Fighting the Field at Matchpoints

August 25th, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

When playing in a competitive game attitude is important. Matchpoint bridge is strangely abstract in that you playing against the players you may never face at the table, so one’s attitude towards the field becomes important. In a recent Regional my partner and I had a healthy lead after the first of 2 sessions in a seniors’ pairs game. The field was not distinguished. The second session began well, and when about a third of the way through my partner scored well in a doubled part score against our main rivals, I felt our position was unassailable. At this point thinking to consolidate our position, I decided to play down the middle and concentrate on reaching the par result. In this I was mostly successful as a later study of the hand sheets confirmed. Yes, there was one hand where I kept the wrong card in the endgame and allowed 3NT to make, but that was only slightly below par as the declarer had given us an opportunity by a misplay. Imagine my surprise when after 11 rounds we found we had fallen behind in the standings. A bad last round where so-so opponents fell into a high scoring minor suit partial (-130) sealed our fate. It was as if we had been riding high, wide, and handsome in a hot air balloon before I turned off the gas burner and set us to drifting gently to the ground, helped along by a nasty downdraft at the end. Our skills had not diminished suddenly, but my attitude had, and this reduced my alertness towards opportunities that presented themselves. Too late I recalled the comment of the late Paul Soloway, ‘I never play for averages.’

It is common for experienced players to advise otherwise. In his book Matchpoints (1982) Kit Woolsey begins by stating, ‘what we are trying to do when we play bridge (or any other game of imperfect knowledge) is to minimize the expected or average cost of being wrong.’ This appears to suggest the need to minimize potential losses by going with the field in close bidding decisions. What many, like me, forget is his following definition, ‘the cost of being wrong is the difference between the result of the action in question and the optimal possible result which would be achieved if the winning action were taken.’ The cost is not calculated against the field action but against the odds present in the lie of the cards. One cannot afford to miss opportunities for a good score.

‘There is no security on this earth, only opportunity’ – General Douglas MacArthur

It is not difficult to treat the problem theoretically where there are just 2 alternative contracts possible. So we might think of the bidding outcomes as a game or a partial, or a slam and a game, or a grand slam and a small slam. Competitive bidding situations commonly involve more than 2 possible contracts, but that can wait for now.

What to Expect in Theory

The number of players doesn’t affect the theoretical results concerning the expected scores which depend solely of the probabilities of 2 events: PB, the probability that a given contract will be bid by the opposition, and PM, the probability that the given contract will make. You will score 1 for every opponent whose score is below yours, score ½ for each opponent who has the same score as yours, and score 0 for each opponent whose score exceeds yours. For ease of explanation we often illustrate the problem in terms of a slam being bid, but the reader may keep in mind the method applies to the other situations mentioned above.

There are 4 possible situations: 1) you bid slam and it makes; 2) you bid slam and it fails; 3) you stay in game and slam makes, and 4) you stay in game and slam fails. The probability of slam making is PM, so the probability of its failing is 1 – PM. The probability of the slam being bid is PB, so the probability that it won’t is 1 – PB. The expected scores under each situation are as follows:

We denote the sums, S1, S2, S3, and S4, respectively. The sum S1 + S2 equals the expected score when one chooses to bid the higher level contract; S3 + S4 equals the expected score when one chooses to stay in the lower level contract.

Clearly, one should choose to bid to the higher level if there is a greater than 50% chance of making it, regardless of what the field is doing. This is a nice result for idealists as one should in theory bid according to an evaluation based on the cards alone. An accurate evaluation requires accurate information, and inevitably there is uncertainty due to the inadequacies of the bidding system. The worse one’s bidding, the more inclined one is to go with the field. It helps in this regard if everyone bids according to the same rules.

The field has an expected score of average (½), so no matter how crazy the crowd, if you follow the crowd, you can expect an average score. That is part of the survival kit of the mediocre player. One might imagine that the probability of bidding a contract should reflect the probability of its making, that is, the field will tend to bid contracts where PM>½ and avoid those where PM<½. The critical decisions will occur where PM is somewhere in the vicinity of ½, that is, where there is maximum uncertainty as to whether the contract is more likely to make than not. However, the field has its preferences and tends overbid games. A 50% chance of making a major suit game requires more than a simple finesse, as one must take into account the possibility of a 4-1 split, an eventuality most players ignore both in the bidding and in the play. On the other hand the field tends to underbid minor suit slams, as most pairs do not have the methods to explore for slam and stop in 4NT. Why, then, are so many good players affected by what the field is bidding?

Baseball and Bridge

Over the long run of a baseball season it is a part of the game that a team experiences ups and downs. So it is at matchpoint bridge: one doesn’t score above average on every hand, and sometimes a disaster occurs at random. The baseball strategy employed for making the playoffs is to beat up on the poor teams while breaking even with the rivals. It is hard to win a matchpoint event if one gets a string of averages against pairs who are handing out tops to others. On the other hand, one should be content to achieving an average against the best pairs, as that means one hasn’t fallen behind them in the race for a top position. To achieve an average one bids as the field bids.

Matchpoint games differ from team games in the same way that the baseball season differs from the playoffs. To get to the playoffs a team needs home run hitters who are considered good if they hit a home run once in 20 at bats. They hit mistakes. They are like the players who take advantage of poor pairs. Once a team gets to the playoffs, the game changes, as a team must face another good team. Now accuracy and consistency are most important, and an ability to bunt may become critical. Often the heroes are steady players who never made the highlights during the season. So it is at bridge. Tactics vary with the players at the table and depends on the quality of the field.

Strategic Bidding and Maximum Uncertainty

At matchpoints sometimes one may wish to minimize the potential loss and sometimes to maximize the potential gain. The 2 strategies can be analyzed mathematically as follows.

The difference (S1 + S2) – (S3 + S4) can be broken down into the following 2 components:

One may attempt to maximize the gain for bidding correctly, or attempt to minimize the loss for bidding incorrectly. A very important condition is a probability of ½, which represents a condition of maximum uncertainty as to which contract the field will prefer (PB=½), or which contract will make (PM=½). In such cases, maximizing the gain or minimizing the loss are contrary strategies: as S4 goes up, S3 must go down. If S4 is greater than S1, then S3 must be less than S2. Here are some numerical illustrations.

Condition I is the condition of total (legitimate) confusion. There is symmetry with regard to bidding slam or staying in game. It matters not one iota, on average, whether one bids on or not. The gains are the same, the losses are the same.

Condition II represents the situation where half the field overbids to a contract with a poor chance of making. The worst possible result is got by not bidding the popular game and it makes (Situation 3). So to minimize the loss one bids the game the field favors even though the chances of making it are poor. To maximize the gain, one sensibly avoids a game that has a poor chance of success.

Condition III represents a situation where half of the field misses a very good slam, possibly stopping in 3NT. To maximize the gain, one should bid the slam, even though one gets the worst score if it happens to fail. To minimize the loss, one avoids the slam, but is likely to score poorly.

Condition IV represents the field’s obvious blind spot, avoiding a so-so minor suit game. The best score is got by bidding and making it, the worst by going down. It doesn’t cost much to stay in a partial (and there may be a bonus when some go down in 3NT).

Condition V is the reverse situation in which the field is eager to bid a 50-50 game. In this case the highest expectation is for bidding against the field, staying in a partial, and making it, while the lowest expectation is for not bidding the popular contract that happens to make.

Minimizing the Effect of Being Wrong

Given a choice of mistakes, under what conditions is it better to bid a contract that fails (Situation 2) than to not bid a contract that succeeds (Situation 3)? The expected advantage for overbidding versus underbidding is ½ (PB – PM). If one is making a mistake, it is better if one has lots of company. The worst outcome possible is got by bidding an unlucky but unpopular slam, as represented by Condition III.

When in doubt one may decide to bid on the basis of what the field may be doing. That will minimize the potential loss, but it may not get one to best contract, as illustrated by Conditions IV and V. Under these conditions the best and the worst scores are got by bidding against the tendency of the field. Under Condition IV, PM + PB < 1, whereas under Condition V, PM + PB >1. In the next blog we shall show this is an important distinction in a team game.

Maximizing the Effect of Being Right

There are those of us who prefer to back their own judgment rather than follow a field that is too often flawed in its approach. The question for us is this: which correct decision is likely produce the highest score on average: bidding a makeable slam (Situation 1) or by staying out of a slam that doesn’t make (Situation 4)? In what way does the decision depend on the probability of slam being bid by the field? The difference in the expected scores for staying safely in game or bidding successfully to slam (S1 – S4) is given by the following expression:

The expected gain for bidding on is a positive quantity when 3xPM is greater than 1 + PB. (Condition IV) This tells us that one may justify bidding a slam that is less than 50% successful if the field tends to avoid it. For example, if 2/3 of the field will avoid a particular slam, one needs only a 45% chance of making it to gain more by bidding slam than by stopping in game. This is swinging bridge, as it risks a large loss albeit in a good cause. On the other hand, if the opponents are more likely than not to bid the higher scoring contract, one need a better than 50% chance of success in order to justify staying low as well. Thus, if 2/3 of the field is expected to bid a slam, one maximizes the expected gain by avoiding the slam with less than 5 chances in 9 of making (PM=56%). Here is an example of this phenomena.

Beating the Field

Most responders would not hesitate to bid 6NT immediately on the basis a faith in HCP totals and a near certainty that the field will do the same. Normally with 33 HCP between the 2 hands, 6NT would be a favorite to make, but there are some abnormalities to be noted on a double dummy basis. Most importantly with regard to probabilities, the distribution of HCPs is not consistent with the length of the suits held. One would expect the opener to have better diamonds and worse clubs. The ♣ AK doubleton is a bad feature. The responder’s longest suit is headed by the ♣ J, so there is little prospect for establishing a long trick in the suit. The ♥ J is wasted, the 1 HCP it represents would be much better placed if added to the ♣ J to make it the ♣ Q. In addition the division of sides is an unpromising 7-7-6-6 rather than the more usual 8-7-6-5.

The probability of making slam is less than the probability of bidding it, so the hands represent a situation where one might profit hugely by going against the field. There are 10 tricks off the top, so some luck is needed to move the total up to 12. If spades split 3-3 one can get a functioning squeeze going in the minors when the player with the ♣ Q holds 4 diamonds. Declarer might get lucky if a defender without the ♣ Q discards a diamond from 9862.

A well-informed player has good reasons for downgrading, however, the knowledge needed to make a fine judgment requires an informative sequence of several revealing bids that convey doubt. Given a choice either partner might decide not to bid the slam and the pair will probably score very well indeed by merely taking their 10 tricks off the top. However, most players would not bid in this way – either they consider it dangerous, or they like to take charge, or they are not capable. If the slam just happens to make, a pair that stays out of it will score poorly. Maybe unlucky, but one mustn’t complain.

Bidding Maps

It is helpful to visualize the decision making process by way of a bidding map with PM and PB as the co-ordinates. The simplest version is a flat map that displays the decision to bid on or not without indication of the elevations involved. Here are the flat maps for matchpoint decision as to whether to bid on (Yes) or not (No) or Flip a Coin ( –).

Minimize Loss

Maximize Gain

The minimum loss map merely reflects the symmetrical rule, ‘bid on when PB>PM, don’t when PM>PB’ This yields a bad decision when poor games are being bid throughout the room, but many players go with the field in this situation, compounding the error. This is a situation where a brave judgment to pass based on poor trump quality can result in a good score.

The maximize gain map reflects the rule, ‘bid on if 3xPM is greater than 1+PB’. The maximize map yields the better approach as it conforms more closely to the optimal rule of ‘bid on if PM>½’. When PM equals 0.5 (maximum uncertainty as to whether the higher contract makes) and PB is greater than 0.5 (a suspicion most will bid it), one maximizes the gain by stopping short and minimizes the loss by bidding on.

When I hear a player reflect, ‘I thought we might make slam (or game or NT), but there won’t be many in it’, I think, ‘there goes a player so good he can afford to pass up golden opportunities.’ At the end of the game I find he usually scores above average, yes, but he is not near the top. Such a player does better at teams. In the next blog we shall investigate why this is so.

Afterword: Hugh Kelsey’s Advice

In his book Match-Point Bridge (1970) Hugh Kelsey presented the conservative view with regard to bidding close games. He wrote, ‘the game should normally be bid, for most players are healthily aggressive in their bidding habits and a fifty-fifty game will be bid more often than not. If there appears to be any reasonable chance of success you should wish to be in game.’ His advice is equivalent to minimizing the loss when one makes the wrong decision. He notes, ‘The good player does not like to gamble on close bidding decisions…. He therefore chooses to play down the middle on such boards, relying on superior judgement on the competitive hands to pull his score above average.’

This advice seems to me to be poorly argued. There is a limit to the accuracy one can obtain from a bidding sequence, true, but that accuracy may be lessened by interference, so there is more scope for error, not less. We see that all the time. Bidding space is reduced. Superior judgement depends partly on the information made available by unreliable opponents, so one can be mislead, whereas bidding in an uncontested auction depends on the information provided by one’s usually reliable partner who has your best interests at heart.

After the opening lead is made, declarer has a firmer grasp on the probabilities involved. He may feel more in command of the opportunities presented. That is an essential psychological factor. No one argues that declarer should do what the poorer players are doing, finesse at every opportunity, rather one concentrates one’s efforts on besting the average players. One must be prepared to take advantage of a particular lie of the cards that provides an overtrick, even if there is some risk involved due to the fact that most players will not make the same play. For example, a partial elimination and endplay is a common way of achieving this, but one must rely on fairly even split in the side suits, otherwise one may suffer an untimely defensive ruff resulting in a poor score. The difficulty with adopting the same positive attitude during the auction is that the uncertainty when bidding is greater than the uncertainty when one sees 26 cards. Nonetheless there may be more clear mistakes made in play than in bidding.

The argument that one should bid with the field does not even assert that the risk outweighs the gain, for as we have shown, there may be great profit obtained from staying out of popular unmakeable contracts. No, the advice reflects what Pliny the Elder observed 2000 years ago, that the best plan is to rely on the mistakes of others. If one is a good player in a bad field, that cynical approach can be successful, but remember what happened to Rome – it fell to the barbarians in 476 AD.

Afterword 2: Matchpoints as Democracy

Matchpoint scoring is a democratic process. On every hand each pair has a vote on the best contract. Rarely is there complete agreement, but usually a consensus is achieved. The plebiscite may be worded as, ‘does such-and-such a contract have a better than 50% chance of success?’ A player votes ‘yes’ by bidding it. Insufficient punishments are handed those who made a mistake when they joined the majority, whereas the system comes down hard on dissenters who got themselves in trouble even though their motivation was sound and they would be correct more often than not. Their rewards are posthumous. In theory if a self-interested majority votes for a particular contract, it is most likely to be a sound one, but in practice a large number of voters may not have the foggiest idea, so they just goes along with what they think others think. The average player feels safest in the middle. He reacts conventionally the way he has been taught. Often he is left to ask himself, ‘what went wrong?’ That happens a lot, not just in politics.

The majority know that much of what they are being told comes under the euphemistic heading of ‘Wishful Thinking’, but they continue to have faith that vast improvements can accrue from small adjustments here and there. They tend to blame themselves for bad results, not the system, accept punishment for their supposed misdeeds, and feel that next time they’ll get it right. But the next time around another problem that requires fixing crops up unexpectedly somewhere else. They listen to those who propose patches that will make things better. Filling out a convention card is like filling out an income tax form – legal advice is required to take full advantage of the loopholes offered. Most react unfavorably to lying, because they themselves have never been taught how to do it properly. The majority abhors fundamental change and embrace expediency. They sacrifice the future to the past. They keep coming back for more, because it’s a great game.

Thinkers and Doers

August 6th, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

Largely, there are thinkers and there are doers. Some think without doing while others do without thinking. In the 20th Century, we have encountered Generals McArthur and Eisenhower, the former a brilliant commander whose egotism got him into political hot water, the latter a mild-mannered desk president who warned of the military-industrial complex, but did nothing to curb its power. McArthur was for attacking the enemy’s weak points, whereas Eisenhower followed the expensive strategy of advancing along a broad front. We observe the same general strategies at play at the bridge table. The McArthurs of the bridge table are always for boldly attacking a weak point, whereas the Eisenhowers try hard to avoid a play that may appear on paper to be an error.

On the ACBL Bulletin bidding panel there are teachers and there are champions, not the same breed. The top scores go to the ‘teachers’ who know what’s ‘right’, whereas the answers of Jeff Meckstroth, who knows how to win, get only an average rating. My advice is to emulate Jeff. I have noted that when asked to give advice to the general public, the great players suggest something very basic, like, ‘keep your concentration’, or ‘count the cards’, whereas lesser players suggest something quite complex, like ‘adopt Super-Stayman’. The master players are conscious of the fact that average players lose more by not keeping count than they miss by not playing the best of all possible conventions. It is like asking a doctor how to lose weight: the average doctor fills out an expensive prescription, whereas a good doctor merely says, ‘don’t eat so much.’ Which doctor is the more popular with his patients, do you think?

Those who teach and write about bridge are of the Yin variety. They seek perfection, and find it most readily on the printed page. As players they prefer complicated agreements, and become easily upset with partners who forget the system, or miss an inference. They are prone to quote probabilities, preferring to make a losing bid or play that is ‘right’, rather than taking a winning action that is ‘wrong’. They expect the opponents to bid and play correctly, so miss opportunities to take advantage of errors.

Frank Stewart, clearly a Yin type, is a fine bridge writer who gains my admiration for the way in which he bares all and modestly tells the truth as he sees it. In the Monday Bulletin of the 2010 New Orleans Nationals, he describes a hand in a team game on which as declarer he missed a chance for a brilliant endplay of the kind he had described in dozens of articles. With ♦ AQT in his hand and the lead in dummy he could play a diamond to the ten and force a return into his tenace. However, by not cashing his ♣ A in preparation for the endplay he neglected to remove his victim’s exit card, so the cold game was defeated. He put this down to being rusty and losing control of his emotions.

I wonder if there isn’t more behind this loss of concentration than the feeling of euphoria of seeing the cards perfectly placed for an ambitious game that normally would be down. There may be a feeling of remorse involved as in a perfect world he would have stopped in a partial. The perfectionist is often reluctant to take advantage of the imperfections that plague our game, whereas the Yangs eagerly feed on mistakes. Let’s look at 2 examples from my club where I played on the emotions of the opponents. Warning: it’s not pretty.

When Emotions Prevail

When you see the opponents are upset, that is the time to take advantage of their emotional state. Last week on the first hand of a round of duplicate, the opponents’ bidding had gone 2♣ – 2♦ (waiting); 4NT – Pass. No sooner had the Yin player, a man, put down a modest dummy than the complaints began. The Yang player, a woman, said she was asking for aces, and angrily put her cards on the table, claiming 12 tricks off the top. Her partner apologized, saying he took 4NT as invitational, and that 8 HCP with 4-3-3-3 shape (with ♦ Qxxx) wasn’t enough for going further. Although he repeatedly advised they should discuss it later, the loud criticism didn’t abate under the director came to the table and told the woman to shut it down, as others could hear what she was saying. Despite this, missing a lay-down slam cold on any lead was worth 25%, some small compensation for those patrons who have been encouraged to follow standard methods.

An opportunity to put this troubled partnership to the test came on the next hand when, after my partner opened a weak 2♠ in first seat, I held ♠ 7 ♥ KJT86 ♦ 943 ♣ A543. Sensing this was a good time to show some initiative, I bid 2NT asking for shortness, planning to bid 3♥ if partner didn’t do so first. He did, so I corrected to 3♠ , our better fit. The player on my left, still fuming, came in belatedly with 4♣ , going down 3, a top for us when 3NT was cold with diamonds running. (It could have been down 4 if partner had given me a spade ruff.) There would have been no problem if at any point she had doubled, getting her partner into the action – something a total Yang never does.

My second example arose later in the same session. My LHO was an overly active Yang whose Yin partner was commenting remorsefully that he was bidding completely without fear, by which I suppose she meant without reason. The trick is to play upon the doubts of a player who suspects her partner’s bids, so has to depend on your bidding in order to arrive at a reasonable assessment of the true situation. Vulnerable against not, I picked up: ♠ K2 ♥ J65 ♦ K983 ♣ KQJ5, a normal opening bid, but one which I detest for its lack of aces and the ease with which it can be overcalled. So I passed and awaited developments. LHO opened a weak 2♠ , partner doubled, RHO passed, and I bid 3NT, which was a pretty good description. My RHO thought for some time before allowing me to play in this contract. Partner had a suitable 1=4=4=4 hand with 3 aces, and I ended up making 5 in a straightforward manner, which scored a surprising 80%. The RHO commented, ‘Normally I would have sacrificed holding 4 spades, but I didn’t think that with a passed hand he would make it.’ The Yang had opened 2♠ with a topless suit, a void in clubs, and 4 hearts, and here she was the one apologizing! I find it ironic that doing something stupid, such as preempting on a garbage suit, is condoned, whereas doing something clever, such as passing with a defensive opening bid, is frowned upon.

These examples are not of general import but for the fact that my intuitive approach usually is successful. I can’t explain it, but doing what I feel is right usually works, whereas going against my gut feeling turns out to be wrong on a vast majority of instances. Well, I do have over 30 years of experience to draw from. I have often heard an opponent comment, ‘I knew it was right to …., but I…’ and they proceed to give a valid reason, usually involving HCPs, why they made the mistake they did. So I conclude it happens a lot, and not only to me. Trust your instincts, my friends.

An Appreciation of Frank Stewart

In the August 2008 issue of the ACBL Bulletin, Frank Stewart wrote, ‘bridge is a game of problem-solving and logical thinking.’ He left out the qualifier, ‘partly’. Thus he should have written, ‘bridge is partly…’ and so on. On paper the cards lie where they should according to the probabilities. The opposition bids are reliable. Aye, there’s the rub… in the real world the opposition bids aren’t reliable. The logical machinery works only as well as the initial assumptions that start it, and if one begins with false information, the logical play is not likely to end up the right play.

Information is the key as that forms the basis of the assumptions that drive the logical processes. At the table one should keep this foremost in one’s mind: a bid is not a suggestion that one play the hand in the strain mentioned, but a message to partner that is overhead by the opposition. The temptation is there to misrepresent a holding in order to gain an advantage. Or a player may be bidding mistakenly or irrationally on instinct, as I think he should upon occasion, even though committees may disapprove. An occasional aberration doesn’t change the probabilities much, but they do upset the nice logical process that Stewart imagines. In addition, bidding systems are imperfect, so even true information doesn’t always provide a detailed description that one can take to the bank.

Recently Frank has turned his attention to anticipation during the bidding process. He likens it to chess where the player benefits by looking a couple of steps ahead. He notes, ‘careful bidders think in terms of how they will describe a hand.’ His practical advice is geared towards overcoming deficiencies in standard bidding practices, the emphasis being on how to transmit reliable information in an efficient manner over a sequence of bids. He does this well, adapting the same sensible, non-dogmatic approach we encounter in the writings of Mike Lawrence. I say he writes first-class, inspirational fiction.

When I watch a game, be it baseball or bridge, I see the flaws. When seeing my heroes struggle through a hand on BBO, I am inclined to stand up and shouts at the screen, ‘lead a diamond, you fool!’ As the BBO hosts often comment, ‘bridge is different when one sees all 4 hands.’ How true, and that is my point – it is just a matter of degree. Given good information even a mediocre player can get it right where a misinformed expert fails. So do the experts bid as Stewart suggests, most informatively? No. The bridge tables of the New Orleans Spingold are far removed from Frank Stewart’s writing desk.

A common misrepresentation against expectations is a preempt where the majority of points lie outside the long suit. Against the winning French team who played a steady game throughout without the pressure bidding so favored by American players, Zia overcalled 2♠ on  ♠ QT9653 ♥KT ♦ 6 ♣ K862. Jean Quantin did the same. Hamman raised to 3♠ on a defensive hand: ♠ J2 ♥ Q742 ♦ KJT52 ♣ A3. When the French reached a hopeless 4 ♣ , Zia bid 4♠ , doubled for a loss of 8 IMPs – a bad breach of discipline glorified by many when successful. On a later hand after Hamman’s solid vulnerable 3♦ preempt, Zia returned the favor of raising on Jx and defence: ♠KJT64 ♥ 98654 ♦ J8 ♣ J. Down 3. In the other room Quantin passed 3♦ and ended up defending a Meckwell 4♥ , undoubled, for a gain of 12 IMPs. So where’s the logic? No, bridge is much more interesting than chess because of the mystery behind what is heard but not seen.

Nothing to Fear, But…

The last 32 boards of the 2010 Spingold final on BBO were a special treat, some excellent bridge playing with instructive commenting from most of my favorites, Joey Silver, P.O. Sundelin, David Burn, Kit Woolsey, and, last but not least, Larry Cohen, erstwhile partner to David Berkowitz, one of the finalists. Cohen stated, ‘This is where experience pays off. They have all been here many times before in a tight 4th quarter of a big match. The first few times you go through it, it is very hard to keep a straight brain.’ There were possibly some physical problems that may have compounded the difficulties as the sessions may have set a record for the number of bathroom breaks. When given a time warning by a director, Alan Sontag, known for his speedy play, commented, ‘I would have played faster, but for the distance to the bathroom.’ He wasn’t the only one.

After 62 boards, the Metzler team was ahead by 12 IMPs, when Cohen gained a reputation as a prophet of doom as he typed, ‘Boards 63 and 64 look rather tame, but I know the Metzler team will wince, thinking I am cursing them.’ Here is the fateful Board 63, which is evidence of what can happen when one over-reacts to what may be, but isn’t.

Board 63

Dealer: South Vul: N/S	North ♠ 4 3 ♥ 7 4 ♦ Q J 8 6 ♣ Q 7 6 5 2
West ♠ K 10 6 5 ♥ K 6 2 ♦ K 10 5 ♣ J 9 3		East ♠ Q 9 ♥ 9 5 3 ♦ 4 3 2 ♣ A K 10 8 4
	South ♠ A J 8 7 2 ♥ A Q J 10 8 ♦ A 9 7 ♣ —

At the other table South opened a Precision 1♣ , as Sontag might have done, and played in 2♠ without interference, making 110. Opening 1♣ was safer there than against Moss-Gitelman who could be expected to compete vigorously at the existing vulnerability if they held long clubs and/or diamonds. From Sontag’s point-of-view, it was safer to open 1♠ as that might better allow him to get both the majors into the auction. Of course, as we can see it was not safe at all, as he had to jump to 3♥ to get across his full playing potential. That was badly judged. Although Meltzer might have won if Berkowitz had passed 3♥ (no double then), it must be said that it was Sontag’s needless fear of what might happen that caused this disaster. There’s a lesson here: what happens, happens.

The Information Wars

July 26th, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

In case you haven’t noticed, there is a bridge war taking place over that precious commodity, information, as players strive to gather as much as possible for themselves while preventing others from doing the same. Blind faith in the Law of Total Tricks has led to a wide-spread propensity to bid on shape without regard to high-card content. There is a understanding, not written on convention cards, that at IMPs players don’t double impudent bids unless ‘it is dead cert to be the best contract’, to use Nick Sandquist’s line from his report in the July 2010 issue of Bridge Magazine. Thus, a sequence of honors in a long suit provides immunity from a penalty double of an errant overcall. Problems can arise for both sides due to a lack of reliable information.

Consider advancer’s choices in fourth seat in the auction: 1♠ (2♥ ) 2♠ (??) The assumption underlying traditional, conservative methods is that the overcaller has a good hand with a good suit, and the opponents have at least an 8-card fit with 17+HCP. The primary objective is to compete for a part score, game being a remote possibility. If advancer has hearts, he may raise to the 3-level primarily on distribution, but if he suggests playing in a minor at the 3-level, he should have a good hand and a good suit. A normal conservative structure includes these understandings:

Double is for takeout to the minors;

2NT invites 3NT if the hearts are strong;

3 of a minor is forcing; 3♠ is a strong raise.

Today, the assumptions behind the traditional methods have pretty well gone by the boards as players open light and raise on garbage, increasing the chances that game is available to the defenders. The ‘good-hand, good-suit’ overcall rule no longer applies as players overcall lightly partly on the fear that the hand may belong to their side. Why not overcall, if one cannot be doubled for penalty? Nothing ventured, nothing gained. If that is the agreed style, advancer’s methods should take into account the increased uncertainty on both sides. Here is a simple, flexible approach to advancing in the above situation.

Double shows a balanced hand with 10+HCP, or clubs;

2NT is a minor-suit takeout based primarily on distribution;

3♣ transfers to 3♦ ;

3♦ is a good raise to 3♥ , inviting game;

3♥ is purely competitive;

3♠ asks the overcaller to bid 3NT with a stopper.

A Battle Lost

In his recent blogs, Ross Taylor has provided valuable insight into the action during the 2010 Canadian Open Team Finals from a participant’s point of view. He included comments on the following deal against tricky opponents who favor light opening bids. The action demonstrates clearly why a new approach is needed and how the simple adjustments given above can be used to increase one’s ability to cope an increasingly uncertain environment.

Board 111

Dealer: South Vul: N/S	North ♠ — ♥ A K 8 7 4 2 ♦ J 6 5 ♣ A J 10 6
West ♠ A K J 5 4 ♥ 6 5 ♦ 8 7 3 2 ♣ Q 2		East ♠ 10 8 7 2 ♥ Q J 9 ♦ K 9 4 ♣ 9 7 5
	South ♠ Q 9 6 3 ♥ 10 3 ♦ A Q 10 ♣ K 8 4 3

Aficionados of the weak NT may claim a triumph on this deal, based on what happened at the other table, but I don’t see it that way. The BBO commentators were speculating as to how NS might reach a pretty decent 6♣ (♣ Q on the left, or ♦ K on the right, plus normal distribution) when Nick Gartaganis jumped to 4♥ , bidding what he though he could make. This demonstrates the attitude that opposite a limited opening bid it pays to blast away without much consideration given to the possibility of a slam making on particularly favorable lie of the cards. ’Don’t ask, don’t tell’ is the rule of thumb of those whose strategy it is to promote uncertainty and make the opponents guess at every turn. It is possible to reach 6♣ with natural bidding as follows.

Getting to 6♣ depends on North’s willingness to show his good 4-card minor, normally something players avoid in the rush to play in a major suit game. One can see that the interference in spades doesn’t prevent a constructive and informative sequence, in fact, it helps by indicating NS have little wasted in spades.  At the other table there were more bids but less accuracy on display. As we often say, every hand has a history behind it.

Campbell was congratulated by Ross Taylor for a psychic redouble that talked the opposition out of proceeding further. Undoubtedly he had hit a seam in the NS competitive system, nonetheless I feel that neither partner should be put off by West’s redouble; one of the opponents has to be seen to be lying. Looking at all 4 hands one sees that the problem lies in the interpretation of the responsive double. If it merely indicates a tepid attempt to push the opponents a level higher, then North is happy to do so at the 3-level. He may even expect to get another chance to bid. However, if a double shows clubs or a good balanced hand, as suggested above, North can take a more aggressive stance. A cue bid of 3♠ is indicated, saying, ‘bid 3NT with a stopper, or bid 4♣’. He has both possibilities covered. The fact that North holds such good clubs, suggests South’s double is based on a balanced 10+HCP. (If he had a lesser hand, he might takeout with 2NT.) Later North can deduce that the slam depends largely on 1 of 2 finesses. Thus,

The Yin and Yang of Transfers and Doubles

After a disaster philosophy comes in handy for keeping things in perspective. Chinese philosophers have long considered human activity in terms of 2 seemingly contrary elements that through their interaction determine our natures. These are not Good and Evil, but Yin and Yang. Yin, the feminine element, is slow, soft, diffuse, and tranquil. Yang, the masculine element, is fast, hard, solid, and aggressive.  Exploring for slam by exchanging cue bids is basically a Yin process where feelings count, whereas RKCB is a Yang process where one player takes charge and the information exchange is less precise. Generally, auctions contain Yin and Yang elements to varying degrees.

The Yin element is strongest in flat hands with HCPs scattered over several suits. Doubles are a Yin device. They solicit co-operation. The Yang element is strongest in hands with a long suit or suits. Transfers are a Yang device where partner expected to play a supportive, passive role. The Losing Trick Count is the evaluation of choice for distributional hands. Currently this element dominates aggressive actions without regard to the defensive value of the hand. In a system of competitive bidding, as far as possible, Yin and Yang bids should be recognizable as such from the very beginning. Unfortunately space requirements here require Double to be ambiguous, but the probability of a long club suit is comparatively low. This is better than a wide ranging double that includes the possibility of long clubs and/or diamonds.

Generally in competition there is a need for a modest takeout (MTO) showing the values to compete further and a strong takeout (STO) when one wishes to convey excellent playing strength. There is a need for showing length in the other suits without promising defensive values, a distribution takeout (DTO). In the above scheme, the DTO is 2NT for the minors, the MTO is Double, and the STO is the cue bid, suggesting an interest in 3NT. The cue bid is not needed to show a game-going raise, as the transfer raise will do a better job. It is of great benefit to be able to raise partner’s suit in several ways, especially when half-empty overcalls are in use. The above scheme allows many routes, be it by way of a double, cue bid, or transfer, as well as the usual direct routes.

The Three Steps to Becoming a True Master

The sword masters of ancient Japan spent centuries refining the art of hand-to-hand combat. They have something to tell us about the art of playing bridge in a highly charged, competitive environment. They emphasized the training of the mind, and defined 3 stages of development to becoming a master: 1) know yourself, 2) know your opponent, and 3) forget yourself and your opponent. Applied to bridge these stages translate to the following.

1)    Refine your card play technique. Recognize your weaknesses. Attain confidence in bidding and defence. Practice, practice, practice.

2)    Through experience recognize different opponents and their approaches. Don’t be rigid; recognize deficiencies; adopt appropriate counter-measures.

3)    Look beyond the opponents and act decisively putting aside apprehension on the one hand, and over-confidence on the other. With a calm mind let your learning and experience take over and act according to what feels right. Focus on the substance of the deal, which is the fundamental element in every encounter regardless of whom you are playing against.

Luckily, bridge players live to fight another day. There is not much lost even if our game turns out to be a bummer. With little to lose, some players strive to beat par on every hand hoping that on a given day they’ll be successful enough times to end up a winner. Swinging sometimes pays off, but it is better during the game to forget about winning and losing and to play with an uncluttered mind.  Accept the occasional good result and bad result as inevitable consequences of competing in an uncertain environment. In the long run you’ll find satisfaction in that approach. Well, that’s the theory. The rest is up to you.

Limited Bid Tactics

In the above deal Klimowicz exercised good judgment based on accurate hand evaluation. Some players would have bid 3♠ , either initially over 2♥ , or subsequently over 3♣ after the redoubler had advertised a maximum hand. Imagine passing 3♣ with at least a 9-card spade fit and, presumably, 20-21 HCP. One could hardly imagine this auction if their system were 2/1, yet, this is a 10-loser hand with no ruffing value and half the HCPs in the RHO’s suit. If he had bid 3♠ reflexively at any point, surely NS would have pushed on to game on the momentum of the auction. The 2♠ bid had the added advantage of giving NS greater scope for error. Klimowicz could act in this manner because Campbell’s opening bids may be of the garbage variety.

Over the past 60 years pairs have continually re-equipped themselves with the latest bidding weapons. One aim is to damage the opponents’ lines of communications. It is legal, but is it admirable? If two opponents choose to play the psychological guessing game, the action may be exciting for the participants, while not being suitable for family viewing. Depending upon deception and lucky results is not a long-term strategy for victory, as this gives rise to agitation, frustration, over-reaction, and exhaustion.

A Bidding Bubble Bursts

Whatever happens in the Canadian bridge world is usually but a pale reflection of what is happening south of the border in the USA. So, I was not greatly surprised this week to discover even more frantic activity of the kind described above in a semi-final match of the GNT where a Precision-based team (Simson) faced a team of  ‘standard’ bidders (Morse). Of course, the Clerkins were pushing their light bid strategy for all it was worth, and were leading the match by 23 IMPs when the following deal arose in the 3^rd segment. It reminded me of the 2008 Wall Street collapse caused by optimistic over-investment in worthless properties – there is, after all, a limit to how far one can go before some clear-headed individual wakes up and decides to take a sure profit.

Board 71

Dealer: South Vul: Both	North ♠ A K J 10 8 ♥ 8 ♦ K J 9 8 5 ♣ 6 5
West ♠ Q 4 3 2 ♥ A J 4 ♦ A ♣ A Q 10 7 2		East ♠ 7 ♥ Q 10 7 6 2 ♦ Q 10 3 ♣ J 9 4 3
	South ♠ 9 6 5 ♥ K 9 5 3 ♦ 7 6 4 2 ♣ K 8

* strong       ** less than a game force (?)

The play turned out to be a modest success as the contract at the other table was down 5 in 3♠ , alas, not doubled. Mercifully we don’t have a record of that auction.

The above auction features one of my favorite gripes, a raise on 3-small without much hope of scoring a ruff in the short-trump hand. This is a 9-loser hand with the high-card features probably subject to finesses with the strong hand on the left, as is the case. If I am not going to pass, which is what the hand is worth, I would rather bid 1NT or even try a deflective 2♥ , after which partner must tread lightly. Diamonds represent the better trump suit. Raising to 2♠ puts the overcaller back in charge of the auction, and he is likely to be encouraged to make another move, no matter that South is a passed hand.

North sees a need to keep the opponents out of 4♥ . Give partner the ♠ Q96 and he has 2 entries needed to play towards his diamonds and possibly keep the penalty to a tolerable level. Well, NS vastly overestimated the value of their property in what became a seller’s market. If they had sold out to a makeable 4♥ , the loss would have been a modest 3 IMPs.

About a Girl Named Florida

July 12th, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  9 Comments 

No sooner had I finished reading Mlodinow’s book, than I received a call from a very nice lady who had decided to take up bridge upon retiring from a job in which she had dealt constantly with statistical data. Prompted by her love of numbers, she was drawn to my book. I congratulated her on her choices and wished her years of happy entertainment without mentioning the frustrations that go along with the game. However, the kind lady had called not to praise my book, but to correct it. She was familiar with The Monty Hall Problem, and was convinced that my treatment was wrong. I apologized for my inadequate explanation of the process, but happily could refer her to ‘The Drunkard’s Walk’, for a fuller treatment of the problem and its resolution, and thus for an independent confirmation of the validity of my approach. I hope she followed my advice, recovered my book from the trash bin, and corrected her long-held views.

The Monty Hall Problem is one often used by bridge writers to illustrate the application of conditional probability to card play, in particular, through the Principle of Restricted Choice. Now Mlodinow has provided us with another illustrative example of the Bayes’ Theorem at work that demonstrates directly the difficulty many encounter with the concept of probability linked to the current state of partial knowledge. He calls it ‘The Girl Named Florida Problem’. A detailed description may help in seeing the connection.

Suppose that a couple have produced 2 naturally conceived children. What are the chances they are both girls? We assume that at the time of conception a boy is as likely to result as a girl. The event is mathematically equivalent to tossing a coin. First we present a false argument that was common in centuries past which goes as follows. There are 3 equally probable states: 2 boys, 2 girls and a boy and a girl. The chance of producing 2 girls is 1 in 3? That is wrong because the probability of a given outcome of a series of random events is proportional to the number of ways in which that outcome could have been produced. One must take into account the birth orders, of which there are 4: boy-boy, boy-girl, girl-boy, and girl-girl. The chance of producing 2 girls is 1 in 4.

Pascal would have got it right, as would most bridge players who are asked, given that 2 finesses are to be taken, what are the chances both succeed? There are 4 equally likely possible outcomes of the play, for two of which one finesse wins and the other loses. The chance of both finesses succeeding is 1 in 4.

Next we ask if one child is known to be a girl what are the chances the other is also a girl? It would be wrong to argue that given that one is a girl doesn’t affect the odds the other is a boy, so the chances of 2 girls should be 50%. The correct argument is that the birth order of boy-boy has been removed from consideration, so there are 3 possible sequences remaining leaving the chances of 2 girls at 1 in 3. Similarly, if we are assured that at least one finesse wins, the chance of the other also succeeding is 1 in 3.

Next we ask, what are the chances of 2 girls given one of them is named Florida? There are those who would argue that whether the girl was named Florida, or Jane, or Laura should make no difference to the odds that their other child is a boy. Although the name Florida is unusual, there is no causal effect at work. Consider the problem statistically and imagine going through US census data looking for all parents with 2 children one of whom is named Florida. Can we expect to find that the other child is a more likely also to be a girl? It doesn’t make sense that we should.

Although there seems to be no causal link between the name and the probability of 2 girls, the argument doesn’t solve the Girl-Florida problem as posed. The correct solution is obtained by incorporating the information that a daughter is named Florida, condition FL, into the possible sequences of births. The possibilities are the following 4: boy- FL, FL-boy, FL-girl, and girl-FL, in half of which the other child is a girl. This corresponds to our intuitive feeling that it doesn’t matter whether the girl was named Florida, or Jane, or Laura, the chances are 50-50 the other child is also a girl. What does matter is that the naming of one child changes the odds for a second girl from 1 out of 3 to 1 out of 2.

The application to bridge probability is straightforward. Suppose the opponents hold the ♣ 4, ♣ 3, and ♣ 2. If we lead the ♣ A from hand and the LHO follows with a low club, it may not matter whether the played card is the ♣2, ♣ 3, or ♣ 4, but what does matter is that the card is specified. There is a difference between ‘a low club’ and the ♣ 2 being played, just as there is a difference between ‘a girl’ and ‘the girl named Florida’, the difference being in the amount of information being made available. As birth order must be taken into account in the 2-child family problem, so the order of play must be taken into account when following in a suit. If the LHO is seen to have been dealt the ♣ 2, all the possible combinations for which the RHO has that card have been eliminated.

What is the connection to The Monty Hall Problem? The formulation is the same. One begins with a set of conditions of known probabilities. Information is provided that reduces the number of possibilities. In The Monty Hall Problem, a door is opened to show that the prize does not sit behind that door. The probabilities are re-evaluated on the basis of the remaining conditions. These conditional probabilities must add to 1, as only these possibilities remain. Mathematically the process is expressed by Bayes’ Theorem. One must be careful when describing the process in normal language which is not well suited to describing random activity. Hence the need for books that attempt to get around this fundamental difficulty that affects even the most intelligent readers.

Doubling in the Dark

We now turn to the problem of finding patterns in data with random components. It is dangerous to draw an unbiased conclusion as our upbringing leads us to seek out examples that justify a prejudiced view. When I saw that the Canadian National Open Team Finals was to be a match between a team with two Big Club pairs and a team with two 2/1 pairs, I expected the Big Clubbers to triumph, as they did. The interesting question is this: to what extent can it be claimed that their victory was due to the use of a superior bidding system? We have space only for a few disappointing counter-examples.

One advantage of Precision’s limited bid strategy is that the user has a better chance of controlling the flow of information. If partner opens with a Big Club, every effort can be made to extract information concerning conditions that might constitute a rare set of circumstances in which a slam is worth bidding. If partner has opened with a limited bid, one may cut off the flow of information by jumping to game with substantial values when there is little perceived need to search for alternative contracts. That is the scientific explanation. There is also a psychological as well as technical advantage to getting in first. By opening light one may inhibit the opposition’s constructive bidding. If that is your style, partner has to carry on as if your bid were normal. This may work well if the illusion created matches reality in critical aspects, such as suit quality.

Watching the Finals on BBO, I was reminded of a one-act play I attended in a London’s West End theatre some 4 decades ago. The curtain went up on a stage in darkness, but we heard the actors carrying on the polite, boring conversation of one upper-middle-class couple visiting another in their London flat in the evening. After a minute or so of that, just as the audience was growing restless, the stage lights came on, and one of the actors exclaimed, ‘Oh, damn, there goes the electricity again!’ After that things got amusing as we could watch the couples moving about in the dark, bumping into each other, doing things they knew the others couldn’t see, their conversations never quite matching their actions. Much laughter, but eventually the ideas ran out, the lights came on (out, that is) and the conversation returned to normal as the couples bade their conventional farewells.

As I say, it was a one-act play, and more of the same would have become tedious. I felt the same after watching the finalists play blind-man’s bluff for 32 boards over a scheduled 128 boards. The auctions never seemed quite to match their holdings, and bluffing was a major strategy in view. Here is a deal that gives the flavor of the contest.

Board 22

Dealer: East Vul: E/W	North ♠ A 3 ♥ A K 9 7 2 ♦ K 10 7 ♣ A 9 4
West ♠ Q 10 7 ♥ Q 10 4 ♦ 9 8 ♣ Q 10 6 5 3		East ♠ K J 9 8 6 5 2 ♥ J 6 5 3 ♦ A J ♣ —
	South ♠ 4 ♥ 8 ♦ Q 6 5 4 3 2 ♣ K J 8 7 2

Daniel Korbel had an intriguing problem as to what call to make on a hand with 7 spades, 10 HCP, a void, and 6 losers. There are very few who would pass and await developments, so if one feels compelled to bid, 3♠ is reasonable, as partner can read you for a pretty good hand; it combines preemption with a bare modicum of construction.

Ross Taylor wanted to get out to the best minor suit game, but Gordon Campbell liked his hand a lot – 8 controls, the stuff that slams are made of. The odd aspect of 6♦ * was that it was the preemptor who did the doubling. Good move: Korbel wanted a club lead, but he didn’t get it. No problem this time, as Darren Wolpert had enough weight to hold it to 11 tricks. One could say that the auction was typical of thousands one might encounter at a local club duplicate – nothing really wrong, but nothing really right.

Judy and Nicholas Gartaganis have represented Canada internationally with great success. They play their idiosyncratic form of Precision to the hilt. Superficially their bids appear normal, but often the effect is to create an illusion. Theirs is a style where the offensive potential of the hand from the bidder’s perspective is taken into account, so their bids are more judgmental than descriptive. If this puts off opponents used to more conventional evaluations, so much the better. Here Judy G. saw her hand as a 1♠ opening bid. Points! Schmoints! Add 5 points for a void, and you are at the top of the range for a Precision opening bid (joke). Unfortunately, there is always a partner there to mess it up, as follows.

When Keith Balcombe bid 5♣ he was already too high, and Nick G. could guess that his clubs meant trouble, however, there appears little need for a double as the profit might not be greatly increased by that action. 4♠ was not likely to make. He could have passed and gained 4 IMPs on the board, but that is not his style, so he doubled for maximum profit. Of course, Judy G. had to pull the double, losing 12 IMPs on the board.

The above deal provides a lesson on how to compete against flightly bidders. Be more concerned about finding out what you and your partner have rather than what the opponents say they have. Bid your cards to the hilt and turn uncertainty to your own advantage. The guessing game works both ways, and it is unlikely the light bidders can double with assurance. On this hand Ross Taylor made a proper 4NT takeout, and Keith Balcombe, with both opponents getting into the bidding, was not tempted to go for slam. He was happy to double and take his profit. Having bid his values, Taylor could pass.

In the Land of Wishful Bidding

If the cards cooperate, it pays to direct one’s bidding towards a particular end from the start without attempting to deliver full disclosure. Under this scheme the minors take a back seat. After all, with this hand: ♠54 ♥Q8 ♦AK8752 ♣AK9, would you prefer to play in 3♦ making 110 or 3NT making 400? Rather obvious, even if the chance of making 3NT is only 1 out of 4. Mathematically close, but in a long match you’d still opt for 3NT, as there may be psychological advantages to bidding and making a bad 3NT.

What is your bid with the above hand if your RHO opens 1♣ ? Rather than introduce diamonds in the hope partner will be able to bid something useful, why not bid 1NT, suggesting 3NT? No one will guess you have such a potential source of tricks, but partner may be able to make an encouraging move showing values in the majors. Indeed, that is what happened but the end result left something to be desired, when partner took the 1NT bid at face value and, not surprisingly, attempted to declare the hand in a major suit.

Board 16

Dealer: West Vul: EW	North ♠ 5 4 ♥ Q 8 ♦ A K 8 7 5 2 ♣ A K 9
West ♠ A Q J 5 ♥ A 7 5 4 ♦ J 3 ♣ J 7 4		East ♠ 7 3 ♥ K J 6 ♦ 9 4 ♣ Q 10 6 5 3 2
	South ♠ K 10 9 6 2 ♥ J 9 3 2 ♦ Q 10 6 ♣ 8

At the other table the doubling was in the dark. Campbell could open a weak NT, and Balcombe doubled to show values. Klimowicz managed an escape to a safe location, which Taylor doubled, he thought, for takeout. Balcombe could have gained 9 IMPs merely by bidding his 6-card suit, but greedily he passed and held the gain to 3 IMPs. This shows once more why successful doubling of partials has become a lost art. One must first bid one’s values, and if the opponents carry on further, then double and let an informed partner decide the issue.

Team Trial Tactics

July 2nd, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

Recently I spent several beautiful, sunny days in front of my computer watching the Canadian and USA Team trials on BBO. The experience is different than reading a written report in a short article that highlights a few outstanding deals on which a large number of IMPs were won through brilliant play. Although one might wish otherwise, our bridge heroes can’t demonstrate super-human powers consistently on every deal. The best players maintain a high standard of play over the long haul and avoid horrendous errors of the kind I make every session. Observers who can see all 4 hands may groan at losing decisions, but those are understandably an inevitable part of the game. One comes at length to realize that brilliance can be no more than occasionally catching a glimpse of reality through a fog of uncertainty.

It is natural to ask, did the best team win? This is the wrong approach as ‘best’ is subject to game conditions. Matches have been lengthened in an attempt to reduce the effects of randomness, the idea being that the better team is more likely to prevail the longer the match is extended. In the USBF Open Trials after 60 boards the world champion Nickell team trailed the underdog Harris team by 5 IMPs, but after 120 boards they prevailed by 78 IMPs, a clear indication to most that virtue was rewarded in the end. However, if 2 teams are evenly matched, the length of the match may have less effect, as in the latter stages the lead may change several times, the winner being the team that just happens to be ahead after the last board. Such being the case, fatigue may become a factor so tactics involving wearing down opponents through continual pressure. Every hand has the potential to become competitive. Psychological ploys come to the fore as early disasters can be written off if seeds of doubt are planted that bear fruit later in the match. On the other hand, there are long-term advantages to keeping it simple to avoid putting pressure on one’s partner. ‘Fast arrival’ and bidding what you hope to make are all part of a dumbing down process that conserves energy by eschewing delicacy.

Dumbing down is the bridge equivalent of playing vuvuzelas at the World Cup. After an hour or so I suppose it begins to get to the neighbors who in self defence think they have to take up the same instrument. I prefer the earplug approach to try to keep my sanity. This emphasis on mindless emotion was at one time considered (incorrectly) to be found solely within the realm of women’s bridge, but now with the feminization of American culture, it has invaded all aspects of society and definitely taken over men’s bridge. Goodbye stoic John McCain, who knows pain, hello vibrant Sarah Palin, who knows the difference between a reindeer and a mousse. Today if one puts forward a coherent, logical argument on any topic, one can’t help but feel terribly behind the times. The same applies to straightforward, informative bidding.

A BBO commentator, Henri Schweitzer of France, in conversation with the sensible Alan Graves, Canadian internationalist and former resident of Victoria, BC, noted that today’s players have adopted the ‘tactical’ approach of applying pressure by increasing uncertainty. What pressure? If I were an opponent of world champions I would not be impressed by a partnership that 1) lets me play undoubled in 4♠ down 3, 2) doubles me in 3♥ making with an overtrick, 3) preempts 2♥ on a defensive collection that leads to my making 3NT when the opponents are going down 3 on a normal spade lead. I would be impressed when they reached 7♣ on the following auction and removed 12 IMPs from their early deficit of 48 IMPs. The bidding reflected the placement of the cards.

Golf and Bridge

On Father’s Day a stocky Northern Irishman, Graeme McDowell, showed us how it should be done when he overcame the odds and won the US Open over famous names such as Tiger Woods, Phil Michelson, and Ernie Els. At the end of the third day his magic touch had left him and he fell precipitously from first place into second as a young phenom, Dustin Johnson, surged ahead by 4 strokes. Tiger Woods hit one of the greatest golf shots of all time, and appeared to be posed to overtake the field. Although he had never won a major tournament, and may never again, Graeme felt he still had a chance. On the first 3 holes, Johnson succumbed to pressure and lost 7 stokes to par, so McDowell suddenly found himself in the lead. Despite a poor last round of 74, 3 strokes over par, he won by 1 stroke, as the great ones tried and failed to make up ground.

His explanation of events was a propos to bridge competition. The game, he said, starts and ends with the golf course, and how one copes with it. Personalities are secondary. If one tries for birdies, there was an increased risk of bogeys, so those who tried to catch up in order to win were doing themselves a disservice. The optimum approach, the one he pursued, was to aim for the par result and not give up anything to the course. This approach worked because Pebbles Beach is a very tough venue. He had just one birdie all day, but he saved many pars with a good putt. On the last hole all he needed was 2 putts for par to win by 1 stroke. It looked easy because all the hard work had already been done.

The lessons for bridge players are obvious. Come prepared to play your best, and don’t think you have to do more than your best in order to win. The placement of the cards is what counts most, so don’t be distracted by personalities. Take what the cards give you. Don’t assume prematurely that an opponent has made a brilliant move, for even if he has, brilliances are rare, and there is nothing one can do about that. Let the chances come to you, rather than actively pursuing abnormal results. However, aggressively take full advantage of opportunities when they do arise. Expect to make mistakes and encounter unlucky results, but let them pass, and keep your concentration in the face of adversity.

Randomness Plays a Role

Recently I finished reading a most entertaining and popular book, ‘The Drunkard’s Walk’, subtitled, ‘How Randomness Rules our Lives’ by Leonard Mlodinow that examines human weakness when it comes to dealing with events, such a sporting contests, that contain a random element. It appears that humans are born with an inherent grasp of randomness, but that as our language skills are being developed, and we learn to identify objects and events, we lose some of our inborn ability to merely accept things as they come. Our training leads us to seek out patterns that justify a prejudiced view.

Thinking of golf scores as the outcomes of a random process, Mlodinow would maintain that it is quite probable that a good golfer will make some great shots out of the 280+ shots he takes, and that some unknown player will come up with a good round or two in a row, and may even play extraordinarily well and win the US Open, not because he has suddenly acquired the perfect golf swing, but merely because it was bound to happen to someone sooner or later for no particular reason. I agree. There are many duffers who have scored a hole-in-one, but that doesn’t make them good golfers. I once pulled off a triple squeeze to make 7NT but that doesn’t make me a great card player.

On the other hand Mlodinow would maintain that on a random basis even a superb player is going to make the occasional horrendous error. We shouldn’t make too much of that, just as we shouldn’t make too much of the occasional great result. Here are 2 simple slam hands messed up by 2 pairs of world champions during the quarter-finals of the 2010 USFG Open Trials. The losses on these 2 hands exceeded their margin of defeat over 120 deals. Really, there is no logical reason for screwing up on these simple situations.

What is the lesson? Consider Justin Johnson. If a friend asked him on a beautiful sunny day to come out for a round of golf at Pebble Beach, the loser buys the beer, he would probably shoot close to 74. If he could have adopted the same relaxed attitude in the last round of the US Open, he would have emerged a champion. By putting himself under too much pressure, he destroyed his inner calm and shot an 82. On the above hands the bidding got fouled up because of mental short circuits caused by self-imposed stress.

Stay calm. Play your game. Someone has to lose – assume it won’t be you.

The above advice seems boring in the extreme, but it is not easy to follow, apparently.

The White-Beard Bikers of the Bridge Table

Everyone has a favorite hand played by the winners that confirms a prejudice. I have one involving Chip Martel and Lew Stansby of the 2010 USA championship team. Long ago Chip (57) and Lew (70) were seen as the bad California boys who played the weak NT, which they still do. Now they are like white-beard bikers keeping to the speed limit, no longer feared as rebels, but seen as early practitioners of the save-gas principle.

Board #102

Dealer: East Vul: EW	North ♠ 85 ♥ Q2 ♦ AQJ5 ♣ 86432
West ♠ AJ932 ♥ KJ10985 ♦ — ♣ K5		East ♠ KQ1076 ♥ A6 ♦ 643 ♣ Q97
	South ♠ 4 ♥ 743 ♦ K109872 ♣ AJ10

My prejudice is that it is wrong to open 1♠ on 11 HCP, 3 controls and 8 losers. One is not going to lose the spade suit, as the deal clearly demonstrates. Even after Stansby guaranteed a spade fit, Martel declined to be pushed about by a preempt over a preempt. Calmly he passed a second time, but when his partner feebly doubled, Chip bid what he thought he could make. The end result represented a good fit with reality. At the other table Platnick, playing Big Club, he felt he should open a pressure-packed 1♠ .

Weinstein’s action gives a counter-argument to the proposition that one shouldn’t bid a Grand Slam without the assurance of 14 tricks. Diamond’s 5♦ bid convinced Weinstein that the opponents were going to bid 6♠ eventually, and it appeared that the diamond suit held no prospects for a defensive trick. Following the principle of the last guess, he applied his own pressure by bidding 7♦ . Take that! How costly was it likely to be?

This deal demonstrated good teamwork. Martel and Stansby are not the firebrands they were in the past, but they continue to play their game well. It was they who bid Hands A and B to the correct contracts thus gaining 26 easy IMPs. Sure, there were some soft patches, the normal expectation simply on the basis of probability, but they didn’t throw away IMPs through quirky behavior. In a bridge game, in Teams especially, it is not all about ME, but about US. That is the long and the short of it.

The Half Empty Overcall

May 26th, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  5 Comments 

Farmer John: Did you hear about Old Tom’s good fortune?

Farmer Bill: No. Did his daughter run away with the hired hand?

Farmer John: No, he fell off his horse and broke his arm.

Farmer Bill: Where’s the good luck in that?

Farmer John: Well, he could’ve broke his neck.

Competitive bidding is like that – often just avoiding disaster can be considered lucky.

Ulf Nilsson, the well-known Swedish bridge expert, has observed that contrary to orthodoxy overcalling on a suit lacking in the normal complement of top honors is often advantageous. His idea is that if you have AKxxxx in a suit, partner is less likely to have an honor in that suit than if you had overcalled on KJxxx. He refers to this as ‘the suit quality paradox.’ His conclusion is that one should overcall freely with a weak suit within a good hand, and his experience tells him this is a frequent winning action. ‘Less is more’ is a concept worth considering in detail. After all, it is a finite world, so the less we have the more partner can have. And if partner has nothing? ‘Down 500? Not to worry, they can make game’ – we’ve all heard that.

To take matters to the logical extreme, imagine if instead of bidding what we have, we bid what we don’t have. Say we open 1♠ to tell partner, ‘don’t expect anything in this suit.’ In fact, there are lots of useful bids like that, a splinter bid being the obvious one. The Precision 2♦ is such an opening bid, showing a hand 11-15 HCP with shortage in diamonds. It says, ‘Not diamonds, partner.’ It is notoriously difficult under standard procedures to show a hand with 4-4-4-1 shape – one has to bid 3 suits, and even then partners may not catch on. So here we have it in one bid. Also leading a suit in which you have nothing is more likely to find a suit in which partner is well endowed. Sometimes that works, but too often partner forgets how brilliant you are.

Bidding bad suits doesn’t always pay off when the alternative is a double. Can partner tell? Here is an example from yesterday’s game where I put an opponent to the test.

Dealer: West Vul: NS		North
		♠	752
		♥	1075
		♦	A73
		♣	AQ43
West				East
♠	A63			♠	QJ4
♥	983			♥	KJ642
♦	KQ92			♦	—
♣	985			♣	J10762
		South
		♠	K1098
		♥	AQ
		♦	J108654
		♣	K

Horrid preempts, nonvul vs vul, third seat, are part of the 2/1 system. Actually, I like preempting in a suit one above my shortage. South should have been warned by the presence of the ♥AQ in hand, but being optimistic, and having a long suit, she decided that partner could very well come up with the kind of support that an expert gets from a partner. In fact, her husband had good support. 3♦ makes, but not 4♦ , so there was really nothing to be done after the ‘excellent’ raise by North. However, an overcall of 3♦ hardly seems to be the best approach when 3NT or 4♠ should be kept in the picture.

Lest we think this was merely a bit of Friday night folly, here is an example from the German Bridge Team Trophy match between Turkey and Hungary, May 16, 2010, a match that, History suggests, was taken seriously by all concerned.

Dealer: South Vul: EW		Nikolits
		♠	J10
		♥	QJ832
		♦	AK4
		♣	A104
Assael				Aslan
♠	AK852			♠	43
♥	K106			♥	9754
♦	10			♦	J97
♣	Q765			♣	K832
		Lakatos
		♠	Q976
		♥	A
		♦	Q86532
		♣	J9

North had the type of hand on which most feel it is worthwhile to take some action, and, indeed, partner held a top honor in his 5-card major suit. The Hungarian North overcalled in hearts and Lakatos could deduce his partner had an opening bid without a great heart suit, but he felt he could not make an encouraging 3♦ bid without the risk of going overboard. If he had thought like Ulf, he might have tried 3♦ on a weak suit, found partner with great support, and reached a making 3NT.

The Turkish North made a more flexible call of double, so South was forced to encourage with his half-empty diamond suit. No problem, it seems, and 10 IMPs to Turkey. Kubac’s double was heaped with praise by the BBO commentators, but I am not so sure they are correct. Traditionally overcalls are meant to show a hand that is playable in the suit named. That is too narrow a view, especially if one is to follow Nilsson’s advice and overcall with values largely outside the suit, in which case, advancer should be able to bid freely. The use of transfer responses to overcalls can be of some help.

Note that if the clubs and hearts were interchanged, North could have overcalled 2♣ and South could have bid 2♥ easily with a happy result. Thus, an overcall especially of 2♣ can be taken as a first step in a competitive process in which playing in clubs is not necessarily the one and only aim. There is a takeout aspect to the call.

Doubling in America traditionally is meant to show a hand playable in more than one suit, so if over a double by North, South had bid 3♣ , the doubler could hardly have bid 3♥ to bring the major suit back into play – that would show a much more powerful hand. Doubling on a 1-suited hand hoping later to be able to bid the suit conveniently is one of the worst aspects of the American double. Uncertainty is risky.

Here is a hand reported on BBO on May 20, 2010. Roy Welland and Zia were engaged in a practice match against up-and-comers from the Netherlands, the practice being intended primarily for the youngsters. Welland passed in first seat only to enter the auction at the 3-level after the opponents had limited their resources, a bad approach.

We can see Welland’s logic: the opponents have a spade fit, so we have one, too. Diamonds are poor, but that merely increases the odds that partner has support! Wrong this time, as this is a rare 5=7=7=7 division of sides. Unlucky? Not really. The ♠ KQxx represent a very bad omen, to which Zia’s ♠ J adds more doom and gloom. However, Welland’s logic is not entirely wrong. Look at Zia’s shape. Over 1♠ should he not be taking action, such as a 2♠ cuebid? If Welland thinks the aggressive Zia would have acted with 5-5, then Welland’s outrageous 3♦ bid doesn’t seem as mad as at first glance.

This is another example of how competitive bidding depends on the partnership stance. If the aim is always get into the action, then more latitude has to permitted partner which allows for (or even demands) light actions. An absence of action is in itself informative. This applies to action taken over light opening bids, such as employed by Meckwell. Nilsson has given us an example that illustrates the urge of all to get in early.

Dealer: West Vul: Both		Nilsson
		♠	J3
		♥	K9
		♦	A643
		♣	AJ652
Meckstroth				Rodwell
♠	A64			♠	K9752
♥	A65432			♥	QJ
♦	Q87			♦	K109
♣	4			♣	1085
		Wrang
		♠	Q108
		♥	1087
		♦	J52
		♣	KQ93

The NS division of sides is 5=5=7=9, so there are 17 Total Trumps. EW teammates made +140 in 2♥ when the American North didn’t see his way to overcalling, vulnerable, on a half-empty suit. Nilsson took 9 tricks in clubs for a gain of 6 IMPs.

As a first cut at analyzing results, I ask myself, ‘what would have happened if the East and South hands were interchanged?’ Deep Finesse tells me, ‘nothing much changes.’ NS will bid to 3♥ on their 9-card fit and make 140 on a club lead. The NS division of sides is 7=4=7=8, and the Total Trumps are still 17. Thus, Nilsson was neither lucky nor unlucky in that respect. If 3♣ gets doubled and stays doubled, it goes down 1 on a heart lead for a loss of 2 IMPs, but it is unlikely that NS will be tempted to try to collect.

Remarks

The question of the advantages one obtains from overcalling at the 2-level on half-empty suits can’t be answered with a few examples. Nor can statistics help greatly, for, as we have seen, the results will depend on the methods adopted by the players involved. One might say that overcalling on a weak suit is more likely to have a bad affect on partner’s game than on the opponents’. Why? Because the information content of the overcall will be greatly reduced without the restriction on suit quality and length. In many cases the opponents will bid again, and partner may be in doubt as to whether to compete further. Once the opponents have limited their hands it becomes much more dangerous to push without good trumps. Of course, the opponents may misread the situation and allow themselves to be pushed too high. Part of a winning strategy is to generate plus scores on defense. (There is a cure for this: cooperative doubles. Not many partnerships have the confidence to adopt this strategy.)

Total Tricks and Overcalls

Nilsson considers he was somewhat unlucky to find partner with a 4-3-3-3 shape. It is easy to analyze the situation with regard to what is most probable, and to see that 4-3-3-3 is not that unexpected. First, Meckstrorth’s 1♥ opening bid is most likely to be with a 5-3-3-2 shape. We can combine that with Nilsson’s shape to obtain the most likely distributions of the South and West hands, as follows. A and B designate the hands held by East and South without specifying in which direction they belong. The directions are equally likely.

If North has A as his partner, the division of sides is denoted under N&A; if B, under N&B. In this situation the most likely division of sides is the same for each potential partner, thus so is the total number of trumps. On that basis it makes sense for both sides to compete at the 2-level. The danger is that South may compete to the 3-level holding ♣ xxx if he expects North to hold 6 clubs. Note that a 4-3-3-3 shape in the South hand is not unlucky, but most likely. Is it unlucky to find Meckstroth with 5-3-3-2 shape?

Some expert writers claim that the more hearts North holds, the more likely it is that he has a fit with South’s hand. We can test this under the assumption that North held 4 hearts and 2 diamonds rather than the other way around.

Unexpectedly, the most likely number of clubs held in combination remains at 8. The ominous portent is that the most likely number of total trumps is reduced to 15, and it becomes more dangerous in theory to compete in clubs to the 3-level. Note that South will hold a doubleton heart, so over a negative double from East he may be inclined to bid 3♣ on what is essentially a misfit deal. He shouldn’t, because his 4 spades tells a story, however, he may wish to prevent West from rebidding his hearts cheaply. Ideally West or East should be able to double cooperatively for penalty a venturesome 3♣ excursion by South, but if they can’t, the cost of a bad bid is greatly reduced. That is the confused state in which we presently find ourselves, where competitive methods are based on what used to be true, but no longer is.

For more directly from Ulf Nilsson, himself, visit his website.

Partner A and Partner B

We don’t want to leave the impression that it doesn’t matter theoretically whether Player A or Player B becomes North’s partner. The above cases are special in that the SE division of sides consists of all even numbers. Here is a case where the division of sides is a mixture of odds and evens so that the Total Trumps vary.

The Total Trumps can be 16 or 18 depending on whether Hand A or Hand B is dealt to East, a 50-50 proposition. If East holds Hand A with 3 hearts, he will raise hearts and South will raise clubs. North is likely to declare in 3♥ . This is correct when the Total Trumps are 18. If East hold Hand B he will be inclined to try for a penalty double of 3♣ . If the red suits are exchanged in the North hand, the situation can be worse.

When the Total Trumps are 15, North is in danger of being doubled for penalty as East will hold a hand with shape 4=1=4=4. Matters will be made much worse if South gives a courtesy raise to 3♣ with 3 low clubs. Of course, if East holds the 4=2=4=3 hand, he will make a negative double and South will raise clubs with 4. According to the Law of Total Tricks this is the correct action, and the contract may devolve to NS without further action by either side. This is what happened in the Meckwell hand discussed above.

This analysis involves only the most likely splits so we are dealing with the most even splits possible. A full analysis requires a computer program that takes into account all possibilities. At the table the extreme cases will take care of themselves. This analysis points to the need for methods that deal with what is most probable, by which we mean the development of cooperative doubling techniques based on shape information.

A Mike Lawrence Overcall

In his 1979 classic on overcalls Mike Lawrence suggested the following hand as a 1♠ overcall of a 1♥ opening bid: ♠ QJ97 ♥ 86542 ♦ A ♣ AJT. He considers this an automatic call at matchpoints and a minimum call at IMPs. So here we have another version of the half-empty overcall. Lawrence argues that holding 5 hearts is an inducement to bid, as it increases one’s chance of finding a fit. The overcaller can make game opposite ♠ K8642  ♥ J ♦ T863 ♣ Q93. Well, anything is possible, but I have not had great success when I have tried it. It seems that the LHO holds that hand more often than partner, but that is unlucky – it should happen only half the time.

We can look at the hand shapes to see if some insight emerges from the consideration of the most likely division of sides. Assume West has opened 1♥ and North has overcalled on 4=5=1=3 shape. What shapes are the most likely for West, East, and South?

One should place West with 5 hearts for his opening bid. It is most likely that the other missing cards are divided as evenly as possible between the 3 hands. Although the best fit for North-South is likely to be in spades, the number of total trumps doesn’t encourage vigorous action by South even when holding a 4=1=4=4 shape (Hand B). A jump raise is not recommended under these circumstances. Holding Hand A any red-blooded South will give partner a single raise, but the portent couldn’t be worse. This is the half-empty aspect of Lawrence’s overcall. Let’s look at the half-full aspect and assume Player B holds the favorable shape of 5=1=4=3. The following layout is the most probable.

If North finds Player B sitting opposite, prospects are bright, but if he finds Player B on his left, prospects are bleak. East passes and South bids 2♦ , West passes, and the doubling begins. In this situation the glass is not half-empty or half-full, it is more like ¼ full and ¾ empty. The reward may be great, but the risk is also great, which makes sense. Acceptable risk is a matter of probability: the expected gain versus the expected loss.

In both situations considered above, the downside is represented by a Total Trump count of 14, the worst possible situation. How likely is it that the Total Trumps reach 17? We can compare the numbers of combinations. The ratio of the combinations for more favorable 17 to the less favorable 16 is 3/5. We then come up with this comparison:

North may escape dire consequences if EW can’t double for penalty, but the bad results will outnumber the good results – I would guess in the ratio of 5:3. Taking action when one holds length in opener’s suit doesn’t look like a good bet to me, even when balancing.

The Two Diamond Reverse

May 20th, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

Progress may have been all right once, but it has gone on too long

– Ogden Nash (1920 -1971)

I am a believer in progress, although I don’t imagine we can ever achieve perfection. There is no way around it – the greatest obstacle standing in the way to perfection is the human race itself. Close inspection of ancient Greek statues relieves that today’s men and women are being built in the same way as always. Any progress we have made must be a result of what isn’t always apparent, our great accumulation of knowledge.

We think of progress as a drunkard’s walk: 2 steps forward, one step back, with an occasional fall into the gutter. Like Descartes, Adam Smith, the 18th century eccentric, held a mechanistic view of human behavior. He thought that an economy unfettered by regulation would achieve a natural, dynamic stability governed by the law of supply and demand. Random stresses and strains might cause momentary instability, but collapses, although painful, would be temporary. In the long run onward and upward movement would be sustained by invisible forces. When we hear a TV commentator misquoting Smith to explain to the masses that government regulators, not greedy bankers, caused the economic collapse of 2008, one can’t help imagining a wolf lecturing to sheep on the evils of vegetarianism (under a banner that reads ‘Every Sheep for Himself’).

The same dynamics apply to the obvious advances we have made in bridge bidding. We might have progressed even farther if it weren’t for regulations that limit our actions. Imagine a world where a partnership can use any system without restriction. According to the concept of the survival of the fittest, competition would act to reward good agreements and punish bad ones, effecting an evolution to the best of all possible bridge systems. One can imagine a long and painful process at the end of which very few bridge players at the top remain to enjoy the benefits (as with unfetter capitalism). Progress is being achieved but under regulatory restrictions that are gradually being relaxed as the remaining bridge playing society becomes conditioned to advantageous change. There is no reason why the general mass of players shouldn’t benefit from the changes as, once understood, they are accessible even to those of modest talent or limited time. One example is the evolution of Stayman. Not long ago one could not use Stayman without promising the possession of a 4-card major, but the removal of the restriction has benefited all while causing undue distress to only a few intransigent traditionalists.

Is there is an Economic Law of Bridge Bidding, like the law of supply and demand, that drives the major changes that we have experienced in the past 50 years? One invisible but obvious driving force is the need to utilize bidding space so as to facilitate the exchange of information. In 1980 Jeff Rubens proposed the Useful-Space Principle, which states, in part, ‘when allocating bidding space, assign it where it is most useful without regard to the natural meaning of the call.’ The desire for more efficient communication has driven the movement away from natural bids that necessarily require and reveal some qualification within the bidder’s hand. The definition of ‘useful’ should include a quantitative as well as qualitative aspect.

Let’s rephrase the rule: assign bidding space in a manner that is most likely to produce the greatest profit on average. This takes into account both the scoring method (what is right at matchpoints may be wrong at Teams) and the cost due to a loss of bidding space, the necessary requirement for transmission of detailed information. In some cases one may sacrifice bidding space when it is judged that further information would help the opponents more than one’s partner. So, it is sometimes good strategy to bid 1NT – 3NT, and leave the opening leader to find the killing lead if there is one. This is the Principle of Fast Arrival – akin to charging the most the market will bear. But the strategy of minimizing the exchange of information will not work well when there are several options that should remain open. In this situation one wants to use the cheapest bid available to facilitate the exchange. This is the basis for relay bids used to gather information while giving little away. It is akin to engineering the best result at the cheapest price. A bidding system should be partly natural, partly relay, and partly preemptive, so as to allow different approaches under different circumstances.

History of the Polish Club

The development of bridge in Poland is interesting, as under Soviet rules the game was forbidden up to the time when the Goren era of 4-card majors was coming to an end in the USA. Coming late to the game Polish players were free to develop their own methods without baggage. Eventually they came up with was a mixture of the best from the US, Britain, and Italy: 5-card majors on a 2/1 base, strong NT, a 1♦ bid that promises diamonds. Weak twos were expanded. The strong 2♣ bid was quickly abandoned in favor of a 2-way forcing 1♣. Over 1♦ they always bid a 4-card major up-the-line, unless a minor suit slam is highly probable. There are many relay bids scattered throughout the system, which enable development of the subsequent auction along natural lines. One can see evidence that bridge bidding in America is coming around to the Polish space-saving approach. Is it only a matter of time until they merge?

It is an inevitable consequence of the need for information that, whatever system is proposed, saving bidding space is a top priority in a constructive auction. As time marches on, diverse systems become more alike under the pressing need to conserve space, so the 1♣ bid assumes a larger load. Last month playing against two veteran ladies with 2/1 on their convention cards, I saw my RHO open 1♣. Opposite a passed partner I happily bid 2♣ with 4 HCPs and 5=4=3=1 shape. In a short space of time the opponents had propelled themselves via Blackwood to 6♣ on a 6-card fit, ♣A10xx in dummy opposite ♣Kx. Holding 6 clubs my partner threw them a life-line double which they nobly refused to grasp. In the spirit of the times I led the major my partner had not bid Down 1100, declarer explained, ‘I had only 2 clubs, but I did have 18 HCP!’

A Polish expert would have started in the same sensible, space-saving manner, however, if one is going to adopt the Polish Club, one must at the very least keep one’s partner informed. There are many instances where a 2/1 player is under pressure to ‘lie’ about his hand because his system as defined presents no suitable choice. It was Al Roth, not coincidentally an advocate of sound opening bids, who made famous the expression, ‘if I can only get through this round of bidding….’ Gradually opponents catch on, and as time goes by some bids of convenience eventually, like actresses, gain respectability through age and frequent use. The classic example of this evolution is the Fourth Suit Forcing convention. We shall find use for another version: FSWW – Fourth Suit Weak and Waiting – a designation that would not be endorsed by Ely Culbertson.

A Bit of US Bridge History

I was very happy to receive some informative comments on my last blog from Judy Kay-Wolff, the gracious and beloved wife of Bobby Wolff. If anyone can convert Bobby to the use of inverted minors, she can. I feel a bit guilty dredging up some old hands from 40 years ago, but I do so solely in the interests of science. If we can’t learn from own mistakes, maybe some of us can learn from the mistakes of players much more gifted than ourselves. We have at our disposal the results of practice bidding hands for the US Aces as they prepared to regain the world championship in 1970. As part of that team, the partnership of Bobby Wolff and Jim Jacoby became world champions in 1970 and 1971. In his autobiography The Lone Wolff Bobby writes, ‘Jim did great against palookas, but he tended not to measure up against the top players. In the early years of our partnership, Jim and I were undisciplined and not very effective, but things brightened up when we started playing a system similar to the Neapolitan Club.’ I feel this is an honest assessment that might be applied to many talented players who, blinded by success, refuse to adopt superior methods knowing they can outsmart the field.

Be that as it may, we will examine a couple of their faulty auctions that began with a natural 1♣ and included a reverse to 2♦, ostensibly a natural sequence, but one which was understood at least partially as a bid of expedience needed to fill a gap in the methods of the time. We shall then suggest a way to formalize such an agreement in a manner that saves space and provides a convenient and flexible continuation.

Jacoby had to find an appropriate bid over 1♠ to show his fine 19 HCP hand. As we shall suggest below, 2♦ is an efficient choice, provided partner recognizes the possibility that the bid does not promise length in diamonds, but is merely a device for pushing things along cheaply. With a game force established, Wolff chooses to rebid his spades rather than introduce hearts cheaply. If it were available at the time, Jacoby might have tried 4♥ over 4♦ as Last Train to Clarksville, today’s waiting bid suggesting slam ambitions – 4♠ looks to be inadequate. Wolff cuebids shortness in his partner’s suit, always dangerous, and Jacoby raises himself to 6♣. Wolff attempts to sign off in 6♦ another non-suit. Jacoby bids 6NT rather than 6♠ because he wants to protect the ♥K on the opening lead.

Just as with the elderly ladies at my club, trouble arose because there was no firm agreement as to the live possibilities associated with a presumably natural call. They were still struggling at the 6-level to find the strain. That 5♣ bid is truly hair-raising: Wolff thought they had agreed on either diamonds or spades. Lest we think this hand was a singular aberration, here is a second example of the nebulous 2♦ reverse at work.

The end result is not horrible, but the slam needs a bit more luck than is usually granted to us lesser players. The point of this auction is that consideration was given to a NT game contract, either 3NT or 4NT. Wolff appears to over-value the ♣J, bidding aggressively on just 3 controls, when it would be much better if that extra HCP transformed the ♠Q to the ♠K. Then slam would depend mostly on the heart finesse.

A Proposal

These examples illustrate the use of a 2♦ reverse as a convenience that forces the auction without necessarily delivering a diamond suit. At least the presence of a club suit is assured. I suggest we can expand the use of the reverse by introducing simple agreements that would overcome the need for restriction even on the club suit. Let opener’s reverse to 2♦ allows for a 2 types of hands: 1) the normal reverse where opener holds 16+HCP with more clubs than diamonds, and 2) a NT hand with 5+ clubs, 17-19 HCPs, and no 4-card major. As we have seen above, the second type can lead to trouble if responder puts too much faith in the nature of the diamond suit. To function well the system needs good separation between type 1 and type 2 so that responder can exercise informed judgment later in the auction.

One should realize that a 2/1 auction that begins with a ‘natural’ 1♣ is fraught with uncertainty. Responder bids 1NT with 8-10 HCP and no 4-card major. With a 4-card major he may bid 1♦ initially only if he holds game going values and a long diamond suit, planning to reverse later. Thus, a response in a 4-card major may be woefully weak. Naturally responder will not be in the right mood for pursuing high level contracts, and may be hard put to suggest stopping in a playable partial. To alleviate the problems while maintaining the overall philosophy of the Walsh scheme we suggest the following agreements in which the opener keeps control of the auction and responder provides a better description of his values. This leaves the opener in control of the auction at least up to the point where suit agreement has been reached. It provides the opportunity to stop at a low level if the responder has stretched on minimal values.

Responses After 1♣ – 1♥ – 2♦

2♥ is natural, forcing; 2♠ artificial, weak and waiting, FSWW

2NT is 9+ HCP, flat, forcing; Suit bids at the 3-level are game forcing and natural.

Responses After 1♣ – 1♠ – 2♦

2♥ is FSWW, 2♠ is natural forcing, other bids are the same as above.

(If opener had clubs and hearts he would have reversed to 2♥, not 2♦.)

The simple agreement is that a bid in the other major is a weak waiting bid. Opener should be prepared to be passed in 2NT or 3♣. Opener rebids a forcing 3♦ to show a very strong club-diamond reverse. Apart from the weak waiting bid, and because of that wrinkle, one sees that bidding can proceed in a come-as-you-are manner in a natural setting. Let’s revisit the Jacoby-Wolff hands to see if this scheme provides improvement in any way to situations that have proved difficult in the past.

3♥ establishes a game force, and describes a major 2-suiter. Opener may hold 4 hearts without longer clubs. 3♠ sets the trump suit, 5♦ patterns out responder’s hand, so 6♠ is reached in the knowledge that the clubs in opener’s hand are somewhat wasted. The diamond situation demands the hand be played by responder. It is important to note that once the trump suit is established, the auction becomes cooperative with responder having more of a say in determining the final contract than opener whose failure to introduce diamonds has indicated a type 2 hand – balanced but with a good club suit.

In this auction we have allowed responder to make a mild slam try on the basis of the fine club support. It is important in a NT contract to have the spades protected on the opening lead. In a situation where the opener has limited his hand with a 3NT signoff, a subsequent 4NT can be taken as a place to play. This allows responder to bid 4♣ without the fear of being carried beyond his depth. Alternatively responder could bid 3♣, forcing, over 2♦, then 3NT over 3♥, but this may shut down the auction prematurely.

In Conclusion

An artificial reverse to 2♦ is a convenient way for a player with a strong opening 1♣ bid to show his strength without fully revealing his shape. Responder’s next bid describes his hand. On this simple and efficient basis a partnership can proceed in a largely natural manner to explore jointly the possibility of various games and slams. To readers who find this approach attractive, I can recommend the excellent (2005) book by Krzysztof Jassem, WJ05 – a Modern Version of Polish Club. The WJ05 system is similar to Precision in the extensive use of light and limited opening bids at the 1-level.

One Diamond – Two Clubs – Two Diamonds

May 11th, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  8 Comments 

The 2/1 Game Force idea has gained popularity because of the simplicity of the concept. The principal focus of most auctions is to find support for a major suit. Thus, even experts who tend to open light with a 5-card major find the concept useful as is precludes the need to jump the bidding in order to create a forcing sequence. With a 5-card major suit opening bid deficiency in the high card content is often overcome through the ruffing with small trumps.

The situation is quite different when the opening bid is one of a minor where there a greater probability of playing in a NT contract. The priorities are: to find a 4-4 major fit, to look for a makeable NT contract at the appropriate level, to declare by default in 4 or 5 of a minor, or, rarely, to reach a minor suit slam. One difficulty is that if a minor suit slam is makeable, but not obvious, then in all likelihood so is the more obvious 3NT, so with the priorities being set as they are, slams will often not enter into consideration. On the other hand, the aim to compete for a part score in a minor has not been highly regarded, and traditional systems are not geared to such an eventuality. Recently, however, the mood has been to get into the auctions early if only to disrupt the opposition.

In the light of widely variable priorities the dangers of opening light in a minor suit are considerable, dangers which are amplified by the inappropriate use of systems with a conservative base. Max Hardy maintained that the response of 2♣ to 1♦ is a game force. Many club players adhere to this style, if only in principle. Many who open light in a minor and stick with an inappropriate response structure are willing to suffer the consequences if a poor 3NT doesn’t turn out well. Of course, anyone who is inclined to gamble will place his bet on 3NT regardless of the system being employed. Being forced to bid 3NT by your system when you feel it can’t be right is another matter entirely.

The current consensus approach after 1♦ – 2♣ is a ‘minefield’, according to Eric Kokish and Beverly Kraft, conductors of the popular Bridge World feature, Challenge the Champs, ‘because a two-club response creates a game force on the next round unless responder rebids 3 clubs’ (April, 2010). Here are the problem hands that prompted this comment. Aubrey Strul and Mike Becker were using the common approach.

Progressive experts have devised system changes that accommodate a light opening bid, but many of their artificial solutions are beyond the scope of the average player. The South African internationalists, Tim Cope and Glen Holman, have successfully adopted a systematic aggressive approach. They were able to achieve the top score for above combination by bidding 1♦-2♦-3♦-Pass. One wonders where the clubs have got to. Mike Lawrence, whose methods are discussed below, might suggest 1♦ – 2♣ – 2NT – 3♦ – Pass, the key bid being a non-forcing 2NT which limits the high card content of the opening bid. This seems to be closer to the mark as responder has given a good description of his holding. Notice that none of these methods is used to explore the possibility of a 4-4 fit in the majors.

Too Many Hands, Too Few Bids

The problem with the 2♣ response is that it takes up too much bidding space to allow for a full exploration of all possible contracts if all that is transmitted is that responder’s best suit is clubs and that he holds 12+HCP. Some pruning of the possibilities is required. Firstly, the opening bid should promise 4+diamonds, which allows freedom for 4-card raises. This adds to the load on a 1♣ opening bid, but there is additional space available for that bid. Secondly, the 2♣ bid should deny interest in a 4-4 major suit fit, thus reducing the necessity to explore that possibility. Thirdly, the lower limit of HCPs should be 11 HCP. Lastly, an immediate 2NT response should be natural and limited to 11-12 HCP without a 4-card major, a bid of convenience, correctable to 3 of a minor, that removes a potentially dangerous component from other auctions.

Given this scheme I have a simple suggestion: make opener’s rebid of 2♦ incorporate all strong opening bids (15+HCP) that truly merit going to game opposite such a response, otherwise bid naturally. If opener bypasses 2♦ he envisions playing in a part score, unless responder had a solid opening bid of his own and can force the auction beyond 3♦. After the 2♦ delay, responder and declarer bid naturally in a search for games and slams. Let’s see how this works after the strong 2♦ rebid which forces to 3NT.

Responder’s rebids after 1♦ – 2♣ – 2♦(strong)

In the natural auction where opener bypasses 2♦, the bids of 2♥ and 2♠ are forcing, showing a concentration of values in a hand limited to at most 15 HCP. This is not the classical strong reverse. It is possible that responder may later raise the major suit bid in a suggestion to play in a 4-3 fit when 3NT appears hopeless, if, indeed, opener does hold 4 cards in the suit. This would be the case if responder were short in the other major. Responder cannot introduce a major suit on his own with this purpose in mind.

After a limited rebid by opener, responder must take charge with extras. Introducing a new major suit acts as a forcing bid, showing values in the suit, initially in a search for 3NT, but subsequently may be a slam try cuebid. A jump to 4♥ as a control asking bid is available, but perhaps better limited to cases where opener does not rebid a major. Below are given several hands to demonstrate the method, first, we compare with an expert’s take on the standard approach.

Mike Lawrence’s Analysis (1987)

In his book, Workbook on the Two Over One System, Mike Lawrence devotes a full chapter to the 1♦ -2♣ auctions without coming to any definitive conclusions, however, we may consider some of the auctions he presents for consideration in the light of our simple suggestion.

This last bid turns out to be exactly the same meaning under both schemes. Lawrence suggests this bid should be employed as often as possible, even with a singleton club in a 4-4-4-1 hand. Here is a hand that gives him problems: ♠8642 ♥7532 ♦ AKJ8 ♣A. Because of the quality of the major suits, Lawrence reluctantly suggests opener rebid 2♦, not 2NT. In our scheme opener may bid 2♥ as a one-round force, not promising reversing power or shape, and await responder’s reaction. It is still possible to stop in 2NT or 3♦. However, all in all, opener might do better by not opening this hand in the first place. With a better hand opener can bid where his points lie by bidding 2♥ with ♠8642 ♥KQT ♦AJ753 ♣K, expecting responder to bid 2NT or 3NT with a spade stopper.

Example Hands

I refer to my approach as ‘come-as-you-are’. It isn’t fancy, and there are no tight restrictions. To work well, it has to get the slams right. That may be the easy part.

In the natural auction partners exchange information through a series of cuebids. Responder can make the psychological bid of 7NT as he can count on opener to have a good diamond suit on the basis of his chosen series of bids, starting with 2♦. In the control asking auction responder takes charge with a 4♥ asking bid. Once he locates the ♦Q he chooses the safer grand slam in diamonds. Opener might correct to 7NT.

The next example deals with stopping safely in 3NT.

It is often best to respond 2♣ rather than 2♦ as more information can be gathered concerning opener’s strength. In the long auction opener and responder find a double fit in the minors and show values in the heart suit. Responder bids 3♠ to express doubt, and opener suggests 3NT. Responder has no reason to go further. The marked spade lead holds declarer to 11 tricks. In the short auction responder jumps to 3NT on an aceless hand without slam interest. This is the approach one takes at matchpoints. If declarer receives a ‘safe’ heart lead, he makes 13 tricks.

The next example deals with stopping in 5 of a minor with poor trump quality.

Opener’s 2NT shows 17-19 HCP in a flat hand. Responder has doubts about 3NT, so shows the nature of his hand by supporting diamonds, leaving the hearts suit open to question. Opener’s 3♥ bid expresses doubt about 3NT, and responder takes the hint. The characteristic of these hands is that both players hold hands in which the long suit contains neither ace nor king, which makes the hands difficult to bid in a natural setting.

Finally, we return to the Bridge World hand of April, 2010.

Opener can rebid his best major in a limited context. Responder shows his club suit is rebiddable. Opener doesn’t like clubs so has to rebid his miserable diamond suit, nonforcing, but that does not mean it must be passed. It is possible that responder may raise spades holding Qxx, and the final contract will be 4♠. Not this time.

If opener chooses to follow Mike Lawrence’s advice on rebidding 2NT (12-14 HCP) despite the singleton club, responder can show diamond support, nonforcing, because the 1♦ opening bid promises at least 4. Responder has bid the 2 suits in which he holds top honors, which is a happy circumstance for natural bidders. Opener doesn’t see a good source of tricks in his hand, so he doesn’t proceed to 3NT and good judgment prevails.

A Rational Look at Irrationality

March 31st, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Any model of human activity must contain allowances for irrational behaviour. So it is with bridge bidding. If players always behave in a rational manner, bidding would be uniformly informative and scores would tend to cluster narrowly around the mean. A 66% score would be quite a remarkable departure, 69%, fantastic. That is what one might expect from a tournament involving only expert players, however, my impression is that even in NABC events scores are becoming more variable. This is an indication of irrationality at work, and as the players involved are experts, one must conclude peculiar bidding is becoming a deliberate maneuver intended to confuse rather than to inform.

On a much more modest level, I am continuing my experiments in the employment of 2/1 bidding scheme after years of playing Precision. Last weekend my partner and I achieved a 3rd place finish in a Victoria Sectional event, not as a result of brilliant card play, bur rather as a consequence of some highly unusual bids within the context of the system to which almost everyone in the room purported to adhere. As a matchpoint event is made up of 26 separate skirmishes, it is not good tactics to give up the battle on half the hands; one must strive to achieve a good score on every hand regardless of the relative strengths of the 2 sides. On defence keeping the opponents to their par score is an admirable and sometimes profitable objective, but the bidding that precedes the play is aimed at preventing the achievement of this objective. It is a matter of cost versus gain, and how much one is willing to invest in the worthy cause of disrupting their auction.

If one is to develop a bidding style it is necessary to take into account that not everyone is bidding according to hard and fast rules; sometimes there is a great deal of uncertainty involved in what appears superficially to be a normal action. It is the spirit of the times. In pursuit of methods that cope with wide-ranging competitive bids, we examine our own peculiar actions and the sometimes irrational motivation behind them.

Precision Denied

When we arrived at one table I announced Jack and I no longer played Precision. ‘Oh, good,’ commented my RHO, known more for her outspoken opinions that for her good sense, ‘2/1 is much better.’ As this seems to be a common opinion, I felt I should give it some consideration when I came to open the bidding on the following hand: ♠ K74 ♥ A3 ♦ AK9874 ♣ K10, a juicy collection with 17 HCP, 7 controls, 5 losers and a good 6-card suit. This is just the sort of hand that gets underbid consistently in a 2/1 system. Playing Precision I would be thinking of slam and would open 1♣ to facilitate an exchange of information with partner. I was about to open 1♦, when the RHO’s comment caused me to reconsider. Maybe she was right and there is an advantage to opening an insane 1NT, although I hated it. Let the blind lead the blind.

All went well when partner bid Stayman then forced to game with 3♥ Smolen showing 4 hearts and 5 spades. The rational approach was to bid 4♣ as a cue bid in support of spades. Scientists might even define this as Roman Key Card in spades. Usually with so many aces and kings I prefer suit contracts, but when my RHO expressed great interest in the meaning of 3♥, I got a funny feeling in the back of my head and signed off in 3NT knowing that this would be an unusual contract, one that might result in a zero score against a spade slam. I played low from dummy on the expected heart lead. Why was I not surprised to see my RHO pitch a club? This was the full layout:

Dealer: South Vul: EW		Jack
		♠	AQ652
		♥	KJ98
		♦	J
		♣	J73
West				East
♠	8			♠	J1093
♥	Q1076542			♥	—
♦	106			♦	Q532
♣	Q85			♣	A9642
		Bob
		♠	K74
		♥	A3
		♦	AK9874
		♣	K10

* 5 spades and 4 hearts, forcing to game.

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What’s Wrong with Relays? Nothing!

March 24th, 2010  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

I have been reading 2 excellent books, one on bridge bidding and another on a related subject, language. These books are not of a kind like The DaVinci Code which you will read from cover to cover in a weekend to see how it will all come out in the end, nonetheless, you’ll get much more satisfaction from the same effort spaced over a month.

Steven Pinker is a Harvard professor who specializes in the analysis of our cognitive processes. His best seller is entitled, ‘The Stuff of Thought – Language as a Window to Human Nature’, which is a good title as it tells us what the book is all about. The bridge book I am enjoying is Roy Hughes’ ‘Building a Bidding System’. Coincidentally Hughes is a linguist, so one can imagine that his approach to bridge bidding will be consistent with what scientists are discovering about languages in general. Language is one means by which we communicate, and the form of language to some extent determines how we think about things. So it is with bridge bidding and the terminology applied to it.

About Counting

Dr Pinker tells us that our quantitative thinking takes place in two locations in the brain. Differentiation of more from less is handled in an area different from that in which counting takes place. In the circuitry of the brain counting is closely linked to language. Those who know more than one language do their counting in their mother tongue. Some remote Amazonian tribes can count to 3 only, an ability they share with crows, yet they can distinguish the many from the few. The relatively advanced Mudurukū tribe have words for 4 and 5, but experience difficulty at the higher end of the scale. These arithmetically challenged people are not yet ready for credit cards, but they might be able to play a decent game of bridge. Adopting 5-card majors would overtax their abilities, so ACOL would perhaps be best for them. It is not that these tribes aren’t as smart as the rest of us, it is just that they have not developed an appropriate terminology and the focused approach that goes along with it.

It is easier as well as more productive to count the suits separately than to attempt to count up to 13. At the bridge table when playing a hand, one must make a real effort to count, whereas it is easy to think along the lines, ‘West has more clubs than East, so I will finesse him for the queen.’ Often counting accurately up to 4 to either side works well enough, but sometimes that is not deep enough. So the Mudurukū people with their limited counting skills could easily handle the common 4-4-3-2, 4-3-3-3 and 4-4-4-1 shapes, less well the 5-3-3-2, 5-4-3-1, and 5-4-2-2 shapes, and would have difficult with 6-card suits. All this tells us is that it is easier on the brain to estimate in an intuitive way, but that one must take more care when faced with bad splits – taking more time and shifting into a lower gear, as it were. Counting requires real effort and concentration.

Words Shape How We Think

Our perception of the world around us depends on the words we have been taught. As babies we first observe various objects without distinction. When we learn the names of the objects we learn how to distinguish between them. The greater the degree of distinction the more refined our thinking becomes. Take colors as an example. If we can name only the primary colors, we can absorb television commercials fully, but we wouldn’t be able to distinguish well between natural objects. We may even prefer fruits and vegetables that are colored to match more closely our primitive scale. We notice this trend in flower shops that sell spray-painted plants and decorated stones. I wish I knew as the names of as many flowers, plants, and birds as my wife, as her life must be much richer than mine with regard to our natural surroundings. So it is with bridge bidding. We have to teach players to distinguish between the various kinds of bids, and stop pretending that ‘natural bids’, akin to the primary colors, are somehow better than ‘artificial bids’, which allow for greater variety and description. The quality of bids lies in their potential in the exchange of information concerning the lie of the cards.

The problem begins in our bridge infancy when we are first taught how to count points and bid according to a point scale. The teacher says, ‘1NT means 15 to 17 HCP’. No. First, one should be taught how to play the cards, how to distinguish good contracts from bad, and only then how to get to the best contract. The game is all about taking tricks, not about following rules of syntax. Historically, whist came first, so a hundred years ago many people knew how to play the cards. Bidding systems were introduced to change whist players into bridge players. The early methods were primitive. In the modern age we have no pool of card players to draw upon, and the old guard are dying out. There is a different need to be met. Organizations have to teach card play first, then give students reasonable ways to arrive without prejudice at the correct contract. Bidding is the language that gets us there though the exchange of information. Relays and transfers make more sense than deceptive natural bids. Teach the basics and simplify.

When one is bidding, one is having a conversation with one’s partner. As with any conversation there are two main components: asking and telling. When we say, ‘the weather is fine today’ we are not saying much, rather we are avoiding providing any useful information. That is like a ‘pass’ that gets things underway. If one says, ‘I like your suit’, that is welcome information, and if one obtains a reply, ‘And I like yours, too’, we are off to a happy start whether or not we are talking in bridge language or merely exchanging pleasantries on the street. The question, ‘can you lend me $100 until Friday?’ is a different kettle of fish, and requires a specific answer. The natural concepts of asking, telling, and waiting are not difficult to apply to bridge bidding. Let’s do it.

Bridge Terminology

Bridge terms should fit the designated functions. Historic labels such as Blackwood and Stayman don’t fulfill this requirement and serve to fragment basic concepts. The term ‘transfer’ is a good one as that fits the function. The term ‘relay’ represents bad usage, as the term relates to expediency (minimum bid) rather than to purpose. If the function is to await further clarification without revealing anything, the bid could be termed ‘waiting’. New Minor Forcing is a ‘waiting’ bid. 4NT Blackwood is ‘ace-asking’. It is not telling except by implication. 5NT after 4NT tells all the aces are held, and asks about kings. So it is ‘asking’ as well as ‘telling’. I leave the rest as a task for Roy Hughes. In a natural system, one may not have available a suitably defined natural bid that allows one to get more information, so one is reduced to ‘lying’ in order to ask indirectly. This is a bad situation. To have rules that force perfectly honest folk to do something that is borderline illegal and subject to punishment is horrid psychologically. Even honest pros who sincerely advocate ethical behavior and strict adherence to regulations have upon occasion been called up, like Robespierre, before a Committee and subjected to punitive action. Most likely it is the law that is dishonest.

Relays as a Natural Approach

We should look at the bidding process from the point of view of information exchange rather than insist that every bid in theory suggests playing in a specified contract. In ACBL games, when a player uses a transfer bid, that player’s partner announces ‘transfer’ to alert the opponents of the special application. Everyone knows what a transfer is, and how to cope with it, nonetheless, an errant partner might be warned of an unusual application the knowledge of which he shouldn’t use. Having come this far, it is a simple next step to introduce an announcement of ‘relay’ to the relevant bids, so no one gets hurt. Everyone can appreciate the advantages of a relay and standard bidding will improve greatly with its wider acceptance and application.

Standard bidding already incorporates many relay bids, Stayman being the prime example. At one time it was felt by bridge authorities that Stayman was an asking-telling bid promising at least 1 four-card major. If it turned not to be so, errant users were subject to punishment. Thankfully that idea has long gone by the boards and the lawyers have lost a weapon. We have accepted the principle that a relay can be no more than a waiting bid telling nothing except through implication.

What are the costs? Every time one introduces an artificial bid, one loses the natural meaning, at least temporarily. So it is with Stayman, which gives up on playing in 2♣ with a bad hand. For most that’s a price worth paying for so much return on so small an investment. Another cost is the freedom it gives to an opponent to double the artificial bid without much fear of direct reprisal, however, that cost may be turned to profit as it gives the stronger side greater definition in the auction which they may turn to their advantage. We observe this in Precision auctions where the prevailing attitude among lesser players is to interfere with misinformation, thus giving the stronger side more options.

2/1 Examples

In my view any jump bid above a jump raise of partner’s call is by definition an unusual bid, whether or not it can be designated as ‘natural’. Opponents should have a right to ask the meaning of such a bid even if it has not been alerted. For example, what does this 2/1 sequence imply: 1♣ – 1♥ ; 3NT ??

If you assumed 3NT shows a semi-balanced hand with long, solid clubs and a doubleton heart, you were wrong. Yes, 3NT is ‘to play’, but it contains the additional information that the opener is extremely short in responder’s suit. A friend told me that holding ♥KQJTxxx and the ♦A in this auction he bid 6♥ over 3NT, and went down, as his partner was void in hearts. As I didn’t know for sure what 3NT means, I would have bid 5♥ as a cautious toe-in-the-water effort, which makes. This sort of self-protective maneuver in the face of uncertainty happens when what may be interpreted superficially as natural and normal is actually far from it. It is only natural to ‘take out insurance’.

My friend acted on what he thought was the correct interpretation of the 3NT bid. Sometimes fortuitously you gain from a misunderstanding, but most often you lose. Here the so-called offending side was punished for their ignorance of the finer points of 2/1, but suppose 6♥ had made. Would there have been a legitimate complaint forthcoming from the opponents that given a full explanation they would have led differently, even though my friend was bidding in good faith? I think not, although apparently it is always worth a try. Under my definition, unusual jumps are self-alerting, so an opponent should ask the bidder what his agreements are. His partner should leave the table during disclosure. This serves to even the playing field, and there is no offense in those cases where the unusual bid is misinterpreted yet results in a good score.

An Amusing Appeal

Currently there is a policy to punish players who forget their agreements. This discourages players from adopting superior methods. In the recent Las Vegas Nationals, a pair was punished because an obscure convention came up. Although we were not present, on the evidence in the Bulletin see if you think the adjustment was fair. West held ♠ J65 ♥ AQT ♦A953 ♣ QJT and opened 1♦ , both vulnerable, after her RHO had passed in first seat. LHO passed and partner jumped to 5♥. Quickly now, within 10 seconds, should you alert even though you aren’t sure what partner’s bid conveys? If you alert and say, ‘just a minute, I’m not sure what our agreement is’, can not that be construed as prejudicial? However, if the RHO announces, ‘I would like an explanation’, you would leave the table and partner would tell the opponents what he thinks is your agreement. The opponents are informed and you are allowed to take your chances, perhaps on the mistaken impression that 5♥ was Super Western Cue. That’s fair, and, better still, it removes many of the grounds for speculative appeals that have nothing to lose and everything to gain in the current atmosphere.

Next imagine that you eventually remember that 5♥ is Exclusion RKC Blackwood, but think that ace-asking bids are no longer alertable. You bid 5♠ to show 1 key card for diamonds. Partner bids 6♦. Keeping in mind that this is a matchpoint event, would you correct to the higher scoring contract of 6NT? I see nothing wrong in that, as when partner bid 5♥ he was committed to 6♦ at the very least, so you have the option of upgrading your secondary values. It appears that the ♦K is missing (partner didn’t relay to 5NT), in which case partner’s diamonds are long and his black suits must be strong albeit short. If I were playing in the Vanderbilt against Meckwell at the other table (first round, of course), I would bid 7♦, as chances like this won’t come again. Perhaps that is one reason why they clobber teams like mine, but I don’t give up without a fight.

West did bid 6NT, partner bid 7♦, and she corrected to 7NT. The opponents were not damaged in the play as 7NT, which depended on the ♣K being onside, was cold, but they won their appeal on the grounds that West was influenced by her partner’s actions before his 6♦ bid. Although East had not hesitated, North stated that he had heard ‘inaudibly muttering’. Is that possible? I know good players can see the unseen cards, but I didn’t know some can even hear the inaudible invitation. West explained her 40 second hesitation by the fact that she had been playing Exclusion Blackwood for 5 years but it had never come up! This is an extreme example of the truism that the less frequent a bid, the more informative it is, but only if you can recall the details. If the ♣K had been offside, we wouldn’t have been given this amusing tale – or even if the North-South pair had called the director when 5♥ was bid.

This is really too much! Inaccuracy will always remain an inherent part of bidding and play. Let’s be more open and honest in how we treat the process. As with tax laws, the more loopholes and seams in a patchwork process, the more lawyers and their privileged clients can take advantage of the unintended consequences. Make a fundamental change and simplify with announced relays and intrinsic alerts on unusual jumps. Good play and good behavior are promoted by an accurate transmission of information around the table. Uncertainty promotes confusion.

Here is a natural exchange of information that leads to the cold 6NT. It starts by keeping the bidding low to facilitate the exchange. Do you see a better way?

I estimate 10% of pairs at my club on any given day are capable of bidding in this straightforward manner. Half eliminate themselves by rejecting the sensible agreement that 2♦ is a forcing raise. Masterminds will jump to 4NT and play it in 6NT. Bingo! We admit that masterminding satisfies some egos and sometimes leads to a good result, but is it a reasonable approach? Obviously, it is best to have West declare in 6NT.

Linda Lee’s Bidding Problem

Let’s look at a recent slam dredged up by Linda Lee from a Swedish championship on BBO. Her question was: can anyone come up with an auction which reaches in a reasonable manner the grand slam in hearts? Relays are not allowed! (An equivalent sports question would be: can you swim across the river with one hand tied behind your back?) Yes, I can, using simple Precision.

The first hurdle is overcome when opener bids 1NT rather than raising spades immediately. This is a practical impossibility with a natural system. In a Big Club system the opener is the captain, so he can afford to look around without having control of the auction snatched away from him by a mastermind partner. The texture of his major suits is such that opener can see the advantage of playing a 4-4 fit in hearts if such exists. I feel it is clear that spades can wait, provided it is agreed that opener is in charge.

Sometimes one is lucky, and this is one of those rare times, as responder shows 4 hearts. The next hurdle is the setting of trumps, which paves the way for cue bidding. Responder has some responsibility at this point to limit his hand, and with less he might raise directly to game. In actuality he holds 5 controls, and expects opener to hold 6. With just one king missing, responder realizes they are in the slam zone. So he initiates a cue bidding sequence, even though his hearts are not that great.

The cue bidding proceeds smoothly as aces can be bid up the line without fear of misinterpretation. 5NT is a waiting bid, a standard ploy when trying for a grand slam without any specific controls remaining to be bid on opener’s side. Responder may not like his intermediate spades or the heart quality, but he trusts partner and gives what information he can, 6♣ showing 3rd round control of clubs, and awaits developments. Opener knows enough to bid 7♥ with some confidence. But wait! Isn’t there a danger that if responder takes more than 6 seconds to consider his options in the face of inevitable uncertainty, that the opponents may appeal on the grounds that his hesitation suggested partner bid 7♥? I hope not. Uncertainty is endemic; one should be able to exercise one’s right to ponder the possibilities without fear of punishment. No kidding!

Good Methods are Adaptable

Even if one concedes that the given auction works well with the given hands there remains the question of what happens if we change this or that card. For example, suppose responder doesn’t hold the ♥Q. In bidding grand slams with 4-4 fits one requires assurance of trump solidarity. Furthermore, what happens to the cue bidding sequence if the minor suit aces are interchanged? Therein lies the beauty of the relay asking bid – opener can determine exactly the critical holdings, and responder needn’t fret about the overall suitability of his hand. Thereby we avoid hesitations.

Let’s suppose we change the natural 1NT to a relay bid, merely asking responder to describe his hand further. In his chapter on relays, Roy Hughes points out that relays work best when the relayer has a flat hand. It is probable that a Big Club opener will very often have a hand that qualifies for this treatment. We might add that transfers also work well opposite a NT hand, as they save space and make the stronger hand the declarer. Thus, transfer responses make sense after a relay ask. So after a 1NT relay responder should bid 2♦ to show hearts. Opener bids 2♥ to set trumps and at the same time asking about trump quality. Responder bids 2NT to show the ♥Q, and we are off to the races with trump solidarity established by the time we reach 2NT.

After 2NT one might proceed with an equal exchange of information through the use of cuebids as shown before, but with responder more confident in the knowledge that his trumps are considered adequate for slam. Responder may be able to bid 6♣ over 5NT without hesitation, thus avoiding an ethical-legal problem. A more flexible approach is to continue with 3♣ as Roman Key Card in hearts, an easily recognized relay, by which opener maintains his captaincy. This approach is flexible and transparent, and it doesn’t prevent the opposition from interfering along the way if they so wish, in fact, it gives them added options. Both sides are better informed. So, what’s the problem? Must we all bid badly in order to keep the majority happy? Next question: are the majority happy or would they like to bid better but don’t know how?