Watching Meditation at Work

I was delighted to see Allan Graves come out a winner at the 2014 Spingold as a member of the Richard Schwartz team. I have played against him several times at our local club while he was a resident of Victoria for a brief period. It is always a pleasure to lose to a gentlemanly card shark as one comes away thinking one has been given a free lesson. His comments on BBO are always thoughtful and to the point. He now lives in Vermont, plays bridge professionally, and teaches at the Shambhala Meditation Center.

I hope Graves writes a book on his fifty years of bridge experiences, one that includes how his meditational exercises have helped him at the table. Meditation is often portrayed as an otherworldly endeavor when the practitioner shuts himself up and contemplates his navel. I think not. Otherworldly to me is hoping for divine intervention in a situation that appears to be beyond one’s control, whereas meditation is a means for attaining self-reliance. Paradoxically, self-control leads to greater freedom of action. The basic technique is to train diligently and do what you feel instinctively is right at the time.

Descartes famously conjectured, ‘I think, therefore I am’. Buddhists decline this approach, preferring the more mundane assessment, ‘I am what I am.’ Self knowledge is an important element. Once you discover you are a fool, you can work hard at becoming less of a fool. (Well, that’s the theory behind it.) It is not a question of right or wrong. One learns to observe one’s own actions dispassionately, which tends to prevent an emotional over-reaction. Accept the fact you won’t always do the right thing.  Remember,

‘Even monkey fall from tree’ – Munenori Kawasaki ?

Allan could do a better job at this than I can, nonetheless let’s look at him in action at the recent Spingold, as reported on BBO. Board 43 in the Semi-Final against Team Assael showed the value of partnership trust in a competitive auction. Such trust is developed over many boards, and sometimes one may be criticized for being overly cautious during the process, but there can be a payoff if one is patient and maintains a high degree of awareness so that caution doesn’t become the overriding approach. With none vulnerable the German opponents began with a minimal 1♣ bid on 4=4=1=4 shape with a singleton ace.

Schwartz had a decent (that is, old-fashioned) overcall in diamonds. Piekarek had a modern transfer response of 1♥ which allowed Graves to show values there cheaply. Smirnov was able to jump raise to the 2-level, but that was not high enough to shut out Schwartz. Now Piekarek took up some more space with his mediocre hand, but not enough to prevent Graves from getting in a cue bid at the 4-level. The enemy bidding had helped him in his evaluation, and EW did little to impede the NS exchange of information. Schwartz was no doubt delighted to show his club controls, and Graves took the hint.

A good carpenter plans ahead and makes best use of the tools available with the result that it all looks so easy when everything fits together nicely. At the other table the workmanship had a somewhat slap-dash quality, so the end result was a bit wonky.

Sementa showed his diamond support and shortage with a jump cuebid in spades. Tokay liked his hand a lot, and went into ace-asking, rather than cue bidding the club controls. Apparently he customarily overcalls on much less. Sementa probably regretted having taken up his own bidding space, so he bid a simple 5♣ without confirming the spade void. Tokay counted 2 losers and stopped in game. As it turned out the wrong player made the final decision. Shutting out the opponents can be profitable, true, but shutting out one’s partner is bad when it’s your hand. It is a matter of perception.

Here is a hand from the third session of the final. Allan didn’t do anything, so a Zen-like  non-happening, but as the Chinese say, ‘when nothing can be done, do nothing.’

Schwartz led the ♥K which was allowed to hold, Graves following with the ‘encouraging’ ♥2, Zimmermann with the ♥4. The sight of the dummy’s minor suit honors sitting behind his is disheartening to a defender who had revealed his all. It appeared that if he played a second heart he could later be endplayed successfully. If so, nothing could be done about it, but rather than ‘do nothing’ and continue with the ♥T, Schwartz precipitated the action. He cashed the ♠A and unblocked the ♣K hoping for a miracle. We see this kind of ‘give up’ play often enough at the local matchpoint game, especially when the cookies are being put out just before the coffee break.

It was unlucky that the game could have been defeated and that teammates accurately bid only to 3♠, making 140 for a loss of 10 IMPs. Monaco had taken the lead when 2 boards later Graves again turned the tide in the third quarter of a match by bringing home a vulnerable game that was defeated at the other table.

At the other table Nunes as West opened a weak 1NT, Fantoni bid 4♣ as a transfer to hearts. Against 4♥ Lindqvist led the ♣3. Nunes ruffed in dummy and played of the ♥A and ♥K, applying the familiar rule of ‘Eight Ever, Nine Never.’ Down 1 appeared to represent a normal push.

Schwartz-Graves has a very American 2/1 auction to a vulnerable game. As we learned from the Davy Crockett Show, don’t show fear when facing a bear in the woods. Zimmermann had questions to ask about this simple auction. Eventually he chose a spade lead and hit pay dirt. North took 2 spade tricks and exited with a safe diamond, the ♦7.

Declarer won the ♦K with the ♦A, played the ♥A, then finessed Multon for the ♥Q, making his game, gaining 12 IMPs, and putting his team back in the lead. What led him to the successful line of play? I see 3 possible factors at play:

• the bad result 2 boards earlier,
• the defender’s actions, and
• table feel.

Personally I don’t like a teammate who tries to swing a result by taking an action chosen specifically for being different from what is expected at the other table. In this case, that would entail finessing for the ♥Q rather than playing for the drop, the expected out-of-sight action. I don’t think Graves would consider himself to be in a situation where he would choose that alternative in the hope of creating a swing. His partnership, playing against the Monaco sponsor, was the senior pair in a team with 4 young guns, so his role was to come through the session without major damage, leaving the swinging actions to the likes of Brogeland and Co who come by them naturally.

The BBO commentators made much of the fact that the opening leader was marked with 4 spades and 3 diamonds. Multon was criticized for returning the ♦7 after taking 2 spade tricks on the opening spade lead, thus giving away the distribution in that suit. One might conclude that with 5 cards in spades and diamonds in the North hand, and 7 cards in those suits in the South hand, the difference of 2 was enough to justify the trump finesse. This argument ignores the possibilities in the club suit. It is more likely that the NS distribution is North: 3=2=2=6 and South: 4=2=3=4 than it is North:  3=3=2=5 and South: 4=1=3=5. That is to say, the difference of 2 vacant places is more readily filled by a 6-4 club split than by a 3-1 heart split. The appearance of the ♥T doesn’t affect the odds.

The third factor is table feel. We are told that Zimmermann asked Graves several questions about the bidding sequence, which appears to us to be quite straightforward. Why would the opening leader feel he has to ask for hidden meanings unless he has a problem? This in itself raises suspicions, especially when the defenders have not entered the auction. The same applies when a defender comments on the suitability of the dummy on first inspection. This is invariably a tip off of an exception circumstance. Expect bad breaks, provided that one is playing against honest and/or naïve opponents.

We won’t ask Allan why he finessed, but remain happy in imagining that all three factors may have had a cumulative effect leading to the winning decision.