Against the Field

September 8th, 2015  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Against the Field

What distinguishes matchpoint from Teams is the amount of consideration one gives to what others are doing with the same cards. At matchpoint scoring emphasis is placed upon reaching a common contract and outscoring the field through clever declarer play, and/or uninformative bidding practices. There are added advantages to be got from uncertainty. The general perception is that accurate bidding gives a pair a better chance of reaching the right contract but a lesser chance of beating par. An example from a recent club game illustrates the downward trend.

Playing in a mixed field of 13 tables using 2/1 methods, how might West approach the problem of what to open in third seat holding ♠ AKJT3 ♥ 6 ♦ AKQ9 ♣ KT4, 20 HCP with 3+ losers and 7 controls. In making decisions, sooner or later, one will tend to bid what is best according to what is most probable given the partial information available at the time. Only rarely can one bid with perfect certainty, so it is usually a question of how much information one feels is needed to make a decision and achieve a good result. Most follow the expert advice inspired by successful Wall Street traders: ‘bid on rumor, defend on count.’

As West holds 20 HCP, there are 20 HCP up for grabs, and the fact that 2 players have passed already, it is reasonable to assume partner holds the expected number, 7. That should be enough to cover one loser, but not necessarily 2. Should one explore for the perfect cards opposite or merely blast to 4♠, the most attractive contract, with high expectations of making it? On this deal we can tell you that 10 of 13 pairs played in 4♠ and you will score 70% if you play in 4♠ without a club lead. Using Wall Street logic, if you took the gamble, you deserve the reward. Of course, your gain from taking an unusual route to a common contract would be an innocent opponents’ loss.

If West plays by the book by opening 1♠ to begin a cooperative auction, who knows where it might lead? After a pass by North, East now faces a problem with ♠ 9876 ♥ AQ754 ♦ JT9 ♣ 7. From his point-of-view the expectation is that the other three players hold 11 HCP each. In his book, Passed Hand Bidding(1989), Mike Lawrence placed considerable emphasis on the possibility that partner may have opened in third seat with a load of garbage, and that the opponents, if given the chance, may be poised to enter the auction, or at least gain information valuable for their defence. A jump raise would show this degree of support, 4 trumps and an unspecified singleton, thus serving 2 strategic purposes simultaneously.

Of course, nondescriptive bids based largely on HCP ranges are not conducive to accurate slam bidding. 4NT usually constitutes a desperate attempt to extract some useful information albeit above game level. Three Wests felt it is incumbent upon themselves to try RKCB, and finding there was an ace missing, they signed off in 5♠, held to 12 tricks. This awful approach scored an undeservedly high 33%, 37% less than any blaster to game who escaped the club lead.

To be sure there are ways to reach 6♠ with 2/1 methods, and 2 pairs out of 12 achieved that, scoring 11 matchpoints while being held to 12 tricks only. A pair of ‘super-blasters’, the kind that can ruin an opponent’s a good game, got to slam in an auction that was the mental equivalent of arm wrestling: 2♣ – 2♦( an Ace or King); 2♠ – 4NT; 5♦ (3 key cards) – 6♠. Overall they scored 42%, so we can cancel the committee.

Only one pair reached slam presumably by legitimate 2/1 methods as they are both bridge teachers who always have their bids. That good result may ease their consciences as they preach the word to their congregations of unrepentant transgressors. They got to the slam, yes, but devoid of sharp practices scored just 50% overall, a field-happy result.

Finally, the only pair of Precision bidders in the field managed to bid slam informatively and scored 67% overall. They adhere to the strategy of ‘accuracy in construction, aggression in competition’, made feasible by their limited-bid structure.

The auction was brief and to the point. Declarer decided the final contract without knowing everything about responder’s hand, but he knew the essentials. It is worth noting that responder’s 4♥ bid promised the ace, so was informative. It was not of the vague ‘wait-and-see’ kind which crops up in co-operative 2/1 auctions.

So now we can see how the slam could be bid with 2/1 methods, in fact, in a superior manner: 1♠ – 3♣ (splinter by a passed hand); 3♦ – 3♥; 3♠(forcing) – 4♥, etc. Below game level the opening bidder knows more about responder’s hand than does the Precision bidder and is in a position to extract even more information. So why didn’t the field reach slam? Well, the system lends itself to a great deal of variation. Maybe responders don’t play a limit–raise splinter by a passed hand. Maybe 3♣ is a preemptive jump shift, or maybe a fit showing jump, or a nondescriptive mixed raise. Does the pair play Drury? Is responder strong enough for Drury, and if so, what are his options on the next round? The fact there are so many choices indicates none is very good, although each might work best on any given deal. Overall it’s a mess.

Swinging to Catch Up

There was one peculiar result manufactured by a competent veteran pair – 4♠ making 5.

Checking their scores reveal a series of tops and bottoms during the session. One can imagine a state of mind in which declarer feels desperate to get back in the running after a disappointing result on the previous board. After a nondescriptive auction to 4♠, declarer can see his side has missed a slam if the ♠Q drops. To generate a swing he hopes the ♠Q will not drop, so he goes against the field and finesses on the second round of trumps, the only way to hold himself to 11 tricks.

Some would accuse him of antisocial behaviour for operating in this selfish fashion, asserting that a player should strive to preserve the integrity of the field, such as it is, especially if he is having a bad game. Personally I have lost many a matchpoint by playing against the odds in an attempt to make up some ground. I blame Hugh Kelsey for suggesting one should modify one’s approach based on what one thinks the field has done. This is akin to driving downtown traffic while constantly looking in the rearview mirror. If the field is in 6♠, 2 overtricks in 4♠ will be wasted. So you may hope the ♠Q doesn’t fall. However, if it does fall, you can’t beat the slam bidders, and all you can hope for is to match the others who, like yourself, play in 4♠. You will score below average by making 12 tricks, but you will not score a bottom. If the ♠Q doesn’t fall, you will have a decent score making just 11 tricks. It pays to overcome your disappointments.

Here is an example of declarer play that may be more in line with what Kelsey had in mind.

One can see what declarer was thinking when he opted for 3NT rather than 4♥. His hand taken in isolation is very suitable for play in a NT contract with decent chances of making as many tricks in NT as in a heart game. He knew he was bidding against the field. I picture The Field as a Granny full of commonsense advice, a bit behind the times, and mostly unaware of what’s going on behind the scene. Granny won’t bid a slam unless she can count on 12 tricks off the top, and it is pretty obvious that on these cards The Field will be playing sensibly in their 4-4 heart fit, normally making 10 tricks.

The opening lead was a non-life-threatening fourth-highest ♦3, a reprieve from the quick establishment of defensive tricks in clubs. Two aces are missing so timing will be important. Hearts, which are known to be divided 4-4, seemed to be the suit to tackle. If the hearts are played in the manner of those in 4♥, usually declarer will take 2 heart tricks, but be held to 9 tricks, thus getting a bottom. Nevertheless declarer won the diamond lead in his hand with the ♦A and played the hearts abnormally, ducking to ♥9 on his right, an onerous safety play not usually recommended at matchpoints. Ominously the RHO regained the timing for the defence by switching to clubs. Declarer won the ♣A in dummy and ducked another heart, losing to the ♥J on his left when the ♥T appeared on his right. This went against the rule of restricted choice, as with ♥JT9 initially the RHO might have played the ♥J previously. Disaster ensued, down 2 being the woeful result.

Rather than worry about how the field might handle the trumps in 4♥, declarer might have considered how to play for the maximum number of tricks in his NT contract. Spades are a 7-card suit and hearts an 8-card suit, but the spades lack only ♠AJ8 whereas hearts lack ♥AJT9. Spades will have to be played eventually, so a reasonable play is to win the ♦K in dummy and finesse the ♠9. This gives a 3-times better chance of making 3 tricks than does playing on hearts and has the added attraction that one can still entertain the hope that the hearts are behaving badly. Furthermore, it is often advantageous psychologically to make your early play towards the hidden hand.

With the RHO holding ♠AJ8 the play yields 3 spade tricks and the freedom to establish a trick in hearts for the 9th trick. This would be a good recovery at Teams, whereas at matchpoints it is a ‘costs nothing’ play, because down 2, down 1, or making 9 tricks will score the same zero. The best result is got when upon winning the ♠A the RHO persists in diamonds – now 10 tricks come home – another top attributable to a misguided defence. Well, doesn’t Granny advise, ‘always return your partner’s suit’?

Ah, Sweet Mystery of Bridge

May 12th, 2015  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

I remember as a boy listening on the radio to Jeannette MacDonald singing “Ah, Sweet Mystery of Life’. It was most embarrassing for a youngster to hear a middle-aged woman proclaim to the world at the top of her voice that at long last she had finally experienced deeply satisfying sex. Yes, even as a boy I knew she wasn’t referring to watching a glorious sunrise over frosty Kansas stubble fields. The mystery to me was that the females in my family were lapping it up, even my own mother. Right then I realized I was headed for trouble later in life.

Henry Kissinger once confessed that to be known as an expert one must tell the people what they already have been led to believe. I was reminded of that when I read for the first time the much praised book by Jeff Rubens entitled, ’The Secrets of Winning Bridge’.  It is chock full of commonsense, but has he uncovered any secrets?  As Fred Gitelman points out in the introduction of the latest edition, what Rubens does so well is put into words the ideas we already believe about playing bridge. That is no mean feat. Does the book advance our ideas beyond what is commonly held to be true? No, but being a good teacher is achievement enough.

Al Roth was Rubens’ ultra-conservative mentor, whose ideas may have been based on his experience that if a Manhattan millionaire wants to give you his money for the sport of it, you’d be a fool not to take it. And you must not give it back. He wrote of bidding as ‘painting a picture’. I think he was referring to the works of Impressionist School, where with a few deft strokes the artist may capture the essence of a subject, leaving it to the viewer to fill in the details from his own imagination. Presumably the artist then hurries off to Café Montmartre for a few quick one with his friends. The bidding tools available to the bridge player are necessarily crude instruments, so we paint with broad strokes and it becomes expedient that one captures the essence of one’s collection of cards within the limits of the inadequate tools at hand. This process goes beyond the bounds of systemic rules, and some creativity and imagination are required, especially in contested auctions, otherwise we are merely painting by numbers, numbers of high card points, that is.

Location, Location, Location
As he is addressing the average bridge player, Rubens is quick to point out that HCP  evaluation is accurate about 90% of the time when both partners hold flat hands. That is comfort for the masses, but he then points out that HCP evaluation is not perfect as there are cases where the expectation is far from reality. Here are two hands he uses to illustrate the shortcoming of relying solely on HCP totals.

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With Hands A and B the standard opening bid is 2NT. The responder has 12 HCP. The simple approach is for responder to bid 6NT on a combined HCP total of 33 HCP, yet with Hand B 10 tricks are the limit, whereas with Hand A 12 tricks are easy. What is wrong? As Rubens describes it, whereas the top cards remain in place, the movement of the apparently insignificant 2’s and the 3’s from one suit to another makes a big difference. The thought that insignificant cards are often crucial some may find disturbing. Are we therefore condemned to a bridge life governed by hidden factors?

The solution is rather simple: as with real estate, the value of controls depends on location, location, location. That means more than the locations within one’s own hand, but the locations with respect to the controls held in partner’s hand. One can discover the degree of fit through an honest exchange of information with one’s partner. Furthermore, it is not the weak responder who should be asking the questions and making the decisions, it is the stronger hand, as the holder of the most controls can better place the controls opposite and better evaluate the fit. Standard bidders don’t follow this principle; they want to preserve the right to decide no matter what, exercising what they call judgment.

There is a relay system that allows for better evaluation, the Viking Club, because the initial response structure is based largely on showing shape. Asking for controls follows later in the auction. So both Hand A and Hand B are opened 1♣ and the bidding proceeds to 3♠ with responder showing 12-14 HCP with 3=4=2=4 shape. With Hand B the opener soon discovers the existence of a mirrored distribution in a division of sides of  6=8=4=8, all even numbers. It is not difficult to avoid 6NT and stop in a heart game contract where declarer may play along elimination lines with the hope of avoiding 3 club losers. With Hand B opener uncovers a more likely distribution, 7=6=5=8, which provides 12 tricks of the top. (Note the odd numbered splits allow for the discarding of losers.) This division of sides is much more likely than the other which justifies bidding 6NT if one is making a blind guess. It is a question of probability based on partial knowledge. Gather more information about the division of sides and the probabilities change.

Late in life I have discovered the importance of the division of sides. I call it the sweet mystery of bridge. It is a mystery that can be explained, but most players don’t want to talk about it. Instead, they are eager to tell you how many points they held.

Yin and Yang Hand Types
Jeff Rubens is recognized as the man who put forward the Useful-Space Principle that states that in a constructive auction space should be assigned where it is most useful regardless of the natural or traditional meanings of the call. Transfer bids are a good example of such an assignment. Today overcallers realize that their job is to remove useful space when the deal belongs to the other side thereby undoing Rubens’ good work.
Overcalls are getting to be very light and the suit bid can be weak. In the face of interference the emphasis is clearly on showing support for partner’s suit, and authors have devised methods to distinguish the kind of support partner can expect. There is the other side of the coin: how much value exists in the overcaller’s suit. This aspect has been largely neglected. Obviously with the sides balanced in HCP, the more your side holds in their suit, the more points they are likely to hold in yours – a reason for caution.

It is best when painting a picture with your bids is to attempt to capture the essence of your holding by separating flat (Yin) hands from distributional (Yang) hands as early as possible, and among flat hands to distinguish hands that are well stocked in the opponents’ suit and those that are not. Suppose partner opens the bidding and your RHO overcalls. For flat hands the high card content is a major means of evaluation whereas for shapely hands losing trick count and controls come to the fore. Troubles occur when responder’s reaction can be a mix of the two categories. We are thinking here of the all encompassing negative double which can be made with a long suit and limited values or with a flat hand and scattered values. The long suit may never enter the consciousness of the opener, who will tend to use high card content as the default means of evaluation.

Flat hands have little potential for contributing significantly to the number of total trumps. The difference between the longest suit and the shortest suit sets the absolute limit. A 5-4-3-1 shape is excellent as it contributes 4 to the total trumps if there is a fit in the 5-card suit, 3 if the best fit is in the 4-card suit, and even 2 in the third worst candidate. Of course, you will not uncover the best fit unless you bid, sometimes incautiously. The one thing one should not do is press on aggressively when holding top honours in an opponent’s suit.

Information Reveals the Unusual
Bidding systems are based largely on the assumption of normal circumstances, and encounter difficulty when conditions are not normal. A bid is most informative when it reveals something unexpected. An overcaller normally has values in the suit he chooses to bid, and an advancer may also. So bidding a topless suit has a deceptive element that may work to one’s advantage. If the AKQ in a suit are missing, the chances are they are distributed around the table with no one player the wiser. If someone holds two of these cards, that player will know that something unusual is in the offing. So in competition, especially with a flat hand, one does best to keep partner informed of the abnormal state of affairs when the opponents are bidding a weak suit. Here is an extreme example from the 2005 Bermuda Bowl Final.

According to the analysis of Eric Kokish, Lauria and Versace are known for their aggressive style in competition which leads them to bid many a hopeless game. Furthermore, the Italian’s attitude towards doubling is less shape-restrictive than one expects (but doesn’t always get) from American players. Presumably with this cat-and-mouse style one has to rely on the opponents’ reactions more than is healthy in order to glean from the auction the necessary information on the lie of the cards, which leads to the dangerous condition of reliance on the opponents more than one’s partner.

The HCPs are divided 19 to NS who have a 9-card spade fit and 21 to EW who have an 8-card heart fit in addition to a supplemental 8-card fit in diamonds. The Law of Total Tricks if crudely applied leaves to the expectation of 17 total tricks in the play. Indeed, Meckwell could come to 9 tricks in a spade contract, but what about EW? With the expectation of only 8 tricks it appears rather too aggressive to bid even a vulnerable game, as the Italians are wont to do. As the cards lie, they should be held to 6 tricks, so the number of total tricks was 15, not a total one wants to encounter at the 4-level, or even the 3-level, as Hamman-Soloway discovered when they reached 3♥, unopposed and undoubled, off 300.

One can see on a double dummy basis that the problem is that EW are missing the AK in one red suit, and AQJ in the other. Versace took the final fatal step, however, the blame lies with Lauria who can see in his hand the AK of the suit introduced freely on his right, representing 7 of the 12 HCP he holds. Any bid by him at this stage will be altogether too encouraging. The warning signs are up. Leaving Meckwell to play in a spade partial making 9 tricks would give Italy 4 superfluous IMPs to add to their final winning total. Which proves what? Overall, aggression pays, but it should be exercised with discretion.

In a competitive auction one problem is how to best describe the hand, another, how best  inconvenience the opponents. Over 1♠ Lauria had 2 reasonable space-saving options: a responsive double or a pass. Of course, we are all reluctant to pass, Lauria more so than most, so a double would fit the bill, if it were defined to show this type of hand – an opening hand with nowhere to go linked with a willingness to go somewhere. He chose to be disruptive, which didn’t inconvenience Meckstroth one bit. It is safe enough to bid 9-card fits missing top honors. As for Verace’s 4♥ bid, well, sometimes one can be too clever – or should I say, too trusting, which is not the same thing.

Real Matchpoints

March 25th, 2015  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Play bad bridge and you lose  –  Robert Hamman

It is in human nature that conservatism increases in proportion to uncertainty. After World War II and The Great Depression, anxious parents filled piggy banks and taught their kids to save their pennies and the dollars would take care of themselves. Of course, we can now see that they would have done better to borrow to the hilt to buy stocks in devastated and discredited companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Japan.  

It was a time when Charles Goren was the King of Bridge. He was known for not doing anything flashy – he left that side of the game to his partner, Helen Sobel. While his bidding system is a thing of the past, his books on card play are still worth reading. Today’s attitude is more upbeat, and the current King of Bridge is the aggressive and inventive Jeff Meckstroth, who plays a system that remains a mystery to the uninformed masses.

In his book, Secrets of Winning Bridge (1969), Jeff Rubens gives his opinion that matchpoint game does not qualify ‘real’ bridge, because one’s score on a given board depends on how one’s results compares with the large number of pairs who play the same cards as you do. I ask, ‘what’s wrong with that?’ It’s like major league baseball: over a long season you must score well against the poorer opponents while holding your own against the better ones. Situations arise that are beyond one’s control, however, and overall it’s technique that determine how well you will do.

In a matchpoint contest each board is scored on the basis of a ranking from best result to poorest result. The rankings are added over all the boards. This gives a statistic based on the sum of ranks, a perfectly valid indicator of achievement. A board passed out, defended at 1NT or bid to 7NT carry the same weight. So what does the final statistic measure? At best it measures your overall efficiency in all aspects of the game, at worst how well your opponents played against you. Bridge is a game, the rules are arbitrary, and your score, for better or worse, is what you live with until next time. Don’t take it personal.

What is the relationship between the results at the tables and the double dummy results? One would like to believe that the two are highly correlated. Achieve the double dummy result and you should score well. That is not guaranteed on any given board. More often the results at the table reflects how closely the bidding has conformed to the bidding system most favoured by the majority of the players, in my club 2/1 GF with 5-card majors. The bidding system possesses a certain degree of accuracy but the design is geared to seeking high scoring contracts like 3NT and 4 of a major that will succeed under normal circumstances. Go down in 3NT with 25 HCP and you are assured of not having suffered a bottom score. It is even worse than that. Here is what can happen.

Eight pairs got to 3NT uncontested after West opened 1NT. One East, Blaster Bob, merely raised 1NT to 3NT, whereas 7 others went through an invitational sequence, having subtracted a point due to the poor 4-3-3-3 shape as they had been taught to do. At these tables the bidding proceeded as follows: 1NT – 2♣; 2♠ – 2NT; 3NT – Pass. There are 2 advantages to this long-winded  approach: East will be absolved of blame no matter the result, and the opening leader may be deceived into thinking East holds 4 hearts for his Stayman enquiry. At one table an expert pair did better (in theory) using the delicate sequence that follows.

Against the field’s adherence to 2/1 bidding with a strong NT, Sid and Sam were playing a weak NT system in which a 1♦ opening bid promises at least 4 cards in the suit.  Without interference 2♦ would be a transfer, but after an overcall it could best be described as ‘nonforcing but constructive.’ Which is to say, any squeak for an opponent reduces their elaborate structure to natural rubble. Similarly, in an uncontested auction opener’s 2♠ rebid would be a strong reverse and 2NT would show a standard strong NT opening bid. After interference with diamonds established as trumps, 2♠ was merely forcing to 3♦. Sam evaluated his cards in the light of these developments. A return to diamonds would not show his true worth, and he had a weakness for playing in 4-3 major fits, so he gave a raise to 3♠, ending the auction, but arriving happily at the optimal EW contract. Three rounds of hearts were lead, declarer discarding a club on the 3rd round. Sid gave a sigh of relief when both defenders followed to the ♦A and ♦Q.

‘Phew,’ exclaimed Sid, ‘lucky the diamonds were 3-2. 3NT is down off the top on the heart lead, so we should score pretty well’. As with most statements made immediately following the play this was misguided wishful thinking, for pairs in 3NT were making 9 or 10 tricks even on a heart lead. S&S scored 1 out of a top of 8.

Five pairs in 3NT made 10 tricks on the fourth-best lead. Two players led the ♥A to look at the dummy. In one case South played the ♥2, upside-down attitude, blocking the suit, but getting an above-average score. Immediately upon checking the score this pair agreed the method which they were trying for the first time was superior to standard hi-lo they had been playing together for 20 years. At another table South unblocked the ♥T, but North continued with a low heart, giving declarer his 10th trick.
South: What’s wrong? I was unblocking.
North: You played the Ten, denying the Jack
South: So what’s the difference? Just cash your King.

Blaster Bob’s partner, Passive Polly, once more unlucky, was the only declarer to go down when two Grandmasters got it right, partly because they approach all games bid by Bob with an appropriate degree of suspicion.

A rose by any other name may smell as sweet, but a contract by any other route may not be a good. It depends on what information has become available to the defenders. Probabilities are not fixed stars in the firmament, they move around as information becomes available. Probability is linked to information which is linked to choice.

On aggregate Sid and Sam may gain on their use of the weak NT, but there will be hands where the strong NT puts declarer in a better place because of the uncertainties remaining. Here Sid could have been more crafty. Once Sam raised to 3♠, Sid could guess the field would be playing in 3NT on a heart lead. If he aimed to minimize his loss if he were wrong, as suggested by Kit Woolsey in his book, Matchpoints, he would have bid 3NT despite the opponents’ actions, faking a stopper. It might have worked. How often the opening lead against a freely bid 3NT is not in the suit bid and raised by the opponents. Instead he aimed to maximize his gain, expecting the vast majority to be going down in 3NT. He was unlucky on this hand because the ♥A and ♥K were with the opening leader rather than divided between the defenders. Crudely speaking by going against the field Sid had a 2 to 1 chance of a top score.

There should be no grounds for complaint if 1 in 3 times one scores poorly. Indeed, we should all be glad to play a session where on two-thirds of the hands one starts with an advantage over the field. Just playing the cards well and counting out the hands is the mark of a consistent winner in a mixed field, but there is no virtue in resting on one’s superior abilities in that regard. Although there is safety within a crowd, it is regressive to suggest that there is an advantage to be got from bidding as badly as the majority. There is such a thing as progress, after all, even though there remains uncertainty in execution

Were We Fixed?
A common lament from also-rans is that they lost because they were fixed by some silly action by the opponents. My partner might say likewise, but I don’t think that way. Here is a recent deal where the defenders bid strangely to our great disadvantage.

 As she put down the dummy, Connie apologized for her bidding, something I always avoid before the results are in. ‘I know this is wrong,’ she said, ‘but I had one of my hearts in with my diamonds.’ If she hadn’t said that I would have congratulated her on her fine bidding, but one can’t congratulate someone for their poor eyesight. You see, she was apologizing for bidding the hand correctly, that is, against the standard matchpoint procedure of always doubling a spade overcall when you hold 4 hearts. Naturally by bidding correctly the pair outbid the field to an ice-cold slam and handed us a bottom.

There are lessons to be learned. Perhaps I should have passed and awaited developments? Naaa. Maybe I should add another convention to the card and adopt Roman Jump Overcalls? Naaa. Maybe, partner should have jumped to 3♠ on nothing? Get real, these things happen. I don’t blame Dame Fate in the guise of a nice lady for our falling one short in the rankings. There were two other hands where we scored poorly when the opponents bid to 6♥ with 13 tricks off the top. Painful, perhaps, that the field offered us no protection against competent bidding, but if on the last round I had counted out a hand correctly we would have ended in first place. So, control what you can control, and forget about what you can’t.

The Least Lie

March 3rd, 2015  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

During my first year of duplicate I opened 1♣ on a hand containing ♣AQ doubleton and ♦xxx. When the hand was over I was castigated by my LHO for not opening 1♦. It appeared he had given up an overtrick on a pseudo-squeeze. I have always felt that one should prefer to bid where the points are, and had no deceptive agenda in mind, in fact, I thought I was being informative. If I had deception in mind I would have opened 1♦ on the worthless suit hoping to discourage a diamond attack. Certainly there was no intention of playing in a diamond contract and it would be wrong to suggest there was. I was surprised that the rules required such an action rather than discourage it. This simple example shows the value placed on suit length without regard to suit strength.

Preempts these days hardly conform to any rules. During the 2014 Reisinger Final against Levin-Weinstein, Andrew Gromov tied the record for the worst 6-card suit opened at the 3-level in first seat. He opened 3♠ on: ♠ 765432 ♥ 7 ♦ 54 ♣ 984. Not to be outdone in the record-tying department, his partner, Aleksander Dubinin, raised on ♠ AKQJ matching the previous best 4-card raise to game. In the subsequent confusion the Russians defeated their opponents’ 5♥ contract by 3 tricks. It would be remiss of me not to mention that Gromov-Dubinin would have won the board even if they had passed throughout.  Here is the full deal with the auction at the other table.

Meckstroth unimaginatively passed initially. Rodwell eventually doubled 4♥ by Grzegorz Narkiewicz and gave up 590 to the opposition. The loss was only 1 board at BAM scoring. Meckstroth does what Meckstroth does, but how should we approach a similar situation? Larry Cohen’s guidelines regarding total tricks suggest a player in doubt should bid 4♠ over 4♥. With respect to total trumps East might expect 18 in the form of 10 spades and 8 hearts. The Law requires a reasonable balance of HCPs, which we do have here, 17 versus 23, but the East hand is pretty much useless on defence. It is reasonable for a strong hand to double expecting partner not be without an entry, otherwise one will not be doubling enough. Rodwell’s double should not mean, ‘leave it in, I’ve got them down in my own hand.’ So Meckstroth’s pass indicates he was trusting his partner more than his opponents, hard to do but always the right approach. With no sign of an entry in the East hand Rodwell has to develop tricks entirely from his own hand. Even with BAM scoring passing the double is rather too strong a position to take when your partner isn’t of the caliber of Eric Rodwell, and even then …..

Let’s turn our attention to Meckstroth’s 2♠ bid. When I emulate the experts and bid on nothing, it usually comes back to haunt me. Partner is more likely to be fooled than are the opponents. After all, partners are supposed to trust one another whereas the opponents are rightfully suspicious. Beyond that, the opponents can guess more easily that you have nothing, and may be encouraged to bid on to their best contract, and play it correctly to boot given the information you have given them free of charge. If partner forces you to bid, that’s different. So I think over 1♥ Meckstroth should either have passed, giving up the hand early, or bid 4♠ on the assumed 10-card fit. It is of interest to note that 5♥ should make double dummy (Deep Finesse) so the fact that Levin was defeated by 3 tricks points to the fact that the insane overbid is often more effective than the reasonable wait-and-see approach. It is always hard to gauge the depth of insanity.

Bidding Topless Suits
Those who preempt or overcall on topless suits do leave clues, which relate primarily to the length of the suit bid. The deception in the clue lies in the lower than average high-card content within the suit. Usually length and strength go together, so disjointedness may steer the opponents in the wrong direction, the deception being greatest when the missing honours are split between defenders. It doesn’t work so well if one opponent is well stocked, so can see through the deception.

Last month at my club South, nonvul vs vul, opened 2♠ on ♠ JT9875 ♥ 84 ♦ 954 ♣ K9. My partner, West, bravely passed on ♠ AK843 ♥ J72 ♦ 3 ♣ AQ32, and when I made a balancing double on 0=4=5=4 shape with 9 HCP, he had 2 chances for a good score: pass for penalty (500) or bid 3NT (600). John greedily chose to play the hand in 3NT. North led the ♠Q from ♠Q2. Declarer held up on the first lead and won the second. After a lead to the dummy’s ♦KJT87, winning the ♦J, he was able to count the hand and manufacture an endplay against North to yield the 9th trick. With no major fit, most EW pairs played undisturbed in a club partial.

The preemptor had deception in mind with no redeeming feature in hand. One can hardly expect to shut out the others at the table with such flimsy values. A good preempt presents the opposition with a losing option, but here there wasn’t one.

Opening Very Light
The ACBL allows very light opening bids in a suit provided a prior announcement is made. This warning is ineffective as most opening bids will be normal. It’s like the boy crying, ‘Wolf’. Let’s just assume that everyone opens light upon occasion.

Trouble arises if one assumes the HCP content is directly related to the playing potential of the hand. The HCP descriptor takes on the role of an evaluator. This is a common assumption foisted on beginners, some of whom never learn better. If the official 2/1 rule is simply that an opening bid of 1♥ promises at least 5 hearts and at least 10 HCP, as the newer player is led to believe, then the opening bid on less is a ‘lie’, but it is not outside the law and it makes bridge sense. So the ‘lie’ is not even a fib: it is a systemic flaw.

There are many ways to evaluate a hand that go beyond the simple point count. Taking into account the shape of the hand, a player is allowed to add points because of distribution, so a sound 1♥ bid may contain less than 10 HCP. In The Joy of Bridge by Audrey Grant and Eric Rodwell, the authors suggest adding 5 points for an 8-card suit, so the opening bid of 1♥ may legitimately contain a mere 8 HCP yielding the required 13 ‘points’. Only the bidder knows how much he owes to shape and how much to high-card strength.

Let’s consider a hand that appeared in the Ask Jerry column of the August 2014 ACBL Bulletin. Presumably Helms’ answers to questions from ‘newer players’ meet with ACBL approval. The hand was ♠ AJ ♥ 98765432 ♦ 5 ♣ A7, and the question was, ‘what would you bid as dealer?’ Helms recommended opening 1♥ as ‘the least lie’. Certainly a 6-loser has playing potential. With regard to defensive values, Helms believes that the presence of two aces is sufficient defence for an opening bid at the one level. It is a sad situation indeed when a new player is told it is in his best interest to ‘lie’.

The offense to defence ratio is not the main consideration here: it’s the effect on an opponents’ thinking. For ‘newer players’ the least lie with the above hand is 3♥. This hand wouldn’t be much of a surprise to an inexperienced opponent when it is eventually revealed. The poor quality of the suit argues for treating it as a 7-carder. Bidding and play can follow normal procedures, and decisions will have a reasinable basis to work from. Of course, 3♥ is not the most effective bid for the opening side, because 1♥ gives a better chance of getting to slam. On the other hand, if partner has a poor hand, the opponents may be confused during both the bidding and the play. The opponents will not be able to come to a well-reasoned solution based on probabilities, luck will be the determining factor, and it is most likely to benefit the opening bidder. One concludes that by ‘the least lie’, 2/1 teachers actually mean, ‘the most effective lie’ within the context of the system as it has been taught to beginners. So why not start by teaching truthfully from the start?

The Effect of Mysterious Bidding
Consider the classic ending of an Agatha Christie mystery. Hercule Poirot has gathered the suspects in the library and is about to reveal the identity of the killer of the nasty millionaire with a shady past. ‘I am baffled; it appears none of you did it,’ he reveals, ‘It may have been a mysterious contract killer who mistakenly came to the wrong address.’ Agatha would get howls of protest from her fans; the out-of-the-blue ending has made a mockery of the reader’s attempt to sift the truth out of the evidence and overcome the false clues provided. Well, the same applies to playing a hand of bridge. There has to be a chance of getting it right by thinking it through, otherwise the whole exercise becomes a farce. If the ending comes by chance after one has been misled all along the way, the work of the little grey cells has been wasted entirely. ‘No, no, no, mes amis, it was suicide made to look like murder.’ Bridge players are prepared to believe that for they have seen it often enough with their own eyes.

Better Than 50%
A slam on a finesse is condemned by senior experts, especially in a matchpoint game, but some finesses are better than 50%.  As Terrance Reese has noted, there is usually a clue.

John Miller opened a potent 1♥ (5 losers, 4 controls) and I had an old-fashioned 4-card raise, 12+ – 15 HCP. John asked for controls in the minors, and I showed my 5. He did not hesitate to bid the slam. It is always a temptation to bid a slam merely to celebrate having a convention others haven’t got, but that wasn’t the reason here. Over 3NT South passed quickly before John remembered that 3NT was a conventional raise.  It had never arisen before. Belatedly he alerted, and South noted she could take back her pass. John agreed, and she thought some time before passing again. So who would you think holds the ♠A? It was unlucky I didn’t have another queen lurking in the background, but the doubleton spade was a hidden chance that worked as well.

Another factor that enters the calculation is that playing in 4♥ making 12 tricks was a below average score, because 2 players were doubled in that contract. So you don’t need a full 50% chance to bid slam. What you need is a method that convinces an opponent that you are over your head in 4♥. Maybe some opened a putrid 3♥ and were raised to 4♥ – that could do it.

Bridge at My Club

February 11th, 2015  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

Bridge blogs are full of complaints. I am here to complain about the complainers who deride the game as played at the local club. They express grievances at a director’s poor decision regarding unauthorized information (UI), but UI is derived from familiarity of the personal quirks of opponents and partners alike that are an integral part of the local game. If you drop into a club where you are unknown, beware the smiling, wrinkled faces that merely mask the devious minds – the face of Santa Claus, but the disposition of Mack the Knife. Initially you, as an unknown factor, will have a great advantage, but over subsequent sessions the room will learn to peg you and adapt their methods to combat your particular modus operandi. As your scores plummet you will come to realize it is a time for a change of strategy, and, zip, back up again your scores, until the field readjusts, and so it goes.

Scientists deplore the introduction of human factors into the game, (why can’t we act more like computers?), but really, doesn’t that add to the game’s challenges? Facing a married couple who have been playing together for 40 years, one needs to know more than what’s in a book of mathematical tables – one has to know something of human nature. They won’t always do what you would have done with the same cards, and you can’t expect the said couple to forget, much less forgive, all those annoying habits they have come to recognize over decades. It works both ways.

If you come to our club seeking a partner you will probably be assigned Edna, a former club owner, now, alas, suffering from Parkinson’s disease and confined to a wheelchair. Her most enduring memories include shaking (left) hands with Pete Grey, the one-armed outfielder for the St Louis Browns. Apparently what drives her still is an abiding desire to screw up a Precision auction as long as she’s still able to do so. Your pre-game preparation might go something like this.
‘Hello, my name is Edna and I’m a nonagenarian. Do you know what that means?’
‘Does it mean you belong to an ancient sect that rejects The Book of Genesis?’
‘No! It means I’m over 90 years old.’
‘Congratulations, I wouldn’t have guessed. Well, Edna, what do you play?’
‘I play whatever you play.’
‘Precision?’
‘No, not Precision’
‘Flannery?’
‘No, not Flannery.’
‘Drury?’
‘No, not Drury – you will find I always have my bids.’
‘Stayman?’
‘Yes. Last week I came in first without any of this fancy stuff.’
‘Now we’re getting somewhere. 15 to 17 No Trump?’
‘Not with 4-3-3-3.’
‘You don’t open 1NT with 4-3-3-3?’
‘No! I don’t use Stayman with 4-3-3-3. 4NT is always straight Blackwood.’
‘That avoids confusion. How about , no, not Ogust….’
‘I won’t start without my tea and cookie. The cookies are over there on the shelf.’
‘Lots of milk in the tea? I’m guessing here.’
‘Yes, please, if you would be so kind, but make sure it’s hot.’

I daresay anyone could have a good game playing with Zia, but here you would be facing a real challenge, but the same problem at the table that your opponents will be facing. The only difference is that they will be moving on after 2 boards. Still, bridge is bridge, and the most important factor is where the cards lie. It’s important to maintain your concentration. Here is a recent deal that was particularly upsetting to my partner, John, who once more was done in by the redoubtable Edna.

Ben, a naval veteran of the Korean War, has been witness to many astonishing feats in his day, especially in the port cities of the Orient, but even he took some time before passing Edna’s unusual 3NT. When John asked what 3NT meant, Ben shook his head and replied thoughtfully, ‘I don’t know.’ That made sense. Knowing Edna as we do, ‘impervious’ is the adjective that comes to mind, one should take him at his word. There is no need to call for the director. As South I would have bid a pass-or-correct 5♣, even 6♣ is a good save against 4♥ making, but in the light of history one can understand Ben’s reluctance to support with support. At the club passing with nothing is usually the best course of action, and doubling merely adds to the confusion, but, of course, one can’t double one’s partner even if at times you feel like it. As it was, John got to show both his suits and eventually reached the optimum EW contract.

Despite the wayward auction, on a club lead declarer has only to play the diamonds for one loser.  So, the ♣A ruffed, a heart to the lightning-fast ace, and the ♣K, ruffed, put declarer in his hand with the diamond suit foremost in his mind. John drew a second trump with the ♥K in dummy and ran the ♦8, losing to the ♦T. The ♠J was returned. A third trump to dummy allowed for a finesse of the ♦Q, losing to the bare ♦K for down 1, leaving us to wonder if there wasn’t a better play. Just because a play doesn’t work doesn’t mean it’s wrong, although it always feels that way. If it feels good, it might be wrong. Even if it feels good and is good, some smart-ass will tell you it’s wrong.

Playing at our club where the uncertainties are greater than previously thought theoretically possible, it pays to distrust the bidding and gather information on card placement before committing to a line of play in a critical suit. In the face of partial knowledge one is supposed to assume what is most probable. Cashing the ♠AK entails a little risk, but if one does that before drawing the last trump it enables one to ruff a third spade and conclude North began with a tripleton spade and a singleton heart. Entries to dummy are few, so declarer must unblock some intermediate trumps to preserve entries. Here the conclusion would be that the diamonds sit 2 in the North and 3 in the South. This is exactly the way it was.

There are 2 ways to approach the diamond suit under these circumstances. One way is to finesse twice starting by running the ♦8, as John did. The other is to play the ♦A first and see what transpires – a discovery play rather than an attempt to drop a singleton ♦K. If the ♦T appears from the North, go to dummy, lead the ♦8 and cover South’s card. .The Principle of Restricted Choice tells us it is 2:1 that North was dealt ♦KT rather than ♦JT. Let’s compare the results for the 10 possible combinations. In loving memory of my high-school algebra teacher, ‘Grumpy’ Gordon, let a and b stand for the missing low cards.

Playing the ♦A first loses in 3 cases out of 8. Ironically this sequence scores up the game. The commonly held belief is that optimally one runs the ♦8 and finesses the ♦Q on the second round. This loses in 2 cases. The key combination is JTa opposite Kb. If Ben plays the ♦J on the second round, it is twice as likely to be from ♦KJa than from ♦JTa.

There is more to the story. The optimum play clearly depends on whether you feel Ben is capable of playing the ♦J from ♦Jab on the first round. If you are a stranger to our club, you won’t know Ben, so you could assume that he is capable of this expert play. But if, based on his scruffy appearance, you feel Ben is not up to the extravagant expenditure, you would assume he would never play the J from J53 on the first round. Under that assumption, the optimum play is to go up with the ace on the second round once the 2 low cards have appeared from his hand. Then one loses only in one case out of ten, Kab opposite JT. Technically, John’s play of the ♦Q on the second round was a compliment to Ben’s abilities. Maybe, Ben, knowing John’s expertise, had purposefully double false-carded? Intriguing thought; sometimes it’s hard to distinguish between accident and intent.

As the cards lay, going on a voyage of discovery would have accomplished nothing. The standard plays are based on what is most probable, so discovering the cards are placed where they most probably are adds little. That is the reason why so many play carelessly. However, one gains when the cards are not distributed as expected. Suppose John plays off the top spades before playing a second trump. The defensive signals may suggest Edna held 2 spades and Ben, 5. The distribution of the diamonds is now most probably 3 in the North and 2 in the South. That recommends an alternative line of play with this 7-card ending and the lead in the dummy.

The ♦8 is led and South’s jack is covered, leaving the old lady helplessly endplayed. What sweet revenge that would have been against an old nemesis! Playing off the ♠AK to a 7-card ending works most of the time when North holds 3 spades and 2 diamonds, as we have seen, but in this case success is guaranteed. So technique should have overcome psychology, which is the way we scientists would like it to end.

Well, that was just one of the exciting hands played that day that could have been dull, but weren’t. The local club presents the participants with problems they will not find in textbooks. If one wants to win, it is nobler to win by making smart plays, rather than sitting back and profiting from the opponents’ frequent mistakes. One should strive to actively take advantage of the opportunities presented. On the given deal 5 out of 8 players declared in 4♥, only one making an overtrick. Let’s give Edna some credit for her initiative in pushing us higher. Three players were in 5♥, only one making it. Playing off the ♠AK early as suggested would result in a 90% score. So good declarer play would be amply rewarded. On the other hand, bad play is not punished as much as it would be in an expert game, which keeps the majority coming back for more. As the less fortunate transgressors often remark, ‘we had company, partner.’ Which is nice.

3NT – Everyone’s Favourite Contract

February 10th, 2015  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Players at all levels know the advantages of bidding and making 3NT. A priori this is the most desirable and accessible game. System designers devise ways to get the users to 3NT with a reasonable chance of success. Accomplishing this with a minimum release of information increases the chance of success as declarer may benefit from a faulty defence. Systems that define their structure on the basis of HCPs are geared towards this approach as HCPs are useful in gauging the potential for success in NT contracts, whereas they are not nearly as good at gauging the potential for success in suit contracts.

Another approach is to bid informatively in the hopes of finding a better contract. It usually doesn’t pay to bid with a view of avoiding a close game, so what is meant here is bidding to a minor suit slam. A making slam is rarer than a making 3NT, so this approach is working against the a priori expectations. Information by its very definition is what separates prior expectations from reality. If information is exchanged and the expectations are fulfilled, the bidders have to some extent reduced their chances of success in 3NT, especially when they have stretched to their limit. Many inferior players have a phobia against describing their hands and look for ways to win by guile.

The Bias towards 3NT
Here is a real-life illustration of a systemic failure which came up on BBO in a Portuguese tournament. As the opening bidder how do you view the following hand: ♠ — ♥ A53 ♦ K64 ♣ AKQ9763? Would you think of it as a hand that will play well in 3NT if partner has the semblance of a spade stopper? Or would you see it as a 4-loser hand for which slam is probable if partner has cover cards in the red suits? The best contract depends on whether partner’s honors lie primarily in the red suits or in spades. A priori one would bet on spades as an honour in one suit is more probable than honours in two, but it pays to find out, if the system allows you to do so. This was the auction at one table.

6NT was doubled for a spade lead, and the contract was down off the top as the ♠AQ sat behind the ♠KJ86. One might consider this an unlucky result, but actually it was lucky because at the other table the contract was 7NT, down 2, doubled! Nonetheless the result was horrible as 7♣ is an obvious lay-down contract. 6NT played the other way was cold, so why did the opening bidder bid NT with a void? The system made him do it. His incredible tunnel vision followed as a consequence of his view that his was a 3NT rebid.

Rather than opener trying to describe his highly unusual, strong hand it is better if responder describes his hand. A 4-4-3-2 shape is not unusual. Here is a sequence we could use starting with a Precision 1♣, that says nothing about clubs.

Opener has the option of bidding 2NT/2♠ to ask for a 4-card major. Instead he is able to set the priorities towards a club slam in the knowledge that responder has at least 2 clubs. Natural control bids follow until responder shows a preference for 6NT, which would have scored well in Portugal. From his point of view 6NT is in keeping with the general nature of his hand. Opener should know enough by this time to bid the Grand Slam.

1NT within the 2/1 System
1NT is the anchor bid with regard to reaching 3NT contracts. In the past the lower limit for 1NT was 16 HCP. The average number of points opposite was 8, so 3NT was within grasp nearly half the time. With the passage of time the lower limit has decreased so that today , playing 14-16 limits I find this 13-point hand worthy of 1NT: ♠ Q8 ♥ KT7 ♦ KJ96 ♣ AT93. The most likely contract will be in NT, but the hand contains decent support for the majors. The average number of points opposite is 7, so game is available less than half the time which means one is bidding primarily to win the part score battle. If partner proceeds to 3NT on 10 HCP, it’s true that an extra Jack might make a difference, but a sequence of 1♦ – 1♥; 1NT doesn’t appeal to me at all. Exchange the minors with the majors and there is too great a chance of missing a major partial on a 4-4 fit, so I open 1♦.

In the 2/1 system described by Max Hardy (1989), a higher range of HCP is maintained, which leaves a gap between the rebids after a light minor suit opening bid. To remedy this, Hardy includes some very good hands with a 6-card minor in the 1NT category, presumably to benefit from a bolstering of the lower limit from 11 HCP to 15 HCP. The effect of this is to place a poison pill within the 1NT bid, for example, ♠ A7 ♥ K6 ♦ 942 ♣ AKQ965 – a 5-loser hand with 6 controls, the equivalent power of  20 HCP. To show such power opener must bid 2NT freely at his next turn. Most of the time, this will work in giving a good description of the exceptional holding, however, there is a theoretical problem. For responder to show interest in a diamond slam this sequence is recommended: 1NT – 2♦; 2♥ – 2♠; 2NT – 3♦, where 3♦ is the first meaningful bid. It shows a 6-loser hand with a broken 6-card diamond suit. 2♦ normally shows hearts, but 2♠ cancels that meaning and says responder is about to show a hand with a good minor suit. However, opener may have the big hand folded into 1NT and he must bid 2NT/2♦ to show it. Here is a possible outcome.

Responder plans to bid 2♠/2♥ as a forcing relay canceling the normal meaning and enabling him to bid 3♦ to show a broken diamond suit with 6 losers. Opener ruins this plan by showing a ‘solid’ minor, obviously clubs. Responder follows through showing diamonds, but opener can’t tell if this was his original intent. In these circumstances 3♦ could have several interpretations.

• a broken diamond suit, 6 losers
• a re-transfer to hearts
• hearts and diamonds

 Because the 2♠ cancellation has not occurred, the original intended meaning should be no longer a valid interpretation. In fact 6NT is a good contract on this particular placement of the major suit controls, but the bidding system is not helping the players to reach it. It is bad practice when one must fight one’s system. I would expect a gutsy responder to jump to 6♦ and hope partner makes the right choice.

Some players will not worry about missing the occasional slam because they use the hide-and-seek approach foisted on them by 2/1 designers. It appears many have a phobia about giving up information, which means they prefer to guess unnecessarily in order to take advantage of the uncertainty in the auction. The argument is that they gain overall on frequency. However, this is not an either-or choice as there are approaches that allow one to distinguish between situations for which one should take a flyer at 3NT, and for which one should go slowly and bid informatively.

Bidding within a Context
The system designer has given users guidelines to see him through under normal circumstances, but during a cooperative auction a player is free to choose one bid over another, in that way selecting the information he prefers to convey. The selection process begins at the first bid. It is best if a target contract can be assumed earlier rather than later in order to choose the information within in a particular context. If 1NT can be opened with a 5-card major, the bidding veers towards 3NT. It will be difficult for the opener to revert to his major. If one is bidding in the context of a NT contract, revealing the locations of stoppers is of prime importance, whereas in the context of a suit contract revealing controls is most relevant. It is well known that if the target is a suit contract, a player should ‘support with support’ immediately in order to set the agenda. A ‘worthless doubleton’, the anathema of a 3NT contract, can be quite useful in a suit contract.

In his book, The No Trump Zone, Danny Kleinman discusses at length the many aspects of an opening 1NT bid. Here is his guideline: ‘A 1NT opening should deliver a narrow range of value in support of partner’s suit or on defense against an opposing suit contract.’ That puts 1NT within the right context from the start.

If one opens 1♦, diamonds are not strongly suggested as trumps, and the search is just beginning with the contract of 5♦ being something of a last resort. The system designer works around the possibilities. If the best contract is 5♦, the only way to find out whether this is one of those rare occurrences, is to have the informative methods to discover the exceptional circumstances. Responder has need of a forcing raise, but where is it? As we have seen previously in the context of a weak NT system, Doug and Sandra Fraser play that a 3♣ response conveys this message. From this point on the auction is geared primarily to choosing between 3NT and 6♦. Subsequent bids have a meaning related to this task. It is much harder under a 2/1 system where 1♦-3♣ is nonforcing (10-12 HCP) showing 6 clubs, as it is uncertain as to where the auction is leading. Because it is difficult to establish a fit in either suit, 3NT looms large through the fog.

3NT ends most auctions. The bidding falls flat because the 3♥ bid is interpreted as showing a heart stopper and indirectly asking for a spade stopper, which responder has. Bidding 3♠/3♥ would deny a spade stopper, not show support for diamonds. One might consider this a rare, unlucky combination for the system. Most of the time 1♦ will be bid on a hand limited to at most 14 HCP, the top priority being given initially to finding a major suit fit. 3♣ will be useful in reaching a close 3NT without giving away information concerning the weaker major suit holding, or even the strength of the diamond suit. There is value in uncertainty in such cases, which the system designer planned to exploit.

The HCP limits on 3♣ are not a useful measure of the playing potential in a minor suit contract. Five controls are worth the equivalent of 16 HCP, which applies to both hands. Only 2 controls are missing. The worthless heart doubleton turns out to be a useful asset. The system should provide a way to exploit this strength in the cases where the 1♦ opening bid is not the expected flat minimum. Needless to say, a Precision 1♣ auction will reach 6♣ with ease, because the club fit will be revealed on the first response and the focus will be on controls not the total number (28) of HCP held. Opener can ask questions of responder without directly revealing his own holding, thereby hiding behind a veil of secrecy without having to put on a false mask

The Art of Good Guessing

January 16th, 2015  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

During the Baze Seniors Final super-scientist Eric Rodwell was asked what his 3rd seat 3NT bid meant, and he replied, ‘it can be anything I want.’ I was shocked. It was as if Albert Einstein had risen during a symposium at Princeton and said, ‘Gentlemens, forget about Cosmic Evolution for the time beings – tonight Abbott and Costello open at Minsky’s.’ Has Rodwell abandoned a lifetime search for systemic perfection and adopted the unsound method of randomization? Hardly. He was referring to his 3rd seat non-vulnerable 3NT on this hand: ♠ 62 ♥ A2 ♦ AT ♣ AKQ8532, a strange choice with 4 losers, when the hand could be opened a Precision 1♣. Still, it can be a temptation to occasionally bid whatever you fancy, a temptation to which many succumb in the intoxicating spirit of individual freedom. The trouble is they somehow imagine they are increasing their chances of winning rather than merely being a pain in the ass for the others involved.

In the December ACBL Bulletin August Boehm notes that even the concept of captaincy is foreign to many of the younger generation of players. They are overly concerned about how the opponents react rather than where the cards lie. Perception outweighs truth. Yes, bidding blindly does have the potential of increasing the chances of success, if a high scoring contract is reached with little information given up to the defenders. Here is an example of how not to do it from the recent Winter Nationals in India. With both vulnerable North opened a 3rd seat 1NT on ♠ T76 ♥ A5  ♦ AQJ9652 ♣ K. The BBO commentator noted that the most frequent game contract is 3NT, as if this somehow justified this strange start. The second most common game contract is 4M, he noted apologetically, when NS eventually reached 4♠ on a 5-3 fit without North having mentioned his diamond suit. Well if one is going to adopt this mode of operation, why not open 3NT and be done with it?  Opening 1NT is misguided deception for its own sake with little upside, whereas 3NT was unbeatable on any lead.

The key to successful master-minding is to guess according to what is most probable given what is known at the time. Guided by the predominance of 3NT contracts, our Indian declarer might imagine a hand opposite that would contain about a third of the missing points and fulfill an 8-7-6-5 division of sides, the most likely division as well as one suitable for a NT contract. In this case one might assume a  4=3=1=5 shape with 8 HCP. So it is not unreasonable to assume a hand opposite that looks something like this: ♠ Kxxx ♥ Qxx ♦ x ♣ QJxxx. On a blind lead the timing may be there to establish the diamonds, and there is nowhere else one would prefer to play the hand.

Here is the actual 8=5=8=5 combination, which in character isn’t that much different from the most likely expectation.

Actually, partner was well stocked in both majors and the ♣JTxx were most useful, so it was not necessary to rely on the diamonds for tricks: 4 spades, 2 hearts, 2 clubs and 1 diamond make up 9 tricks. With 4 losers outside diamonds declarer must not create a 5th by finessing for the ♦K. 4♠ represented a 10 IMPs loss against a diamond partial. Well, one can’t apply this technique if partner’s bidding is all over the lot; someone has to provide real information, otherwise it’s like bingo.

Bidding a Grand Slam
The ACBL Bulletin contains a feature called The Bidding Box in which successful pairs compete in the bidding of 8 hands. The aim of the contest is to present possible bidding sequences using common practices. It is a question of the use of what limited information can be made available, rather than a test of alternative means of obtaining information. Indirectly it is a justification of common practices under trying circumstances. The judge’s scoring is based on a matchpoint scale with a top of 12. In the Dec 2014 issue the victorious pair was a married couple from our local club, Douglas and Sandra Fraser, who play a souped up version of 2/1. Their successes in the NABC Senior Mixed Pairs come as no surprise to those who know and admire their commitment to excellence.

Slam hands are a major component of the contests, and this is where detailed agreements such as those devised by Doug Fraser, come to the fore. Let’s have a detailed look at Problem 5 for which both pairs scored 10 out of 12 for reaching 7♦. The second-seat opener (East) holds 16 HCP and flat hand, for most an automatic 1NT opening bid. Responder holds 11 HCP. General rule: with 26 HCP between the 2 hands, no shortage, stoppers in every suit and a long minor, play in 3NT. However, pairs who bid 1NT-3NT are not likely to win many bidding contests.

Responder holds ♠ A7 ♥ 9 ♦ KT86532 ♣ A76 – 6 losers and 5 controls. A priori the most likely distribution for a 1NT opening bid is 4-4-3-2, and the most likely division of sides is 8-7-6-5. Responder does better by considering the most likely shape given by the a posteriori probabilities based on what he sees in his own hand. Here is a reasonable expectation based on 5=6=9=6 with 15 HCP opposite.

The argument for 3NT goes as follows. The opening lead in a major suit will be useful coming up to the strong NT hand with its tenaces. Slam may come down to playing the diamonds for 6 tricks and just 1 loser somewhat less than a 50% chance. Not many will bid slam on 26 HCP, and if they do they might be defeated. A jump to 3NT could result in a useful opening lead and lots of matchpoints. There is slam potential in responder’s hand, but can one explore slam without fully committing to it?

An aggressive responder might aim for a NT contract and ignore diamonds as a candidate trump suit. He can ask for aces (using Gerber) and hope for 5 cover cards for his 6 losers. That might lead to a risky 4NT, however, the Bidding Box hand is much better than expected (6 controls, not 5) so it proves rewarding to explore in a simple manner.

Bridge at My Club

December 22nd, 2014  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

Bridge blogs are full of complaints. I am here to complain about the complainers who deride the game as played at the local club. They express grievances at a director’s poor decision regarding unauthorized information (UI), but UI is derived from familiarity of the personal quirks of opponents and partners alike that are an integral part of the local game. If you drop into a club where you are unknown, beware the smiling, wrinkled faces that merely mask the devious minds – the face of Santa Claus, but the disposition of Mack the Knife. Initially you, as an unknown factor, will have a great advantage, but over subsequent sessions the room will learn to peg you and adapt their methods to combat your particular modus operandi. As your scores plummet you will come to realize it is a time for a change of strategy, and, zip, back up again your scores, until the field readjusts, and so it goes.

Scientists deplore the introduction of human factors into the game, (why can’t we act more like computers?), but really, doesn’t that add to the game’s challenges? Facing a married couple who have been playing together for 40 years, one needs to know more than what’s in a book of mathematical tables – one has to know something of human nature. They won’t always do what you would have done with the same cards, and you can’t expect the said couple to forget, much less forgive, all those annoying habits they have come to recognize over decades. It works both ways.

If you come to our club seeking a partner you will probably be assigned Edna, a former club owner, now, alas, suffering from Parkinson’s disease and confined to a wheelchair. Her most enduring memories include shaking (left) hands with Pete Grey, the one-armed outfielder for the St Louis Browns. Apparently what drives her still is an abiding desire to screw up a Precision auction as long as she’s still able to do so. Your pre-game preparation might go something like this.
‘Hello, my name is Edna and I’m a nonagenarian. Do you know what that means?’
‘Does it mean you belong to an ancient sect that rejects The Book of Genesis?’
‘No! It means I’m over 90 years old.’
‘Congratulations, I wouldn’t have guessed. Well, Edna, what do you play?’
‘I play whatever you play.’
‘Precision?’
‘No, not Precision’
‘Flannery?’
‘No, not Flannery.’
‘Drury?’
‘No, not Drury – you will find I always have my bids.’
‘Stayman?’
‘Yes. Last week I came in first without any of this fancy stuff.’
‘Now we’re getting somewhere. 15 to 17 No Trump?’
‘Not with 4-3-3-3.’
‘You don’t open 1NT with 4-3-3-3?’
‘No! I don’t use Stayman with 4-3-3-3. 4NT is always straight Blackwood.’
‘That avoids confusion. How about , no, not Ogust….’
‘I won’t start without my tea and cookie. The cookies are over there on the shelf.’
‘Lots of milk in the tea? I’m guessing here.’
‘Yes, please, if you would be so kind, but make sure it’s hot.’

I daresay anyone could have a good game playing with Zia, but here you would be facing a real challenge, but the same problem at the table that your opponents will be facing. The only difference is that they will be moving on after 2 boards. Still, bridge is bridge, and the most important factor is where the cards lie. It’s important to maintain your concentration. Here is a recent deal that was particularly upsetting to my partner, John, who once more was done in by the redoubtable Edna.

Select (you can triple-click it) and over-write this text below the diagram.

Ben, a naval veteran of the Korean War, has been witness to many astonishing feats in his day, especially in the port cities of the Orient, but even he took some time before passing Edna’s unusual 3NT. When John asked what 3NT meant, Ben shook his head and replied thoughtfully, ‘I don’t know.’ That made sense. Knowing Edna as we do, ‘impervious’ is the adjective that comes to mind, one should take him at his word. There is no need to call for the director. As South I would have bid a pass-or-correct 5♣, even 6♣ is a good save against 4♥ making, but in the light of history one can understand Ben’s reluctance to support with support. At the club passing with nothing is usually the best course of action, and doubling merely adds to the confusion, but, of course, one can’t double one’s partner even if at times you feel like it. As it was, John got to show both his suits and eventually reached the optimum EW contract.

Despite the wayward auction, on a club lead declarer has only to play the diamonds for one loser.  So, the ♣A ruffed, a heart to the lightning-fast ace, and the ♣K, ruffed, put declarer in his hand with the diamond suit foremost in his mind. John drew a second trump with the ♥K in dummy and ran the ♦8, losing to the ♦T. The ♠J was returned. A third trump to dummy allowed for a finesse of the ♦Q, losing to the bare ♦K for down 1, leaving us to wonder if there wasn’t a better play. Just because a play doesn’t work doesn’t mean it’s wrong, although it always feels that way. If it feels good, it might be wrong. Even if it feels good and is good, some smart-ass will tell you it’s wrong.

Playing at our club where the uncertainties are greater than previously thought theoretically possible, it pays to distrust the bidding and gather information on card placement before committing to a line of play in a critical suit. In the face of partial knowledge one is supposed to assume what is most probable. Cashing the ♠AK entails a little risk, but if one does that before drawing the last trump it enables one to ruff a third spade and conclude North began with a tripleton spade and a singleton heart. Entries to dummy are few, so declarer must unblock some intermediate trumps to preserve entries. Here the conclusion would be that the diamonds sit 2 in the North and 3 in the South. This is exactly the way it was.

There are 2 ways to approach the diamond suit under these circumstances. One way is to finesse twice starting by running the ♦8, as John did. The other is to play the ♦A first and see what transpires – a discovery play rather than an attempt to drop a singleton ♦K. If the ♦T appears from the North, go to dummy, lead the ♦8 and cover South’s card. .The Principle of Restricted Choice tells us it is 2:1 that North was dealt ♦KT rather than ♦JT. Let’s compare the results for the 10 possible combinations. In loving memory of my high-school algebra teacher, ‘Grumpy’ Gordon, let a and b stand for the missing low cards.

Playing the ♦A first loses in 3 cases out of 8. Ironically this sequence scores up the game. The commonly held belief is that optimally one runs the ♦8 and finesses the ♦Q on the second round. This loses in 2 cases. The key combination is JTa opposite Kb. If Ben plays the ♦J on the second round, it is twice as likely to be from ♦KJa than from ♦JTa.

There is more to the story. The optimum play clearly depends on whether you feel Ben is capable of playing the ♦J from ♦Jab on the first round. If you are a stranger to our club, you won’t know Ben, so you could assume that he is capable of this expert play. But if, based on his scruffy appearance, you feel Ben is not up to the extravagant expenditure, you would assume he would never play the J from J53 on the first round. Under that assumption, the optimum play is to go up with the ace on the second round once the 2 low cards have appeared from his hand. Then one loses only in one case out of ten, Kab opposite JT. Technically, John’s play of the ♦Q on the second round was a compliment to Ben’s abilities. Maybe, Ben, knowing John’s expertise, had purposefully double false-carded? Intriguing thought; sometimes it’s hard to distinguish between accident and intent.

As the cards lay, going on a voyage of discovery would have accomplished nothing. The standard plays are based on what is most probable, so discovering the cards are placed where they most probably are adds little. That is the reason why so many play carelessly. However, one gains when the cards are not distributed as expected. Suppose John plays off the top spades before playing a second trump. The defensive signals may suggest Edna held 2 spades and Ben, 5. The distribution of the diamonds is now most probably 3 in the North and 2 in the South. That recommends an alternative line of play with this 7-card ending and the lead in the dummy.

Select (you can triple-click it) and over-write this text below the diagram.

The ♦8 is led and South’s jack is covered, leaving the old lady helplessly endplayed. What sweet revenge that would have been against an old nemesis! Playing off the ♠AK to a 7-card ending works most of the time when North holds 3 spades and 2 diamonds, as we have seen, but in this case success is guaranteed. So technique should have overcome psychology, which is the way we scientists would like it to end.

Well, that was just one of the exciting hands played that day that could have been dull, but weren’t. The local club presents the participants with problems they will not find in textbooks. If one wants to win, it is nobler to win by making smart plays, rather than sitting back and profiting from the opponents’ frequent mistakes. One should strive to actively take advantage of the opportunities presented. On the given deal 5 out of 8 players declared in 4♥, only one making an overtrick. Let’s give Edna some credit for her initiative in pushing us higher. Three players were in 5♥, only one making it. Playing off the ♠AK early as suggested would result in a 90% score. So good declarer play would be amply rewarded. On the other hand, bad play is not punished as much as it would be in an expert game, which keeps the majority coming back for more. As the less fortunate transgressors often remark, ‘we had company, partner.’ Which is nice.

The Way They Were

November 4th, 2014  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  9 Comments 

The BBO coverage of 2014 world championships from Sanya provided bridge fans with lots of entertainment and food for thought. Kit Woolsey was on hand to give his spot-on expert analysis and Al Hollander was as ever an entertaining and helpful commentator. Both these guys favour Big Club systems.

First we should note that Kerri Sanborn came out a winner in the Mixed Pairs playing with Jie, or ‘Jack’, Zhao, an event she won in 1978. We have criticized her bidding methods with regard to some women’s team events, but here her natural style fitted the field well, and she won by the huge margin of 4 boards over 10 sessions. Graciously she acknowledged that Zhao was the nicest male partner she has ever played with, presumably surpassing in that regard Barry Crane and Bob Hamman, among others.  Zhao for his part disclosed his secret was that he always let Kerri assume the male role. We can see that ‘Jack’ has accommodated himself well to life in America, where the affluent male will do anything to please his significant other, anything short of voting for Hillary Clinton on a secret ballot, that is.

Of course, with the Mixed Pairs one always imagines there is romance in the air. Kerri and Jie we picture as being in the honeymoon phase where nothing rankles and two hearts beat as one. Auken–Welland appear to be involved in a tempestuous roller coaster relationship where exhilarating highs are followed by gut-retching lows. The highs were all the sweeter, as they came out winners in the Mixed Teams. Gromov-Gromova represents the happily married couple who play for the long term conserving energy and judiciously avoiding the usual pitfalls as best they can. For the numerically inclined, here as evidence are the percentage scores over the ten sessions.

Commentators in their role as teachers advise students against a roller-coaster existence that goes against the notion of safe normality. They prefer the steady approach to bidding, aiming for a normal result while hoping to benefit from the mistakes of others. Auken-Welland aren’t satified with that; they aim for inducing errors through altered perceptions. Frustrated opponents often double a perfectly sound contract because they feel that somehow they are being robbed blind, which at other times they often are.

Zia is especially admired by the commentators willing to overlook the occasional psyche. To be known as a master card shark it is enough to be able to play the cards as if one can see the actual layout, simply put, when one’s perception matches reality. It is partly a matter of probability and partly one of psychology through the reading the intentions of the opponents. The true expert is not afraid to take the chance that what he perceives is what actually exists. This is when miracles appear to occur, but they are not miracles, just confident card placement. Here is an example where Zia was generously praised for performing a miracle in the Mixed Teams.

Marion Michielsen, twice a champion at Sanya, had the methods available to make Zia declarer in 3NT on a 7-7-6-6 division of sides. Kit Woolsey noted that the safest lead might be the ♦7, and so it came to pass. In fact, the contract makes on any lead, the key being not to take the finesse for the ♠K. Well, that’s what Deep Finesse tells us, and it’s a fact. However, on winning the ♦Q, Zia had nothing better to do than take the spade finesse at trick 2. 3NT could now be defeated, confirming my superstition that on a 7-7-6-6 deal finessing should be a last resort. Upon winning the ♠Q, West can defeat the contract in several ways. Lew Stansby continued the ♥K which was allowed to hold, Johanna giving encouragement. On the continuation Zia won the ♥A and set up the suit. The lack-luster defence led to this 5-card ending once the hearts were played out.

Needing 4 tricks Zia had to decide whether the remaining spades were evenly divided or whether he should run the ♠9. He got it right, and gained 10 IMPs against 3NT by South down 1 at the other table.

Two commentators were fulsome in their praise judging it to be a miraculous result. Kit deferred, putting the blame squarely on the shoulders of the defenders. Clearly, in the interest of telling it like it was, Woolsey was not concerned about removing himself from anybody’s Nicest Commentator List. He made two criticisms: Lew should have got rid of the ♦8, the card he was known to hold, and Johanna should not have encouraged continuation on the non-fatal lead of the ♥K. Thus, most apparent miracles have a root cause that can be found through correct reasoning. Let’s give Zia credit where it is due: he gathered information, drew the correct conclusion from what he had observed, and acted accordingly. Perhaps that is rare, but it is not miraculous – it is science at work.

For the benefit of followers of the Open Teams, Woolsey followed the fortunes of the Nickell team until they were eliminated in a close match against the Poles. Coincidentally a Polish Team last won the world’s championship in 1978, the same year Sanborn-Crane won the Mixed Pairs in New Orleans. True to form Kit was not slow to point out places where improvement was possible, while others defended the performance of the American pairs deemed by some to be the greatest in the world. Our main interest lay in the performance of Meckwell. It is the current trend in high-level bridge to present a false impression by entering the auction with poor holdings. In this way experts have adopted a style that comes naturally to bad players. Auken-Welland carry it to extremes, but the trend is general. The idea behind it is that there is something to be gained from uncertainty, especially when the hand belongs to the opponents. Here is a case in point from the final session in which a Big Club opening bid was involved.

The only entirely innocent bidder appears to be Michal Klukowski, the soon to become 18 year-old champion, sitting West. Piotr Gawrys followed the age-old adage, ‘when in doubt lead trumps.’ Obviously he didn’t trust his partner’s double. Surprising there aren’t more trump leads. Anyway, after this lead the contract depended on finding the ♥A onside, which the naïve observer might think has a less than 50% chance.

The quick conclusion is that the reason for this poor effort lay in Gawrys’ overcalling on a garbage hand, even though no space was lost as a consequence,  however, Meckwell were able to engage in a largely natural auction. They had trouble stopping in 4♠, whereas 2/1 bidders might feel they stretched to game. In the other room the Polish pair bid without interference to 6♥, an even worse contract. At each table South cuebid 4♣ to show a control. I am against this style, feeling more comfortable with the Olde English style that insists the first control cue bid be in a suit in which first round control is held.

Without interference it is convenient to have 3NT act as a serious slam try in the agreed major, however, as Woolsey noted, when the suits bid by the opponents suffer from PDD,  the pronounced deficiency disorder, it makes sense to be able to bid NT naturally to show where the true values lie. Stumbling into 3NT would have won the match for Nickell. This is often the situation after a PDD attack, and it only a matter of time before experts learn to make the fine adjustments. Meanwhile, we lesser players should continue to bid 3NT to play and expect bad defence, profiting from the low information content made available. Unfortunately for Meckwell 3NT in their auction retained the characteristic of a slam try in spades., and the quality of Meckstroth’s heart suit remained a mystery.

Perfect in Its Imperfection

September 3rd, 2014  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  5 Comments 

What is captivating about participating in a sport is that a false impression of perfection is momentarily achievable. It is most exhilarating to score a goal, or hit a home run, or score up a risky slam, however, perfection that is not sustainable isn’t really perfection, is it? Participants can enjoy the moments of exhilaration when everything falls into place, but what one should learn most from playing sports is that one has to practice diligently and perform with panache. Hard work makes miracles possible, but failures are frequent.

Plato set Western thinking along the wrong path when he made perfection the central theme of his philosophy. His way of thinking leads to aspirations for unobtainable goals resulting in a continuous state of dissatisfaction and negativity. Really, we’d be much happier if we forgot about attaining perfection and strived merely to make the world a little better, step-by-step, which is an achievable goal. It would add up over the long term, A shining example: medical advances since the time of Mozart. The way to start is to observe without prejudice conditions as they are.

One consequence of the idealization of the bidding process is that under the rules a player is expected to give a clear and unequivocal explanation of the meaning of partner’s bids. In a recent ruling that determined the winner of the Wagar Cup, an American pair was penalized when the explanation of a call was vaguely expressed in terms of uncertainty, which was interpreted by an opponent as a statement of certainty. Only an idealized view of the bidding process would allow such an interpretation to be valid, especially in a situation where 3 players had already bid. Tolerance is called for. To illustrate this point, here is Deal 58 from the Wagar Cup Final played by those same players from whom perfection was assumed for the purposes of making a judgment. Even without interference their auctions were flawed. That is to be expected as the language of bidding is a crude means of communication. Doubt, not certainty, is the norm.

The bidding poses no apparent problem to a 2/1 bidder. Sanborn opened her major and rebid her minor 4 times. Levitina responded with her long major and supported partner’s major twice. When given a choice at the 5-level, she chose to pass with only 3 red cards in her hand. Unbeknownst to her these 3 red cards were the key elements to slam. It was perhaps unfortunate that she never had a convenient opportunity for showing her clubs. One may sympathize with her predicament; we can only question whether she is yet another victim of the standard approach where the weak hand is allowed to make the final decision after the strong, distributional hand takes pains to show shape by emphasizing her suits. The important extras in the South hand, ♥T9 and ♦JT, were impossible to transmit, misplacing the burden on North to guess the correct conclusion.

The problem is a fundamental one with regard to a natural system where each player bids her suits and somehow they come to a mutually agreed collective conclusion. This works well enough when the perception of each player closely matches reality, possible when the hands are balanced, hence subject to a reasonable interpretation based on probability. It is not possible when the hands are highly distributional, as each partner will have difficulty in picturing the potential of her holding in the context of a contract played from the other side. Such was the case.

Because they hold a highly distributional hand, some Souths may fear that a bad trump split is likely, but this is a false assumption. The fact that North and South have extreme distribution does not imply that the opponents also have distributional hands. On this misfit deal the NS hands have a distribution of sides of 6=8=7=5, the most common of sides. The opponents’ cards form a 7=5=6=8 division with 3=3=3=4 opposite 4=2=3=4, the most mundane of splits possible, and the most probable. So an upside to a misfit auction is that declarers can expect even splits between the defenders.

It may be that some will have no criticism of the Levitina-Sanborn auction, concluding that 5♦ is a reasonable contract on just 26 HCP, however, I find the process fatally flawed. With regard to information the bid of 1♠ was poorly conceived. Of course, many who place the emphasis of length in a major would accept it, considering it a matter of style as well as efficiency. This is a judgmental, short-term view. Note that the system operated in such a way that clubs could never be mentioned, so the information conveyed was far off the mark. This was inconsequential, as it is a matter of what information is critical and what information is irrelevant. South knew what was needed from the first; North never did catch on.

I can imagine Sanborn thought her 5♦ bid was forcing, a last attempt to get to 6♥. It would be for me. She chose not to cuebid a control in a black suit. My understanding is that once trumps are agreed, a bid in another suit above game level shows a control and initiates a slam exploration. Hence, a bid of 5♦ over 4♥ would deny a black suit control.

Even though there is something wrong here, EW were not going to appeal 5-making-7. Generally, defenders have to live with imperfect results that derive from bidding mistakes, favourable or not. The rule is, ‘no harm, no foul.’ However, under the principle of the right to know, rather than the need to know, one may ask at every turn because the information might be useful at a later stage. If a mistake has occurred, an unfavorable result can be appealed, and possibly a procedural penalty can be picked up on the grounds that the opponents didn’t know their agreements.

That was nothing compared with what transpired at the other table. South (Ran) began with a strong Precision 1♣, which puts the captaincy in her hands. This was a good start. North was able to show both black suits naturally and give heart support at the 3-level, indicating a good hand. An exchange of cuebids was enough for Ran to opt for slam in a red suit, so she jumped to 5NT to allow Wang to choose. It is bad for a captain to ask the crew what to do next, when the captain has more relevant information.

Stubbornly Wang stuck with clubs, corrected by Ran to 6♥. There is should have ended it, but Wang belatedly took over the captaincy and bid 7♣, thinking that Ran’s control bid of 4♣ indicated the ♣K. (What is ‘oh, shit!’ in Mandarin?) The upshot of the misunderstanding was that Ran played in 7♥, which some have calculated as having a 1% chance of making. Miraculously it came home. It is an intriguing thought that, because of the ♦9, it would have been better to play in 6♦, the 7-card fit, than in 6♥, the 8-card fit. Yes, trump quality is important, and AKJT964 was better than AKT97642.

An opponent might have asked during the auction, ‘does 4♣ promise a top honor control in clubs?’ and if Wang had said, ‘yes’, which is what she believed, could the result be appealed on the basis of misinformation? Should the Chinese be docked IMPs for having forgotten their agreements? On another day it might work. There was a possible effect on the opening leader, JoAnna Stansby, as she led a trump from ♥863. It didn’t matter in this case, but with perfect knowledge she might have led an unusual spade away from ♠KT9. Most often a lack of knowledge acts in favour of the eventual declarer.

To return to the main point of my discussion, the normal condition at the bridge table is one of shared uncertainty. Here we have two pairs at the top rung in women’s bridge who without help from the opponents, frankly, screwed up. That is not to condemn them for not being perfect, but to remind ourselves that even at the top levels perfection is rare and temporary. (In fact, playing too well only gives rise to suspicions.) The rules have to be applied with this foremost in the minds of the authorities. It is a false hope that one can legislate perfection. Assuming perfection doesn’t make it so.

If you give me six lines in the hand of the most honest of men, I will find something in them which will hang him. – Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642)

A man who does not trust himself will never really trust anybody.
– Cardinal de Retz (1613-1679)