Bridge Beyond Reason

Some people like to think of bridge in deterministic terms: find the correct solution and you win. This is the textbook approach. In practice there is uncertainty, in which case, the correct solution entails finding the most probable construction, which does not always provide the winning solution in the short term. Losers are left with the consolation that they will come out ahead in the long run. Some are disturbed when perfectly logical approach falls short in practice. One sometimes reads a complaint along the lines, ‘If the ♣2 and the ♣3 were interchanged, he would have made his slam by overtaking in dummy. It’s a pity such a small change makes such a big difference.’ Well, it’s not a pity at all, it’s a fact of life: a small change can make a big difference. It’s not a question of probability because the ♣2 and ♣3 can be interchanged without changing the probabilities. The effect is chaotic in that a small, apparently insignificant, change can have an unpredictable huge consequence. Furthermore, it is futile trying to refine the bidding to the point where one can distinguish a winning placement from a losing one. I short, there are limits to what one can achieve through reason alone.

Uncertainty is at its highest when competitive bidding is involved. In his book, The Contested Auction, Roy Hughes notes that it is impossible to cover the many variations that may come up during a contested auction.  Having made that point, he devotes the bulk of the book to a discussion of a multitude of methods along with his personal preferences. One may agree or disagree on each suggestion, but in the end the sheer weight of choices presented dulls the brain. It is satisfying to think that every sequence can be refined to provide the greatest advantage, but I ask myself, how much disclosure is optimal? I maintain that too much refinement can be counter-productive, and not just because of the memory load. What is needed is a flexible general approach to competitive bidding. This is not the case for constructive bidding where practice makes perfect.

Consider the situation where the opponents have used a bid, say Multi-2♦, that requires a written defence. Would you prefer a half-sheet or several pages? Through its sheer bulk the most detailed defence may cause confusion, even though all the possibilities are clearly defined, and the half-sheet defence may be criticized for being suboptimal. However, it can be better to keep it simple and let general principles guide the action. If one opts for the more detailed definition it may well be the opponents, who are familiar with the subtleties, will benefit more. Being specific may play into their hands.

Experiments with stock trading practices have shown that decisions tend to get worse when the amount of information available is increased beyond a certain point. This is counter-intuitive, but the figures don’t lie. With regard to bridge, we can expect an even worse effect when all players are active in the auction often providing conflicting information. That in itself adds stress which compounds the problem. Promoting uncertainty by entering the auction can be useful if it increases the chance the opponents will make a mistake. Keeping the pressure on may pay off late in a long match. 

A Takeout Double in the USBC Final

The normal expectation before the bidding begins is that the hands are balanced. Once an overcall is made the perception may change. To double on a balanced hand is more dangerous as the initial expectation has not been altered greatly. On a bad day one might get redoubled. So I would not double an opening bid of 1♠ on this hand: ♠ A5 ♥ Q652 ♦ Q985 ♣ KJ8. The red suits are defensive in nature, and most of the points are in the shorter suits. I count 9 losers. Partner will have to bid at the 2-level, and a double two of a minor puts the odds in the favour of the opponents. I can’t imagine a takeout double being recommended by a bridge teacher, but experts think otherwise.

Lead: ♦K for down 3, -500.

Although the light double was within the bounds of a normal action under NS partnership agreements, it was misjudged under the circumstances of having a 17 IMP lead with 4 boards to go. As noted on BBO, there was considerable amount of table talk taking place, which I have concluded added to the stress of an already stressful situation. Hampson’s worst error was his subsequent redouble which re-enforced Levin-Weinstein’s inclination to go for the throat. Why redouble when the ♣KJ8 represented good support for partner’s chosen suit?

My criticism of the double turns out to be totally wrong when judged in the light of the overall result. EW can make a vulnerable game, so a loss of 500 represents a virtual gain on the board. Unfortunately or otherwise the bidding proceeded as follows at the other table:

Rodwell made the same bad double, but Moss was intent on reaching the best game for his side. Choosing to play in hearts showed a distrust of the double. Rodwell led a low heart. Bathurst made the fatal play of going up with the ♥ K. Meckstroth unfailingly found the club switch, and the contract was down 1 for a loss of 12 IMPs. If the contract had been 3NT, Bathurst could afford to lose 4 tricks so might have been more inclined to play the ♥ J and make his game for a gain of 3 IMPs.

Thus a garbage bid that defies common sense may yield unexpected gains when the opponents fumble the ball. Logic doesn’t apply, so what are we left with? Let’s not resort to the ‘bad luck’ excuse. One might conclude that the bad takeout double gave the impression that Rodwell held the ♥ A. The misplay was a logical consequence of that reasonable assumption. Or one might think that psychological factors took over in a moment of stress, perhaps increased by the disappointment that the contract was not 3NT.

In such cases the player who made the wrong play shouldn’t be relied upon to give his reasons. It may be that he himself does not know why he took the action he now regrets. Hormones may have provided an unconscious reaction. On the other hand, he may remain defiant and may not want to reveal his thinking at the table which included some extraneous considerations. There is always a next time. Actually the game is more interesting when it takes on an additional psychological dimension.

Consider what to do when called to an appeals committee. When asked to give one’s reasons for taking a disputed action, the truthful answer might be, ‘because I felt like it.’ Of course, this is frowned upon, because the committee is there to bolster the concept of bridge as a game of logic. They distrust emotion. So, when called upon, one has to be prepared to give pseudo-explanations that more or less fit the hands which are now fully on view. This may require some overnight preparation. Giving several reasons gives rise to doubt, so pick the most plausible and go with that. Be convoluted if you must, but keep emotion out of it. This is yet another situation where it may not pay to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 

The Topless Suit

A fairly safe way to enter the auction is to bid a suit. The hope is that partner may be able to raise, so that one can compete on the basis of the Law of Total Tricks. The expectation is that if one bids a suit and partner raises, we hold some control of the suit. This may be so, in which case the opposition will do well to avoid declaring in 3NT. Thus, unlike the takeout double, a suit bid does fundamentally change the perception of the opening side. The antidote to this kind of bidding is for the opening side to bid NT if they have a stopper. Partners can be surprised to find both have stoppers. In such cases I assume the opposition have our suit as well stocked as we have theirs, which makes 3NT all the more attractive. Recently I was able to put this theory to the test.

Lead ♠Q, 3NT making 430

I had my usual misgivings about opening in a suit with a flat 19 HCPs, however, with 2 aces and 2 kings (6 controls), trying for game in a suit looked appropriate, so I resisted the temptation to open a light 2NT. Partner gave me a raise in hearts, after which my RHO got into the action with a 2♠ call. As my controls were in the suits the opponents had bid, I felt 3NT would be a better contract than 4♥, so I bid it on the assumption that partner had help in clubs. I half-expected a club lead, as certain opponents get into the auction for the purpose of finding out which suit to lead –not spades, not diamonds, not hearts, ergo, a club. Not this time. The opening lead was the ♠Q.

Once again letting the opponents into the auction paid off . I felt further satisfaction when the RHO showed out on the first heart lead towards dummy. The field was in 4♥ going down on the bad breaks, sometimes doubled. I could afford to set up 3 tricks in hearts, ending up with 10 tricks for a 90% score.

I can see the temptation to bid 2♠. The 2♦ overcaller must be very short in hearts, so if he holds a few good spades the chances of pushing the opponents too high is good. Unlucky, then, that I held such a good hand and that the 2-level overcall was rather skimpy. However, when one knows partner is short in their bid suit, one must recognize that such shortness motivates light actions. And if you hold strength in their suit, they must be bidding on strength in yours. It works every time, but players keep missing the inferences, so the practice persists. Whenever you can, make them pay.