Bob Mackinnon

Bids and Expectations

When it is not in our power to determine what is true, we should act according to what is most probable  –   Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650)

When partner opens the bidding he creates a first impression that may be difficult to correct. Suppose partner opens 1 within the context conservative 5-card major system. Although there are no guarantees, one expects, on the basis of probability, that he has at least one honour card in the suit, unless we ourselves hold all the top spades. How should one react to the bid? Of course, we should react according to what is most probable given what we can see in our own hand, but temper our actions according as the known variability. The bidding system may have solved that problem for us. It requires that we raise to 2 with 3 spades and 6-9 HCP. That is designed to be on average the best we can do given the expectations. The question is, what if, due to inherent variability, the hands do not conform nicely to expectations? In that case problems are likely to arise.

One may expect that partner will have opened 1 with 5-3-3-2 shape and (roughly) 13 HCP distributed between the suits in proportional to their lengths, that is, 5 in spades, 3 in each of the 3-card suits, and 2 in the doubleton. Here are some possible 1 opening bids.

Most Likely

I

II

III

AJxxx

AJxxx   (0)

Jxxxx    (4)

Axxxx   (1)

Kxx

Kxx       (0)

KQx      (2)

Kxxx     (0)

Kxx

Kxx      (0)

Kxx      (3)

Kxxx     (0)

Qx

xx         (2)

AK        (5)

—         (2)

13 HCP

11 HCP

13 HCP

10 HCP

Departure   0

Departure   2

Departure  14

Departure   3

Zar Pts     28

Zar Pts     26

Zar Pts      28

Zar Pts      28

The departure is the sum of the absolute differences between the number of HCP actually held in a suit and the expected length of the suit. Hands I and II have the most likely shape, but they are vastly different in their HCP distributions. If one opens a ‘light’ 1 with Hand I one may feel that the bid gives a good description of the holding as it is pretty much what partner can expect. The lack of an honour in the short suit is of minor concern. If one opens Hand II, there is a need for further clarification. Even though the HCP total is up to snuff, the distribution of HCP is far different from what partner will expect. It could be a case of ‘nothing wasted in spades’ in a heart contract, a fact that will require several bids to establish firmly. Despite encompassing only 10 HCP Hand III is the best offensive hand and fits well the expected distribution of HCP. In the subsequent bidding responder should be able to reveal the shortage in clubs in order to clarify the full playing strength of this combination without promising extra HCP strength. That facility is up to the system designer to provide, or not – the 5-4-4-0 shape is rare.

On opening bids with hands low on HCP but with good distribution, for constructive purposes it is important that the HCP be well distributed in the long suits – the short suits don’t matter as much. In a traditional bidding system where extra bids show extra strength, the hand may be worth one bid but not a continuation, so it is difficult to correct first impressions without overstating the overall strength. In a system where opening bids are limited and subsequent bids are ‘competitive’ in nature, there is more scope for painless clarification. (In the next blog we consider a bad arrangement – self-preemptive intermediate two bids as used by the Italian pair, Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes.)

When Push Comes to Shove
There is a great advantage to opening light with length in the spade suit, because to compete the opponents have to bid one level higher. It may be negative thinking to ask this question, but what happens if they win the contract? Obviously one of us is on lead, and the question arises as to whether we should lead a spade, the suit we bid so optimistically. Before we look at the probabilities, let’s look at a couple of hands where spade leads proved disastrous. The first comes from our local game.

 

Dealer: West
Vul: North
North
  —
  A862
  KT985
  AT32
 
West
  JT832
  Q7
  Q
  KQJ96
East
  K74
  KT43
  A62
  854
  South
  AQ965
  J95
  J743
  7
 

West

North

East

South

1

1

Dbl

3

3

4

Dbl

All Pass

The West hand has 26 Zar points, so is deemed worthy of an opening bid. North has his bid, and East won’t be criticized for wanting to compete, and South has a legitimate 4-card jump raise. West expects 4 spades opposite, so he bids to the level of his assumed fit. North continues his good work and East surely has the stuff to double. So by modern standards here is a perfect auction, so far. But it is wrong. The Total Tricks add up to 17, which one should expect to sit 9 with NS and 8 by EW. So EW do well to compete to the 3-level. Even though the tricks sit 10 with EW and only 7 with NS, down 2 undoubled should prove profitable. So the only error one can point to is the final double by East.

To be fair, can East expect the opening bidder to hold a topless spade suit after he has freely bid at the 3-level? More likely he holds 4 good spades and a doubleton diamond, reducing the number of Total Tricks. It appears then that this is the time to strike at those who bid on nothing. The next question is: what to lead? From East’s point-of-view a spade lead is surely safe, but in fact it is the only lead to allow declarer to pitch 2 losing hearts on the AQ and cross ruff for an overtrick. The double didn’t cost, the lead did.

Let’s now go to the Seniors KO Semi-Finals at the 2011 Nationals in Seattle. Here we can expect reason to prevail, or can we? Might we not find that the Seniors are afflicted by the same disorder we observe at our local club, namely, undue affection for the spade suit regardless of its defective structure? You know it’s true.

 

Dealer: West
Vul: NS
Schermer
  J6
  J9652
  AKQ5
  52
 
West
  T4
  Q43
  JT7
  KQT98
East
  K9872
  A87
  963
  73
  Chambers
  AQ53
  KT
  842
  AJ64
 

West

Schermer

East

Chambers

Pass

Pass

2 *

Dbl

2

3 (-> )

Pass

3

Pass

3NT

All Pass

 

John Schermer and Neil Chambers were cited by Bobby Wolff as being one of the best seniors’ pairs at the recent world championships in the Netherlands. They are the antithesis of the overly active players of the younger generation we see emerging on the scene. They may lose out by not acting when perhaps they could do so to advantage, but they gain by the trust partner can put in their action when they do act, as in the deal above.

East-West are up-to-date in their competitive structure which allows them to preempt with a multi-2 bid in 3rd seat with the garbage hand dealt to East. The bid promises at least 5 cards in a major- really. Well, Schermer is known to pass on some very good hands, so maybe a bit of preemption will have good effect. A BBO commentator claimed this convention has been shown to possess a 57% success rate. OK, but doesn’t the quality of the suit come into it? Apparently not, if the main aim is disruption.

Chambers has enough stuff to double without length in hearts, as he expects hearts to be the suit in which East is preempting. The preemption may about to work, or at least break even, but here comes West getting active and bidding what he hasn’t got, perhaps in a ‘pass or correct’ mode that risks misinterpretation. Schermer can transfer to hearts on the assumption that spades is the opponents’ best fit, and later suggests 3NT as the final contract. Necessarily brave bidding by a passed hand, based largely on partnership trust, partly on knowledge of the opponents’ proclivity towards light preemption.

One can hardly blame East for leading a spade, thus giving away the contract and losing 12 IMPs. At the other table, North opened 1 , East overcalled 1 and South ended up as declarer in 3NT. The contract can be defeated on the T lead, but West felt no compulsion to lead his partner’s suit, not when he held such good clubs. At this table it all seemed reasonable, as it so often does in a seniors’ event. It was a difficult hand to play even with help from the opening lead – the hearts weren’t well placed for declarer.

The Honour Structure in an 8-card Fit
If one aspires to follow Descartes’ advice and play according to what is most probable, then it pays to know the odds when partner shows a suit of a given length. Let’s first consider the case where a player opens 1 and responder raises to 2 . What are the expectation that he holds at least one honour, A,K, or Q (denoted by H)?

If the opener has Hxxxx, the chances that responder has raised on Hxx or HHx is 64%, if we take the suit in isolation. One should play for that possibility. From the other side, if the responder holds Hxx, what are the chances that the opener has at least one honour? 78%. So when defending it is even more likely that a lead in the suit is called for from responder’s side. On the other hand, if responder holds xxx and opener has a 5-card suit, the opponents also hold 5 cards in the suit. It is even odds whether opener holds none or one or that he holds two or three honours. That could make the lead ineffective, so alternatives can be considered. In cases where a player considers bidding a 5-card suit without a top honour, he should take into account the resulting uncertainty in partner’s mind, as partner may not look for alternatives when he should. This applies more to overcalls than opening bids, however, with borderline opening bids the quality of the suit is an important consideration, if one is aiming to elicit cooperation from one’s partner.

If the aim is to disrupt, then one takes one’s chances without expecting partner to get it right. The more levels taken up by an overcall, the more disruptive it tends to be, an overcall of 1 over 1 being the most space consuming, so the most suspect. If it is judged that the overcaller is weak in HCP, the overcall should show a good suit, but if he is judged to have a good hand, the overcall may be of necessity in a weak suit. In short, the lighter the bid, the better the suit. 

If a pair has an 8-card fit, the chances are 69% that they hold 2 top honours, but the a priori odds change according as an opponent’s holding. If an opponent holds Hx, his partner will hold Hxx or HHx 49% of the time strictly on an a priori basis, which may encourage some and discourage others when contemplating a NT bid. Usually a top honour in the opponents’ suit is a bad omen for those who contemplate bidding one more.

Comments on Zar Points

The 4-3-2-1 HCP scale has become a standard descriptor in the definition of opening bids. They represent hard information on the basis of which the opponents can make deductions on which to base their actions. The HCP content by itself is not a good method of hand evaluation in the case of a hand with shortage, so points have been added to the HCP scale that reflect that fact. These points do not represent hard information, as the opponents cannot know their source until after the hand is played. Thus, even a 2/1 player may open ‘light’ with 10 HCP upon occasion when the shape is particularly attractive. Some literally-minded opponents may be deceived as to the defensive potential of the opening bid and allow the opponents to steal the hand. Generally their protests fall on deaf ears, but they may still feel injured by a bid that did not fall within the limits prescribed on a convention card. It then becomes a question of how far a player may carry this action of adding points for distribution.

In the case of so-called Zar points, the answer is: a long way. Even a hand with 8 HCP can be given consideration for constructive action. For details of the development of the Zar point count process, the reader is referred to the reference by the originator, Zar Petkov of Ottawa (2003) available from the Bridge Guys site under ‘zar points’.

The Statistical Basis
Before we discuss the theoretical basis for the Zar formula, we will critique the arguments  that Petkov gives to justify his claims of superiority to the traditional Goren methods. First we should say that criticizing Goren is akin to beating a dead horse, as for years experienced have rejected it except as a very rough initial guide to hand evaluation.

Suppose TV reporters interview Occupy Wall Street protesters 100 of whom have beards. They ask the question, ‘do you support a special tax on CEO’s earning over $1 million?’ After the first 50 are questioned, the interrogators believe they are on to something as 49 have confessed that they do support such a tax. It was not surprising that 98 out of the 100 bearded protesters felt the same.

Armed with this information, those who do opinion polls decide to stop bearded men in the vicinity of Wall Street and ask the same question. Can they expect 98% accuracy in predicting that bearded men support such a tax? No. After a few no answers, the analysts add a modification: they exclude bearded men in suits who carry brief cases. Accuracy improves after the police release some protesters and a number of them return to the area. So there is some validity to the conclusion that bearded New Yorkers tend to support a super-tax, but it would be wrong to think it applies in most cases – that would constitute prejudicial judgement based on tainted evidence.

This is a simple example of how deductions from a test group cannot always be taken as predictors over a wider sample. The Petkov statistical results come from a narrowly chosen set of hands that satisfy a certain criterion. Let’s take as an example the set of 70,000 hands in which the correct contract is 3 or 3. By correct we mean that on a double dummy basis 9 tricks and only 9 tricks are made. The Goren points method overbids on 21931 boards (30%) whereas the Zar points method overbids on 2439 boards. In that sense the Zar method provides a much more accurate evaluation. However, there is an advantage to overbidding at IMP scoring where a vulnerable game should be bid with only a 3 out of 8 chance of success. At matchpoints, one gains by bidding impossible games that come home on a defence that falls short of double dummy status. The more uncertainty in the bidding, the better the chance of a faulty defence, so the Goren methods may work advantageously in practice. So if we choose a sample of 70,000 results from hands played by those with a wide variety of skills, we can expect quite different results with a greater degree of fluctuation.

The above arguments against the validity of statistical justification for Zar points as predictors does not mean that they do not constitute a good method of evaluation. There are theoretical reasons why they should work better than the Goren points, and we shall go into those next. The first advantage and perhaps the greatest, is that the method allows for light opening bids – a clear practical advantage. Petkov points out that there are more hands that fall in the narrow range of 8-11 HCP than as fall in the wider range 12 to 37 HCP. Traditionally the former fall in the category of an initial pass, while the latter are divided into 5 main categories of opening bids. On an information-theoretic basis, this is a bad arrangement. It is a better situation if those 8-11 HCP hands were also divided into 5 categories, which increase the average information of an opening call. This is not feasible, but the more passed hands that can be moved to opening bid status, the more informative the system becomes. This is a justification for aggressive systems in general – being aggressive also means being more informative, and more accurate in prediction as well. So, some special arrangements for those ‘good-bad’ hands have been made at the 2-level, while the HCP limits to 1-level bids have been lowered.

Zar Points and the Law
The Law of Total Tricks is a principle that is used by many to guide their bidding. A hand does not exist in isolation, so the playing potential depends on the degree of fit that one expects to encounter with partner’s hand. The most common division of sides is 8-7-6-5. The number of total tricks is the sum of 13 and the difference between the length of the longest combined suit (8) and the shortest combined suit (5), so the number of total tricks (TT) equals 16. Less than 16 and the hands do not fit well, greater than 16, and we are taught to bid ‘em up. Here are 3 examples with their a priori probabilities to consider.

8-7-6-5   TT=16   23.6%
8-8-5-5   TT=16    3.3%
8-8-6-4   TT=17    4.9%

The occurrence of the 8-7-6-5 division of sides greatly outweighs the other 2, and it is reasonable to base action on the assumption of this division, provided that it remains the most probable condition once one sees one’s own hand. To stick with this a priori assumption means that one will sometimes miss the opportunity to act on a more favorable division with a greater number of total tricks.

Judging a hand in isolation, one may consider the difference between the longest suit held and the shortest as an indication of playability in that it represents the maximum available contribution to TT. This sets a limit to what is possible. Thus, a 4-3-3-3 shape can contribute at most 1 to TT, whereas 5-4-3-1 can contribute up to 4, so has more potential.

Players have also learned from statistical studies that hands with a double fit play better than the TT predict. So when one considers opening a hand, one should take into account the probability that a double fit exists. Let’s consider the division of sides when one is dealt a hand with 5-5-2-1 shape.

5 – 3  (8)          5 – 2    (7)
5 – 3  (8)         5 – 3    (8)
2 – 3   (5)         2 – 4     (6)
1 – 4   (5)         1 – 4      (5)
Weight : 16           9

The probability that the division of sides is 8=8=5=5 relative to a division of 7=8=6=5 is in the ratio of 16 to 9 (64%). Based on which is more likely, it makes sense to act as if there is a double fit and the TT equal 17, not 16. That results in a greater than normal motivation to generate action.

Double fits enhance the playing strength of the combinations. In the case above one sees that the 5-5-2-1 shape readily produces a double 8-card fit. Overall the a priori chance of a double fit is 44%. For a 5-4-3-1 shape the chance is 34% and for 4-4-3-2, it is 22%. Petkov has taken this into account by adding as points the sum of the 2 longest suits, 10, 9, and 8, respectively. The greater the sum, the more likely that a double fit exits.

It is possible to calculate the probabilities of Total Tricks and double fits for any given shape of hand, but the problem remains as to how to rank the distributions and provide them with a number of points that will reflect their relative degrees of playability. Petkov has assigned points in a simple manner. 5-4-4-0 is ranked 1 point below 5-5-3-0. Is that a valid assessment when the former has a great probability of encountering a double fit? Is 1 point the correct differential?

Zar Points Formulation
In its simplest version we have this definition:
Zar Points =  Honour Strength + Distribution
     =    HCP + Controls + (Longest – Shortest) + (Two Longest)

Zar points are divided into 2 main categories: honour strength and distribution,  subdivided into the following four factors: the HCP on the scale of 4-3-2-1, the number of controls (Ace=2, King=1), the difference between the lengths of the longest suit and the shortest suit, and the sum of the 2 longest suits. These four are not independent. The sum of the first 2 results in a points scale of 6-4-2-1, which favors the aces and kings over the queens and the jacks. This is appropriate for hands that are distributional in nature and are suitable for play in suit contracts. The third term relates to the potential contribution to the TT, and the fourth term relates to the probability of a double fit. Thus, the basic elements of hand evaluation as described above are included in the Zar evaluation.

There is another factor that so far has not been considered: the losing trick count. This takes into account the placement of the honors. A combination of KQxx in one suit and xx in another counts as 3 losers, whereas a combination of Kxxx in one suit and Qx in another counts as 4 losers. Clearly the coincidence of the KQ in one suit is the more favorable situation. It is more likely that a suit with 4 card has been dealt 2 top honours than it is that a suit with 2 cards has been dealt one top honour, so on that basis alone if one looks at successful combinations more of them will be of the former type than of the latter. Generally hands for which game is likely have a suitable losing trick count, hence a well placed honour structure, so that factor is filtered out in the Petkov selection process.

Integration into a System
To bid is to release information. A major question is how partner can react systemically to the revelations. Opening light in third seat, even on a 4-card major, is a feature of 2/1 systems. The use of such bids has been justified on the grounds that partner has passed and will not over-react to a noise, or that the opponents may be about to enter the auction profitably with the balance of power. What Zar evaluation implies is that one shouldn’t wait for partner to pass – the idea is that one should pre-balance on speculation, as it were.

When a partner discovers a fit, he may jump preemptively (Bergen style) or he may ask for further definition through a check-back bid, such as Drury. So one merely moves Drury to the third seat and the best hand at the table may end up doing the asking. A problem may arise when there is no apparent fit. The probability of a fit with one of the longer suits has not been realized, which in the case of a shapely hand goes against the a priori odds. In this exceptional case more must be known of the distribution and relays may be an effective solution, but there is still a danger of getting too high. Once the Distribution Points are known, a lower limit is set on the total of high card points.

There are some, myself included, who will go against the strictures of the 2/1 system by occasionally opening light in first seat. One danger is that the opponents may overcall and the auction becomes competitive, in which case partner may feel obliged to double the opponents in a contract that may prove unbeatable. To guard against this happening I prefer to open light on suits that I want led, if it comes to that. The same applies to my overcalls. Another danger is that partner may take us to 3NT. Again, if I can provide a good suit that represents a potential source of tricks, I am more inclined to open light.

Zar points do not provide a means of distinguishing good suits and bad suits, so in that respect they share a fault with Goren points. My qualification for a light opening bid is to possess at most 7 losers and at least 3 controls in the long suits. The more points I have outside my best suit, the less inclined I am to take action with less than the normal compliment of HCP. Here is a hand given by Petkov that qualifies by my standards:  KQxxx KJxxx xxx —, 9 HCP, 2 controls, but only 6 losers.  I would be inclined to wait-and-see with this 7-loser hand: Qxxxx KJxxx Kxx —. One consideration: if we defend at a high level I am less sure that a spade lead will get us off to the right start.

What is a Void Worth?
To examine the difference in evaluation between a void and a singleton, let’s compare the 5-4-3-1 shape to the 5-4-4-0 shape by looking at light opening bids with 10 HCP.

KQxxx

AQxxx

KQxxx

KQxx

KJxx

KQxx

xxx

xxx

xxxx

x

x

25 Zar points

26 Zar points

26 Zar points

7 losers

7 losers

6 losers

Because of the void, the hand on the far right has one less loser. That should be worth about 5 Zar points because a game bid in hearts or spades (10 tricks) requires 52 Zar points. Well, the void represents a contribution of 5 points in that it applies to Zar points through the term (Longest – Shortest). That is almost as good as an ace on the 6-4-2-1 point scale. The singleton contributes 4 points, only 1 point less, as good as a king. What is the significance? The hand on the left is not an opening bid by Zar standards, but the middle hand is. The difference in these borderline hands lies in the number of controls held, 2 on the left and 3 in the middle. The void delivers the equivalent of a difference between an Ace and a King. Next we examine some frequent division of sides.

Hand

Opposite   (Division)

 

 

 

5

3    (8)

2    (7)

2    (7)

3    (8)

4

3    (7)

3    (7)

4    (8)

4    (8)

3

3    (6)

4    (7)

3    (6)

5    (8)

1

4    (5)

4    (5)

4    (5)

3    (4)

TT

16

15

16

17

Hand

Opposite   (Division)

 

 

 

5

3    (8)

2    (7)

2    (7)

3    (8)

4

3    (7)

3    (7)

4    (8)

4    (8)

4

3    (7)

4    (8)

3    (7)

5    (9)

0

4    (4)

4    (4)

4    (4)

3    (4)

TT

17

17

17

18

The a priori odds of at least an 8-card fit with a 5-4-3-1 shape is 74%, which is why it is generally considered a shape with which one strives to bid.  One sees the mundane 8-7-6-5 division of sides is common, and there is a danger of a misfit division, 7=7=7=5.

A common division with a 5-4-4-0 shape is 8-7-7-4. Overall the a priori odds of at least an 8-card fit is 84%, so the prospects are clearly better than for 5-4-3-1 by an average of 1 card. That one card extra in a fit is equivalent to one less loser. It is not clear that Zar points give sufficient weight to the difference at the game level. However, one must keep in mind that 3 losers (xxxx) is not typical of a 4-card suit, and that QTxx is much better.

Getting to the Right Contract

Before we discuss how to get to the right contract we have to define what we mean by the ‘right’ contract. In an absolute sense, under the assumption that both hands are known entirely, it is the contract that has the highest average score at IMPs or the highest median score at matchpoints. Probability enters into it – we have all reached contracts with excellent prospects only to experience failure because of bad breaks, but that does not mean we weren’t in the right contract.

During a bidding sequence neither partner can know for sure what the right contract is – that can be judged only by looking at both hands. To reach the right contract consistently, one player has to know enough about his partner’s hand to judge accurately the potential of the two hands combined. That means relevant information has to be exchanged. One might conclude that the more information exchanged the closer the final contract will be to the right contract, but players are acting under constraints. There is a difference between the best contract possible and the best possible contract given the circumstances. There is practical merit in attempting to reach the right contract as a pair will score well on most (but not all) such contracts. Intellectually speaking, that is one of the attractive challenges of the game. Bidding contests are designed towards that end.

Popular bidding systems embody attempts to get the ordinary player to contracts that will score well most of the time. They will get you into the ballpark, but they may not get you into the best seats. Major suits are given precedence over minor suits because they score better. This puts a bias on common bidding sequences. We know that major suit slams are much easier to reach than minor suit slams, even though both carry a bonus over game contracts. This fundamental biasing of the bids in favor of certain contracts over others regardless of their theoretical merit influences the judgement of players who tend to add their own bias to the mix. We bid 3NT on speculation without a thorough investigation of better alternatives, because statistically it’s to our advantage. We see this effect in bidding contests when the contestants, who are good players, consistently bid to a hopeless 3NT when the right contract is a partial – their system makes them do it.

Because they are statistically based, standard bidding practices are limited in their ability to reach the right contract when the right contract involves a rare combination of assets. To do that the players must add rarely used bids that enable a more specific exchange of information. That helps, but there are still limits on accuracy because of the overall reliance on HCP evaluation. There are some players who prefer a simple system and are willing to take their chances by bidding what most often will be successful, given what they know. They rely on their own storehouse of statistical information. A loosely defined system allows freedom of movement. Not favoring a full disclosure, the shrewd player gets restless after just 2 rounds of bidding. They choose contracts in the hope that the circumstances are as expected and/or the defence will be kindly. In what follows we shall look at some hands to see how a player may choose his bids in a way that gets around the limitations of a standard system in order to provide a better definition than is provided normally. I think of the technique as enlightened masterminding.

The Strong Hand Should Decide
How do we know when we start bidding what contract to aim for? This question arose in my mind when I read the opening sentence of Marshall Miles’ article, Powerhouse Opposite Lightweight, in the Nov, 2011 issue of The Bridge World.

‘ A two-club opening bid should be used as any other call, made any time it is the action most likely to reach the right contract.’

After opening 2 one would think that the best choice of bids would be in a structure where the opening bidder can ask the responder to provide relevant information that would allow the holder of the strong hand to make the final decision based on what he has learned – that is, some sort of asking sequence should be enabled to so opener can asks concerning what he needs to know. It’s bad enough when the holder of a powerhouse prejudges what appears to be best and biases his bidding towards that end, but in the current state of affairs with 2 opening bids the responder is allowed too much leeway in choosing his calls according to what he thinks might be the right contract. Here is an example from a recent team game that illustrates my point.

 Bob

  Bela

 

 

AQ732

J54

  2

2*

8

A7

  2

2NT

AKQ6

JT95

  3

4

AKQ

J874

  Pass

*2 controls

I had a powerhouse hand and my partner was able to provide relevant information immediately concerning the number of controls he held – one ace or two kings. I showed a spade suit and partner showed his shape. Over my 3 Bela made the best bid available to show what was likely to be, from his point-of-view, the right contract. He was correct in his assessment as I was warned not to proceed further in spades. Even if he had held 2 kings, the trump quality did not appear sufficiently robust – he had told me as much.

At the other table responder bid an unlimited waiting 2. Opener bid spades and was raised to game. With less information available than I had, opener evoked RKCB and ended in 5. This went down on a 5-0 trump split! That news made me especially happy as I am one of those who don’t like using 4NT as an ace asking bid except as a last resort.
The trouble with both auctions was that they focused on spades when the right contract was 6 played from the strong hand, which is pretty obvious when one can see both hands. To get to the right contract opener needed to know about the 4-card diamond support. I suggested to Bela that the best sequence would be:

2 – 2*; 2 – 2NT, 3– 3; 4 – 4; 5 – 5; 6 – Pass.

He couldn’t see why responder would choose to bid 4 after agreeing spades. The key word is ‘choose’. It is impossible for him to visualize my hand, so allowing him to choose a bid on the basis of what he thinks is most likely is clearly the wrong approach. It is difficult when one has to swim against the stream of one’s bidding system. The problem would be even more difficult if he had not already limited his hand by his 2 bid.

Choosing the Right Bid
Let’s pursue Miles’ assertion that the right choice of bid is the choice that is most likely to arrive at the right contract, whatever that happens to be. Here are 2 hands discussed in the previous blog that with only 28 HCP between them can deliver 6 on a dummy reversal. That’s unusual. Should the opening bid be 1 or 1NT (15-17 HCP)?

Bob 1

  Bob 2

B1

B2

AKT

Q9864

  1NT  

2*

  KJ3

AQ7

  3

4

K85

AQ64

  4

5

T974

2

  5

6

If opener wishes to make the call that is most likely to reach the right contract, he does not begin with 1. Why? Because the hand is not about clubs. Naming a suit, even if the identification is based largely on length, will create an impression that is hard to overcome. Opening 1 on a bad suit has one advantage: if the hand is played in a NT contract, the opening leader may be inhibited from leading clubs. So there is a built-in bias towards 3NT, because responder, based on the probable location of club honors, may justifiably fear wasted values there, and even with slam in mind he can hardly cue bid later in clubs to show shortage – that is usually taken as showing a club honour.

Note that the opener holds only 14 HCP, but he upgrades with 5 controls, the equivalent of 17 HCP.  Opening 1NT rather than 1 takes the luster off the club suit, and when responder shows spades, it is rather timid not to ‘super-accept’ with a 3-card suit when half his points lie in the spade suit. Of course, the hand has no ruffing power, but the opening bid has said so. Now it is easy to bid to slam on this particular combination. Sheer dumb luck? Not at all – the opening bidder first limits his hand then makes bids that reflect the location of his controls in support of responder’s suit.

Standard methods are geared towards a normal expectation of the distribution of HCPs, that is, length and strength are correlated. Responder expects that, justifiably so. One has to take that into account when choosing the bid that best describes the character of a hand. Let’s assume a more normal distribution of HCPs and see how that works.

Bob 1

  Bob 2

B1

B2

AT6

Q9864

  1  

1

  K63

AQ7

  1NT

3

K85

AQ64

  3

4

KJ74

2

  4

Pass

Following the normal procedures now leads to the right contract. From the perspective of the opening bidder, there is only a remote possibility that the contract should be played in clubs, but a 1 bid conforms closely to what responder will expect. The spades are nothing extraordinary. Responder correctly downgrades for wasted values in clubs.

Finding the 4-4 major fit
Here is another deal from our recent team game where Bela and I failed to reach the best contract by choosing our bids strictly according to the system guidelines.

   Bob

  Bela

 

 

AT85

KJ94

  1NT  

Pass

  K86

QT93

 

 

AJ9

5

 

 

AT8

J976

 

 

I held 16 HCP, but 7 controls are worth much more than what is normally expected in a 1NT opening bid. Bela passed (‘I had only 7 HCP’) where I would have evoked Stayman and raised 2 to 3. To my way of thinking, pass is not the call that is most likely to lead to the best contract – the chance of a 4-4 fit in a major is too great, in which case, add 3 support points. A diamond lead would appear to be a danger against a NT contract.

The problem would have been avoided if I had opened 1 so the auction could proceed:  1 – 1; 1 – 2; 4 – Pass. In the event on a heart lead I gained an IMP for +180 versus +150 by finessing twice in clubs. Our opponents had bid the hands in exactly the same way. Of course, I would not have to adjust according to circumstances if I were playing a Big Club system, 1 giving partner less scope for faulty evaluation.

Why Experts Upgrade and Don’t Downgrade
Some BBO commentators express frustration at the experts’ inclination to upgrade their hands and bid outside the HCP limitations imposed by the definition of their bids. Frequently it is seen that 1NT is opened on 14 HCP when the stated limits are 15-17 HCP. There are many factors that will promote the value of a hand – the expert wants to treat his hand as being equivalent in strength to what is normally expected from a strong 1NT opening bid. The effect of the upgrade is lessened if the ordinary hand with 14 HCP is included routinely as being within the range of 14-17 HCP. Experts don’t upgrade only because they think they can play the hands better than most – they upgrade because standard evaluation underestimates powerful suit combinations.

(In my most recent game imitating an expert I achieved 3 clear tops by opening anti-systemically on hands with extra playing strength:  1 on KQT965 Q64 Q863 –; 1 on 976 AQ985 KJ94 7; and  2 on KJT987 5 Q8643 7.)

Experts don’t downgrade. There may be a temptation to downgrade from a standard 1NT if one holds a quacky 15 HCP within a 4-3-3-3 shape.  One may plan to open 1, say, and modestly rebid 1NT, however, partner will assume a hand with 12 HCP. In effect the downgrade is close to 3 HCP, equivalent to a king, whereas an upgrade may be a mere 1 HCP, equivalent to a jack. The same reasoning tells us why it is closer to expectations, hence less deceptive, to open on a good 10 HCP than it is to pass on a bad 12 HCP.

There’s Something About Three

There are many bad connotations surrounding the number 3: ‘Two’s company, three’s a crowd’, misfortunes come in three’s’, ‘the three ravens’, ‘the three witches of Macbeth’ and more. The negative associations carry over to bridge: ‘the 3-card raise’, the 3-3 split’ and ‘a 4-3-3-3 shape’. On the other hand the number eight, a lucky number in China, has positive connotations: ‘an-8-card fit’, ‘an 8-control hand’. We’ll get to these when discussing hands below.

Italian players may have been disappointed to place third in the recent Bermuda Bowl after leading throughout the round robin largely due to 2 adverse slam swings in the last 16 boards of their quarter-final match against Netherlands. I am not that sympathetic, especially after watching members of the team performing in the Italian Mixed Teams Championship. Here is a quiz: which player found room to criticize his female partner on after the following deal.

 South

  North

S

N

♠ A3

♠ QT972

  2♣  

2*

AK9

Q43

  2NT

3 *

AK74

865

  3♠

4NT

♣ KJ92

♣ A7

  6NT

Pass

A club was led to the ♣Q and ♣K. Declarer played the ♠ A and a low spade towards the dummy. When the ♠ J appeared from West, she could claim 12 tricks. In the other room the auction was similar: declarer opened 2NT, was transferred to spades, and accepted the invitational 4NT. She too received a club lead, but soon lost her way, succumbing to an urge for trickiness.  She led low to the ♠ Q which Buratti cleverly ducked holding ♠ K654 behind the dummy. So the declarer who made the straightforward play of leading the ♠ A gained 14 IMPs. Who received the criticism?

If you guessed the player who bid and made 6NT you were correct. Her partner voiced the opinion that she should have passed 4NT. The chances of the spades producing 4 tricks is around 5 out of 8, not a worthwhile margin for a nonvulnerable slam. Of course, I think she was right to accept, because 1) she had 9 controls, 2) slam might well be bid at the other table, and 3) his spades could have been better, ♠ QJ9xx having a 59% chance of producing 4 tricks. There is no dependency on the spades splitting 3-3.

It is bad psychology to blame a partner for bidding and making a slam. Better to wait for a more appropriate time. There may have been a carry-over effect on later hand.

 South

  North

West

North

East

South

♠ T732

♠ 9

  2*  

4

Pass

?

AJT8

KQ97653

 

 

 

 

AJ

KT84

 

 

 

 

♣ A87

♣ Q

 

 

 

 

The woman who had misplayed 6NT did not hesitate to raise her partner to 6 after he had jumped over a Multi-2 showing a preempt in an unnamed 6-card major. Well, that was one way to avoid confusion. The player whose partner had criticized her initiative, passed his jump to 4 even though she held 3 aces and very good hearts. What might her partner have for his jump to game? I think a confident partner might have found an acceptable way to move forward. Anyway, as I said, any sympathy directed towards the Italians was greatly diminished – maybe third place was where they belonged.

 

Good 3-Card Support

David Burn noted during the BBO broadcast of a 2011 Venice Cup match that a 4-3-3-3 is too often underrated by the player who holds it. True enough, as an 8-card fit is likely, but without any ruffing power the potential for a high number of Total Tricks is low. It is the hand opposite that must take up the slack, which means the ruffs are transferred to the hand with the long trumps in the classical manner of the dummy reversal.

It is common enough to raise on poor 3-card support once partner has shown a 5-card suit. This may lead to problems as a raise on xxx is really an inadequate description. On the other hand, a raise with top honors can be very useful, as in the following fanciful construction where the opener has a 3=3=3=4 shape.

 Bob 1

  Bob 2

B1

B2

♠ AKT

♠ Q9864

  1♣

1♠

  KJ3

AQ7

  1NT

3

K85

AQ64

  3♠

4

♣ T974

♣ 2

  6♠

Pass

Neither hand is especially strong, and the division of sides is a common 8-7-6-5 with 16 Total Tricks, but there is very good structure in the trump suit, and nothing wasted in clubs. The result is that there is transportation to be had in the red suits. Routine bidding will not get the pair to slam – responder must be at pains to show his shape and not be put off by a natural opening bid in his short minor. Once the opening bidder is informed of the shortage in clubs opposite, he can bid slam, because he expects tricks in the red suits and ample ruffing of the clubs. It is not easy.

Suppose a spade is led to cut down the ruffs, picking off the ♠ J. A club is lost and a second spade is led, won in dummy. Declarer can ruff a club immediately, and ruff 2 more clubs returning to dummy with a diamond and a heart. A second heart is won in dummy, the last trump is drawn and 2 more diamond tricks and the A bring the total to 12. Thus we have come to 12 tricks on 28 HCPs. The loser count is 13, so this process gains a trick over the normal expectation of 11 tricks, which is what you get if you draw trumps early, losing a club and a diamond when the diamonds split 4-2 as expected. (Note that even if declarer stops in 4♠ , the reversal process can gain many matchpoints against routine play.)

 

The Probability of a 3-3 Fit

A table of a priori probabilities is based on the possible combination of cards being dealt to 2 players. To calculate the probability of a 4-2 split relative to a 3-3 split when 6 cards are missing in a suit, one merely takes the ratio of the numbers of combinations available.
There are 2 components to take into account, the combinations within the suit and the
combinations outside the suit.
4-2 split:
 the number of combinations within the suit is 6! divided by 4!2!  (equals 10);
 the number of combinations outside the suit is 20! divided by 9!11!
3-3 split:
within the suit, 6! Divided by 3!3! (equals 15);
outside the suit 20! Divided by 10! 10!

The ratio of the numbers of combinations in favor of a 3-3 split is (3/2) times (11/10), so the probability of a 3-3 split in clubs, say, is much greater than the probability of a 4-2 split in clubs. However, the a priori tables include the possibility of a 2-4 split as well, in which case the probability of either a 4-2 split or a 2-4 split is greater than that of a 3-3 split by itself.

When one declares a hand it may be that one or the other 4-2 splits is eliminated from consideration, in which case a 3-3 split becomes the favorite. Here is an example where one wishes to estimate the chance of obtaining 3 tricks from a suit in this layout:

♣5432    opposite  ♣KQT

At the beginning the chances are slim – Roudinesco’s dictionary rates it at less than 20% – but often one is faced with making what one can with what one is given. A low club goes to the king, winning, and a second low club towards the tenace is won by the queen. What are the chances the ♣2 will set up at this point? With the ♣A and the ♣J the only 2 clubs outstanding there are 2 live possibilities to consider: AJ on the left, or A on the left and J on the right. (At my club no one behind the ♣KQ holds up the ♣A twice.) The probability of getting a third trick is the probability that the suit was dealt 3-3.

One cannot go to the a priori tables to obtain this probability. We are comparing one 4-2 split to one 3-3 split. The relative probability is the current ratio of the number of card combinations in the outside suits. Originally this ratio involved combinations of 20 cards in spades, hearts, and diamonds, but now the number of unknown cards has been greatly reduced with the comings and goings.  The number of vacant places must be taken into account. If there is no difference in the vacant places, the 3-3 split is more likely, and you’ll make that ♣2 more often than not, provided you can get back in hand to cash it. If there are 2 fewer vacant places on the left, it more likely than not that playing the ♣T will result in 2 clubs being cashed on the left. That could be good if it results in a suicide squeeze and/or an endplay.

As you may have gathered I am partial to the 3-3 split and the 3-card raise, but then I was brought up on The Three Musketeers.

 

The Division of Sides

An interested reader asked me how to calculate the division of sides. It is a basic characteristic of any bridge deal, so it is worthwhile to grasp the procedure. From Mathematical Theory of Bridge by Borel and Chéron we obtain these probabilities:

8-7-6-5   23.60%    7-7-6-6  10.49%     7-7-7-5    5.245%

The probability of one division relative to the other is the ratio of the number of card combinations that can be dealt under each condition. Let’s compare the numbers of combinations for 8=7=6=5 against those for 7=7=6=6, where the suits have been specified. We need to take into account all 52 cards.

Your Side 26! divided by  8!7!6!5!
Their Side the same,
    Or 26! divided by  7!7!6!6! the same.

The ratio is 16/9 in favor of the 7=7=6=6 division.
In addition there are the various combination of suits which may apply. There are 24 possible divisions of 8-7-6-5, and 6 of 7-7-6-6. Thus, overall with all combinations included, the 8-7-6-5 division is the more likely in the ratio of 9/4.

Next we compare the 7=7=7=5 division and the 7=7=6=6 division.

Your Side    26! divided by  7!7!7!5!
Their Side 26! divided  by 6!6!6!8!
    Or 26! divided by  7!7!6!6! the same.

The ratio of combinations is 4/3 in favor of the 7=7=6=6 division. There are just 4 combinations available to the 7-7-7-5 divisions, so the ratio overall is increased by a factor of 6/4. The 7-7-6-6 division is favored in the ratio of 2 to 1.

The above results can be verified by comparing to the ratio of the percentages given above. The absolute percentages are calculated by obtaining the probabilities of all possible divisions relative to one (say, 7-7-6-6), obtaining their sum, then dividing each element by the total, thus normalizing to a sum of 1. That is, the probability of one of these divisions being dealt must be 1, as all possibilities have been included.

Once the dummy hits the deck the division of sides is known exactly, so the a priori odds concerning the divisions are irrelevant beyond that point. There remain to be discovered the distributions of the suits within the division. The most likely splits are the most even splits that can produce the division under the constraint of what is already known, because these are the splits that have associated with them the greatest number of possible combinations.

Some Bermuda Bowl Slams

Slam hands can play a large part in determining winners in a team match, and the 2011 Bermuda Bowl proved no exception. In the Semi-Final match between Italy and Netherlands, 2 slam swings in the final segment provided the bulk of the margin of victory for the Dutch. It was not all luck, and the following deal provides us with a fine demonstration of how not to go about looking for slam.

Lauria Versace L V
♠ K872 ♠ QJ943 2NT 3♣
A9 K742 3 4
AK87 93 4♠ Pass
♣ AK2 ♣ Q9

Lauria opened 2NT with 21 HCP and Versace employed Puppet Stayman in search of a 4-card major suit fit. 3 indicated a 4-card major was held and 4♠ sent the message that the suit was spades. 12 tricks were easy. There are 2 criticisms I would make on this approach. First, the hand is too strong to open 2NT, as with 9 controls the hand is worth much more than the 21 HCPs indicated; the hand is worth more like 30 HCPs, well outside the promised range. Second, the weaker hand gets to decide the final contract without transmitting any information that could indicate partner should upgrade.

The Dutch had a better approach even though the opening bid was the same misguided 2NT. Brink responded with a descriptive transfer to spades.

Drijver Brink D B
♠ K872 ♠ QJ943 2NT 3
A9 K742 4♣ 4
AK87 93 4NT 5
♣ AK2 ♣ Q9 6 6♠

Drijver could upgrade on the basis of the known spade fit, and drove to slam. It was somewhat fortuitous that the fit in spades proved to be the critical element, however, it was better sequence than the horrid Puppet sequence provided above. Actually, this hand shows what the Big Club is all about, even without transfer responses.

Bob1 Bob2 B1 B2
♠ K872 ♠ QJ943 1 1♠
A9 K742 2♠ 3♣*
AK87 93 4NT 5
♣ AK2 ♣ Q9 6♠ Pass

1♣ is strong, 1♠ promises 5+ spades and 8+HCP, 2♠ agrees trumps, 3♣ shows one top spade honour, 4NT is RKCB,…. but opener could bid 6♠ straight up to save time.

Of course, even Precision players can miss a good slam if they allow the weak hand too much authority, as in this deal from the Bermuda Bowl Finals.

Lall Grue L G
♠ KT ♠ A763 1♣ 1
K4 QT65 2* 2♠ *
AK6 93 2NT 3♣
♣ AKQJ75 ♣ 863 3 3NT

Justin Lall began with the Big Club and Joe Grue gave the negative response (0-7 HCP). Lall decided to make a descriptive Kokish-like call, 2 showing a big hand. (Here we are guessing.) Grue relayed and Lall revealed a very strong NT hand. Note that he had hidden his especially rich club suit. Grue applied a Stayman 3♣, and signed off in 3NT. It appears that the auction was geared to finding a major suit fit. Lall had forced the auction, so had little to guide him as to the potential in the responder’s hand.

It would have been better for Lall to reveal the nature of his hand with an old-fashioned single-suit slam try jump to 3♣ (4 losers or less, no 4-card major) to force responder to make a descriptive bid with 3 available as a second negative with regard to clubs. Responder has an easy 3♠ bid, and 6♣ will be bid by opener, sooner or later.

Pros and Cons of Opening Light

It is well known that there is a strategic advantage to opening the bidding when the high card content is fairly evenly divided between the pairs, the most likely situation, and when the auction might become competitive. The mathematical theory of information provides another good reason for opening light. The normal pass rate for traditional methods is around 50%. Opening light entails opening hands that traditionally would be passed, the net result being that the pass rate is reduced to around 40%, so, on average more information is being delivered over the full spectrum of possible calls. In effect, for active bidders a pass is better defined and a suit bid is more poorly defined than normal.

Defending against a light opening bid presents problems. The tendency for an opponent who plays a traditional system is to interpret the opening bid in terms of what he would promise if he were to open with that same bid. From his point of view it is the additional uncertainty with regard to the familiar bid that presents a problem. ‘How can you open with that garbage?’ he may ask. Traditional defences may prove inadequate, and there is a danger of being stolen blind. We often see complaints that light opening bids force an opponent to adopt the same strategy. The tendency is to make each deal subject to competition, a condition that favors those who open light. As we have noted in previous blogs, light bidders look very bad on some hands, but overall they hold an advantage.

There is a disadvantage to opening light when responder holds a good hand and the deal is not competitive in nature. The added uncertainty in the definition of the opening bid requires responses that can extract additional information and allow the contract to be played at its proper level. Games mustn’t be missed and slams especially become difficult to reach with confidence. Here is an example from the 2011 world championships where few succeeded in reaching slam and many failed.

Piganeau Leenhardt P L
♠ AK7 ♠ QJT 1 2
KT852 Q4 3 3NT
QJT4 AK63 Pass
♣ Q ♣ A763

This is a purely natural and descriptive French auction from the 4th round of the Seniors’ Bowl Final. Many would not find fault here, but one must say the bidding has not come to grips with the particular characteristics that make this deal special. The more likely it is that the 1 opening bid may be light, the less likely it would be that responder would contemplate trying for a slam. That is true in general, but when in the Venice Cup competition the Indonesian South, Dewi, opened 1, limited to at most 15 HCP and often light, her partner Murniati was able to bid a strong 2NT (16+HCP) and later jump to 6 . For most pairs 2NT is a heart raise, so Indonesia had the right tools for the occasion.

In the Bermuda Bowl the Dutch bid to 6 and USA2 didn’t. In the Senior Bowl Peter Boyd and Steve Robinson got to the slam using a sophisticated version of 2/1 with relays, and we shall give their auction as it was fully explained on BBO, whereas the Dutch relay auction was not. Either would illustrate my point.

Boyd Robinson B R
♠ AK7 ♠ QJT 1 2♣*
KT852 Q4 2NT* 3*
QJT4 AK63 3* 4♣*
♣ Q ♣ A763 4* 4♠ *
4NT* 5
6 Pass

___

2♣ game force, balanced or clubs
2NT 4 diamonds and 15+HCP
3 asks for more information, balanced
3 short in clubs
4♣ RKC with diamonds as trumps
4 1 or 4 key cards
4♠ asks for the Q
4NT shows Q and ♠ K
5 natural
6 I have extras in trumps plus the K

We commend the veteran pair for the use of an efficient sequence that is part of a development over several decades. Here are 2 seniors with memories intact. I look for an easier approach that would rely to a greater extent on adaptive partnership cooperation. This is best when the 2 hands are balanced in HCP with neither partner having a clear advantage over the other. Playing Precision I would respond with an artificial 2♣, a common enough agreement these days, and adopt the Indonesian ladies’ approach.

Bob1 Bob2 B1 B2
♠ AK7 ♠ QJT 1 2♣*
KT852 Q4 2 2NT
QJT4 AK63 4NT 6
♣ Q ♣ A763 Pass

___

2♣ game force, balanced or clubs
2 4 diamonds
2NT balanced, 16+HCP
4NT maximum limited opener
6 excellent support for diamonds

The hands fit better than they might with the sequence of diamond honours in the one hand and the Q conveniently placed in the other, but the choices of bids would indicate to a fair degree that the values held are working under the current circumstances. Responder might have bid 3NT instead of 2NT if there was no interest generated by the diamond bid. A minor suit orientation is announced with the 2NT bid, and opener’s ♣Q appears to be a useful card worthy of full promotion. The presence of the ♠ AK also gives opener assurance that diamonds will have good support opposite. One can see the advantage of a limited opening bid, as the opener can jump to 4NT as a nonforcing limit bid without confusion. Of course, if one cannot do without RKCB, a bid of 4♠ might serve as a substitute, although it might not be clear what trumps are being referenced.

Having an agreement that 2♣ is an artificial game forcing bid does not solve all problems. I must admit that I can’t see the reasoning that led to failure in this all-too-common auction: 1 – 2 ♣*; 2 – 3; 3NT – Pass. In this case a raise of 2 to 3 should not be taken as a descriptive bid, allowing opener to make the final decision, but as a slam try agreeing diamonds as trumps and asking for outside controls. A reply of 3♠ stands out as a means below game to show where values are held. 3NT would appear to show better clubs and worse spades.

Usually in a slam auction it pays to establish trumps early, but in this case responder’s hand is rather modest in controls (5) and flat in distribution. The presence of the AK guarantee that the opening bidder will not show much enthusiasm for a diamond slam and it will be difficult for him to show extra length in diamonds. In fact, he is rather endplayed in the bidding which has got too high. 2NT saves space and is descriptive of shape and soft outside strength. Diamond support may take the form of a delayed 4 bid, leaving 4NT as a resting place in the worst case scenario. With the given deal, a 2/1 opener can complete the picture of his hand by bidding 3♠ , kicking the can down the road. 3NT by opener should be reserved for garbage dumping.

The Cult of the Eight-Card Fit

The Law of Total Tricks has had a profound influence on modern bidding practices. Players are willing to act on the belief that usually it is safe to enter the bidding on the priori promise of an 8-card fit and not much else. Distribution is everything. Most of the time they get away with bidding on less than the traditional HCP requirements. One danger is that about 1 time in 6 there is no 8+-card fit, so winning the contract may turn out to be a pyrrhic victory. Secondly, the long suits may be poorly stocked with honours, reducing the number of total tricks. If you hold top honors in their main suit, they are likely to be in the same position vis-à-vis your main suit. Thirdly, if an opponent becomes declarer, the defence may suffer on the opening lead, and knowledge of the distribution may aid him in bringing home a risky contract.

These 3 points should be the keystone to defending against active bidders. Under normal circumstances a player does well to adhere to the cult and bid to a contract that matches his potential with regard to total tricks. When values are evenly distributed about the table, the chances of being doubled in a partial are not great. After that level is reached, but not before, one may consider doubling for penalties if the opponents carry on dangerously. Obviously, within the realm of the new reality, one’s competitive bidding agreements must be geared towards this approach.

Here is an example from the Semi-Finals 2011 Bermuda Bowl where a player sought prematurely to punish overly active opponents who may have bid too high.

Dealer: West

Vul: EW

Fleisher

K7

KJ93

T763

KJT

Grue

853

7

AK5

A97654

Lall

AQ9

8652

J98

Q32

Kamil

JT642

AQT4

Q42

8

Grue Fleisher Lall

Kamil
2♣* Pass 2NT* Pass
3 Pass Pass Dble

All Pass

Grue’s 2♣ bid promised a 6-card suit, 11-15 HCP. Lall’s 2NT was a ‘good’ raise to 3♣ (as opposed to a raise based solely on the number of clubs held). Discretion being the better part of valor, Kamil could not double for takeout at this point, because 2NT included the (rare) possibility that Lall held a good hand without a club fit. Once it was confirmed that the opponents had bid to the level of their 9-card fit with the HCPs evenly distributed between the sides, Kamil felt he could make a balancing double to compete for the part score. He was assured of at least an 8-card fit with his partner.

The match had not been going well for Fleisher’s team, and he obviously felt in the need for a swing. We can see that gambling a penalty double on the basis of ♣KJT opposite a singleton was not the winning decision, as it resulted in a score of -870. The ♣KJT look promising but they produced just 1 trump trick. We surmise that normally Fleisher would have pulled to 3 which goes down 1 but which beats the result achieved at the other table, 4 down 2. If the opponents had continued mistakenly on to 4♣, then a penalty double might be called for, but it is not to be recommended here when there is no assurance that 3 makes and 4♣ doesn’t.

Again we see the propensity of Grue-Lall to avoid a direct raise when they have some semblance of high card power. Lall’s bidding 3♣ directly might make it easier psychologically for Kamil-Fleisher to compete effectively. The 2NT bid contained a poison pill: the threat of a strong hand with a misfit in clubs. However, this is rare, and an opponent should act on what is most probable, taking a risk that may occasionally cost a lot. The effect of these unlimited transfers in competition is to give the opponents extra bids with which to describe their potential in the face of dubious actions. So one should define the difference between direct action over a transfer and delayed actions against the expected weak sign-offs. I would define direct actions as strong, a direct double of 2NT being balanced takeout, and 3♣ as a game search with short clubs. Thus, when South passes 2NT and later balances against 3♣ with a double, the guidelines are set and North knows not to attempt a speculative double of 4♣, as discussed above.

A most amusing but instructive comedy of errors occurred in the Semi-Final match between the USA teams. It shows what can happen when both sides are bidding like crazy in an atmosphere of mutual misunderstanding.

Dealer: South

Vul: NS

Grue

AT65

K94

AKT8

♣ 63

Weinstein

KQ83

JT852

Q62

♣ A

Levin

Q76

9753

♣ KJT542

Lall

J9742

A3

J4

♣ Q987

Weinstein Grue Levin

Lall
2* Dble 2 2NT (?)

Pass 3 Dble Pass

Pass 3 Pass Pass
Dble Pass Pass 3NT
Dble All Pass

Weinstein’s 2 was an ‘extended’ Flannery bid, possibly with 5-5 in the majors. One sees this is a good description on distribution, but a poor one on high-card placement as the advertised long suit has none of the 3 top honours and half the HCP lie in the minors. This bodes ill for a player who declares on this hand, but this is not a concern to the modern bidder. Grue has a value-showing double, and Levin makes a cheap raise, keeping hidden his long suit for the time being. Of course, he knows Weinstein is short in clubs. Lall makes what appears to be a natural, invitational call suggesting an exploration for 3NT, but Grue confesses he hasn’t the foggiest idea what 2NT means. Perhaps it is a weak Lebensohl transfer to 3♣?

After Grue transferred to 3♣, many observers felt that Levin should pass, knowing there was a NS misunderstanding, but Levin is made of sterner stuff, and he doubled the one contract he might expect to defeat. Lall is obliged to pass, but Grue has been warned, so he corrects to 3. Weinstein with defensive cards in the minors, and perhaps expecting more from Levin, doubles that. The moment of truth has arrived. Commentators expect Lall to read the situation and bid 3ª, but he retreats to 3NT, the Sanctuary of the Wholly Unknown that has provided protection for so many lost souls. Weinstein doubles that confident Levin will provide some assistance. He leads the 5 and 3NT is defeated eventually by setting up the suit. As noted by Kit Woolsey at the time, Lall’s one hope when in with the A was to attempt to pass the ª7, but he led the ª9 which was easily covered by Weinstein. So 3NT was that close to making.

At the other table Wooldridge opened 1, Martel doubled and Hurd bid 3♣, a fit showing raise. Customarily this delivers some tricks in clubs, which it didn’t, and 4 hearts, which it didn’t. It should have come as no surprise that Stansby had enough to bid 3ª. Martel wasn’t going to stop there with his fine controls and singleton club. Well, if they were in game, I suppose it didn’t cost much to double Martel, who made 11 tricks, for a score of 790 and a gain of 15 IMPs on the board. The result might be considered a triumph for extended Flannery as it had stolen the NS spade fit, but IMPs would have been won even if Weinstein had passed throughout.

What does one board prove? In the end the brash Young Turks defeated the established experts by a substantial margin by applying constant pressure that eventually paid good returns. That means one must be prepared to put up a battle on every hand, fighting fire with fire. Uncertainty must be made to work for you as well as for them. Doubling a contract just because it rates to go down under normal circumstances doesn’t work well when the circumstances are unusual. There will be chances enough to double when it is obvious that the cards are badly placed, as their bidding takes little account of suit quality.

As a case in point we’ll finish with a look at this year’s world champions acting rather foolishly against the Italians, whom they ended up beating, of course.

Dealer: South

Vul: NS

Drijver

8

AT9753

653

J75

Versace

A5

K

AQJ972

KQ64

Lauria

JT964

QJ8642

4

A

Brink

KQ732

KT8

T9832

Versace Drijver Lauria

Brink
Pass Pass
1 2 Pass Pass
Dble Pass Pass Redble
Pass 3 Pass Pass
Dble All Pass

The division of sides was 7=7=7=5 for EW and 6=6=6=8 for NS. The Total Tricks were 15. Clubs represented the best fit for NS, but they lacked the 4 top honors, and they split 4-1. EW might opt to play in spades or hearts, with the trumps splitting 5-1 or 6-0, respectively. The conditions were unusual, so there was opportunity lurking in the cards.

Sensing it was a good time to get active, Drijver preempted on the assumption there is no such thing as a bad 6-card suit. Circumstances alter everything. After years of thinking otherwise, in a flash Lauria was made aware of the defensive potential of the 5=6=1=1 shape. In the back of his mind he may have even wondered how to steer partner into bidding 3NT. Versace did well to balance with a double, just in case, and was rewarded when Lauria was able to convert to penalties. The Dutch easily found their 8-card fit, but to no avail. The contract went down 5 for1400 at a cost 17 IMPs.

At the other table, Wijs opened the bidding with a strong club. Bocchi sensed it wasn’t a good time to get active and the Italians lazily passed throughout. With much difficulty the Dutch reached 4, going down 1, after 6 frustrating rounds of relay bidding. They had missed their best game, 3NT! Even without the diamond finesse! Perhaps they should have seen that when their division of sides was revealed.

Life in the Uncertainty Lane

Youth is not the era of wisdom, let us therefore have due consideration

– Comte de Rivarol (1753 – 1801)

While watching youthful players from the USA and the Netherlands duke it out in the Bermuda Bowl Final, a mature expert was provoked into commenting, ‘this is not bridge as we know it.’ Perhaps he has a short memory, for we were all young and foolish once upon a time. But how foolish can one be if one has reached the Finals against sensible and experienced opposition? Rather than shake one’s head in disbelief, it is better to find the reasons why these young men were successful as cooler heads fell by the wayside.

The old way to bid a hand was designed around transmitting information so as to arrive at a sensible contract most of the time while avoiding large penalties. The new way is to get into the auction early and light in order to create a competitive auction in which the opposition may make an error they would be unlikely to make in an unopposed auction. This may create a problem if partner holds a good hand, but the problem is overcome by bidding any game that appears to have a decent chance of coming home. Not very subtle, is it?

It is the wrong strategy to try to extract penalties on the feeling that the opponents may have got too high. The large penalties come from deals where the defenders hold the balance of power and have sufficient communication to avoid endplays. In the 6th session of the Final, Kevin Bathurst tried unsuccessfully to swing IMPs on the suspicion that the Dutch were bidding beyond their depth.

Bathurst Zagorin B Z
♠ QT96 ♠ K873 1♣ (4) Dble (Pass)
A 4 4♠ (Dble) Pass (5)
986 742 Dble (Pass) Pass (Pass)
♣ AT842 ♣ KQJ65

Bathurst opened on what might be deemed an inadequate holding by traditional standards. What is the rush? Old Age may ask. Muller made a strong preemptive bid holding an 8-card suit with an outside ♠ A and K, keeping everyone in the dark while applying pressure all around. Zagorin doubled to show 4 spades, and the 8-card fit was uncovered. Muller doubled to show the nature of his preempt and Wijs calmly raised to 5 with JT9 and AQJT5, although 4♠ would have failed on an unlikely diamond lead. Based on the takeout double of 4, Bathurst doubled for penalty on the hope that partner could provide a diamond trick on defence, but it was not to be – the hidden distribution in the form of an undisclosed 10-card club fit defeated his purpose. Passing 5 would have split the board, as 11 tricks were normal and routine on the EW holding.

When following a strategy of opening light and overcalling disinformatively, one purposefully creates uncertainty. Large swings may occur randomly for both sides, but the enterprising player can tolerate losses because his strategy is to create swings. What is lost on one bad result can be made up easily on the immanent next swing. Doubling speculatively for penalty is not the way to go about it in an atmosphere of guessing all around. Later in the same session, this board came up.

Zagorin Bathurst Z B
♠ J4 ♠ K96 1♣ (2*) Pass (4)
J6 A3 Pass (Pass) Dble (Pass)
AQ54 KT632 Pass (Pass)
♣ QJT75 ♣ 862 *majors

Here we see a rather awkward holding for a standard 1♣ opening bid. What would be his rebid over a major suit response? My experience tells me this is a good hand for passing. Wijs has an easy entry into the auction on: ♠ AQT832 T9842 J ♣ K. Yes, things could go wrong if partner chooses hearts, but, then again, they could go right, and they did when Muller found he held a suitable raise on KQ75 and the ♣A. Bathurst has passed when he might have taken action earlier, so now he was more or less obliged to do something at this late stage. This time it was the excellent but undisclosed 9-card fit in diamonds that proved his undoing – too many values contained in one long suit.

The problems created by uncertainty may be alleviated by creating more bids in competition. Hence we see the use of transfer responses to create space that allow players to distinguish between competitive bids and constructive bids. Lebensohl methods can be applied to many situations. The difficulty for the average player is that methods must vary according to the circumstances. Even the Dutch world champions went for a penalty of 1400 on a misunderstanding about the meaning of their artificial competitive bids. Here is a case in point when the 2 USA teams met in the Bermuda Bowl Semi-Finals.

Dealer: West

Vul: NS

Fleisher

JT72

J83

AKJ864

Grue

4

AKT2

Q753

8762

Lall

983

654

T9

AKT94

Kamil

AKQ65

Q97

2

QJ53

Grue Fleisher Lall

Kamil
1 2 2
4 5 Pass 6
All Pass

It would be all-too-easy to say that Fleisher would have avoided all the trouble if he had passed initially, but the world now agrees that Fleisher holds a hand that must be opened 1. Trouble, at least for the other guys, is what we seek. South will respond 1♠ , get raised to 2♠ , and will play happily in 4♠ making an overtrick. Next! But suppose, and we don’t even need to suppose, that East makes an ‘insane’ overcall of 2♣ with a 5-3-3-2 shape. No harm done, one might conclude, as 11 tricks are always available in a spade contract. Kamil shows his spade suit, and a partnership must decide how strong he need be for that action. Certainly 3NT beckons, so Kamil must have considered it was forcing. Grue now made a mysterious bid. We are not quite sure what it means even looking at all 4 hands. Perhaps it was a 2-way bid, showing a good competitive raise to 5♣, reading Lall for shortage in diamonds. He wasn’t prepared to defend a 4♠ contract.

At this point Fleisher has 6 possible bids starting with pass and going all the way up to 5♠ . If he passes he is assured of another set of 4 bids starting with a double of 5♣. So there is no shortage of possible calls, and perhaps no rush to choose one of them. The problem is that there is no agreement as to what information these bids would transmit. To a great extent NS are relying on what they think the opponents are telling them. If Grue had bid 5♣, I suppose that they would have some simple agreements. Perhaps North’s pass would be forcing, Kamil would double on his misfit in diamonds, and Fleischer would raise to 5♠ with no harm done. But after the unexpected cue bid by Grue, it might be uncertain as to what a pass would entail, even though the club fit was advertised. So another example where one may do best by not forcing the opponents into making an easy decision.

Not having discussed this particular auction Fleischer decided to show his shortage while he could with a cue bid of 5♣. Kamil thought partner was inviting slam, as he could already deduce the shortage from his own club holding. Well, if partner can invite slam missing the top honors in spades, there must be a pretty good play for it. So thought Kamil, until Grue led the A and the dummy appeared. Note that Grue did not double 6♠ for penalty. So, apart from Grue, who made the worst bid? I say, neither.

The problem was that NS had no firm agreements as to how to handle this particular situation – a weak opening bid, a weak overcall at the 2-level. Partnerships need guidelines as every possible auction cannot be discussed ahead of time. In the absence of an agreement I think I would bid a simple-minded 5♠ with the North hand. That tells the story – good diamonds with spade support, leaving it to partner to work out the club situation. Usually the active bidders can be trusted on their distribution. Here is a key point: partner can guess the club void, but the opponents can’t. They may double 5♠ .

It been known for years that a 2♣ overcall of 1 has preemptive power. Often the less power the overcaller has outside the suit the safer it is to make the bid. Here is a case in point, the final board in the Semi-Finals of the Venice Cup where Indonesia led England by a small margin. One rolled the dice while the other chose to go quietly. We know who won, but we ask why.

Dealer: South

Vul: NS

Murniati

AJ75

K8732

J

♣ AT7

Dhondy

T4

QJ654

652

♣ QJ4

Senior

9862

AT

AQT83

♣ K3

Dewi

KQ3

9

K974

♣ 98652

Dhondy Murniati Senior

Dewi
Pass 1 2 Pass
Pass Dble All Pass

Nevena Senior overcalled Kristina Murniati’s a limited (Precision) 1 with a gappy 5-card diamond suit doing little damage to the opponents’ auction. Her hand was too good defensively. Suci Dewi knew her side had little hope of making game. Murniati made a balancing double largely on the merit of her singleton diamond, a double that Dewi courageously passed. We say courageously, but what other choices did she have? The 9, the curse of Scotland, might prove an effective card even against a Bulgarian living in England. In the end it was, promoted into a trick sitting behind the T8 with the lead of a heart from the West hand.

The close double paid off 200 in a part score deal, not a great return against the potential loss of 2 doubled and making. However, in the current atmosphere one has to balance dangerously with a double or face the possibility of being stolen blind. At the other table Sally Brock opened an unlimited 1, Nicola Smith responder a feeble and misshapen 1NT, creating a dangerous situation for those who might wish to intervene on a misfit. There was the aggressive Lusje Bojoh sitting in the balancing seat. Decision time. Well, she hadn’t come all the way from Jakarta to end up doubled and vulnerable in a part score deal, so she made the winning call – pass! Imagine that, and with full values for an opening bid! The defence suffered somewhat, and Smith ended up with 9 tricks.

(We note also that France beat Poland on this final board of the semi-finals the d’Orsi Seniors’ Bowl by doubling the indiscreet 2 overcall by the Polish East, while Polish North played in 3♣ off 1. The winning margin was 1 IMP.)

Bridge: Game or Sport?

The 2011 world championships were remarkable in three aspects: the emergence of a youth movement at the highest levels, the firm establishment of a highly competitive biding style that puts little store in high card evaluation, and the evidence of a movement towards state-sponsored teams. These trends coming to fruition are tied in with how bridge is viewed: it is a game or a sport? If it is a game, the aim is to amuse; if it is a sport, the aim is to win.

For many of those participating in the championships the event was an opportunity to meet old friends and play a bit of bridge at a highest level, winning some and losing some. Of the 22 teams entered in each of the main events, few had serious ambitions of reaching the 8-team cut-off. Some teams at the top were out to win and prepared themselves accordingly. For these few it was to be a grueling exercise requiring extraordinary physical and mental endurance. The quality of bridge at the end was inevitably adversely affected as mental resources were drained to the limit. Is this really necessary, and, if so, what do the conditions of contest set out to prove?

The main championships are modeled on the Olympic games where teams represent countries. National pride is used to pump up interest, so the aim is to win; that is, bridge is treated as a sport. During the Bermuda Bowl finals, some 500 Dutch fans gathered in the Vu-Graph room to support the home team and some were heard to cheer when an American player made a costly play. This is natural in a highly competitive setting. In baseball games or hockey games American fans will often boo a leading player who poses a threat to the home team. In a way it is a tribute to that player’s ability. Fans do not boo an opponent who is struggling – they treat him as an individual deserving of sympathy and consideration. In a bridge championship players are not representing themselves as individuals, they are represent an opposing team tied to a country possibly with an unpopular foreign policy.

Officials of the government of Indonesia have acted upon the belief that there is something to be gained from introducing bridge into their school curriculum. This is good news for the world-wide bridge playing community. Of course, we can agree with this concept, as bridge can be used as a learning tool for many worthwhile activities, not the least of which is the development of harmonious cooperation. (Really!) The ACBL has attempted unsuccessfully to introduce bridge into schools, but it has not caught on, as it is not properly tied into academic subjects such as science and mathematics, which need a boost, to say the least. Going a step further, the Indonesians have established a government organization for developing world-class teams to compete in prestigious international events. (See Micke Melander’s report in the WBF Bulletin #12.) Players are paid to undergo rigorous year-long training, both mental and physical, in a strictly controlled setting, similar to what one has seen developed in China, be it for violinists or gymnasts or computer hackers. The governments set goals and organize to achieve them. One might say this is the same Asian strategy that so far has been applied successfully to state-run capitalism. What follows remains to be seen. Meanwhile let’s try not be resentful if they appear to be organized when we are not.

Let’s have a look at the unknowns from Indonesia in the process of eliminating the very capable team of famous ladies from England. Two pivotal hands occurred at the end of the 5th session of the Semi-Finals when England led by 12 IMPs. They illustrate general principles that are often neglected in the heat of battle.

Dealer: South

Vul: NS

Bojoh

TJ3

Q753

AKJ4

97

Brock

4

T8645

T86

T842

Smith

QJ965

K9

Q952

J3

Tueje

AK82

AJ

73

AKQ65

Brock Bojoh Smith

Tueje
2
Pass 2* Double 3♣
Pass 3 Pass 3NT
Pass 6NT All Pass

Some commentators, possibly with an eye to the most likely outcome, felt the South hand was a 2NT opening bid – the old slam killer. In the Bermuda Bowl Weinstein-Levin had reached 6NT unopposed and gone down 1 on a heart lead from Grue, ducked by Lall. The English South did open 2NT, reached a safe 3NT, which made 10 tricks. So it looked as if an IMP could be gained safely with an overtrick. It didn’t happen that way.

Julita Tueje opened a strong 2♣. I, too, see the South hand with its 8 controls and top heavy club suit as an automatic 2♣ opening bid, being too good for 2NT. Lusje Bojoh showed 3 controls with her artificial 2♠ response, so here they were with 11 total controls, only a king missing. I saw that in the same position I might well regret my propensity to bid strongly on such a combination without due regard to where 12 tricks might be coming from. But then a strange thing happened: Nicola Smith doubled for no apparent good reason. I think it was a deflection bid, an attempt to hide the location of the K, doubleton, and the Q, both vulnerable to a finesse. Tueje back-peddled to 3NT, but Bojoh, a known aggressive bidder, took the initiative and corrected to 6NT. I guess she knew her partner well after playing with her for 7 hours a day for a whole year.

Well, I don’t agree with the double, as I don’t want to give the opponents any additional information when they are in a slam auction that starts with an inefficient 2♣. Besides which, the odds are that the K and the Q are not held in the same hand, which they aren’t. One trusts one’s partner, especially a partner who edits a frequent feature in Bridge Magazine on the subject of opening leads. As their coach, David Burn, predicted, it proved costly when Tueje was led to the only chance to make her ambitious contract.

The play was governed by the need to find the cards perfectly placed. Declarer won the spade lead and gave up a club to Horton, who switched to a diamond. Tueje finessed in hearts, dropped the K, and cashed the ♣5, returned to dummy with the K to play the Q and squeeze Smith in spades and diamonds, knowing the diamonds had been dealt 3 – 4. Perfect! That was a gain of 12 IMPs and the next board gave Indonesia 13 more.

Dealer: West

Vul: EW

Bojoh

T6

J8

J976

QT872

Brock

754

Q97432

8

K64

Smith

AKJ83

K6

AK52

J3

Tueje

Q92

AT5

QT43

A95

At the other table Kristina Murniati opened a Precision 1♣ in third seat and ended up after 6 rounds of bidding in 4♠ which made. Here Sally Brock impatiently opened the bidding with a Multi-2. This goes against my criterion for preempts in first seat: don’t open when you hold more points outside the suit than within. The heart suit is badly described, as it lacks even a good interior sequence. Also, there is good ruffing potential with spades as trumps. In summary, a perfectly lousy preempt, vulnerable to boot.

It does my heart good to record that Brock ended up playing in 4 hearts which went down. The bridge gods had decreed that the spade finesse must fail, but it was largely the lack of trump intermediates that led to the loss. One might note that the current trend in bidding is to make bids intended to confuse the opposition, leaving partner to fend for his- or herself. Sometimes it works, sometimes not. One doesn’t expect a player chosen by a committee to indulge in that behavior, so in future there will be a basic difference in approach, East and West. It is good to see science and discipline prevail, as in the end it is the location of the cards that determine what makes and what doesn’t. We’ll pursue ideas on the modern trend towards cultivating uncertainty in the next blog concerning competitive auctions in the 2011 Bermuda Bowl.

Where Natural is Best

s we watch matches in the Bermuda Bowl competition, certain boards stand out: those boards that confirm the prejudices we had going in. That is natural, as it will take more than a couple of boards to overcome the experiences of decades. A case in point occurred in Round Robin 16 where USA1 gained 30 IMPs over Sweden on just 2 slam hands. The successful slam bidders were Martel-Stansby, using an American style based on ‘natural’ bids in a 5-card major, 2/1 game forcing structure.  The unsuccessful pair were Bertheau-Nystrom using a Big Club with relay responses. This prompted one BBO commentator to observe that here was evidence of the superiority of natural bids over bids that were used otherwise, that is, transfers, relays, asking bids, etc. We take the opposite view. If it were not for the slam hands, Sweden would have won. We’ll see where the evidence leads.

Bids should be defined with regard to their usefulness. The information contained in a bid doesn’t necessarily bear any relationship to the strain. If we think of the simple case of 4NT asking for aces, the response 5may reveal 2 aces are held without implying the A is one of them. Of course, I am being pedantic here, but once we open the flood gates, and allow Stayman, Jacoby transfers and RKCB, where can we stop the flow of artificial, but useful, bids and why should we limit ourselves in that regard? However, if some die-hards still see merit in natural bidding, I want to know why.

Whereas in relay system, generally, one player is the captain and has the primary responsibility for decision making, with a natural approach either partner can at any time make a decision based on what he sees before him. There may be features that suggest he upgrade or downgrade, so that even from the beginning he may steer the auction in one direction or the other, prejudging the outcome based on his normal expectations. He may not reveal these features, so they remain hidden to the opponents, as well as to partner. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage. Many a bad contract comes home because of the bad bidding that was used to reach it.  Slams are different only in degree, as generally, accuracy pays, so it is of interest to see why the BBO commentator thought natural bidding was proven superiority in this context. Let’s see if we can, however reluctantly, find grounds for agreement.

Dealer: North

Vul: None

Martel

AQ6

JT863

QJT72

Fredin

753

9

K9863

A832

Fallenius

9842

Q5

54

KT765

Stansby

KJT

AK742

A

QJ94

Fredin Martel Fallenius

Stansby
1 Pass 2NT
Pass 3♣ Pass 3
Double Pass Pass Redouble*
Pass 3NT** Pass 4
Pass 4 Pass 4♠
Pass 5 Pass 7

All Pass **slam try *A

The auction follows the normal American expert style, which is not to say it is in any way ‘natural’. The opening bid is somewhat thin by traditional standards. 2NT promised a heart fit, so the trump fit was immediately established in a forcing auction. 3♣ announced shortage in that suit, not a minimum, on loser count at least, and 3 was a cue bid of convenience that moved things along. Later, on his sparse assortment, Martel bid a most unnatural 3NT as a non-serious slam try! Partner then got about looking for controls in an artificial asking sequence. Hardly classifies as natural, does it?

The bid that allowed for the successful play of the hand was the helpful double of 3 by the West player. East led a diamond, and Stansby immediately embarked on the winning sequence of plays. His plan was to ruff 4 clubs in dummy, in the hope that West couldn’t ruff ahead of dummy with the Q. At the other table without the benefit of an asinine call by West the declarer in 7 drew trumps and fell a trick short.

For me the lessons are that one should open light on distributional hands, and, more importantly, one should not provide gratuitous assistance to opponents who are on their way to slam. How often we have seen such actions backfire. It seems that in the current atmosphere of super-aggressive bidding, it is very difficult for some to shut up. The purpose must be to increase the level of uncertainty by making an insane but possibly credible call in a poor suit. As with the boy who called ‘wolf’ all-too-often, the opponents learn to adapt and are not so easily fooled.

Generally, the greatest source of error in the defence lies in the habit of competing with bad suits. Either the defender doesn’t lead the suit when he should, or he does, when he shouldn’t. If one feels one must compete it is better to bid early and at least take away some bidding space. A double takes away no bidding space and provides the opponents with additional calls. Martel opens 1because he wants to compete, and may have difficulty if he stays silent on the first round. Getting hearts into the auction at a later stage may be difficult and misleading on such a poor suit. An opening heart bid merely promises a 5-card suit, and he does have defensive values outside the suit.

Let’s now look at the hand that shows some advantage to a natural bidding style in that it allowed a player (Martel) to upgrade on the basis of undisclosed values. Again, the primary step we look for is the early establishment of a quality trump suit.

Dealer: East

Vul: Both

Martel

QJ8742

A2

3

A763

Fredin

A3

Q7543

Q9764

Q

Fallenius

T6

JT8

52

JT9852

Stansby

K95

K96

AKJT8

K4

Fredin Martel Fallenius

Stansby
Pass 1
1 1 Pass 2NT
Pass 3 Pass 3
Pass 4 Pass 4
Pass 4NT Pass 5
Pass 6 All Pass

Here the Martel-Stansby auction can be interpreted simply as a natural sequence. Again Fredin is at pains to advertise a suit without much character. His intervention is going nowhere in particular and he knows it. Martel is able to bid his spade suit comfortably, and Stansby can show the power of his hand and the wastage in hearts with a reverse to 2NT. Aided rather than inconvenienced by the minimal interference, Martel eventually employs RCKB and can upgrade because of his hidden extras in spades. 6♠ is cold. The key is Stansby’s control bid of 4 showing his suitability for slam.

Let us now see how the Big-Club Relay system failed when South asked the questions and North had little say in the final decision.

Bertheau Nystrom
♠ K95 ♠ QJ8742 1♣ 1♠
K96 A2 1NT 2
AKJT8 3 2♠ 2NT
♣ K4 ♣ A763 3♣ 4♣
6 controls 4 controls 4♠ Pass

Bertheau opened a Big Club and 1♠ was an artificial response showing 8+ ‘zz’ points with Ace=3, King=2, and Queen = 1, so Nystrom had overstated, apparently.  1NT asked for shape information. 2 was a transfer to spades, accepted. 2NT denied a void, and 4♣ showed Nystrom held 6♠ and 4♣ . The shape was revealed but Bertheau was left with the question of trump suit quality. Bertheau was in the midst of a relay auction, so 4 might have had other uses; he had opened with an under strength Big Club with just 11 zz points.  It seems he was painted into a corner of a system of his own making and felt that 4♠ would not be passed by a partner who had shown promising values. Wrong! It might be said that Nystrom should have continued over 4♠ , despite the initial upgrade. He has just 6 losers and 4 controls and the ♠ J adds some stability to the trump situation. But it is dfficult to bid on once a uncommunicative partner opts for game.

Trump quality had not been established to a sufficient degree. Bidding on distribution alone leaves one at the mercy of probability when it comes to suit quality. Here is how I would have bid this one using Precision asking bids.

Bob1 Bob2
♠ K95 ♠ QJ8742 1♣ 1♠
K96 A2 2♠ 3♣
AKJT8 3 3♠ 4♣
♣ K4 ♣ A763 4 4
5♣ 5
6 losers 6 losers 5 6♠

1♣ is strong and 1♠ shows 5+spades with 8+HCP. 2♠ immediately sets the trump suit while asking about suit quality. 3♣ shows one top honor, there being no way the show the ♠ J. Nonetheless, opener knows there is no grand slam in the cards, so the subsequent auction must be geared towards finding out whether a small slam is viable. At this stage it is best for opener, with only 6 controls, to step aside and let responder take part in the decision making process. (3 would be artificial.) To bid 4♠ would be to deny slam potential, so 3♠ shows non-specific slam interest. One might term it a ‘non-serious’ slam try of sorts. The partners exchange control cue-bids, each exchange promoting the likelihood of 12 tricks being available, until responder has exhausted his possibilities and jumps to a conclusion. One cannot say the auction is natural, but it is cooperative, which enables an exchange of specific control information after an adequate trump suit has been established as the first priority. There lies the main advantage enjoyed by natural bidders.

We note that the opening bidder has not revealed the power of his secondary diamond suit. Had he done so, responder might have been tempted to downgrade. As the auction progresses responder can take an optimistic approach below game by revealing where his controls lie without overstating the overall strength of his holdings. If, knowing what he does, opener sees fit to proceed beyond game without going through RKCB, responder must have faith there exists at least one of many possible good reasons for bidding slam.

Science and Uncertainty

In the 19th century many scientists sought to emulate Isaac Newton in the role of God’s messenger transmitting to mankind the immutable laws of the universe. Today’s view of Mankind is that we are observers whose incomplete knowledge is limited by the accuracy with which we can measure. As measurements become more refined, scientists have to be prepared to abandon cherished principles and move on to the next stage with the realization that there is no end in sight and uncertainty will always prevail.

Within the bridge world scientific bidding is synonymous with the extraction of precise information that reduces uncertainty. Thick books have been written on how to get the most information out of an auction that starts with a 1NT opening bid. Bidding contests promote the idea that bidding sequences can be devised to extract the essential features of a deal that determine desirability of reaching a particular contract. The basic idea is that the more information extracted, the better the chances of success. This is not entirely true.

In practice we know that the success of a contract depends upon the actions of the defenders – the less they know, the better for declarer’s chances. The aim of bidding is not to achieve the fullest disclosure, but to maximize the probability of scoring well. Normally, at IMPs especially, this translates into bidding a high scoring contract and making it with some help from the defenders. One wants to exchange information in order to judge accurately the efficacy of a high-scoring contract while keeping hidden information that may aid the defense. The trick is to achieve the best balance between the conflicting requirements. Recently in a match between Norway and Sweden a deal occurred that shows how the most sophisticated pairs seek to make use of uncertainty.

Dealer: East

Vul: Both

Bertheau

KT2

K53

T942

AQ

Groetheim

Q

AT

AQ76

KJ6532

Tundal

AJ63

96

KJ53

874

Nystrom

9854

QJ8742

8

T9

Groetheim

Bertheau Tundal Nystrom
Pass Pass
1 Pass 1NT (8-14) Pass
3NT All Pass

Here we see Glenn Groetheim, devisor of one of the most advanced relay bidding systems, jumping to 3NT with an inappropriate distribution, just like the Galloping Grannies at my local club. The difference is that an expert partnership has several options available that can be safely pursued without fear of an accident, 2 would have been a relay trigger, yet the expert chooses to blast away to the most likely making game hoping to have the timing to set up the winning tricks in clubs. One may surmise that he has chosen to maximize the Conceal-to-Reveal ratio in order to minimize the chance of an immediate killing lead. He may have anticipated a non-damaging spade lead, but Nystrom had the natural lead of the 7, and 3NT was easily down 3 for a loss of 14 IMPs.

Lest we think it was wrong to insist on reaching game on this combination, the Swedish EW pair at the other table bid and made the ‘impossible’ 5. Johan Upmark opened the bidding with a Strong Club and in a series of 5 relays Per-Ola Cullin provided the information that pointed to the game that can be defeated on a diamond lead, which would have been obvious if EW had revealed their 4-4 fit in that suit. The lead was the 7 which ran to the Q. Upmark played a low club from hand, and the timing was right for discarding a heart loser on the A. This shows one more time that full disclosure is not the way to go if one aims to maximize the gain. To be fair, a mundane result of +110 in a minor partial would have gained a useful 9 IMPs for the Swedes.

A week later in Monaco Bertheau and Nystrom got to bid a slam using their own relay methods against another famous Norwegian pair. The question here is what information does one include in the definition of one’s bids? To qualify as scientific, a bid should be defined exactly in numbers, not vaguely as an attitude, as follows at the other table.

Dealer: South

Vul: Both

Ventin

Q2

8732

76532

J4

Zimmermann

AK6

A5

AT9

K8652

Multon

943

K964

KJ

AQT7

Wrang

JT875

QJT

Q84

93

Zimmermann Ventin Multon Wrang
Pass
1 Pass 1 Pass
1NT Pass 3NT

Pass

4NT All Pass

West has a strong 5-3-3-2 hand, the kind that gives me so much frustration when I am playing 2/1 game forcing at the local club. It pains me to open a nebulous 1 and jump to 2NT for all the world looking like a guy who hopes partner can raise to 3NT on 6 HCPs. My expectations of being raised to 4 clubs is practically non-existent, so I must settle for +690 and an average board. I have suggested starting with a forcing 1 response, but the above result from a top European pair shows that may get you one level higher to no good effect in the end. The problem is not so much a lack of bidding space, one can bid safely up to 5NT, as a poor definition of the bids, hence what information they convey. Even if one starts with game forcing response by East to a Big Club opening bid by West, there remains the question if what information is most relevant: responder’s distribution, of course, to establish a 9-card fit exists, but also the playing strength of responder’s holding with regard to a club slam. Controls are of prime importance.

When I am dealt a hand with 8 controls (A=2, K=1) I am immediately alerted to the slam possibility it represents. Zimmermann had a chance when Multon jumped raised to 3NT showing decent values, if he could have bid 4 naturally and still managed to stop in 4NT if partner primarily held diamonds. This was IMP scoring, after all. The result shows that the 4-3-2-1 scale is not sufficient, as 12 tricks are easy even on a mere 31 HCP. (In fact, 7 makes without a finesse as South’s heart honors can be ruffed out.)

The aforementioned Swedish pair reached 6 in a straightforward manner, albeit in an auction that went on for 9 rounds. The first round was critical: Bertheau began with a Strong Club and Nystrom responded 1 to show 8 or more “zz points”, where A=3, K=2, and Q=1. This evaluation is well suited to distributional hands where controls are more important than slow stoppers in a short suit. No one can convince me that 3 jacks are the equivalent of a king. Bertheau knew after the first response that his partner held the A, a red king, and possibly 3 queens or a second red king and 1 queen. It hardly seems efficient to have to take 7 more rounds to sort it out, but fun is fun. I’m sure the boys put in lots of time preparing for this, so let’s not begrudge them their moment of triumph.

Bidding according to the total number of HCPs is quantitative in nature, but it is not scientific, as it is not a sufficient description. The other factor at work is distribution. The value of isolated queens and jacks lies largely in their relationship with suits held by one’s partner. If a partnership withholds distributional information, then it removes the opportunity to evaluate accurately, and they must fall back on bidding by formula to what is most likely on average. Here is a perfect example from the Hainan Air Cup 2011.  Using Precision methods one pair bid to 6NT on 34 HCPs, the other to 7. Let’s put it in a hypothetical American 2/1 context.

Q2 AT6 1NT 4NT
♥ AK63 ♥ J4 6NT Pass
AQ432 KJT
Q3 AKJ96

The doubleton black queens motivate West to open 1NT (15-17 HCP). He has 5 controls which puts him comfortably at the top of the range. I prefer the range 14-16 HCP, as all too often 17 HCP puts one in the slam range. Responder has 6 controls, the equivalent of 20 HCPs. However, it is uncertain how much weight to put on the 3 jacks and the 2 tens. One can find out only by getting out of the NT mode and start bidding suits. East is not quite sure how to do that. If he does go through a procedure, how sure can he be that he will reach the correct contract? When East opts for a quantitative 4NT, West is happy to accept the invitation. He might consider it unlucky that the hands fit so well, because with 34 HCP in total, 6NT is most often the right place to stop.

West may decide to open 1 planning to reverse to 2 after the expected 1 response. When partner bids 2, West has to decide whether to enter the NT mode or to bid 2 to show a second suit, even though it is likely that there is no 4-4 heart fit. To bid 2 is to guide the defender towards a spade opening lead. When facing a close decision in a forcing auction I prefer to make the cheaper bid regardless and await developments. Here the decision is not even close as 13 of the 17 HCPs lie in the red suits. Here is how the bidding might proceed, in the manner of the Chinese pair involved. The key is the establishment of a diamond fit.

Q2 AT6 1
♥ AK63 ♥ J4 2♥ 3
AQ432 KJT 3♥ 4NT (RKCB)
Q3 AKJ96 5 6
7 Pass

Of course, the bidding is not perfect, as East (Gao Fei) could correct to 7NT. This shows that it is not easy psychologically to switch back and forth between NT mode and suit contract mode. The disclosure of the diamond suit enabled East to give added value to KJT, while the disclosure of the club suit enabled West to add value for Qx. The presence of the Q and J was largely irrelevant.

Note that it doesn’t help greatly for West to open a Big Club. He has just 5 controls, not enough to be able comfortably to take charge of the auction. Usually 6 controls are required, 7 desired. It is East with his 6 controls who can offer the best evaluation, so cooperative bidding is indicated when the high card values are balanced and neither hand has shortage.