The USBF Women’s Final

We have to thank the USBF for providing fans with the double dummy results for the hands played in their tournaments. Of course, we have been warned not to judge an expert’s particular play on the basis of a double dummy result, but that applies to the analysis of one hand at a time. Over the long run it is another matter. The double dummy results give us frames of reference that we can apply to the statistical analysis of several hands within the same category, for example, deals that in theory can sustain a game contract on any lead. For an expert pair missing one such game may be forgivable, but missing several is statistically significant and grounds for legitimate criticism.

It has long been a widely held belief that the key to winning a long team event is to bid your games and slams and not get caught in awkward situations where you might get doubled for a huge penalty. The scene has changed. The ability to compete effectively has become a necessity. That entails withstanding preemptive bids by the opponents. Thus the emphasis has moved from the logical (constructive bidding without interference) to the emotional (in-your-face interference). This shift was borne out by the results from the recent 2013 USBF Women’s Final over 120 boards in which the Sonsini team prevailed over the Baker team by a score of 237 to 197, even though the Baker team was much more effective in reaching double dummy games (and one grand slam) the other team missed. 134 IMPs were exchanged over 15 deals, Baker gaining 94 IMPs, to Sonsini’s 40 IMPs. Despite this huge advantage the Baker team lost.

Clearly Baker was winning under bidding contest rules, but this was real life where bad bids can be transformed into good results. On six hands both sides bid to games that can be defeated on a double dummy basis. The Sonsini team scored 56 IMPs to Baker’s 11, recovering partly from the losses sustained for not reaching double dummy games. Any blame attributed to the defenders has to be left to a detailed analysis. Suffice it to say, the Sonsini team had much the better of it and benefited greatly after ineffective leads.

Highly Competitive Hands
I think of this type as ‘chaotic’ as one could hardly predict the results from a preview of the hand records. Such hands provided Sonsini with a margin of 20 IMPs over 5 boards winning on 4, losing on 1. Although one may practice one’s constructive bidding, it is difficult to practice competitive bidding as so much depends on the tendencies of one’s opponents. In highly competitive deals one would expect an advantage to a pair who has a long history of success, so are most familiar with each others behavior ‘under fire’. One should not be surprised that Deas-Palmer excelled in this category.

In order to regulate one’s hopes and fears one needs methods in competition just as one has methods in a constructive auction, but the world hasn’t caught up yet on how optimally to combine accuracy with enhanced uncertainty. Clearly distribution is important and the Law of Total Tricks has to be an integral part of the system, but one must be aware that the placement of the honors has an effect on the efficacy of the Law.  Let’s see if we can learn from a closer look at the following 5 important swing deals.

One advantage of a 1NT opening bid with a 5-card major is that it limits the high card content immediately. As a result the responder, being well informed, has more say in placing the final contract. Given leeway Levitina could make a move on minimal values without fear of being punished subsequently by her partner. Stansby is not known for frivolous actions. Her jump to 4♠ was based on an 8-card suit and a void in hearts. Sanborn could pass and await guidance from her (unlimited) partner who must surely be short in spades. Not knowing of the 10-card heart fit, Levitina was not tempted to take further action. 4♠ was cold. At the other table Wheeler’s opening bid was less restricted.

Bernstein gave a preemptive raise which failed to shut out Palmer’s spade suit. Wheeler was the captain of the hand. She had extras, so felt she couldn’t let 4♠ pass her by. Having described a poor hand already Bernstein let the double stand – even with a void she held some defensive cards in the minors.  Some might say Wheeler was unlucky, 8-card suits are rare, others might say the ♦K, ♥Q and ♥J were marked as being wasted on defence. I prefer to think this pair was disadvantaged by not being able to limit their hands before making the final decision. Wheeler led the ♥A which was ruffed in declarer’s hand, setting up the ♥K in dummy for the overtrick!

After Bernstein’s pass Palmer opened a weak 2 in either major (Multi) leaving some doubt in Wheeler’s mind as what to do. She passed to await further information. Deas was able to find out what she wanted to know, and was left to play in a makeable 3♥. Having got assurance of the opponents’ heart fit, Wheeler belatedly got into the auction. Scrambling above the 3-level was costly: -300 against a heart partial. This was even worse as at the other table: teammate Stansby opened 2♥ which Granovetter raised provocatively to 4♥, doubled and down 1, increasing the loss on the board to 9 IMPs.

Against a preempt a player is advised to get into the auction early, later often being too late. Playing safe is not safe, as Wheeler demonstrated. The purpose of an opening preempt is to remove bidding space and make the opponents guess, but the responder is often in a position of having to guess as well. Even if one gambles a double in second seat, responder may not be able to take full advantage, as when Granovetter misjudged the offensive potential of her hand. (♠ KJT ♥ AQ2 ♦ KT85 ♣ Q82).

How can one defend against the Multi 2♦ if one is not sure of which major is held on one’s right? The simplest solution is as follows: double says, ‘I would double a weak 2♥; 2♥ says, ‘I would double a weak 2♠.’ All other bids have their natural meanings.

The following exhibit illustrates the fact that wide-ranging preempts make everyone guess. There are general principles to follow. Trust your partner, act quickly on what has been promised, but don’t expect perfection. If the opponents have been made to guess, assume they have guessed wrong. Don’t give them a second chance to get it right. Assume your side’s preempt has worked, perhaps in some unexpected way.

McCallum tends to preempt lighter than most against non-vulnerable opponents. The inherent uncertainty puts the onus on Baker to handle the subsequent competition. Radin bid 4♠, obviously a guess, but was it a good guess? Baker had primarily a defensive holding without aces and could expect 3 tricks on defence, but is there a good chance of a 4th?  The primary guideline comes from the Law of Total Tricks. Given McCallum is 5-5 in the minors, Baker can expect the division of sides to be 5=4=9=8, so each side has a double fit with a total trump count of 18. If Radin can make 10 tricks in spades, Baker can expect only 8 tricks in diamonds, so 5♦* looks to be going down 3, for a score of -500. The sacrifice would lose IMPs even if 4♠ were making.

5♦ went down 4, declarer taking just 7 tricks. One way in which 4♠ is a bad guess is that the opponents have a better fit in hearts, as Baker might have guessed.  At the other table 12 tricks were made in hearts, beating the double dummy limit of 11. So, bidding 5♦ was predictably the wrong move, as it was possible to drive the opponents to a slam in hearts makeable on less than perfect defence.

For the winning team Levitina-Sanborn incurred some losses in the game zone due to a herky-jerky self-preemptive style otherwise encountered with veteran rubber bridge experts. We see it again on Board 7 which involved an eccentric weak 2♦.

This 2♦ preempt with a good suit, 6 losers, a void, and a 4-card spade suit was so bad that I hoped to see it fail badly. Initially it appeared I got my wish. Levitina made an impatient jump that so often lets down her side. Undeterred, Stansby raised Granovetter to game with 5-card support. Levitina doubled with a vengeance to no avail. 4♥ made.  So, bad preempt, bad result, but wait! Oh no! Another bad 2♦ this time from Baker!

By agreement the McCallum-Baker weak two’s are wider ranging in shape than is customary after a certain age. Under circumstances of great variability one needs methods for checking back to get more definition. If one allows a 4-card spade suit to be stuck in amongst the diamonds, you have to be especially circumspect. Given the uncertainty McCallum did not self-preempt as had Levitina, being content to bid 2NT and await developments which were forthcoming from all sides. She raised to game largely on the information the opponents had provided. The gain was a whopping 16 IMPs, but this fine result on Board 7 was not to be followed by others of a similar type.

It would have been much better strategy for Radin jump to 4♥ before clarification could be provided making the uninformative nature of the McCallum-Baker weak two a liability instead of an asset. Preempt the preemptors! Has it come to this? In this on-going process we palookas are years ahead of the experts.