the calculation, as in this example from the 2013 Spingold Final.

Brad Moss led the ♣9, covered by the ♣Q, ducked by Joe Grue (♣2). Jacek Kalita led the ♥T from dummy, covered by the ♥K and ♥A, Moss following with the ♥2.  The ♠4 was played towards dummy, Moss playing the ♠9, a significant card. The ♠J won the trick, Grue playing the ♠7. On the lead of the ♠2 from dummy Grue followed with the ♠5, and Kalita was faced with the decision as to whether or not to finesse the ♠8.

If one blindly follows the guidance of Reese as quoted as above, one finesses, playing for the ♠T and ♠9 to have been dealt to separate hands. The Encyclopedia of Bridge has warned us that such simplistic thinking can be wrong. One has to examine the remaining combinations before deciding.

Let’s simplify and assume on the bidding that Moss holds 7 diamonds, Grue 2, and that Moss has led passively from a tripleton club. The vacant places are 3 in the South and 8 in the North. The probabilities before a major suit has been played relate to the number of combinations of hearts and spades possible on the deal. The hearts and spades may be split in the following manner to fill the vacant places.

If there were no restrictions on the play of the cards, one round of hearts and one round of spades would not affect the relative probabilities. Thus, the probability of South being dealt a doubleton spade would still be more likely than his being dealt a singleton spade in the ratio of 5:4. If there are restrictions on the play, probabilities can change drastically as an adjustment must be made for the number of plausible plays for each remaining combination. Below are given the number of plausible plays at the time of decision when the ♠2 is led from dummy and Grue follows with the ♠5.

Many possible combinations have been reduced to a mere three. We have assumed North would cover randomly with an honor on the lead of the ♥T from dummy. The results show that a singleton spade in the South is 4 times as likely as a doubleton, so the finesse is the correct play.

It is said that only a genius or a fool leads from a worthless doubleton and it doesn’t pay to assume your opponent is a genius. Let’s suppose the lead was from a singleton, as was the case. If the clubs were dealt 1-5, the vacant places are 6 in the North and 5 in the South. The hearts and spades may be split in the following manner to fill the vacant places.

On an a priori basis the chances of a singleton spade in the South hand are slim indeed, but let’s again look at the situation at the time the ♠2 is led from dummy and Grue follows with the ♠5. We assume that North would split his heart honors randomly from ♥KQx on the lead of the ♥T from dummy. Under those assumptions there are just 8 combinations left to consider.

There are 2 possibilities included in Cases III and IV. The odds are 2:1 in favor of playing for the drop. In order to justify the right decision and finesse for the ♠T, as Kalita did, one would have to assume that the ♥K would be played from ♥KQ(x) much less often than half the time, in particular, at trick 2 Grue would play ♥Q about 7 times out of 8. The ♥Q would be the informative play, as normally the King would deny the Queen. If the lower honor would always be played in Cases II-IV, the only remaining possibility is Case I with the singleton ♥K.

We have observed on BBO that the experts usually strive to play the informative card, probably because they trust their partners to make good use of the information they transmit. So, it is quite possible that, early in the play especially, the ♥K would not often be chosen over the ♥Q. This would reinforce Reese’s advice and lead to the conclusion that if North plays the ♥K, one should assume tentatively he had no equivalent card.

This isn’t the whole story, but this report is long enough and as a two-finger typist we were happy that Nowosadzki didn’t play a larger role. At least one can see how the calculations should proceed – even computers have been known to make mistakes. (That’s a comforting thought!) Bayes’ Theorem is correct but one must assign realistic probabilities to the play options. As Voltaire noted, a logical conclusion is only as valid as the assumptions that went into it. Detractors of restricted choice will be glad to discover that in the end judgment is the determining factor, and mathematics acts merely as the Handmaiden to Success (or the Mop-Lady to Failure.) But …

Don’t throw out the baby with the bath water – German proverb (1512)

Threeee Nooo Trump!

August 20th, 2013  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  7 Comments 

While watching the 2013 Spingold Finals, I was reminded of the dearly departed Simon Marinker, one of my favourite Precision partners, who became famous locally for his frequent calls of ‘Threee Nooo Trump!’ After reaching his late 80’s with a failing memory his knowledge of Precision became limited to 1♣ Strong – 1 ♦ Weak. Not surprisingly 3NT was the abrupt ending to many an auction. The meaning was clear – ‘I’m not sure what’s going on, but let me play it.’ As he was a magnificent player of the cards with dummy in view, this frequently led to a major success. Often he sheepishly admitted after a steal, ‘I had to do a bit of razzle-dazzle on that one.’

In the Spingold Final on fully 44% of the boards 3NT was the final contract at one or both tables. Not all of these made. The accuracy was roughly 2 pluses for every minus with swings in both directions. The winning Polish team bid just one slam and not one contract was doubled (Simon never doubled and rarely bid slam, how could he?) In the end we were treated to a very entertaining, close match in which card play rather than bidding accuracy was most often the determining factor.

The Polish pair, Kalita-Nowosadzki, declared 3NT on 11 boards out of 64, making 7 times, going down, 4. They gained 13 IMPs when making, lost 14 when going down. For the ‘Internationls’ the most active pair was Grue-Moss who declared 3NT in 10 of the 48 boards they played. They made their contract on 7 occasions and went down on 3. The net gain for these pairs was 2 IMPs. Going down proved expensive, 30 IMPs over 7 boards, so if either pair could have avoided the big swings they would have done much better. So why so much activity with so little to show for it?

Well, in a team game to play for minimum loss one must bid 3NT if the opponents are going to do so. Of the 15 boards where both tables were in 3NT, on 5 occasions both declarers went down, so no big losses were encountered there. On the other hand it can be very expensive to bid 3NT and go down when the tricky devils at the other table go plus in a different contract. So we can come up with this rule: don’t bid 3NT when it doesn’t make. Call it the Preacher’s Rule and write it down just below the Rabbi’s Rule.

By the time Board 6 came along we had already witnessed two contracts of 3NT going down 2. Board 5 was an 11 IMP swing due to Morgan-Amoils bidding and making 5♦ on an ‘undiscussed’ auction while Kalita-Nowosadzki were down in 3NT. Throughout the Spingold play Allan Falk had been complaining about the young players bidding and making unmakeable slams when their senior-citizen opponents stopped safely in game. Now the seniors were disposed of, but the annoyance resurfaced when Jacob Morgan made 5♦ on the opening lead of an unsupported ace.

Falk:  As he grows older, Morgan will learn that ‘no way to go down’ is the best kind of contract.

That advice is hard to take after one has just gained 11 IMPs on initiative, but Jacob Morgan may accept that way of thinking after he ages several decades. The very next hand provided Falk with even more ammunition.

The American bidding was elemental 1♣ – 2NT; 3NT – Pass. Nothing wrong with the ending in 3NT, in fact, a must-do according to commentators Kit Woolsey and Larry Cohen: 24 HCP evenly divided between the hands, 9 controls, 8-7-6-5 division of sides – a most normal and desirable contract. Meckwell would have bid it, but unfortunately Meckwell had been relegated to the Swiss. There was a problem: it doesn’t make. A spade was led, and declarer went after clubs immediately hoping for a miracle, but this led to down 3 when he became awkwardly placed in the ending.

At the other table Jacek Kalita opened a Polish 1♣ and the bidding proceeded 1♣-1♦(waiting); 1♥– 2NT; Pass. With essentially the same knowledge available to the opening bidder it came down to a matter of judgment. Kalita found the courage to pass with a lack of umph in his club suit. At this table Grue’s lead was a potentially damaging diamond, but Michal Nowosadzki began by running the ♥T successfully, setting up 4 tricks in the suit, establishing a spade and making 8 tricks before the defenders got around to attacking clubs. That resulted in a gain of 9 IMPs, and a vindication of the admonition to bid only contracts that make. Perhaps also to Falk’s liking is the following spectacular hand where 3NT is double dummy makeable on any lead.

At the other table 3♦ was passed out, making 110. East has no satisfactory balancing bid against the preempt, but Jacek Kalita made do with a wide ranging double. Nowosadzki had hearts, but luckily not enough to force in that direction. Kalita then had to guess 3NT rather than introduce his fine spade suit. In this awkward manner the Poles reached the best contract, so it was left to declarer to bring home this double dummy game through double dummy play. Moss, true to his nature, began with the off-beat lead of the ♣9 rather than the ♦Q from his advertised suit. The club might have worked, but here it gave the timing for a free finesse picking off partner’s ♣K.

Kalita had to play the spades for 5 tricks which he managed with the ♠4 to the ♠J and a finesse of the ♠8. The ♥A dropped the singleton ♥K and Moss showed out on the second round of clubs. The hope remained that Moss could be endplayed to give a ninth trick to the ♥T in the dummy or the ♦K in declarer’s hand. So it transpired, a magnificent effort, of the kind that separates the expert from the card pushers.

Intellectually satisfying is the fact that no one did anything wrong and the bids were quite understandable under the circumstances. The preempt was on a 7-card suit, not the 6-card effort we often observe. That being so, the preempt sowed the seeds of its own destruction. There was a right answer and declarer found it using logic based on the information available, nonetheless there was luck involved, in particular, the singleton spade in Moss’s hand was a significant card, the ♠9. When it appeared on the first round of the suit, the law of restricted choice came into effect, so the second round finesse of the ♠8 became the marked play.

This is much like explaining how the magician performs his astounding trick. That doesn’t mean we can do it ourselves, but it does remove the act from the realm of magic. Houdini never revealed how he did it. During a game there are many more difficult decisions to be made that revolve around several possibilities, the trick being to choose the one that will conform most closely to the actual lie of the cards. Sure things are fine, but they are rare. Risk is what drives the game.

We can see Falk’s attraction to bullet-proof contracts, but there is more to bridge than double dummy analysis allows, Horatio. Truth is stranger than fiction, practice more interesting than theory. For the Internationals Morgan-Amoils achieved one big success (13 IMPs) by bidding 3NT when Kalita-Nowosadzki were in 4♥ going down 2. In theory it should have gone the other way around. Should we laugh or cry?

This is the kind of bidding from which our dear Simon often benefited, and again it was undeservedly successful. Rather than leading his fourth highest and setting the contract 4 tricks, Gawel led his to his partner’s queen-high suit, resulting in 10 tricks off the top for declarer. At the other table Bertheau-Bessis were more restrained in the bidding and EW reached the virtuous 4♥. However, something happened on the way to 10 tricks.

Playing in an iron-clad contract doesn’t guarantee success. The lead was an uninspired ♠7. Declarer took the ♠A and lost a heart to the jack. Spades were continued, declarer belatedly pitching the §Q. Now it was merely a matter of getting to lead a second heart towards dummy’s potent ♥K76 combination. Alas, declarer led the convenient ♥K from his hand and lost control as Bessis could get to ruff a diamond with the ♥2. I am sure something like this has happened to us all.

For those skeptical of the principle of restricted choice we note it failed to provide the proper guidance. As this was IMP play, safety was the paramount consideration and on the bidding North was marked with the ♥A. Declarer could have succeeded even with the dangerous approach of winning the ♠K, pitching the §Q on the ♠A, and going to dummy with the ♦K to finesse in hearts. Declarer can afford to lose 3 trump tricks, but not 4.

 There were 13 boards on which 3NT was declared at one table only. It made 6 times, for a gain of 42 IMPs and it went down 7 times for a loss 29 IMPs. The figures bear out the advantages of bidding 3NT on speculation with a less than a 50-50 chance of making. 3NT against a part score in the other room gained 38 IMPs on 3 boards. That explains the attraction to stretching.  Two of these swung in favour of Grue-Moss when the killing lead was not found. One may conclude that the advantage of stretching is based on the fact that errors are a part of the game, even at the expert level.

Putting pressure on the opponents in hopes of a costly error is a valid strategy and 3NT lends itself best to such a strategy. If you always make your 3NT contracts you are not bidding them frequently enough.