Bridge, Sex, and Love

May 6th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Not necessarily in that order. To many the royal wedding has brought back sweet memories of their own most significant occasion(s). Even Elton John seemed moved. Curiously, the Anglican view is that the coming together of this man and this woman means they are allowed to join hands at the altar and kiss chastely on a balcony in full view of thousands of wildly cheering onlookers. The rest is in the hands of the Almighty who works in mysterious ways. Women’s curiosity as to what Kate would look like in her wedding gown has been satisfied, whereas, like most men, I am left wondering what she would look like in her nightie. Knowing the English climate well I imagine an ankle-to-chin form-fitting flannelette with miniature red roses and French lace cuffs – a Performance design from Marks and Spencer.

Success at bridge, like success at love, entails a certain amount of risk taking. The Italians are good at both, because they don’t confuse theory with practice. To an Italian male the only true, everlasting love is that between a mother and her son. Most of us can agree that in theory every action should have a good reason behind it, but the Swedes carry this further by requiring, not one, but two good reasons. Finding that elusive second reason often proves an insurmountable barrier to having sex, and also has a detrimental effect on their slam bidding, as we shall soon demonstrate. At one time Swedish doctors recommended sex after a sauna as part of a fitness regimen until it was demonstrated that bicycling was more beneficial to one’s health provided one dressed warmly and obeyed all stop signs.

In Japan sex is considered a transformational experience during which the Spirit temporarily is freed of the earthly fetters that bind it to the Self. When in Japanese a woman says to a man that she likes him, she is in essence asking, ‘are you, as I am now, feeling transformational?’ There is no exact equivalent in English. In the UK sex manuals traditionally are written by failed novelists, but one mustn’t be too clinical in one’s approach. The Americans are too concerned with physical dimensions while the French, who rent rooms by the hour, spend too much time looking at their watches. North American parents are hopeless on sex, being more informative about credit cards than about condoms, perhaps on fear of being condemned for destroying youthful innocence, with the result that pre-teens get their sex education from pornographic S&M sites on the world-wide web. Bridgewise, most American players are keen on gadgets, but have only one route to slam – through RKCB. They rush to a conclusion never having been taught how to go slow and cue-bid properly.

The royal nuptials were preceded by the prestigious Yeh Bros International Tournament in Wuxi, an ancient Chinese city of 2.2 million whose name you may not be able to pronounce properly. I was surprised China was not among the final four of the teams event joining Italy, Sweden, USA, and Japan, but that would have made it five, wouldn’t it? Of the final four, only the Japanese were playing a system that had its roots in Standard American. It was an all European final where the favored Lavazza team (Duboin, Bocchi, Madala, and Sementa) were opposed by Sweden (Fredin, Fallenius, Nystrom, and Bertheau) who had made the finals for 3 straight tournaments. Like Kate and William they had got the hard part over with, so could settle down to enjoy their situation with a relaxed feeling of accomplishment. We settled in our seats with the expectation that the Swedes would perform at their best in familiar circumstances, but it was not to be as Italy creamed Sweden in the first session. It was practically over before it began. Even though fatigue may have been a factor, it should not be a time to let nerves adversely affect performance. The correct attitude is that one has had one’s successes with this partner, there is lots of time available, so one mustn’t become upset by a few initial failures.

The troubles for Sweden started as early as Board 2 where Fallenius played the role of the nervous, yet willing, bride.

Dealer: East Vul: NS	North ♠ 6 ♥ KQ962 ♦ 76 ♣ A8762
West ♠ AK1082 ♥ 1043 ♦ QJ5 ♣ K9		East ♠ QJ54 ♥ J8 ♦ A984 ♣ J103
	South ♠ 973 ♥ A75 ♦ K1032 ♣ Q54

Most pairs with the East hand have a way to show a mixed raise with 4 trumps. This normally involves a jump to the 3-level, considered safe on the basis of the 9-card fit. Fallenius’ single raise showed a mild liking for spades, allowing Bocchi to come in late with a bid that showed hearts and clubs. After Fallenius showed a more than mild liking, Madala, who has learned to be Italian, moved boldly to a vulnerable game in hearts. Fallenius now professed he loved spades, but the effect had been ruined. Bocchi doubled on the sound of the auction, and he was right. It would have mattered less if the contract went down only 1, but Fredin, perhaps upset by the coyness of his partner’s approach, fumbled it completely and went down 3. At the other table the Swedish East-West passed throughout and defended 3♠ , making 140, a team loss of 12 IMPs. Which proves that being cautious can be dangerous.

The Italian lead was up 16 IMPs with carry-over, when their aggressive bidding set up a killing defence against a normal 3NT.

Dealer: North Vul: NS	North ♠ QJ7 ♥ A2 ♦ AK4 ♣ 109864
West ♠ 10865 ♥ 109754 ♦ — ♣ J75		East ♠ 932 ♥ KQ6 ♦ QJ10 ♣ AQ32
	South ♠ AK4 ♥ J83 ♦ 98763 ♣ K

Sementa’s double of 1NT has little to recommend it apart from the result it engendered, another 12 IMP gain. Nystrom, in the role of Nervous Nellie, hid his head under the sheets after the double when he might have ventured boldly with bid of 3NT. His initial pass allowed Duboin to show a suit cheaply, so that when Sementa was on lead against the inevitable game, he chose the ♥K, setting up the ♥Q as the 5^th defensive trick. Bertheau won the first heart and played on diamonds. With the ♣K bare in the dummy, it was not difficult to take 3 club tricks. In the other room the Italians bid 1NT – 3NT and Fallenius led a pitifully passive ♦Q from a 3-card suit which was very helpful to declarer. If the Swedes wanted to lose they were going about it in the right way.

There followed some bad decisions on choice of game and on declarer play. Charitably we might say that it appeared the Swedes were falling into the trap of playing against the grain in the hopes of creating a favorable swing. Down 64 IMPs they avoided a vulnerable slam that Sementa bid on this auction:

There may be no correct bid, but pass is for bridesmaids. The horrible session was marked by yet another 13 IMP loss on the following slam that was missed by the Swedes, who fell behind by 76 IMPs after just 12 boards, demonstrating once more that the worst way to create a swing is to underbid. Persistent underbidding is a symptom of a team collapsing. To prevent that happening one should play a system that encourages the users to overbid no matter their current mood. Here is a demonstration.

Dealer: WEST Vul: NS	North ♠ K10976 ♥ 53 ♦ J862 ♣ 96
West ♠ 3 ♥ AK94 ♦ AQ94 ♣ A1082		East ♠ AQJ54 ♥ QJ862 ♦ 73 ♣ 4
	South ♠ 82 ♥ 107 ♦ K105 ♣ KQJ753

The auction that featured transfers (1♥ and 2♦) and extra strength (1NT) demonstrates that sophistication is no guarantee of a happy result – first you need a bit of oomph. In the above auction two players had a chance to encourage slam exploration, but neither did. At the other table Sementa as East made the final decision by raising 5♥ to 6♥, but it has always been my contention that the strong hand should assume the primary responsibility for getting to the proper level. That entails an asking bid structure that allows the 1♣ opener to investigate the critical areas without putting undue pressure on the holder of the weaker hand. Having such a system means there is less reliance on uncontrollable psychological factors. Here is a simple Precision auction that would get the job done.

1♣ (strong)                1♥ (5 + hearts, 8+HCP)

2♥ (heart honors?)     2NT  (♥Qxxxx)

3♣ (controls?)            3♦ (at most an ace or 2 kings)

3♠ (spade controls?)  4♠ (♠AQ)

5♣ (club control?)      5♥ (singleton)

6♥ Pass

Anyone would be discouraged by the 3♦ response, but it is still possible for responder to hold the minor suit kings. Opener asks in spades to obtain that information indirectly, and finds the only high card control held is the ♠A. Suddenly it appears he may be getting too high. Luckily responder can show a singleton club, so opener, greatly relieved, can attempt slam on the hope that the diamonds are well placed. Not an ideal auction by any means, it would be better if West were the declarer, but one that leads to a happy result largely on momentum – 13 tricks taken. Faint heart ne’er won the Yeh Bros Cup.

Another example of optimism in action is the 1NT opening bid in the range of 14-16 HCP. I use the very same response structure as with a 15-17 HCP range. I’ll owe partner a point, which may be recovered easily on the opening lead. We see the same effect from experts who open light when they feel they can upgrade because of some undisclosed feature, but it is more than merely a better way to evaluate one’s card placement that goes beyond the addition of high card points. The effect would be ruined if partner tried to compensate from his end, so I tell my partners, ‘always assume I have 15 HCP’. We don’t want to hear excuses for missing games, especially at Teams.

It’s Marshall’s Call

April 27th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

If one wants to become known as an expert, one should repeat in public what most people have already been led to believe. That defines ‘the popular expert’, the type we encounter most often on television news. They are soothers of doubt, purveyors of complacency, and supporters of the status quo. They tranquilize us with trivia. They are like souvenir vendors at an art show. A step up is the expert’s expert, someone who transcends conventional wisdom without challenging it. He makes best use of the conditions as he finds them, skirting around familiar dangers, adjusting as best he can to an imperfect world. His actions speak louder than his words. In the bridge world Michael Rosenberg has achieved this level. A third type is most prominently represented in bridge literature by Marshall Miles, ‘the thinking man’s expert’. Here is an eccentric player whose views very often are in conflict with conventional wisdom, views that upon reflection make perfectly good sense. He promotes progress and is thought to be ahead of his time.

Let’s first state our view that if common sense and common practice are in conflict, common sense should prevail. That revolutionary principle is the foundation of Miles’ approach. His book, ‘It’s Your Call’, consists of a selection of 143 bidding problems culled from his 25 years’ experience as a bidding panel moderator. He includes the choices of well known experts, then tells us why they are wrong and he is right, giving reasons that for the most part sway the reader to his point of view. In the end he exhorts the reader to always keep an open mind and be prepared to break the rules if they are inappropriate to the prevailing circumstances. Problem 101 is an outstanding example.

At matchpoints you hold: ♠ AKQJ64 ♥ 94 ♦ QJ6 ♣98. In the balancing seat how many spades do you bid after the LHO has opened 1♦, passed around to you? One? Two? Four? Miles’ answer: no spades at all, rather, 1NT, the call he made at the table, scoring a top for 150 when others were scoring a measly 140. He makes a good argument for this eccentric choice. There is some justification for acting unilaterally in this manner as partner is a passed hand and needn’t be informed. Many aggressive players will do this with the impatient attitude, ‘OK, you won’t bid your hand, so I’ll do it for you.’ This is known as ‘masterminding’, and quite often it works. The danger is that the bidding may not stop in 1NT. If the opening bidder (foolishly) bids 2♦, partner may come alive and bid his worthless 6-card club suit, hoping for a tripleton honor in partner’s hand. From his point of view that may be the most likely situation. Miles might agree that it is a possibility, but would maintain it is more likely that the hand will be passed out in 1NT.

As is well known, consistency is an essential element if one wishes to bid informatively. If one bids this way on one hand, and that way on another, partner will not be able to treat your bids with a suitable degree of credibility. Wide-ranging preempts are in this category. There are reasons why partners have rules and follow them. However, to be informative is not the main priority of a player who is making decisions – his priority is to get to the best contract given what he knows at the time of decision. Miles maintains that one should make the bid that has the greatest probability of success, even in the initial stages when you don’t know much. Problem 30 is an example.

Partner opens 1♦ and you have to find a call holding: ♠ AQ97 ♥ T762 ♦ A ♣ AJT6. The panel members were split between 1♥ on a poor suit, or 1♠ with a better suit that denies 4 hearts. Apparently there is no way in standard bidding to bid spades and later introduce hearts as a trump candidate in a forcing sequence while conveying the simple message, ‘I have better, not necessarily longer, spades than hearts’. Panelist Ed Davis would bid 1♠, treating xxxx as a 3-card suit. I like that reasoning. If one bids 1♥, based on probability considerations, partner will expect the suit to be headed by at least one honor. In that sense, 1♠ is more informative as it conforms more closely to partner’s expectations. In fact, it is not ideal as the suit exceeds expectations with regard to suit quality, but partner won’t be disappointed for all that. With this hand it pays to encourage in that direction.

Needless to say, bidding 1♥ can be beneficial if you end up playing in 3NT, as a killing heart lead may be avoided because the opponents will expect you to have a better suit. Also, partner might hold ♥AKJx so one might end up in 6♥ after RKCB discloses the ♥Q is missing. From Miles’ point of view, whether or not you respond 1♥ depends on what you think is most probably the best contract. The general principle is that one should not bid bad suits with good hands, so with better clubs, Miles would not hesitate to bid 1♠ on the assumption that slam is a live possibility, but that partner shouldn’t be encouraged to choose 6♥. The weakness in this approach is that responder has no idea of the strength of opener’s hand. That surely must be an important factor. Playing a Big Club system, where the opening 1♦ bid is limited to at most 15 HCP, slam would not enter the picture, so 1♥ is the correct bid. If opener had a better hand and opened a Big Club, then responder should answer truthfully and admit to a 4-card heart suit, especially when the opening bidder can subsequently ask directly about the quality of the suit.

The point here is that, unlike the first example, responder really hasn’t sufficient information after just one unlimited bid to justify basing his action on what is most probable. Following an up-the-line agreement is the best policy, and partner must keep in mind that spades can be a much better suit than hearts. This adds a predictable element of uncertainty that should be resolvable subsequently in a systematic manner. A partnership stands to gain much if it reaches the best contract when it is not the most popular contract.

Generally, in a competitive auction more information is available and the possibilities are more restricted, so assuming the captaincy and bidding to what is the most likely winning contract can be condoned. Yet problems remain. Here is where we can expect Miles to provide us with helpful advice. To illustrate the point, let’s consider the following situation that formed the basis for Problem 34. At matchpoints with none vulnerable, you are playing a strong NT with 5-card majors. Partner opens 1♥ and RHO overcalls 2♣. You bid 2♠, forcing, and the LHO passes. Now partner bids 2NT. The first question is this: what does 2NT tell you about the hand on which partner opened 1♥?

I would say that the minimum you can assume from this 2NT bid is that partner holds minimal values with 5 hearts and a stopper in clubs. He doesn’t have much in spades, as even with a doubleton honor he might have raised to 3♠. As to his shape, there is no guarantee he doesn’t have 1=5=3=4. Luckily there is available now a 3♣ cuebid by which means responder can obtain a more detailed definition of his partner’s holding.

Here is an important point: if 2♠ had been nonforcing and partner had volunteered a 2NT bid, one could legitimately expect a stronger hand more suitable to NT play. One would be justified in assuming a maximum 14 HCP with 2=5=3=3 as the most probable shape with stoppers in clubs. 2NT would be constructive but nonforcing, but when 2♠ is defined as forcing, partner has to make do with what little space is available.

Let’s now look at the hand that opened 1♥: ♠ — ♥ AK764 ♦ 985 ♣ KT632. With this hand most experts responded to 2♠ with a bid of 2NT, but they hated it. Admittedly it would be an extreme position if considered to be a suggestion to play in a NT contract, but it does cover the three main characteristics mentioned above: a minimal hand with 5 hearts and a club stopper. If one is allowed to open 1♥ on these hands (having agreed to use the Rule of 20), then one must be allowed to bid 2NT after a forcing 2♠ from partner. Of course, there is a danger of getting too high, but that is a danger one accepted when one adopted the Rule of 20. Misfits sometimes occur and create predictable problems.

Miles’ solution is to pass 2♠ – a breach of his partnership agreements. Alan Sontag, used to playing in a Precision context, also passes. In practice they were right. Partner held 6 spades and 5 diamonds and 13 HCP, just as Miles guessed. It is wrong, of course, to assume the captaincy at this point in order to save partner from himself. He could have good diamonds that provide tricks in 3NT: ♠ AQxxxx ♥ x ♦ AQJTx ♣ x, or even the values needed to make 4♠: ♠ AQJTxx ♥ x ♦ AQxxx ♣ x. The ♦985 is a good holding assuming the vast majority of the HCPs held by the defenders lie in the overcaller’s hand.

One further point: how can one conclude the 2♠ bidder has a minimum hand? Overcalls on weak hands have become endemic because of the inability of the opening side to cope with their outmoded methods which are based on the assumption that overcalls are sound. These days a 2♣ overcall may be made on a load of garbage, the main intent being to direct the lead or talk the opening side out of their legitimate game. On that basis the RHO may have only 10 HCP, AQJxxx and an outside king that lies in front of partner’s ace, leaving partner with a very useful holding, indeed. 6♦ may be the optimum contract. While this might not be the most likely outcome, it is a possibility that the overcaller is at pains to prevent. If one cannot bear to bid 2NT, one should not have opened the hand in the first place, but having done so, one should assume one has made the correct call, bid 2NT without anxiety, and let partner take it from there. Partner knows your tendencies. It is true that the scoring is matchpoints, so a part score in spades is likely to outscore a partial in diamonds, but there is no certainty this is the case here. Wait and see.

A current difficulty experienced by 2/1 bidders is that their bids are defined on the basis of high card content, yet they act according to their distribution, as the above auction shows. No wonder experts did not approve of their own choice of 2NT, as they were thinking in the traditional mode where an opening bid promises transferable assets. So they would be happier with their bids with the addition of the ♦Q. Bids must be interpreted in the context of a system as a whole. One wonders what would be the reaction of 2/1 players who employ the weak NT. Would the 2NT bid promise at least 15 HCP? One sees that a simple overcall can wrack havoc, so why not do it with impunity?

My personal preference when playing Precision is to treat 2♠ as constructive but nonforcing. So like Miles I would pass 2♠, but unlike Miles I would not feel any guilt for having done so. I had a similar experience at Teams when I opened a light Precision 1♥ , which was overcalled 2♦ by my LHO, a suit in which I held secondary honors. Partner bid 2♠ and I passed feeling that if partner couldn’t react more strongly, 2♠ would be high enough. I suspected his motivation for bidding was a preponderance of black cards. Indeed, partner had a fair hand with spades and shortage in hearts; he wanted to bid something, and rightfully so, but he didn’t have enough to insist on playing at the 3-level on a misfit. My LHO balanced with 3♣ which went down on a lead to my ♥K and spade return to partner’s ♠A, and the cross-ruffing began. They were rather bitter about losing the match in this manner, feeling I should have been forced to bid again, but it is a bad system that forces one to make a bid that one ‘knows’ is wrong. You see, if I had been forced by agreement to bid on, a vapid overcall would have been enough to wreck our auction. My only regret is that partner didn’t find the double. As circumstances change and we open light on hands with few transferable assets, we must adapt to the change and not persist in outmoded traditions that no longer fit the current conditions.

So, what can partner do if he wants to show spades and force to game? The economical answer is to double to save space and bid spades later, forcing, but many consider this an unsound approach. In this age where distribution is given such importance, a second possibility exists: transfer responses. Over 2♣ interference, responder bids 2♥ to show length in spades. If opener bids 2♠, that may be passed (corresponding to the old negative free bid) or responder may continue on descriptively to indicate a traditional forcing 2♠ response. If the RHO raises to 3♣ over the transfer, opener and responder need choices that indicate the degree of fit and the defensive content of their holdings. For the time being transfers seems to solve a problem that previously had no good solution, but new problems are created that replace the old ones. For example, in Problem 34 opener might accept the transfer for lack of anything better, conveying the vague message, ’I would have passed a nonforcing 2♠’. Responder then has to cope with a wide range of possibilities, and for lack of information cannot assume the captaincy at this point. He must describe, not decide. He will not pass with his 6-5 hand.

Not the least problem with the old ways was the absence of a definition of the double as a balanced hand. Here I totally agree with Miles’ view, expounded in his book, ‘Competitive Bidding in the 21st Century’, that a double should present alternatives from which partner is asked to choose. In other words, a double expresses doubt. It is co-operative and never hides a self-sufficient suit, which can be shown immediately through the transfer process or a preemptive jump. A double leaves open the possibility of taking a penalty against reckless opponents. Aggressive players have been getting away with murder for years as there is often no way for their victims to uncover the nature of their combined defensive assets. To double for penalty remains largely a unilateral decision based on a bad trump split when the opponents have nowhere to hide. This is rare. We still haven’t reached the stage of evolution of the double which half a century ago S. J. Simon characterized as ‘a suggestion to partner.’ Fundamental problems require fundamental remedies. Acting on what one knows is right must become part of a system, not merely an individualistic departure from orthodoxy.

My Secret Memoirs

April 21st, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

Everyone knows that giving advice is easier than following it, but occasionally the fates decree that success ensues, no matter what. Last week I followed my own advice, and it worked! As in golf, so in bridge, there is an inner aspect and an outer aspect to the game. I shall explore the inner by giving you some of my secret thoughts as we went through the validation process of winning the Bracket I Knockouts at the Victoria Regional.

The day after our victory I was approached by one of the lovely ladies who through their volunteer work keep bridge alive in our city. “Is it true, the rumor I hear?’ she asked. ‘Yes it is, it was a great team effort all the way,’ I replied truthfully, while feigning modesty. I must admit I was rather put out, as I had always thought we had a very good chance to win. The first secret to winning is to foster the attitude that we are good enough to win if we play our normal game – no special effort is needed apart from avoiding the gross errors that occasionally mar our performances at the local club. The second secret to winning is to play with harmonious teammates. Serenity is the key.

It has been said that a long team match is the finest form of bridge, but I don’t think so. It must be the easiest, that’s why bracketed knockouts have taken over the game. All those brilliant bids and plays you read about constitute just a small part of the action. More important in total than bringing in a close slam are the several boards where one must compete successfully for the part score. Furthermore, the quality of the slam bidding is so poor that one might do well by resolving not to bid any slams apart from the most obvious ones. This is the route the world is following – an uninformative bidding style geared towards winning the game and part score battles that seldom produces a good slam sequence. That being so, the players you want on your team are those who fight well in the trenches and avoid flights of fancy. Mental toughness is what we look for.

In one match we faced a disharmonious pair of ladies. The younger woman was a disciple of Marty Bergen with an aggressive Points-Schmoints attitude. She and I would make a good pair, but, unfortunately for her, her partner was a traditional point-counter. They played DONT over 1NT. I began with a 14-16 1NT. This was their auction.

1NT (2♣) Dbl (2♦ ), all pass. 2♣ = clubs plus another.

My partner’s double showed clubs (and not much else). Declarer played it well, but +130 represented a loss of 10 IMPs as they had missed a cold 3NT. This is why I have given up on DONT – there is no way to show in a cooperative manner that your side holds the values for game. The conservative 2♣ bidder obviously feared that her aggressive partner was merely competing with lots of Schmoints and very few Points. If my partner, the doubler, had come in again, she would have competed further and they would get to 3NT, but, without his help and left to their own devices, they didn’t have the necessary information to proceed, as their past history worked against them.

Tactics that make sense at matchpoints may not play well at Teams. Our teammates commented concerning their opponents, ‘they bid a lot!’ I replied, ‘so do ours, lots of bids, but little accuracy.’ Players have been told to make garbage bids over a Precision Big Club. My advice to my partner is ‘whenever you feel you can bid 3NT over interference, do so.’ Putting pressure on an uninformed opening leader works more often than it should. The trick is not to think that your side is being stolen blind and that you have to make up for it by being extra clever. On defence against strong bids I would not recommend methods that give responder the chance to pass and come in later. Apply maximum pressure immediately. That is also why I hate to play 2§ over 1NT promising any one-suiter of any strength. For goodness’ sake, if you have spades, bid them.

Our teammates were Kirk and Virginia, a married couple. What I like about Virginia, an independent businesswoman, is that she is aggressive to a fault, which is a fault in the right direction. Kirk is someone who plays well with anyone. A thoughtful player, he doesn’t try to win all by himself. He places a necessary restraint on Virginia’s exuberance. As with many married couples, the husband tends to be less inhibited in his criticism than he would be with any other partner, a bad habit. So I told Kirk on the second day, ‘your task today is to keep Virginia happy’, in other words, cut down on the criticism. With age comes the privilege of speaking your mind to the younger generation(s). He understood that if we were going to win, everyone had to play at their best, and if we didn’t win, at least it should be remembered as a pleasant experience. My fondest memory is of Kirk and Virginia walking home that night arm in arm, perhaps the happiest couple in Victoria.

I was told that at one table a husband said to his wife, ‘if you do that again, I’m leaving this table and not coming back!’ This from a player who psyched our side out of slam! This domineering attitude can only benefit the opponents. If you want to lose surely destroying your partner’s confidence and freedom of action is the best way to go about it.

My partner, John, is an excellent declarer. I bid close games confident that he will make the contracts if they can be made. He is competitive by nature, a fearless bidder, so his attitude fits well with our Precision system. We played in 3NT 18 times, gaining 42 IMPs on aggregate. Once after he had gone down 2 and lost 7 IMPs, he complained bitterly that everything was offside. I said to him, ‘we have to bid these games whether they make or not.’ One mustn’t dwell on the failures. The next day in a Swiss Teams, I competed with spades-and-a minor over 1NT and went for 800, a fair result as I misplayed and they misdefended. My partner of that day was visibly upset, but when it came to a comparison, it was a tie board, a ‘normal’ result from a ‘normal’ action. You can’t expect perfection. On the other hand we lost 25 IMPs on 4 hands where we didn’t compete with sufficient vigor for the part score. As Bobby Wolff famously said, passing can be dangerous. You can’t win by sitting back hoping the opponents won’t make whatever they freely bid.

I find the hardest part of the Knockouts comes during the Round-Robin. It takes a while to switch to the long-term strategy involved when playing against one pair over 26 boards.

After the first half we were trailing in both matches. Kirk was complaining heatedly to Virginia that she had missed a perfect opportunity for a responsive double. I intervened quickly, saying, ‘maybe she wasn’t feeling responsive.’ “That’s right,’ she says with a laugh, ‘I wasn’t.’ So a bit of humor sometimes serves to break the tension. John and I had a problem hand where I overcalled a vulnerable1¨ with a classic 2§ with a 6-card suit KQJxxx. John passed and my RHO bid 2¨. John balanced with a double which I left in, having nowhere to go, thinking ‘how bad can it be?’ The answer: terrible, making with 3 overtricks, -780 for a loss of 12 IMPs to our side. After a discussion, John suggested he shouldn’t have doubled and I shouldn’t have left it in. I agreed to keep peace in the partnership, but I still feel it was an extremely bad tactic on a 5=4=2=2 hand whose greatest asset was the ¨A sitting in front of the bidder. (Of course, declarer held the §A.) This was a prime example of matchpoint madness being applied in a team match.

Each match is like a marathon where the optimum strategy is to bunch together during the middle portion of the race. Humans are social animals who feel most comfortable acting within a crowd. I suppose that is one reason everyone plays the same bidding system, however bad it may be. I am the lone wolf. Once playing pairs with John in a Sectional we finished the round early and stood watching the quiet crowd hunched over their cards with worried looks on their faces. ‘All the players in the gym are guessing,’ I commented, ‘and they are all using the same bad system, so we have a great advantage, no matter how good they are. We only need to keep our noses clean.’ We play an aggressive system conservatively, simultaneously taking care of both extreme positions.

In a marathon after 26 long miles, one extra inch may constitute the margin of victory. It is easier to come up from behind than to keep ahead of those keeping pace unseen at the rear. There is a cumulative effect to pressure. The Precision style is to compete early and often, frequently on values that conservative bidders find inadequate. It seems we are always opening the bidding with 1¨ or otherwise getting in the way, but it is a part of the system, not a peculiar habit. Trailing during the second half of the Round-Robin, John opened 1♥ which I raised to 2♥ with 10 HCP, and 3 hearts to the ♥AJx. In balancing seat our RHO felt this was the time to punish our impudence, and he doubled. My LHO concurred, but John made it easily, even foregoing a 9^th trick for the sake of safety. That made up the losing margin from the first half, and we went on to eliminate that team from the next round. Without their help we may not have survived ourselves.

My mantra is, ‘let the system make the mistakes.’ That is, when in doubt make the systemic bid. It may turn out wrong, but at least partner will be reliably informed. In a long match it is important to save mental energy. I can’t remember one tough bidding decision. I can remember several mistakes that luckily didn’t cost anything. My worst mistake came on the board after partner complained bitterly about a bad defence that wasn’t entirely my fault. ‘Could-have, should-have’ should be banned from discussions at the table as they can invisibly destroy concentration as the unconscious brain takes a side road searching futilely for excuses. In golf I see that the winner of the 2011 Masters finished with 4 birdies. He commented that in times of stress, simple is best. While others ran out of gas, Swartzel still had lots left in the tank. The same applies at bridge. If you must be reckless, keep partner out of it, and accept the blame if it doesn’t work out.

John complained at the break in the last match that one opponent was taking too long over a simple hand. In fact, the play was simple, but it was a slam on which they gained 15 IMPs, so some careful thought was called for. “What was she thinking about?’ he said with exasperation in his voice. Well, you can’t waste your mental energy worrying about what the opponents may be thinking, so I said, ‘Good! If she is wasting her time on a cold contract, she’s tiring herself out on a non-existent problem. She may make a mistake later when it makes a difference.’ And I was right.

In the last 7 hands we picked up 41 IMPs – a sprint to the finish when the opponents appear to have faded under constant pressure. Of course, Kirk and Virginia were playing their part on the boards they had played earlier. One element of our system that yielded profits was a one club opening bid followed by a 2¨ response that shows 8-10 HCP in a balanced or semi-balanced hand (4-4-4-1 is possible). Further bids by responder are relays that allow the strong hand to decide the final contracts and to declare them after a minimum amount of self-disclosure. Certainly, relays are the way of the future.

Sometimes players are suspicious that you are doing something very devious. Good, that means you don’t have to. The next day in Flight B Swiss I was playing 2/1 with a different partner when an opponent asked whether we played upside-down attitude on discards. I replied that we played standard discards. ‘Does a high card show values in that suit?’ he persisted. ‘Not necessarily, our discards are more or less random.’ ‘Oh, so you make deceptive discards!’ he concluded. ‘No, we aren’t trying to deceive anyone, we just don’t want to give away information unnecessarily. I call that Standard.’ ‘Right!’ he says, ‘That’s a good way of putting it.’ Later after a long auction on our part, he asked, ‘are all those bids natural?’, and I replied, ‘they are as natural as we ever get.’ After and opening bid of 1¨ on my left I had balanced with a double, and this auction followed:

I think 7 controls and a 5-card suit constitute a huge hand. This is just the type of hand that gives me trouble when playing under the constraints of 2/1. Luckily I wasn’t the opening bidder. The lack of points in diamonds was another big plus, so I pushed on to the often shunned minor suit game. When dummy came down I was not as pleased as I should have been. The RHO took his diamonds then conceded when the clubs proved to be split 2-2. This was the last hand of the day in a largely uneventful match and it put us into a tie for second/third after many a slip and fall along the way in a game marred chiefly by a lack of initiative. You will have noted that it is a game dependent on a 2-2 split in clubs, less than 50%. Unashamedly I maintain that it was a question of whether one is happy gambling an 8th place finish against a possible win. I think a 40% chance is more than enough to justify going for it.

‘Why didn’t you pass 4♠ and play in a Moysian,’ I complained to partner.

‘Oh, you don’t want to do that,’ says the RHO, ‘I got a stack of spades.’

My last piece of advice is this: before you complain about your partner’s action, you’d better first check to see if he didn’t do the right thing after all.

The Vanderbilt Final as a Team Sport

March 23rd, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

In recent blogs I pondered on the place of sports psychology with regard to bridge, sbaoao often considered in books solely as a puzzle solving exercise. Maybe it is that, if one is sitting quietly at home giving the old gray cells a workout after a leisurely Sunday brunch, but the perception is different if one is glued to the computer watching the drama of the Vanderbilt Final unfold like a Masters’ golf tournament. Yes, there is play technique enough to satisfy the purists. Here is some magic with a logical explanation behind it akin to the clarification of how the rabbit got into the hat. It was on Board 27, approaching the half-way point with the Grue team leading Fleisher by 17 IMPs.

Curtis Cheek, South, had opened the bidding with a 3♥ preempt on ♥ KQJ853. Presumably he wanted to keep the ball rolling. It appeared this would be a cost-nothing pressure bid and there would be no damage done to his side, as the normal 2♥ preempt by Chip Martel had scored 140 at the other table. Early in the play Levin, East, found himself on lead looking for some tricks from the diamond suit. He found a way; he underled the ♦Q. Weinstein won the ♦A and returned the ♦2 to Levin’s ♦Q. A club to Weinstein’s ace, led to a ruff on the third round of diamonds. Down 2! A gain of 6 IMPs pulled out of thin air may not be that significant in the general scheme of things where 10 IMPs and more are often flying about up for grabs, and Cheek may have taken it in stride, but this gain must have been a great boost of morale for Levin who was suffering, having come out of his sick bed to play in all 64 boards of the final.

With regard to bridge psychology, there are turning points that one can recognize only as they occur. Some situations which greatly influence the outcome even don’t get written up as the result may represent no more than a missed opportunity. In this aspect the BBO viewers are well served by a great player of a modest disposition who tries to tell it like it is, rather than push a particular dogma. I am thinking here of Larry Cohen, Mike Passell, Kit Woolsey, Alan Graves, in particular, and of that inimitable royal jester, David Burn, who, like King Lear’s fool, laces common sense with acerbic humor without contributing to the overall modesty requirement. (Modesty doesn’t become a maker of barbed comments.)

So we watched as the drama unfolded in the slow pace of a Kurosawa adaptation of a Shakespearean play. The elements of success that had brought the players to this final stage contained the seeds of their future failure. Would the veterans Stansby and Martel find their solid approach caused them to miss sacrifices found at the other table (yes) or would the erratic style of London-based Delmonte and Bakhshi lead them into deep waters beyond their depths (yes, again). Would Bobby Levin’s illness affect his play (yes, indeed.) Would Kamil make a habit of losing in the final? (maybe). Last but not least, what of the dangerous pair, Cheek and Grue? Might they prove a greater danger to themselves than to the opponents? (wait and see.)

As noted above, the vigorous style of the Grue team gave them the early lead. The last 4 boards of Segment 1 provided a swing of 43 IMPs, 32 of those going to Grue who had the lead after 16 boards of 17 IMPs. When Board 10 of Segment 3 began, that lead had reached 24 IMPs. The momentum was still in favor of Grue who seemed to control the action with Levin – Weinstein somewhat on the ropes. One more bad decision by the struggling Levin and it might be all over, but Board 10 changed all that. A gain of 12 IMPs on good teamwork at both tables halved the lead and entirely changed the complexion of the match. It had become a hard fought struggle with errors on both sides.

* Dbl was multi-meaning: a long minor or both majors

Grue and Cheek utilize uncertainty as a weapon within the context of a Precision system. They play upon the minds of their opponents, as this auction shows. There is no reason for Cheek to balance as there appears little to gain from the action other than the hope of pushing the opponents to a contract of two of a major, which they were likely to make. Giving partner a diamond ruff may not gain much as there is no second entry to the South hand. Being doubled in 2♦, vulnerable, does not represent a gain over 1NT making 120.

However, stirring the pot is a strategy driven more by hope than reason.

Grue had no problem guessing the nature of Cheek’s double. He could have taken the easy action and bid 2♣ correctable to 2♦, however, why do that when he could pass and put the pressure on Levin? He could not be certain that Cheek didn’t hold entries outside his minor. So the pressure was on Levin, and it took him several minutes to come to a decision. Looking at his hand alone, one might conclude that pass was the most obvious call in the world. Think of it this way: if partner had been left to play in 1NT undoubled wouldn’t you expect him to make 8 tricks? So what in the opponents’ action would lead you to believe the same wouldn’t happen now? As the clock ticked by, one could almost see the beads of sweat forming on Levin’s fevered brow.

The tactics of players who cultivate uncertainty is aimed at convincing their opponents that something unusual is in the works that will deflect them from a normal, winning action. This could be as common as a bid in a topless suit in a competitive auction, or an off-shape double. Ambiguity plays a role, but even better is a false show of strength using transfers that presumed to show a ‘good’ raise as opposed to a weak direct raise. We are seeing that frequently, as false transfers can hardly cost. Anyway, here Levin had been made to sweat while spectators at home danced around their computers yelling, ‘Pass, you fool!’ We are so glad he did pass, because we believe that in the face of uncertainty one should take the normal action, that is, the action that caters to the most probable lie of the cards. To determine what is most probable we give more credence to partner’s actions than to those of the opponents.

It is somewhat surprising that Joe Grue didn’t lead his normal 4th highest heart, after all, he has 2 sure entries. Perhaps the loss on this board can be attributed to putting too much credence in his partner’s action, which depends to a great extent on how reliable you expect a partner to be. The action at the other table reflects that side of the active style, as well. Do you believe the opponents more than your partner? If they are not entirely accurate in their explanations, should you hold them to a higher standard and seek redress? This is a moral question, not a legal one – we know the legal answer.

It appears that Kamil was playing at matchpoints when he entered the auction, vulnerable, without a safety net. Bakhshi showed values, although one could hardly say it was a penalty double. Perhaps he expected partner to takeout to spades if appropriate. Fleisher had no great love for hearts, so he took out to a minor at the 3-level. Kamil bid 3♣, a sensible expectation being a 5-card suit, which wasn’t met. Bakhshi was on rather firmer ground with his second double, with the normal action being a pass from Delmonte.

One good point made by a BBO commentator was that a general rule for us ordinary players should be that you can’t make separate takeout doubles of two different suits, so Bakhshi’s second double should be definitely for penalty. The other rule I like to apply is that if I have described by hand accurately (and I always feel that I have done so), I allow my partner to make the final decision. In this case I would feel I have exceeded my partner’s expectations for defence against 3♣, so would pass without hesitation. But, of course, I am not an expert, and some experts feel they are paid to make the decisions, however wrong they may turn out to be.

Delmonte’s decision was very wrong, indeed, losing 12 IMPs in the process. He had been jerked around by foolish bidding, and after the fact he felt hard put by it, claiming he would have left in the double if he had any inkling that Kamil may have held only 4 cards in the club suit. Some rumors about an appeal were circulated, but, thankfully, did not materialize. The issue should be not whether you believed the opponents but whether you believed your partner and acted accordingly. We often see the contrary attitude from loose bidders who feel the opponents must be held to account for any digressions from the text. After all, they must depend on the opponents as their only reliable source of information.

The pair recovered nicely in Segment 4 when, with the help of a lead directing double from Stansby, Bakhshi made the right decision to venture beyond 6NT to 7NT with several overtricks available on the side if needed, but the following board proved fatal late in the segment with Grue still holding onto a 10 IMP lead.

Delmonte hid his excellent club suit, Bakhshi bid his bad spade suit, and they reached the inferior contract of 5♠ making 680. This looks very much like a matchpoint strategy where it pays to bid spades come what may. Contrast this approach with that of Weinstein who treated his poor 5-card spade suit with equanimity by doubling the interference rather than making a unilateral suit bid that didn’t in any way imply shortage in hearts. Levin was then able to upgrade his suit for slam purposes. This again illustrates that it is better to bid the suit you have rather than the suit you hope partner can support. It’s true that a slam in spades would have outscored a slam in clubs, but the primary requirement was to get to slam in the first place. Levin took the short-cut.

This reversal put the Kamil team ahead with two steady partnerships at the tables, albeit not playing up to their usual high standard, so the viewer might expect Kamil to prevail over the 9 boards remaining. Then Levin overdid it, jumping impatiently to a grand slam missing the ace of trumps. As reported widely (see Linda Lee’s blog for details) the Grue team could win if Delmonte and Bakhshi could avoid the same error in an uncontested auction, but, wonder of wonders, they also ended up in the same foolish contract, and the match slipped from their grasp. The reason? Succumbing to self-generated pressure that has to be overcome in tight situations, especially after a few costly mistakes that could have been avoided. Perfectionists, Beware the Ides of March. When you see you are making mistakes, don’t attempt to be perfect, because you should be realizing by now that you aren’t. Here is their bidding on that fateful hand.

Delmonte rushed to judgement by jumping to 4♦, taken to be a Roman Key Card asking bid. One wonders if he had a plane to catch. Bakhshi found himself in a spot as he wanted to provide full information on his promising hand. Can judgement arise when partner asks you a straightforward question to which there is a straightforward answer? I have had partners give me the wrong number of aces after Blackwood because they didn’t like their intermediates, and I have always felt that to be a breach of trust. Here Bakhshi felt he should truthfully answer the question he thought had been put him. Whether 5NT is the correct response or not, Delmonte now paid the price for his hasty and greedy action. He made a time-marking bid in the hope of further clarification, belatedly sharing the responsibility of decision making in an auction that had become uncomfortably short of bidding space. Bakhshi, striving to be perfect, guessed wrong. Let’s see how this hand might be bid using Precision 1♣ opening bid where personality should play a lesser role.

There are reasons why accurate slam bidding may require 8 exchanges of information and still end in uncertainty. After the opening 1♣ bid, the subsequent bids are ‘natural’. The important bid is the sacrosanct 3♦, agreeing on diamonds as trumps. Cuebids follow. Cuebidding shortage in partner’s spade suit is a no-no for standard bidders – they are as likely as not to get passed out there (but may still win the board.) 6NT is descriptive, and responder may still bid 7♦ with a solid suit, but he has been warned of the wastage. Easy.

My Troubles with 2/1

March 8th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  7 Comments 

We bloggers have been asked to consider with which of the Victor Mollo Menagerie characters we most associate ourselves. Futile Willie came immediately to my mind, before I remembered that he was a character from S.J. Simon’s Why You Lose at Bridge – humor and analysis much more to my taste. I am intrigued by the ordinary. To me Hideous Hog is a mere Boastful Baboon, if I may mix my animal metaphors.

Why Futile Willie? Well, first, I have an inordinate fondness for the minor suits that goes back over 60 years when, playing with my big sister, Lois, I bid and made five clubs much to the amazement of my proud parents. The full details escape me, but I remember my father saying to my mother with his characteristic nicety, ‘Mind you, Vera, if you had led your accustomed trump there was no way he could have made it.’ Over the intervening decades of duplicate bridge I have pursued my dream of scoring +130 when everyone else is going down in 3NT, and it has proved a costly endeavor.

Is it not strange that as creatures of intelligence we are unable to overcome our early influences and continue to stick with our harmful prejudices? I often wonder if my life would have been happier and more successful if Mom had doubled and led that trump. Sometimes as kids we benefit from a bit of tough love, and I might have gone about my life happily bidding 3NT like everyone else. My mother was a good player, accustomed to winning the tea cup at the weekly ladies’ home game. She explained her success modestly by claiming, ‘I just bid what I have.’ Apparently, true to her name, Vera always told the truth. That philosophy for better or worse has become the cornerstone of my bridge bidding. Of course, she played Culbertson where a club meant a club, so I have had to generalize the concept to that of ‘bidding according to what I have.’

When I joined the local crowd and took up 2/1, I first re-read the books and memorized the rules, not realizing that the rules are there primarily for others to follow so we can deduce how the cards sit. Whether the bids are truthful or not is another matter. Here is the most recent example of me as Futile Willie playing 2/1 according to the book.

With 18 HCP I could have opened 1♣ if playing Precision. As the dummy came down, rather than thank partner as I should, I exclaimed in exasperation, ‘Is this 2/1?’ The diamond lead was taken by my ♦Q, and the ♥J was taken by the ♥A. Three diamonds were cashed, and I had the rest for +150. Superficially it looked as if we’d missed 3NT.

‘Don’t blame 2/1,’ my RHO admonished airily, ‘Bidding is like literature.’

‘No it isn’t,’ I retorted hotly, ‘it is an exchange of reliable information!’

Privately I thought that I would have been in trouble on a club lead. Was it suspicion or the intervention of some ghostly presence that caused my LHO to underlead from ♦AKxx? Perhaps neither, just the fourth highest from his best suit. Scoring at the end of the game revealed I had achieved a much needed top. Most pairs were going minus, only a few managing to stop safely in two of a major. I got to thinking how a pair might actually stop there. Responder must pass on the first round and my RHO must balance with a double. Fine, but won’t they compete to 3♣ as they have a 9-card club fit? So there are advantages of responding light – the hope being that the opponents are frightened into letting your side declare the hand at the two level. Unfortunately on rare occasions partner has a good hand and puts his trust in the system.

I don’t like that result, although I’ll take it as compensation for all the correct bids that have given me bad scores recently. Really, I should have ‘lied’ and bid 1♠, telling myself that if I can just get through this round of bidding I should be OK. The late Alvin Roth is the guiding guru for so many 2/1 players who prefer to wait and see rather than commit, with good reason if you haven’t the foggiest idea as to what partner is up to.

Decades ago when the Italian Blue Team was in full flight there appeared in the Bridge World a rare introspection into standard American bidding practices. What was wrong then is essentially wrong half a century later with the 2/1 system that has superseded Standard American – the inability to handle hands in which the strength is markedly uneven between the opening bidder and responder. The greater the imbalance in strength, the worse the system performs, it’s that simple.

Bidding systems are designed for good performance under the most probable circumstances. So, one system may be as good as the other under the most likely conditions – one might even guess well on experience alone. When one side holds 26 HCP, the expectation is that they will reach a game either in 3NT or 4 of a major, and that by following a system they will get to the proper contract most of the time. Consider the most likely distribution of HCP around the table: 13-7-13-7. No problem here. Opener bids a suit at the 1-level, and responder has enough for game. Exploration begins with players exchanging information on an equal basis. One or the other makes the final decision. Next consider this distribution of HCP: 16-7-10-7. Again the opponents haven’t the wherewithal to raise difficulties, but a 2/1 partnership may have real problems sorting things out. At least I do. The problem can be circumvented by opening a strong 1NT with a wide variety of shapes, a move that sets a lower limit of 15 to the number of HCP held. Now responder’s 10 HCPs have become a game forcing holding, but we have solved one problem by introducing others. What if partner has a good hand, and slam makes by taking tricks in an unexpectedly long suit? Such an approach leads to an unending cycle of adjustments and re-adjustments while system remains basically flawed.

Here is a hand that gave me problems:  ♠ 96 ♥ AK965 ♦ Q7 ♣ AKJ4 – a lovely 17 HCPs strong in controls. Having had difficulties with this type before, I pondered the wisdom of opening 1NT. I find when one expects disaster it is virtually certain to follow. I opened 1♥ and there seemed to be no way to stop short of a hopeless 4♥, for -200. Partner, void in clubs with ♥ 10xx, 12 so-called ‘support points’, invited game, and who was I to decline? Playing Precision I would have opened 1♣ and could have stopped in 3♥ which would be worth almost all the matchpoints, so we weren’t the only pair in trouble on this hand. The main difficulty in the 2/1 auction was that the responder couldn’t evaluate the overall fit, whereas in a Precision auction the opener with a strong hand can obtain a more accurate picture and be in a better position to decide the final contract.

The other side of the coin is the problem one encounters when ‘opening light’ in a 2/1 context geared towards ‘sound’ opening bids. Most ignore that requirement, rightly so on general principles, but wrong systemically. Everyone knows that opening light is advantageous, so why don’t they play a system that allows for it? When partner opened 1♥ on a topless suit, I felt my hand was worth a splinter raise on this holding: ♠ Kxxxx ♥KQxx ♦9 ♣KQx. Wrong! 4♥ went down 2 – four missing aces killed the game and a 4-0 split in trumps set it another trick. Partner held a clear pass, but the score was an average! It looks as if we must use reality-check Drury in all seats.

A third area of difficulty is the third seat opening bid which can be very light by definition. Fine, but all responses must be redefined, a fact of life that most ignore. If partner has passed with a fair hand, partner must strive to compensate and open the bidding. How about this hand in third seat, vulnerable: ♠ T32 ♥ 963 ♦ AQ ♣ AJ1076? Passing would have been a good idea, as this was a 7=7=7=5 deal, and the eventual 2♦ went down 200 for a near bottom. A pass-out was worth an above average score.

It could be argued that these bad results are due to unusual circumstances: misfit hands, voids, and bad splits all contributing to abnormal results. Yet, I would argue that good system is one that enables one to counter unusual circumstances through a meaningful exchange of information. As an analogy consider the operation of Heathrow Airport. Things will run smoothly enough in the normal run of things, but if it snows, difficulties arise. Snow in December is not entirely unexpected, so some provision should be available for coping with the eventuality. If not, the airport system can be judged to operate poorly. On the other hand, a volcanic eruption in Iceland is rare enough that one should be sympathetic if disruptions in flights occur. So with bidding systems, the best are those that incorporate some low cost provisions that guard against disasters due to rare conditions that are nonetheless bound to occur, such as a 4-4-4-1 shape with 16 HCP.

By bidding in an uninformative manner and settling on a contract that normally would be correct, a player is guilty of ‘sleep-walking’ the hand. A 2/1 system can be used in that manner, but perhaps it is better to use a system whose bids are loosely defined, allowing for greater uncertainty and a more flexible interpretation. For many club players, the fact is that a 2/1 bid is forcing to game is the only useful feature that they grasp. The subsequent subtleties serve only to confuse them in their pursuit of the ordinary.

An interesting feature of 2/1 bidding is that users depend on the opponents to provide help in arriving at the correct contract. Consider the auction 1♥ – Pass – ?? where one holds a hand like this ♠ T62 ♥ 72 ♦ QT4 ♣ AKJ53. The hand is worth a bid, but there is no convenient call available to show the powerful club suit. However, if the bidding goes 1♥  – 1♠  – ?? Suddenly one is able to bid clubs, because 12 HCP are no longer required for a 2/1 bid. There are many players who overcall with worthless possessions that present no chance of winning the auction. That may frighten some timid souls, but it may help those who otherwise would have had difficulty with their system. Here is a deal played by well-known US experts on BBO that illustrates how a 2/1 opening bid is so poorly defined that it requires an opponent to come to the rescue with a balancing bid. 

	North ♠   K 9 4 2 ♥   10 6 ♦   10 9 8 5 2 ♣   K 4
West ♠   A Q J 7 5 ♥   A Q ♦   A K J 4 ♣   Q 5		East ♠   10 ♥   J 8 7 4 3 2 ♦   6 3 ♣   J 7 6 3
	South ♠   8 6 3 ♥   K 9 5 ♦   Q 7 ♣   A 10 9 8 3

West didn’t like his 23 HCP as he didn’t have the right shape, I suppose. South had a hopeless 9-loser hand, but he felt compelled to ‘protect’, which to me appears to be a very bad decision. West continued to walk softly, but when the horrible 3♣ came back he took out the big stick. That could have resulted in a large penalty, but how could East (Bart Bramley, the least guilty of the players) know to pass? As it happens 4♥ makes on defence as bad as the bidding, so Bart was underbidding all the way. This is ugly!

Flying on Fumes

There are certain fundamental problems that over several decades now have provided authors with the material to make up books and columns which provide amusement but which, like Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, are ultimately unsatisfactory as they do not provide any solution to a basic problem. One such was treated in the Granovetters’ column in the Feb ♠ 2011 issue of the ACBL Bulletin. At Swiss Teams the vulnerable LHO opens 1♠, passed around to you. Do you balance with this hand: ♠ 7 ♥ 1042 ♦ AJ85  ♣ A10753 (8 losers)? I say no, but Matt Granovetter claims that balancing with a double is ‘the most normal balancing double in the history of bridge.’ That is an oversell. It cost a lot, as given a second chance, the opponents reached 4♥, scoring 650. Opener held a 3-loser hand: ♠ AKQJ10 ♥ AK986 ♦ K107 ♣ —. Really, it pathetic that the 2/1 system requires help of this sort to reach a cold game, but 1♠ rarely gets passed out. Players depend on it. For her part Pam argues Matt should have passed, realizing she takes light action whenever her hand merits it, that is, she doubles regardless of shape – the Italian style. It is obvious that light actions all around the table have become an integral part of the modern game, which sometimes help us, sometimes hinder us, in the pursuit of success. Pass is so rare, it has become informative, claims Pam. Interesting.

The Fear of Missing a Game

The other side of the coin is opening with a strong 2♣ because one fears missing a game if partner has a trump fit and an ace, but has not enough to respond to a simple one-of-a-major opening bid. Here is an example on which partner opened 2♣ because he had a 3-loser hand: ♠ KQJ7 ♥ KJ6432 ♦ A ♣ AK – give responder the ♥Ax and 12 tricks aren’t out of the question. The most likely shape for responder is 3=2=4=4, giving a division of sides of 7=8=6=5. In fact, responder was void in hearts and the best fit was in clubs. By opening 2♣ and bidding hearts opposite a weak hand, one gets stuck in the inconvenient contract of 3♥, down 2, for a 40% score. The relatively high score for a nonsensical result is symptomatic of a flawed system.

It seems one must open at the one-level on stronger and stronger hand, and responder must bid on correspondingly weaker and weaker hands. Hence, instability is created. Opening 1♥ is the more flexible action, although the good spades reduce the chances of an opponent coming to the rescue. In practice, some pairs played in 5♣, making 600 via 2 high diamond ruffs. So there are great rewards available to those pairs who are prepared to exchange meaningful information, even to the point of inviting the opponents to come into the auction. Come on in, the water’s fine, say I.

The Fear of Being Robbed

Very often senseless interference gains an advantage due to the fear that players have that they may be missing something big when they aren’t. They over-react, and the interfering side ends up getting something for nothing. In a recent session I bid 3♦ over a vulnerable weak 2♥ with this: ♠ 86 ♥ 75 ♦ KQJT4  ♣AKJ6. The LHO raised to 3♥. My partner raised to 5♦ on this hand: ♠ KJ94 ♥ 84 ♦ A8764 ♣  Q4. The motivation for this action must have come largely from the fear they were stealing, but the evidence doesn’t support that conclusion. They were vulnerable.

My thought is that 4♦ , making 130 is sufficient over a preemptive action. The question should be, ‘how much has the interference improved my hand?’ Not enough to bid game directly. The values in the black suits are defensive. If the opponents had moved to 4♥  over 4♦ , the opportunity of doubling for a penalty of 500 would be offered, an offer that should not be refused even with a 10-card diamond fit. So 5♦  was a losing bid all around.

Of course, one might comment that this result had nothing to do with the 2/1 system, and had everything to do with the reaction to pressure. True enough, the attitude of the player is important aspect of hand evaluation. To some there is a soothing effect to defining a 2 over 1 bid as forcing to game – it relieves the stress of having to bid accurately. The choices are reduced to 3NT, 4 of a major, or 4NT with appropriate responses, but what a price one pays! Although it has been claimed that 2/1 makes slam bidding easier, I find that minor suit games and slams hardly comes into the picture anymore. Such slams are occurrences that are not well provided for in a system that disproportionately favors the major suits. Watching a 2/1 player bid and make 6♣  is like Dr Johnson’s observing a dog walking on its hind legs: one does not expect it to be done well, and is merely amazed that it is done at all.

Wrong in Theory, Right in Practice?

February 15th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

If something appears to be right in theory, but wrong in practice, maybe we have to change the theory. Think of Galileo. Even today he is criticized by some for publicly upsetting Ptolemy’s theory of a geo-centric universe that had stood unchallenged for 1500 years and still adequately serves the ordinary needs of the ordinary citizen. However, most of us believe that if a theory doesn’t fit the facts, it has to be changed, regardless. That’s progress. If our bridge experiences don’t appear to conform to what is thought to be correct procedure by the current authorities, we should consider changing the accepted procedures. Of course, it is not just one’s own experiences that need to be taken into consideration, as very often our lasting impression are filtered selectively. Here are a few observations of my own gathered during the 2011 NEC Cup as shown on BBO.

There are bids that seem to work more often than custom would lead us to believe. Can they be said to be wrong in theory, but right in practice? I believe Edgar Kaplan thought that nonforcing bids in competition fit into this category, and such was the case when Taiwanese faced Bulgarians with these cards in play:

Dealer: West Vul: None	North ♠ 7 5 ♥ 9 6 ♦ A K Q 10 9 6 ♣ J 8 7
West ♠ J 9 8 6 3 ♥ A 4 ♦ J 5 3 ♣ A K 2		East ♠ 2 ♥ K J 10 7 3 ♦ 4 2 ♣ Q 9 6 5 4
	South ♠ A K Q 10 4 ♥ Q 8 5 2 ♦ 8 7 ♣ 10 3

Consider the East hand. What is the correct action? Some might opt for a negative double, ‘showing the other 2 suits in a limited hand.’ However, it is correct in theory to pass as the high card content isn’t up to the required 9+ HCP. What if the opener is forced to bid 3♣ on a misfit? Patrick Huang took this view and lost 12 IMPs when his partner, Yang, led a low spade against 3NT with disastrous results. Do we then blame Yang?

At the other table Hristov took the theoretically incorrect action of bidding a nonforcing 2♥ . The evidence shows that this gained 12 IMPs, as his partner led the ♥ A and switched to the top clubs, so EW took 7 tricks off the top. So, on the evidence one should bid a good suit if one has been dealt one. This is better than doubling with a 2-suiter, which gives the wrong impression. The lead of a club may not be productive. Here a negative double may have alerted partner, but it might have also alerted the opponents. Doubles are best reserved for balanced hands – well, that’s my theory.

Currently there is a trend to preempt with garage suits, as the effect on the opposition may be to set them along the wrong path. This turns a preemptor into a ‘One Trick Johnny’, either it works or it doesn’t, and many feel that the evidence supports this action. I am one of those who don’t believe undisciplined preempts are correct, as partner can also be mislead. Of course, partners have been warned. Here is a deal where Hristov, the hero of the deal above, gets active with suits that have little to recommend them in any constructive or informative sense.

Dealer: East Vul: None	North ♠ J 9 8 5 2 ♥ A Q ♦ A ♣ A K 8 5 2
West ♠ A ♥ J 9 7 4 2 ♦ 10 9 3 ♣ 10 9 6 3		East ♠ Q 7 6 4 3 ♥ — ♦ K J 8 6 4 ♣ Q 7 4
	South ♠ K 10 ♥ K 10 8 6 5 3 ♦ Q 7 5 2 ♣ J

Some rotten bids are so well established that they have now become a part of systems. After a sensible pass by Huang, Kovachev preempted with a hand that contains defensive values, 3 HCP in his mediocre suit and 6 HCP outside it. One BBO commentator defended this action, saying that one doesn’t come to Japan to pass with this hand. Why does one go to Japan, then? For the same reason some go to Las Vegas, to have some fun and to gamble foolishly against the odds? 4♥ was a sacrifice against nothing much.

At the other table, Hristov followed the correct procedure within the definition of his system by preempting 2♠ to show spades and a minor. Liu sensibly passed, but when the EW side stopped in 3♦ , Chung showed some life with a balancing double, converted by Liu to 4♥ , so the same contract reached. Ah, but doubled, my friends.

One wonders what was in Iliev’s confused mind after his opening lead of the ♠ A held the first trick. His diamond continuation was bad, so do we lay the blame on the misinformed partner? After all, North, the doubler, had produced only a doubleton heart, so South could be in trouble. No, Liu was able to crossruff in the minors and endplay West in the end to give up 2 more heart tricks. At the other table the defenders had passed throughout, so there was no information available to steer declarer away from danger. So there you have it: I praise Hristov’s light action on ♥KJT73, but condemn it with a garbage suit, ♠ Q7643. I am happy to state that the patient Taiwanese came out the winners in this match. Here is an example of their largely natural Precision slam bidding style.

Kovachev made a futile overcall of the Big Club, as custom dictates, and Yang made an old-fashioned jump to 2♠ to establish a game force. There was still enough room left to explore slam fully, Huang even having the audacity to try for a grand slam. As so many commentators would argue, that demonstrated a very bad attitude, as the opponents at the other table stopped in 3NT with hardly a thought given to a club contract. 6♣ made easily.

Most would agree that 2NT is the proper opening bid with a 4-4-3-2 hand containing 21 HCP. To some it is blindingly obvious. I disagree, and the evidence supports my view that with 8 controls one must start with a different bid. Here is another example.

The Australian auction fell far short, and the BBO commentators blamed responder, but I feel it was the opener who was at fault. True, if the opening bid is limited, the onus is upon responder, but he can work only with what he knows. Opener must open 2♣ to show his full potential and responder may be able to co-operate by going beyond 3NT.

With Precision 1♣ the burden rests on the broad shoulders of the opener where it should be. He can ask questions and receive answers. One may see disparaging comments from time to time about the use of asking bids, but these should be ignored. Information is good and knowledge is better. I give a demonstration of how a crude system of asking bids can lead to the excellent slam that is as obvious as they get double dummy. I am a believer in letting the responder take the initiative if he has distributional information that will otherwise get lost, especially when he has limited his values. In the above case, responder has shown at most 2 controls, one honor in his diamond suit, and he has passed in first seat. When opener expresses his interest in slam by asking about the heart holding, responder takes the initiative by jumping to 5♣ to show the shortage there. This implies a maximum based on the information so far transmitted. The ♦ J is a great card. The bidding is crude by advanced expert standards, but enough information is conveyed to reach 6♦ in a routine manner. Of course, 6NT is even better and will win in a bidding contest. If the opening call were 1♦ , not pass, the problem would be one of avoiding 7NT.

BBO commentators serve a purpose when they tell the viewers how one might approach the bidding of a hand using SAYC methods. I would like to see more advice on how to bid the hands using a Big Club system. One can see why the ACBL Bulletin pushes standard methods by ignoring the fact that the current world champion teams play Precision, the US men’s team (Diamond) having 2 Precision pairs, the Chinese Ladies having 3, but the independent commentator should be able to educate the viewer in a wider sense. Continual ignorance and frustration will not make bridge popular with the masses. Here is yet another NEC Cup example where a grand slam was missed, because the necessary information was not made available in a straightforward manner.

A BBO commentator noted that the Chinese auction with its reliance on RKCB might be commonly encountered at the local club, the problem being that after the 2♣ rebid responder has no convenient forcing bid. We have here a system flaw with no apparent fix. However, responder has 7 controls in a 6-loser hand, so the possibility of a slam should be part of his considerations. 7 controls are equivalent to 23 HCP. As in so many sequences, the saving of space is a key factor in obtaining information, so it does no harm and may do some good if responder begins with 1♦ , rather than 1♥ (Walsh style). The hearts will not get lost as he plans to reverse into 2♥ if the opener cannot introduce hearts himself and they are unlikely to get stuck in diamonds. Now over 2♣ , responder has a forcing bid at his disposal. Once the opener, who has bypassed 2NT, bids 4♠ to show the ♠ A, responder should have enough confidence to launch the grand slam force. He can count 12 tricks and there may be squeeze possibilities if opener doesn’t hold a red queen.

Bridge, Baseball and Sumo II

February 8th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

We continue to ruminate over the mental factors that bridge has in common with more physical contests. Under the heading of sports psychology Wikipedia lists the following topics which we shall consider below:

Within this woodpile of topics lie the reasons why some men will always be better than others as well as the answer to the intriguing question as to why women, generally speaking, don’t play as well as men. Sure, some women play better than some men, but bridge is a game primarily played by men’s rules being kept alive by women at the local level who mainly view bridge as a worthwhile social event. Sadly, at the higher levels the popularity of women’s bridge is greatly in decline, except in China where women’s status still needs a boost. A generation ago women rejoiced when Billie Jean King beat Bobby Riggs at tennis, which men claimed proved nothing, but today North American women don’t feel the same need to prove they can beat men at their own game. The rules have changed as women have gained their rights while maintaining their privileges. However, for whatever reason, facts remain facts. In the US generally masculine mind training is being downplayed as school math scores plummet to 25th in the world standings.

Let’s think about money as motivation. Some claim bridge would be more popular if advertisement money was poured into it. No doubt, for money got George W. Bush elected twice, so anything is possible, but would the game become better or worse? I bet on ‘worse’. In 20th century baseball we have seen economic factors at work. Money is an important motivator for those whose parents weren’t born with it. There has been a transition in players from hefty Northern laborers (Honus Wagner), to Southern country boys (Dizzy Dean) to outstanding persons of color (Jackie Robinson), to quixotic Latins from outside North American continent (Roberto Clemente). Ozzie Guillen may be right when he says the future of baseball belongs to his native Venezuela. We can expect money-motivated bridge to go the same way. Will Turkey become the next great source of talent? In baseball money considerations have taken over to such an extent that a manager can’t ask his millionaire sluggers to bunt, because he knows they don’t know how and risk injury if they try. Missing a chance to hit a home run is potentially costly when extra base hits are bargaining chips. Drugs and free agency has resulted in a series of one-year wonders. It was refreshing in the World Series to see San Francisco’s veteran first baseman, Aubrey Huff, lay down his first-ever successful bunt in the major leagues. Richer hadn’t made him better, but all along inside him there was a better player waiting for the chance to emerge. He didn’t arrive at this stage until he took a pay cut.

Team spirit is more important than money. We need look only at the world championship baseball series won twice by Japan with Korea closely behind. Few have any doubts that the best players are from the United States, yet the US has been rather ineffective even though the critical games are played within its borders. It was painful to watch overweight superstars puffing after Asiatic line drives in the gap. In the last championship Japan was in trouble until the last game when the fiercely competitive Ichiro, a hero to his compatriots, came out of his slump to lead his country to victory.

Clearly, American priorities lie elsewhere. One might conclude that there is not enough money in it to provide the necessary incentive, but this is a poor argument that one often hears concerning bridge. When the Olympics were only for amateurs the United States dominated the world in track and field. Since the Olympics have gone professional, the performance of Americans has deteriorated vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The pattern is the same in other well endowed sports, particularly women’s tennis where Americans lag behind although they are almost exclusively the great names of the time before Martina Navratilova left Czechoslovakia. Black players have emerged because they have something to prove: Venus Williams in her prime was awesome; so was Tiger Woods. There was something beyond money that drove them at this particular time in history.

With regard to goal setting there is a long-term aim, which is to play good bridge, but over the short-term one trick is to set oneself an achievable, limited objective. In the last tournament of 2010 the shortest of the first division wrestlers, the 5’6” Toyonoshima, achieved the remarkable score of 14-1, losing on the last day to the nearly unbeatable Mongolian master, Hakuo. His reward was to be moved up in the ranks so that he faced the 7 best wrestlers in the first 7 bouts of this year’s tournament. His first opponent was a 6’6” European giant, so the outlook was not bright. To the delight of his fans and the surprise of the experts, the smaller man caught the unwary Estonian in an arm throw that sent the 420 lb giant hurtling into the front row of seats. Luckily no spectators were injured. In the interview that followed a delighted Toyonoshima stated that he had wanted to win this match because it was the first bout in a new year, a limited objective. Since that initial success he has lost the next 7 bouts in a row, looking particularly lackluster. Because he achieved his first goal in spectacular fashion, he may be able in future to adjust his performance with a degree of confidence not matched to his overall results. (Indeed, he went on to win his last 7 bouts to end up with a winning 8-7 record.) So, in each bridge tournament try to take away an achievement in which you can take pride.

Self-talk is useful in reminding oneself to stay calm and in focus. We have all had bad starts, and no one knows better than oneself that adjustments are needed. Naturally one had hoped for better things, but now might be the time to aim lower and play for averages knowing your partnership is not at its best. The same applies when the reverse happens and you are off to a terrific start. Now one says to oneself, ‘You’ve been lucky, so don’t expect that anything you do will turn out magical. Play good bridge.’ At times a bit of self-criticism serves as a useful reminder to get on track and stay there.

Criticizing partner either openly or internally doesn’t seem to produce the desired improvement, so I am against it for that reason. I am also against opponents who feel they have the right to openly analyze the result. Often after a bad result an opponent may comment sympathetically along the lines, ‘don’t worry I can always make 3NT.’ At-the-table post mortems are notoriously inaccurate. Even if the comments are well meaning, which I am inclined to doubt, they don’t help and serve only as a distraction. The time between hands is best spent in readjusting internally in preparation for the next hand. For some players chatting between hands is a form of relaxation, for others, a tactic of psychological warfare, but then why should I have to pay the price? Be sociable after the game and offer to buy the losers a drink over which you may suggest ways in which they might have improved. Be sure to take along the hand records. Mutual bows are optional.

After writing the above I witnessed this reaction. Early in the game I held ♠ K6 ♥ AKQT87 ♦ AKT3 ♣ KJ and opened 2♣ . Partner responded 2♥ to show exactly 2 controls, obviously a black ace. The bidding proceeded as follows: 2♣ – 2♥ ; 2NT – 3♣ (Puppet); 3♥ – 4♥ ; 6♥ , all pass. My 6♥ bid was based on the assumption that partner was more likely to hold a queen than not. The ♠ A was led, and the slam made easily enough when partner was able to ruff a diamond in his hand without being over-ruffed. 6♥ scored 80%. The opponents’ futile discussion was about whether on a club lead I would make 7♥ from my side of the table, given that the 2♥ response had wrong-sided the contract. They engaged in wasteful, wishful thinking while missing the main points.

Golfers are taught that when lining up a shot they should imagine a swing that sends the ball traveling to the most desirable spot and keep that image in mind during the actual swing. Visualization is such an important element in bridge that it hardly bears mentioning. The trouble with some is that they imagine disaster rather than success. That can be appropriate at times at IMPs when safety becomes the foremost requirement, but generally one should visualize for success. Often we are reminded by pessimistic commentators of Barry Crane’s advice to a partner, ‘don’t play me for the perfect cards, because I won’t have them.’ I wish he had added, ‘neither play me for the worst possible hand as that is the surest way to lose.’

As the saying goes, ‘to the beginner there are many possibilities; to the master, few.’ Some situations require careful consideration, but by anticipating the potential problem beforehand, one has less work to do when such a situation comes to pass. With regard to baseball, a hitter has precious little time to react to a pitch, so anticipation plays a role. The best analyst for the Toronto Blue Jays broadcasts is Rance Mulliniks, a former star infielder, who is most adapt at calling the pitches from the booth. It’s a skill that is hard to teach and comes only with experience. He reads the pitcher’s mind; he recognizes pitching patterns as they develop; he is a master of anticipation. He is so good he often makes the man at the plate look foolish, so I suppose he is not popular with the players. ‘I look for a slider just off the plate, so I would be trying to hit it to the right side’, says Rance, and just at that moment Edwin Encarnacion, not the most perceptive of Blue Jays, swing wildly over the ball striking out without advancing the runner. As with many physical activities, by the time one learns all of the secrets one is too old to enjoy them.

Finally we come to the topic entitled ‘trancing’, a characterization I feel is inappropriate to bridge. In the West trancing has origins in religious frenzy, orgies, and hallucinogenic drug-taking. The name of Hildegard von Bingen is sometimes evoked, whose blood-soaked visions were apparently induced by migraine. I don’t wish that on anyone, rather I would point to the practice of Zen meditation which requires only a bit of quiet. In scientific terms meditation is a means of reducing the frequency of our brain waves by shutting out the many distractions that plague our daily life. First relax and reduce anxiety by arranging your schedule about the event. Leave your cell-phone behind. One needs to feel that there is nothing else one would rather be doing for the brief period it takes to play the game. Intensely focus your attention on the cards. It is easier to raise the brain wave frequency quickly than to lower it, so from a relaxed state of an uncluttered mind one may more easily rise to the occasion. One is ready for the fun of concentrating effort directed towards the conscious solving a challenging logical problem.

Zen activity is instinctive and undertaken without thought. This does not mean it represents an escape from the prison of logic. I think of it as an unlocking of the doors of the unconscious memory, like a computer hacker, accessing hidden information, as it were. I am sympathetic to the view of Stuart Wilde that trancing represents a slipping of the mental shackles of rules, however, to be successful one does not act like a novice who knows nothing. One has first to store information in the unconscious memory thorough practice, practice, practice, so that at the table one is ready to act according to a well-honed instinct. This is especially true of bidding which should be well rehearsed. For the ambitious pair there should be no excuses in that regard. One needs sometimes to act instinctively within the context of a complex bidding system that gives one the advantage over opponents’ primitive agreements, however, rules, especially point-count rules, are made to be broken, if one can see an advantage for doing so.

The First Priority

Fear is an athlete’s worst enemy, and the first priority of sports psychology is to overcome the anxiety that makes a good golfer miss a short putt, a shortstop boot an easy grounder, a good bridge player to violate his bidding agreements. Basically the bridge player has to overcome his doubts, and bravely follow his bidding system even with its flaws. Keeping it simple is best. Unfortunately, due to randomness that occasionally turn bridge errors into profit, we find misdirected players who think that offbeat calls are clever, when basically they are self-destructive. They invent ways to lose.

Here is a recent hand that caused problems when partner wished we were playing Gazzilli. What is your response when partner opens 1♠ : ♠1076 ♥743 ♦J54 ♣A853 (11 losers)?

Playing Precision where an opening 1♠ bid is limited, I would be tempted to raise to 2♠ in a nonvulnerable preemptive mode, knowing that the opposition holds half the HCPs. I expect 2♠ to go down 2 tricks and am hoping they will be pushed to the 3-level. It is tempting to raise when playing 2/1, but the risk is greater as partner sometimes holds a good hand and the opposition is less likely to come to the rescue. Like it or not, the system call, the fearless call, is Pass. You are already in your best contract. Play on.

What I would not do is bid a forcing 1NT hoping to correct to 2♠ . Not unluckily partner held a flat 18 HCP and the auction, propelled by uncertainty, proceeded to 3NT played from the wrong side. This cost 2/3 of a board, a deserving result that kept us out of first place by a single matchpoint. If we had agreed to play Gazzilli, I would respond an artificial 2♣ to show my big hand, and the partnership could stop in 2♠ , which makes, but we hadn’t, so we couldn’t. Inherent instability is one reason why 2/1 is so full of patches. It would have been easy to stop routinely in 2♠ after a Precision 1♣ opening bid.

Bridge, Baseball, and Sumo

February 1st, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Bridge has a lot in common with team games, like baseball, as well as one-on-one games, like sumo wrestling, an intensely physical game where literally one can smell an opponent’s sweat. All contests have important psychological aspects for when abilities are closely matched, psychology can prove to be the deciding factor.

In sumo two near-naked strongmen who appear to be training on doughnuts strive mightily to push one another out of a 15-foot circle. At present the New Year’s championship (basho) is taking place in Tokyo and thanks to satellite broadcasting we are able to see 21 head-to-head matches over 2 hours every night for 2 weeks. Each bout takes 5 minutes but the real action lasts less than half a minute – it as much about mental preparation as about performance. Before time limits were set, the all-important face-off could take up to half an hour before the opponents were mentally prepared to start pushing in earnest. Bridge is very much like sumo in that being in the right frame of mind is vitally important. Winning wrestlers on being interviewed often state that they had no plan, but reacted quickly without thought to the imminent challenge. At times bridge can be played that way, adapting instinctively without thought to changing circumstances, but only if one has trained the mind thoroughly.

Larry Cohen’s Baseball Analogy

In the May 2010 issue of The Bridge World Larry Cohen begins his article entitled ‘Three –Fifths of a Loaf’ with this bit of self-analysis.

‘During my 30 years of high-level tournament bridge, the biggest key to my success… was a middle-of-the-road approach. I was singles hitter who tried for a high batting average.’

Cohen set himself a goal and stuck to it with considerable success along the way. One is reminded of Ichiro Suzuki who has collected 200 or more hits, predominantly singles, in the 10 seasons he has been playing with the Seattle Mariners, a mediocre team. Ichiro can do everything, being also a golden glove fielder and a great base-stealer, but he chooses to hit singles. There are criticisms concerning what he doesn’t do. Isn’t it always the way? Ty Cobb, another singles hitter, who may still share the record for most homer runs (5) in 2 consecutive games with Albert Belle and others, when asked in 1925 why he didn’t try to hit more homers, replied, ‘because it would ruin my swing.’

It is not enough to stick to one’s own game – there is an overall partnership strategy to consider as well. For years Cohen has played an aggressive system (Precision) with another conservative player (David Berkowitz) in a partnership that was missing a certain dash and flair that kept them from matching the standard set by Rodwell and Meckstroth who very often swing for the fences and connect. The baseball analogy is apt. The best players are reliable players can turn it up a notch when required. Good pitching and defence up the middle wins ball games over the long run. The bridge equivalent is playing not to give anything away. It is also said that if a manager plays for one run, he will get one run. This is what is known as ‘small ball.’ This strategy works well against a good opponent in the World Series, as demonstrated by the 2010 San Francisco Giants, but a team has to get to the playoffs first and the Giants barely squeaked in.

A player should develop his own style while having the confidence to take advantage of opportunities when they arise. He must be relaxed and not fear making a mistake. In baseball if a batter gets a good pitch to hit, he should swing at it. If he has a good technique, the harder he swings the better the result. A missed opportunity, like a called strike-2 down the middle, doesn’t show up on the scorecard. A penalty double avoided against an indiscreet contract is such an opportunity. To double and make it stick one needs to work in close cooperation with one’s partner. If your partner can’t trust your bids and signals, and you don’t trust hers, well, bid ‘em up and hope the opposition makes the last mistake. That appears to be where the game has gone, and one can see why that is: the possible gain outweighs the expected loss, so uncertainty carries a high price tag. ‘Don’t double part scores at IMPs’, Cohen advises. Well, let’s look at a deal played by world champions in which an overcaller couldn’t trust even her own bid.

A Disruptive 2♣ Overcall

The scene is the semi-finals of the 2007 Venice Cup competition with France against their old rival Germany, and China against the eventual winners, USA1. Board 30 was also in play in the Bermuda Bowl, so we have a statistically satisfying sample of 8 auctions to study.

Dealer: East Vul: None	North ♠ A 10 4 ♥ A 9 7 6 4 ♦ Q J 10 5 ♣ 6
West ♠ K J 8 5 3 ♥ Q J 10 5 3 ♦ 9 ♣ 5 2		East ♠ Q 7 ♥ 2 ♦ A K 8 7 6 2 ♣ A J 7 3
	South ♠ 9 6 2 ♥ K 8 ♦ 4 3 ♣ K Q 10 9 8 4

Every East opened 1♦ and 5 Souths out of 8 overcalled 2♣ . The 2 exceptions from the Venice Cup competition were from the same match, USA1 vs China: Jill Meyers over-preempted 3♣ , quietly down 1; she hadn’t given the opponents enough rope, a critical factor with bad preempts. At the other table Hongli Wang passed and picked up 5 IMPs when EW bid without obstruction to 3♠ , down 2. Her pass worked well because this was a rare distribution of sides: 7=6=7=6 with Total Tricks at a minimum of 14. There is always danger in going against the expectation of the opponents’ action, as Hongli Wang did, but such digressions are opportunities for gaining as well as losing IMPs. It is satisfying to do what you think is right and accept the consequences, good or bad.

The consensus approach is to recognize the possibility that a 2♣ overcall over 1♦ is occasionally semi-preemptive in nature. The danger with bidding 2♣ in that way is that partner may think you are making a half-empty overcall on a poor suit with values outside raising hopes for higher things. In that case a misfit in clubs would suggest defending and a penalty double might be in order. To illustrate the dangers of a loosely defined action, here are the auctions when France faced Germany.

Sabine Auken and Daniela von Arnim are aggressive bidders, so both are accustomed to light actions from partner. Auken would not give much credence to a semi-preemptive 2♣ overcall, and Willard’s negative double added a note of caution. With no fit, she decided to go quietly when she had the material for a redouble. Cronier repeated her suit, and Williard bid the better of her 2 majors, and there it rested for down 1. To standard bidders it would appear that Williard’s 2♠ action showed strength, but perhaps Cronier was reluctant to go further on an auction that sounded rather suspicious. Maybe she reasoned, ‘If Sabine isn’t bidding anything, she must have something.’ Right!

The real damage occurred at the other table. Barbara Hackett, as West, made a negative double, but when 2♦ came back to her she passed, presumably because she didn’t have the high card values to double then bid a forward-going 2♠ . This is somewhat contrary to the modern hyper-active approach, but, remember, she had Auken – von Arnim in the other room to do the swinging for the team. To Catherine d’Ovidio, steeped in the French tradition of sound overcalls, it appeared that 2♦ should not be the end of it when 3NT might be within range. After all, she had an opening bid opposite an opening bid, 2 aces and diamonds stopped ….. She bid an unlucky 2♥ , but not so unlucky, as Pony Nehmert came to the rescue ahead of her partner as opponents so often do in a poorly defined auction. Despite the warning signs, she bid a redundant and hazardous 3♦ . This is just what an opponent hopes for. ‘Blessings have been bestowed’, thought d’Ovidio as she pulled the double card, her only regret being that Germany was not vulnerable.

Unless I am void in an opponents’ trump suit, I never pull a penalty double if I am not ashamed of my previous bids, and I hardly ever feel ashamed, and remarkably, I am usually right not to pull, even when I should be ashamed, but am not. Larry Cohen takes the low road and I take the high road, a rocky, up-and-down, twisty path with many blind corners. With the South cards I have what I promised, I can produce a normal, informative lead, and I expect my ♥K to be an entry for further leads in clubs. So I trust my partner knowing that West is acting entirely on her own. Daniele Gaviard may have thought she had promised more defence, and needed to protect against the much-dreaded doubled partial. So, it was off the plate and into the fire, -800, losing 12 IMPs solely for psychological reasons. It is painful to see former world champions so far out of sync as these two were. Always the hope is that with long experience comes wisdom, harmony, and tranquility, otherwise, what’s the advantage of growing old? I see none. Be that as it may, they overcame this bad session and remain partners going into 2011.

Respect and Ritual

The Japanese are big on respect and ritual, which shows through in their love of sumo which is ritualized to such a high degree that it becomes a religious ceremony. One cannot imagine Japanese fans booing a referee any more than one can imagine a Catholic crowd booing the Pope. (The difference is that if he is seen to have made a mistake, a referee has to submit his resignation.) The wrestlers bow as they approach the sacred ring to show their respect for the game, they bow to each other as they enter the ring, the loser bows to the winner, the winner bows to the loser, and they bow one last time as they leave. In the midst of all this bowing, they strain every muscle and fiber to crush the opponent without mercy. I don’t advocate that we go that far when playing a round of bridge, but perhaps this attitude can be partially applied. First and foremost, we should respect the game and behave properly. There are traditions that should be maintained. The ritual of thanking partner for the dummy is not one I adhere to, but maybe I should. Like all rituals it may be used to hide a false assumption contrary to the evidence, yet it has significance. Of course, baseball players have their rituals and superstitions as well, like not stepping on the foul lines, not acknowledging no-hitters, etc.

We should respect our opponents, but not fear them. Sumo champions claim that in the preparatory phase they can sense fear in an opponent, which assures victory. One of the purposes of the pre-bout ritual is to help a wrestler overcome his fear. Bridge players can use the same trick when coming up against a superior pair. Don’t tense-up. Speak pleasantly, count your cards carefully, and don’t get drawn into hypothetical discussions. Strive not to win, but to play well in a manner worthy of the game.

Last week I played on a team that once again won the monthly Swiss Teams, this time by the wide margin of 8 VPs over 4 matches. Our Ladies’ pair are outstanding: steady performers who seldom produce a bad result. Before the first match Sally mentioned to Peggy that they should play Cappelletti over 1NT, 2♦ showing the majors, where previously they had adopted Landy. I felt uneasy at this suggestion, firstly because I like to be able to bid 2♠ directly to show spades, but mainly because I don’t think one should change one’s methods just minutes before the game begins. Sally’s argument was that ‘Nanaimo Jones (not his real name) recommends it.’ Well, we won the first match by 35 IMPs and Sally remarked, ‘Oh dear, we may have to play the Jones team next.’ To me the psychology was all wrong, so I commented, ‘well, in that case, maybe you shouldn’t play the same methods Jones is playing. Crowd him.’ I doubt the ladies would have followed my suggestion, but the situation didn’t arise as the Jones team had just lost by 16 IMPs, and never gained enough to come close to us. Thus we were spared for another month. I hope that by February Sally has learned to trust Peggy, who has taught bridge for eons, and agrees to play Landy and whatever other conventions Peggy suggests. Respect a partner who is better than you are, who knows more than you do, and strive to help her play her best game. Be humble but resolute.

(To be continued)

Mathematics and Feelings

January 7th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

Time again for New Year’s resolutions. No need to dream up new ones – I’ll just dust off the old ones which are nearly as good as new. Otherwise, it’s a time for reflection, and we note that mathematics hasn’t yet gained the prominence it deserves in the analysis of the game of bridge. Which is odd, for as a friend said to me, ‘Isn’t bridge just all about mathematics?’ Well, yes and no, for there is a lot emotion involved, but passions are wayward, and emotions require guidance and restraint. From the very first, learning to play bridge is learning to control our mental processes and channel in a useful way our God-given desire to flourish. Generally, the true aim of education is to produce a well-ordered mind open to change. The function of math is to put matters in order by using numbers. Once we understand through the simple application of statistics and probability something of how and why things work, we can broaden our horizons and increase our potential for making further progress in the New Year.

Turning our thoughts to love, isn’t love best expressed in a song? Yet a love song written down on a sheet of music is no more than a collection of mathematically related symbols. Mathematics expresses the love, but it needs a person to perform the music, be it well or poorly. Yes, one can perform brilliantly without being able to read a note, Bix Beiderbecke comes immediately to mind, just as one can play bridge well without a formal knowledge of mathematics, but is that satisfactory? What if composers couldn’t write down their music so that orchestras couldn’t play it? Music would lose its structure, and that appears to be the current trend when a receptive computer can transform anyone’s self-expressive grunts and howls into the latest, forgettable hit where the only love on display is immature self-love. Beauty is characterized by form.

Over Christmas I have re-read parts of the classic work, On Bidding, by Albert Morehead, revised by Alan Truscott and Philip Alder, Englishmen all, which gives an overview of the Standard American 5-card majors approach in the late 20th century. Page 1 introduces the 4-3-2-1 point-count method of hand evaluation, but it isn’t until page 333 that we get to the topic of mathematics per se. In between there is a practical discussion of the collective wisdom embodied in various bidding techniques that arise during a constructive auction, but not much is expressed in terms of statistics and probabilities.

At long last, on page 334, the authors take the space to note that mathematical models are crude and the required parameters are so inexact that one might as well not use the term ‘mathematics’ at all when describing the basis for decision making at the table, rather one should describe the process as ‘figuring’, implying a rough ‘guessimate’ made partly on counting, partly on experience, and partly on table feel. Even if the table estimates are inaccurate, one cannot conclude that mathematics is not applicable. Although each deal taken in isolation may appear to be a random event, there are underlying principles to which events with a random component conform. Probability is the science of uncertainty. After the game one wants to understand why one has been successful and whether one should continue in the same manner in subsequent, similar situations. Is a good result merely the consequence of a good guess, or can one hope to develop a consistent winning approach based on probability? Yes, it is possible, even though one can’t win every time.

Putting Numbers to Feelings

Often when playing a hand one has a vague feeling about what others might be doing with the same cards. This is easier to gauge in matchpoint play where one is dealing with averages over an entire field, but even so scores over a dozen tables may encompass a wide variation. During out latest game my partner and I scored 1100 in a part score deal. It can be dangerous to put too much faith in one’s feelings on the matter, yet, the feelings exist, so can one make use of it in some consistent manner? In our mathematical analysis of simple bidding decisions we used 2 probabilities: PM, the probability that a higher scoring contract would make, and PB, the probability the opponents would bid it also. Let us consider PB first. It is not sensible to assume PB equals 0 or 1, as that expresses maximum certainty that the unseen opponents will do what you expect. Our feelings might be: 1) probably they will bid it, 2) probably they won’t, and 3) I’m neutral. We might assign probabilities, PB, as follows: 1) 67%, 2) 33% and 3) 50%, representing the odds 2:1, 1:2, and 1:1. The numbers are not exact, merely representative of an average over a fair range of probabilities. 50% roughly represents a range between 2/5 and 5/9.

Judging by the predictive powers of BBO commentators who can see all 4 hands, it would be sensible in a team game to assume maximum uncertainty in this regard, that is, PB equals ½. Thus, if a player claims to ignore the possibilities concerning actions of the opponents, and makes his decisions independent of what others may be doing, he is in essence making such an assumption. Unconcern is a theoretically acceptable attitude, in the sense that the expected difference in score between bidding on and not bidding on is independent of PB, however, the result from each action varies with PB, as we showed in a recent blog. If one feels strongly, one can always act with predictable variability.

The most important criterion with regard to bidding on or not is the probability, PM, that the higher scoring contract will make. Here we may pride ourselves in being able to distinguish between several possibilities. After an informative auction but before seeing dummy most would be able to judge on a 5-level basis: sure (75%) confident (67%), doubtful (50%), wishful (40%), and apprehensive (25%). The 50% level is the level at which it pays to take a chance and bid on, hoping for some extra help from the defenders, that is to say, we think on the basis of the bidding the odds are very close, but the conditions of the game dictate we bid games that are no worse than a finesse away from making. When the odds are close to 50-50 it doesn’t pay to worry too much over what to do, as the results are likely to be largely random. At matchpoints one may decide for safety’s sake to do what most of the field is expected to do, thus assuring oneself of ‘company’ if the decision is wrong. That is, one estimates PB to be much greater than ½ and decides accordingly. That is why we often bid 1NT – 3NT, without much concern.

The Long-term and the Short-term

Having assigned numbers to feelings, one is in a position to apply the methodology of mathematics in order to draw logical conclusions expressed in terms of probabilities. A principal result is the average gain and loss that results from a particular decision assuming values for PM and PB. Some argue that they are not concerned with the long-term gains, only with the probable outcome with the hand before them under the current conditions. This expresses the short-term view. Some successful players are known for their ‘table feel’, an ability to play against the odds and come out a winner, based their intuition or skill in reading the psychological tea leaves. This ability should not be dismissed, but then it should not be the total basis for decision making. At the very least the mathematical results are there to be used as guidelines. There may be hidden factors which are not well reflected in the usual models from which the mathematical results are derived, but the task of the analyst is to search out these factors, put numbers to them, and improve the numerical models by including them in future.

One should not be reliant psychologically on short-term results, as there is a variability to random events that may point to trends which are not directly attributable to cause-and-effect. Sometimes one gets a bad result or two for no good reason, and such occurrences are natural to the process. It is better if one takes the long-term view. One may sit back and hope to benefit from an opponent’s mistake, but the mistakes are more likely to come if the opponents feel under pressure. If one gets an early gift, expect that sooner or later it will be balanced with a fix that is beyond one’s control. If partner makes a costly play, don’t despair – assume that later he will make a brilliant one.

Part of the long-term strategy at teams is to continue to play your game consistently while expecting random gains and losses, and to continue to do so even towards the end of the match with just a few boards remaining. Last minute desperate measures are just that – desperate. Playing conservatively to preserve a lead can be fatal. It is better to adopt a comfortable strategy and follow it through, treating the last board with the same approach as the first one. Don’t assume you know what an unseen opponent is doing. This is consistent with playing for the expected result on each board to the limit of one’s ability to judge the prevailing conditions and to react to them.

Following the Rules

Bidding rules are based on the 4-3-2-1 point-count, and players are accustomed to following the rules in the hope that the final contract will produce the desired result. Of course, the rules have a basis in probability of which most are unaware. Let’s take the simple example of the auction 1NT – 3NT. Partner opens 1NT (15-17 HCP) and you hold ♠ Q3 ♥ 983 ♦ KQ74 ♣ AQT6. Probably you bid 3NT without much thought and are not greatly disturbed if 6♣ would have been a better contract. The actions appear to be automatic, and an entire field may be in 3NT.

On the other hand there may be hands on which one bids 3NT on 28 HCP and it goes down on normal defence because there is just not enough combined power in a particular suit. No one is overly disturbed by getting to the obviously wrong contract. Following the rules becomes the primary aim of the average player. However, the rules themselves must be such as to reflect a wide range of probable outcomes. Most of the time 3NT will be the right contract, but sometimes it will fail and sometimes slam is makeable.

The conclusion in On Bidding is, roughly speaking, that one should bid higher scoring contracts that have a 50% chance of success. That translates into bidding 3NT if it depends at most on a finesse. A better way of thinking is that one should bid game if the probability of its making is no worse that a coin-toss, thus removing the focus on finesses. Even better, one bids games for which there is maximum uncertainty as to whether it makes or not. It follows that a bidding system that tells a player to bid game when holding such-and-such number of points must include within its boundary of definition games that are maximally uncertain to produce the best result. That is to say, if 3NT always makes, the rule are too constrictive; sometimes it must fail in order to justify the requirements of the game. At the other end of the scale, 6♣ makes with this combination:

One might argue that the auction that arrives at 6♣ is based on better hand evaluation that the blind auction, but there are risks involved in a revealing auction that stops short of slam, apart from the increased probability of a bidding error because two players are making decisions instead of one. Declarers in 3NT will score well without a heart lead (12 tricks) and may score poorly with it (9 tricks). Many players are reluctant to make revealing bids that may guide the opening leader, so they deliberately bid blindly relying on the probability of outcomes to support their decision. The probability in an average filed that someone will bid 6♣ is low. This is how bad bidding is self-propagated and bad systems are justified.

According to Morehead et al the basic tenet of bidding theory is that ‘each partner must be permitted to speak for himself’, which indicates to me that each player must be permitted to make decisions either directly or through judgmental selection of the bids they choose. Such a concept is popular in North America where individual rights are often the excuse for egotistical misadventures. This is contrary to the principle of captaincy, to say the least. My feeling is that asking bids, like 4NT Blackwood, are a very useful device in which one partner asks directly and the other answers truthfully thus ensuring an accurate one-way exchange of information without the usual spin. The time for judgment comes later. To put it another way, the right of the individual to decide is put aside temporarily in the cause of the common good with the assurance that one’s chance to shine will be forthcoming later in a prescribed manner.

A bidding scheme in which either partner can decide the final contract must of necessity provide a sufficient flow of information in both directions. This exchange may prove beneficial to the defenders, hence there is a reluctance among ‘natural’ bidders to bid in a truly informative manner. I was guilty of this when partner opened 1♣ and rebid 2♣ after my response of 1♦ . What is your bid holding my 20 HCPs: ♠ KT9 ♥ KQJ8 ♦AKQ65 ♣ Q ? Some players bid 4NT (RKCB), found partner with 3 key cards, then bid 7NT, doubled, going down 1 on a club lead. Partner held: ♠ AJ ♥ A3 ♦ 743 ♣ K76542. I bid 6NT directly and made 7 by playing a club towards the hidden hand, naturally ducked by my RHO. This made up for the previous hand where I lazily jump bid 4NT RKCB on 18 HCPs and stopped in 5♠ with 6NT making. So, just another average round at the club!

The Woolsey – Stewart Preemptive Style

January 3rd, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

During the Reisinger Trophy broadcast as I was enjoying the expert comments of one of my favorite analysts, Kit Woolsey, I had to ask myself at times, ‘is this the same Kit Woolsey I watched play a few days earlier in the Seniors KO Final? That Kit Woolsey appeared to be deranged at times, not the same clear-headed, reasonable man whose expert analysis is spot-on now.’ I know that if you sit a calm and reasonable person down at the table and put 13 cards in his hand, it appears that sooner or later a transformation takes place and wild emotions take over and rationality temporarily goes out the window.

It’s not as extreme as Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, perhaps; it is more like when you lie awake in bed in the dark and begin to hear strange, creaking sounds somewhere about the house. It’s this fear of the unknown that preserves some marriages. Even snoring is better than ominous silence, although I do not subscribe to the theory held by some, perhaps guided by Nietzsche, that human snoring was developed by Gothic heroes in the forests of pre-historic Germany to ward off wild beasts after the campfires had burnt out. Well, it the same with bidding, I guess; in the face of the unknown it feels better to make some noise than to keep quiet and doze off while awaiting further developments.

One standard piece of advice with regard to BAM scoring is not to do anything that might jeopardize your teammates’ chances of winning the board. That implies one shouldn’t make wild preempts, which brings us back to the Seniors KO Teams Final, IMPs scoring over 64 boards, in which Kit Woolsey and his partner, Fred Stewart, pursued the strategy of undisciplined preempts for which they have become known. There must be a good reason behind that approach which acts to remove bidding space and deny information. One might argue that nonvulnerable against vulnerable, the losses to the opponents tend to be more damaging in the long run than the losses to one’s own partnership. My own criteria for preempts are neo-conservative, influenced greatly by Woolsey’s observations put forth in his classic book, Matchpoints (1982), undoubtedly set down during his Dr Jekyll interludes. My guidelines are as follows.

1) have 8 losers at the 2-level;

2) the suit identified is the only one that should be trumps;

3) have more HCP inside the suit than outside it;

4) there shouldn’t be secondary defensive honors in ‘their’ suits;

5) bid before the opponents exchange information;

6) be active in suits ranked above your short suit;

7) always anticipate that the opening lead will be in your suit;

8 ) preempt immediately to the highest level you can bear;

9) don’t have length in the RHO’s suit.

When I preempt I am hoping to defend against the opponents who have guessed wrong, so my first priority is not to cause partner to misdefend. It is painful to push the opponents to a game that makes on poor defence resulting from a false impression, yet it happens frequently after undisciplined overcalls and/or topless raises. Suit quality is important, more so at matchpoints. It is true that my preempts don’t always fall within my own guidelines, but they do so with enough frequency that partner should be comfortable with the few exceptions. Second-guessing partner is another way to lose.

That gives us some reference to work with when we come to see how Kit and Fred do things. Does going outside my guidelines turn a profit on average? Not on the evidence we gathered so far from the finals where Morse lost to O’Rourke by 52 IMPs.

Opening 3♠ in first seat, vulnerable against not, puts the risk of getting it wrong mostly on the preemptor’s side. With 6 losers and HCPs concentrated in my black suits as West I could imagine 6♣ or 6♠ might be biddable if I patiently pass. One test I impose is to exchange partner’s hand with that of my LHO and see the effect. In this case, we find:

NS can make 3NT or 4♥ , but they probably double 3♠ , and set it at least 2 for a profit.

If West passes, North opens 1♠ and NS may not get to game from there. There is not much gained by preempting. Next by contrast we see a bid that is so bad it is good. Without interference teammates were able to bid to a makable 6♦ on a 4-4 fit.

Late in the match, NVul vs Vul, Kit took a wild swing and hit a home run, which I applaud, results merchant that I am. Kit bid opposite a passed partner even though he had 4 cards in opener’s major suit, mercifully not Qxxx. Fred had length in the other major, so with 6 cards in one major and 7 cards in the other, it didn’t look to be a good time to preempt. I actually do admire this space-consuming 9-loser preempt as I expect the opponents can make what they will bid, and I prefer a club lead against 3NT. That is not to say it is safe by any means, but often the less one has outside one’s main suit the less likely it is that the opponents will be satisfied with a penalty double. It is when their own suits are weak that they experience doubts and opt to defend. I don’t like that. Another danger lurks, as one might foresee, on the following second-seat (!) preempt.

This preempt doesn’t satisfy half of my criteria, so with some self-satisfaction I note it cost a lot. The misinformative nature of the call predictably caused a problem partner was not likely to solve under any circumstances. At the other table with neither side vulnerable, Wold opened 1♠ , rebid 2♠ , so Morse found it easy to bid 3NT, making 4.

If we exchange hands between Fred’s LHO and Kit, the normal reaction to 3♠ is a double. Both 3NT and 5♦ can be bid and both make on any lead, because of the placement of the red queens in front of the strong hand. There was little to gain by this preempt and much to lose, not because one will get doubled, but because so much works favorably for the opponents with the strong hand on the left. If a high preempt doesn’t scare the opponents it may actually help them make any game they bid.

It is rare that neither side has an 8-card fit; often in those cases the side that wins the competitive auction ends up holding the bag. Woolsey’s hand is quite good, and a Precision player would be tempted to open 1♠ . This would cause little damage as opener will rebid 2♠ and play there making 110 on the actual defence, or down 1 playing against Deep Finesse. In the other room Jacobus preempted 2♠ , which I don’t like, either, but it gave the opponents enough space to get in the auction and go minus. He defended against 3♦ , off 200. Both sides were vulnerable, so Kit & co. went minus at both tables. Next!

This deal illustrates the advantage of bidding early before the opponents have exchanged information. Experts often tell us that if one has 2 suits it pays show both as soon as possible. This is a fine hand with the HCPs in the long suits, shortage in opener’s suit, and it appears that hearts will play well if the LHO is able to bid them freely. Stewart’s 2 suits are not covered by standard methods. Presumably the feeling is that a spade bid takes nearly as much space as a club bid, so there is no need to show the clubs directly. Trouble arises when one feels the hand is not suitable for a simple vulnerable spade overcall. However, shape is important in itself. A Roman jump overcall of 2♠ shows spades and clubs, and that’s the bid I would like to have available with this hand. Sooner or later one will have to bid with this hand and sooner is usually better than later.

By the time Stewart got to show spades, the opponents had established their heart fit at the 2-level. Woolsey sensibly bid game, and was doubled, down 2 vulnerable, not a disaster as 4♥ would make. At the other table Wold overcalled 1♦ with 1♠ , doubled, but now Jacobus was able to jump to 4♠ before the opponents had exchanged enough specific information to be able to apply the axe. So, a gain of 7 IMPs for O’Rourke.

Finally we come to the multi-2♦ preempt which the British, especially, find delightfully ambiguous. American heroes break the law, whereas British heroes find ways around it. The ACBL has been reluctant to accept ambiguous bids, and sets its regulations accordingly, but many US experts have adopted the Multi-2♦ when playing in international competitions where it has been privileged by legalization. The hopeful aim of the bid is to confuse the opposition and possibly to intimidate them, aims that coincide those of undisciplined preempts, so it is not surprising that Woolsey and Stewart would find the Multi attractive. If the preempt fails to intimidate, what then? Here is an example from the last segment of the finals when the Morse team needed some big pick-ups.

Woolsey is not content with the normal degree of uncertainty associated with the Multi-2♦ , so he adds to it, an imaginative effort he knew would not be matched at the other table. If Stewart had known Woolsey’s long suit was hearts, he might have bid game, but his first task was to resolve the major suit ambiguity. 2♠ was invitational in hearts, if that were Woolsey’s suit, which doesn’t exhibit the swashbuckling spirit needed for piratical adventure. Perhaps he was the one most intimidated by his partner’s ambiguous effort. Krekorian had no doubts about Woolsey’s longer major, so he bid his values and was raised to game by Casen on very modest doubleton support. Stewart now found he was effectively shut out, although his was the strongest hand at the table.

4♠ doubled and undoubtedly down 3 would have produced a much needed 7 IMP swing on a board where neither side was vulnerable. But how could Stewart double when there was such a degree of uncertainty in his partner’s preempt, and here we are not referring to the ambiguity in the majors, but in the quality of the hands on which Woolsey would employ the bid? So when one preempts uninformatively it is the proverbial placing of all one’s eggs in the one basket. If the opponents get too high, that may be fine if partner has enough to defeat them, but there is no chance of punishing them when it may be necessary to do so. That is the current state of affairs generally where no one is sure partner has his bid, so one might argue that Stewart’s reluctance to double was not a direct effect of an undisciplined preempt. Nonetheless, I find it extreme not to be able to count on a free-bidding partner to contribute at least one defensive trick.

In this case it may have been necessary to double, apart from the state of the match, as Woolsey-Stewart can make 4♥ and maybe 5♥ . The preemptors had been preempted! At the other table Bates passed with the Woolsey hand, and his partner opened 1NT, which was overcalled with 2♠ , normal action so far. Bates employed a Lebensohl 2NT and showed his hearts by bidding 3♥ over partner’s forced 3♣ . Wold did not raise to game despite his prime controls. Note that the losing trick count gives the right trick total of tricks available on perfect defence, but neither partner could show his full values within their system. In fact, Bates made 11 tricks. There appears to be no way to invite on such a combination of hands. This loss of definition in competition is what makes interference attractive. It is obvious that adjustments to current methods are needed. (Watching the recent Italian Cup finals, I got the impression the current Italian method of coping with interference is to ignore the opposition altogether.)

That’s my take on the Woolsey – Stewart preemptive style. I await with interest further examples on BBO that will show their methods to better advantage, and prove me wrong, but somehow I doubt that will happen. Remember, everything works sometimes, but it is the frequency of success that is the most important characteristic.