Carpe Diem

What does it take to win against a good team? I observe that the winners are most often those who are willing to seize the opportunities when they arise. They take chances. It is a pity that so many BBO commentators find this objectionable. During the 2012 world championships one expert commented about a top pair along these lines: ‘They bid two 50% slams that came home, so now they deserve to go down on this one.’ This is wrong-headed. If a pair bids a 50% slam in an attempt to gain IMPs, they are just as likely to lose IMPs. So the opponents by doing nothing have been given a chance they don’t deserve to win IMPs. There is no law of probability that says that the result on the next hand depends on the hands before, so each 50% chance remains just that, 50%. It is not a question of being right but of getting it right. Wall Street gamblers take the opposite view: that if one takes high risks one deserves to gain from them. That, too, is wrong. If you risk your shirt on a bad gamble you must be prepared to lose it. (The trick there is to bet someone else’s shirt, or even a shirt that doesn’t exist.)

There are the players who strive to optimize their gain when they are right rather than minimize their loss when they are wrong. When one falls behind in a match, one tends to play aggressively to maximize the possible gains. When one is ahead the tendency often is to minimize the possible losses in order to stay ahead. This usually results in a come-from-behind win. As a case in point let’s look at hands from the final session of the 2012 Transnational Teams where the winners, behind at the beginning, bid aggressively to higher scoring contracts and gained enough on 2 boards to win going away.

Wortel	Pszczola
♠ A952	♠ QJ8	Pass	1♦
♥ K876532	♥ T9	1♥	1NT
♦ 8	♦ KJ42	4♥	Pass
♣ 2	♣ AQ54
6 losers	7 losers

The ♠ K was offside, but 10 tricks were there for the taking, which is in line with the losing trick count. Meike Wortel took a positive view when she passed in first seat. Later, judging that her partner had a balanced hand with 2 hearts in a 7-loser hand, she bid the game. The holder of the Yang hand diagnosed the fit after the Yin hand had been limited. This is the best arrangement when shape and controls are of primary importance. In first seat at the other table Judith Gartaganis preempted with 3♥ on her 6-loser hand and played there. Preempting against the opponents’ minor suit fit is not a productive approach, and got the result it deserved, as the only one preempted was her Yin partner. It was a question of attitude as well as evaluation. The 7-4-1-1 hand was worth an opening bid on the Zar points scale, or, in this case, worthy of a wait-and-see pass.

A jaundiced observer might comment that Wortel was lucky, but on the bidding her partner could have had a control-rich hand (♠ QJx ♥ xx ♦ Axxx ♣ Axxx) that produced 12 easy tricks. Here is a slam hand that was bid by the winners and not by the losers.

On this auction South was able to show 3-card support for North’s 7-card spade suit. When the opponents conveniently made it clear they held strength the diamond suit, Lall gave full value to his 5-loser hand, which opposite a normal 7-loser opening bid can be expected to produce 12 tricks. It was a question of attitude as well as counting losers.  The ♥ J had potential value, but in the end it was a matter of playing the heart suit to be split 3-3. The NS action at the other table was less ambitious.

Wortel’s double brought both minors into consideration and was less specific than the 2♦ overcall. Pszczola’s 2♣ call was less frantic than Gartaganis’ preemptive raise to 4♦, that had served the opposition well by focusing attention on the one suit while advertising the opposition’s weakness. Whether it was North or South who should have taken charge is an open question. South’s sign-off in 4♠ appears especially timorous, as a forcing pass wouldn’t risk going to the 5-level if North were weaker than shown.  

In the Open Championships Sweden beat both leading contenders, Monaco and USA, on the way to a convincing victory. Most analysts assert that the best strategy is to bid boldly and play carefully. So we see players taking huge risks during the bidding while exercising extreme caution during the play. Both actions are against the odds, the difference being that one may recover or even profit from a bad bid, but seldom will one recover from a bad play. In the following hand a young Swedish player showed that he was willing to take a risk for a maximum score when the opportunity presented itself during the play as well as during the bidding. This was the winning attitude.

The Swedes throughout showed a determination not to be intimidated by their famous opponents despite the risks. Meckstroth’s preempts may include some outside strength, as here. Rodwell had enough scattered values in the majors to make 3NT appear viable. Per-Ola Cullin had his say, and Meckstroth showed extras given his preempt. Peter Bertheau didn’t want to be left out, so he contributed a double on general principles. No one lost his nerve, and everyone courageously stood his ground.

The defence began well with a heart to West’s ♥ A and the ♠ 6 through North’s vulnerable spade holding. Cullin won the ♠ K and cashed the ♥ K. There matters stood for a long time as he contemplated his next move. If the opposition were in 5♠ going down at the other table (as they were), he would be assured of a gain on the board if he cashed the ♠ A at this point. That was what the BBO commentators expected him to do. Did he think, ‘This is risky. I’ll take a sure plus and maybe win the match on one of the next 13 boards. If not, there is always next year’? If so, he put such thoughts aside.

Rather than assume the worst, he decided to go for the maximum on defence and play partner for the ♥ Q. If partner didn’t have the ♥ Q he might have given some indication on his heart play – the ♥ 5 appeared normal from ♥ Q5, but abnormal from ♥ 85. Trusting his partner to have played helpfully, he led a heart to Bertheau’s ♥ Q. The spade return set up the long spades, so the contract went down 7 for a score of 1700, and a gain of 18 IMPs to Sweden, who had taken the lead.

Don’t blame Rodwell for this disaster; give the Swedes some credit. Clearly, 4NT* was an abnormal contract, but Sweden and USA had been engaged in a psychological slugfest, an adult version of the schoolboy game of ‘Chicken’. For Rodwell to opt for a contract of 5♦* would constitute a loss of face. Those who pull a doubled NT contract to a long minor are labeled, ‘chicken’. Down 2 in either 4NT or 5♦ was the normal expectation, and there was always the chance Cullin would pull or misdefend. If one habitually anticipates a perfect defence, one would never take a chance, which is a sure way to lose.

At the other table the Swedish South, Johan Upmark, did not preempt with a good suit and an outside ace: he considered it the stuff of which opening bids are made. When Hamman jumped to 4♠ , which makes, Upmark carried on to 5♦, no chicken he. Zia having passed once, was not about to pass twice, even though he had not been invited to the party, and Nystrom, with his Yin hand, flat shape and scattered values, felt he could contribute significantly to the defence. This latter approach was successful.

Preempting on good hands with honors outside the trump suit has become a feature of the psychological game. I am glad to see it fail when it does fail. The aim of these bids is to beat par by generating an abnormal result. Very often this works against the preemptor’s side when his partner ends up with a tough decision. Wrong decisions can turn out to be especially costly with distributional hands where the number of total tricks is high (19 in this case). Upmark with a singleton spade bid in a way that protected his partner by removing an option against 4♠ . The pressure was transferred to his LHO where it belonged. One notes the mismatch: a Yin hand held by a Yang personality.

Conclusion
To be sure, the outcome of a deal depends on the lie of the cards. The players whose actions best correspond to the actual lie of the cards stand to win. The best approach is to try to make the most of the conditions as they are seen to exist rather than to avoid disasters in the face of uncertainty. There is the human factor as well, and winners aggressively pursue the maximum. This may end in disaster on any given hand. In the 2012 European Championships Fantunes scored -1400 on a part score deal and still prevailed at the end. Against Sweden Meckwell lost 1700, but were still just 1 IMP behind with 13 boards to play. It’s part of the game.

Meckwell regained to lead on science only to lose the match on a deal where Meckstroth opened a vulnerable 3♣ on a genuinely preemptive hand: ♠ J3 ♥ 974 ♦ 8 ♣ KQJT872. Rodwell opted to play in 3NT, which was defeated due to a lack of entry to the clubs, whereas at the other table the contract of 5♣ bid by Nystrom made exactly. I like it.