Against the Field

Against the Field

What distinguishes matchpoint from Teams is the amount of consideration one gives to what others are doing with the same cards. At matchpoint scoring emphasis is placed upon reaching a common contract and outscoring the field through clever declarer play, and/or uninformative bidding practices. There are added advantages to be got from uncertainty. The general perception is that accurate bidding gives a pair a better chance of reaching the right contract but a lesser chance of beating par. An example from a recent club game illustrates the downward trend.

Playing in a mixed field of 13 tables using 2/1 methods, how might West approach the problem of what to open in third seat holding ♠ AKJT3 ♥ 6 ♦ AKQ9 ♣ KT4, 20 HCP with 3+ losers and 7 controls. In making decisions, sooner or later, one will tend to bid what is best according to what is most probable given the partial information available at the time. Only rarely can one bid with perfect certainty, so it is usually a question of how much information one feels is needed to make a decision and achieve a good result. Most follow the expert advice inspired by successful Wall Street traders: ‘bid on rumor, defend on count.’

As West holds 20 HCP, there are 20 HCP up for grabs, and the fact that 2 players have passed already, it is reasonable to assume partner holds the expected number, 7. That should be enough to cover one loser, but not necessarily 2. Should one explore for the perfect cards opposite or merely blast to 4♠, the most attractive contract, with high expectations of making it? On this deal we can tell you that 10 of 13 pairs played in 4♠ and you will score 70% if you play in 4♠ without a club lead. Using Wall Street logic, if you took the gamble, you deserve the reward. Of course, your gain from taking an unusual route to a common contract would be an innocent opponents’ loss.

If West plays by the book by opening 1♠ to begin a cooperative auction, who knows where it might lead? After a pass by North, East now faces a problem with ♠ 9876 ♥ AQ754 ♦ JT9 ♣ 7. From his point-of-view the expectation is that the other three players hold 11 HCP each. In his book, Passed Hand Bidding(1989), Mike Lawrence placed considerable emphasis on the possibility that partner may have opened in third seat with a load of garbage, and that the opponents, if given the chance, may be poised to enter the auction, or at least gain information valuable for their defence. A jump raise would show this degree of support, 4 trumps and an unspecified singleton, thus serving 2 strategic purposes simultaneously.

Of course, nondescriptive bids based largely on HCP ranges are not conducive to accurate slam bidding. 4NT usually constitutes a desperate attempt to extract some useful information albeit above game level. Three Wests felt it is incumbent upon themselves to try RKCB, and finding there was an ace missing, they signed off in 5♠, held to 12 tricks. This awful approach scored an undeservedly high 33%, 37% less than any blaster to game who escaped the club lead.

To be sure there are ways to reach 6♠ with 2/1 methods, and 2 pairs out of 12 achieved that, scoring 11 matchpoints while being held to 12 tricks only. A pair of ‘super-blasters’, the kind that can ruin an opponent’s a good game, got to slam in an auction that was the mental equivalent of arm wrestling: 2♣ – 2♦( an Ace or King); 2♠ – 4NT; 5♦ (3 key cards) – 6♠. Overall they scored 42%, so we can cancel the committee.

Only one pair reached slam presumably by legitimate 2/1 methods as they are both bridge teachers who always have their bids. That good result may ease their consciences as they preach the word to their congregations of unrepentant transgressors. They got to the slam, yes, but devoid of sharp practices scored just 50% overall, a field-happy result.

Finally, the only pair of Precision bidders in the field managed to bid slam informatively and scored 67% overall. They adhere to the strategy of ‘accuracy in construction, aggression in competition’, made feasible by their limited-bid structure.

John	Bob
—	Pass
1♣*	1♦**
2♠	4♣***
4♦	4♥
6♠	Pass

 

1♣	16+HCP	1♦	0-7 HCP
2♠	game force	4♣	splinter, 4+spades
4♦	♦A	4♥	♥A
6♠	to play

The auction was brief and to the point. Declarer decided the final contract without knowing everything about responder’s hand, but he knew the essentials. It is worth noting that responder’s 4♥ bid promised the ace, so was informative. It was not of the vague ‘wait-and-see’ kind which crops up in co-operative 2/1 auctions.

So now we can see how the slam could be bid with 2/1 methods, in fact, in a superior manner: 1♠ – 3♣ (splinter by a passed hand); 3♦ – 3♥; 3♠(forcing) – 4♥, etc. Below game level the opening bidder knows more about responder’s hand than does the Precision bidder and is in a position to extract even more information. So why didn’t the field reach slam? Well, the system lends itself to a great deal of variation. Maybe responders don’t play a limit–raise splinter by a passed hand. Maybe 3♣ is a preemptive jump shift, or maybe a fit showing jump, or a nondescriptive mixed raise. Does the pair play Drury? Is responder strong enough for Drury, and if so, what are his options on the next round? The fact there are so many choices indicates none is very good, although each might work best on any given deal. Overall it’s a mess.

Swinging to Catch Up

There was one peculiar result manufactured by a competent veteran pair – 4♠ making 5.

Checking their scores reveal a series of tops and bottoms during the session. One can imagine a state of mind in which declarer feels desperate to get back in the running after a disappointing result on the previous board. After a nondescriptive auction to 4♠, declarer can see his side has missed a slam if the ♠Q drops. To generate a swing he hopes the ♠Q will not drop, so he goes against the field and finesses on the second round of trumps, the only way to hold himself to 11 tricks.

Some would accuse him of antisocial behaviour for operating in this selfish fashion, asserting that a player should strive to preserve the integrity of the field, such as it is, especially if he is having a bad game. Personally I have lost many a matchpoint by playing against the odds in an attempt to make up some ground. I blame Hugh Kelsey for suggesting one should modify one’s approach based on what one thinks the field has done. This is akin to driving downtown traffic while constantly looking in the rearview mirror. If the field is in 6♠, 2 overtricks in 4♠ will be wasted. So you may hope the ♠Q doesn’t fall. However, if it does fall, you can’t beat the slam bidders, and all you can hope for is to match the others who, like yourself, play in 4♠. You will score below average by making 12 tricks, but you will not score a bottom. If the ♠Q doesn’t fall, you will have a decent score making just 11 tricks. It pays to overcome your disappointments.

Here is an example of declarer play that may be more in line with what Kelsey had in mind.

One can see what declarer was thinking when he opted for 3NT rather than 4♥. His hand taken in isolation is very suitable for play in a NT contract with decent chances of making as many tricks in NT as in a heart game. He knew he was bidding against the field. I picture The Field as a Granny full of commonsense advice, a bit behind the times, and mostly unaware of what’s going on behind the scene. Granny won’t bid a slam unless she can count on 12 tricks off the top, and it is pretty obvious that on these cards The Field will be playing sensibly in their 4-4 heart fit, normally making 10 tricks.

The opening lead was a non-life-threatening fourth-highest ♦3, a reprieve from the quick establishment of defensive tricks in clubs. Two aces are missing so timing will be important. Hearts, which are known to be divided 4-4, seemed to be the suit to tackle. If the hearts are played in the manner of those in 4♥, usually declarer will take 2 heart tricks, but be held to 9 tricks, thus getting a bottom. Nevertheless declarer won the diamond lead in his hand with the ♦A and played the hearts abnormally, ducking to ♥9 on his right, an onerous safety play not usually recommended at matchpoints. Ominously the RHO regained the timing for the defence by switching to clubs. Declarer won the ♣A in dummy and ducked another heart, losing to the ♥J on his left when the ♥T appeared on his right. This went against the rule of restricted choice, as with ♥JT9 initially the RHO might have played the ♥J previously. Disaster ensued, down 2 being the woeful result.

Rather than worry about how the field might handle the trumps in 4♥, declarer might have considered how to play for the maximum number of tricks in his NT contract. Spades are a 7-card suit and hearts an 8-card suit, but the spades lack only ♠AJ8 whereas hearts lack ♥AJT9. Spades will have to be played eventually, so a reasonable play is to win the ♦K in dummy and finesse the ♠9. This gives a 3-times better chance of making 3 tricks than does playing on hearts and has the added attraction that one can still entertain the hope that the hearts are behaving badly. Furthermore, it is often advantageous psychologically to make your early play towards the hidden hand.

With the RHO holding ♠AJ8 the play yields 3 spade tricks and the freedom to establish a trick in hearts for the 9th trick. This would be a good recovery at Teams, whereas at matchpoints it is a ‘costs nothing’ play, because down 2, down 1, or making 9 tricks will score the same zero. The best result is got when upon winning the ♠A the RHO persists in diamonds – now 10 tricks come home – another top attributable to a misguided defence. Well, doesn’t Granny advise, ‘always return your partner’s suit’?