Getting to the Right Contract

Before we discuss how to get to the right contract we have to define what we mean by the ‘right’ contract. In an absolute sense, under the assumption that both hands are known entirely, it is the contract that has the highest average score at IMPs or the highest median score at matchpoints. Probability enters into it – we have all reached contracts with excellent prospects only to experience failure because of bad breaks, but that does not mean we weren’t in the right contract.

During a bidding sequence neither partner can know for sure what the right contract is – that can be judged only by looking at both hands. To reach the right contract consistently, one player has to know enough about his partner’s hand to judge accurately the potential of the two hands combined. That means relevant information has to be exchanged. One might conclude that the more information exchanged the closer the final contract will be to the right contract, but players are acting under constraints. There is a difference between the best contract possible and the best possible contract given the circumstances. There is practical merit in attempting to reach the right contract as a pair will score well on most (but not all) such contracts. Intellectually speaking, that is one of the attractive challenges of the game. Bidding contests are designed towards that end.

Popular bidding systems embody attempts to get the ordinary player to contracts that will score well most of the time. They will get you into the ballpark, but they may not get you into the best seats. Major suits are given precedence over minor suits because they score better. This puts a bias on common bidding sequences. We know that major suit slams are much easier to reach than minor suit slams, even though both carry a bonus over game contracts. This fundamental biasing of the bids in favor of certain contracts over others regardless of their theoretical merit influences the judgement of players who tend to add their own bias to the mix. We bid 3NT on speculation without a thorough investigation of better alternatives, because statistically it’s to our advantage. We see this effect in bidding contests when the contestants, who are good players, consistently bid to a hopeless 3NT when the right contract is a partial – their system makes them do it.

Because they are statistically based, standard bidding practices are limited in their ability to reach the right contract when the right contract involves a rare combination of assets. To do that the players must add rarely used bids that enable a more specific exchange of information. That helps, but there are still limits on accuracy because of the overall reliance on HCP evaluation. There are some players who prefer a simple system and are willing to take their chances by bidding what most often will be successful, given what they know. They rely on their own storehouse of statistical information. A loosely defined system allows freedom of movement. Not favoring a full disclosure, the shrewd player gets restless after just 2 rounds of bidding. They choose contracts in the hope that the circumstances are as expected and/or the defence will be kindly. In what follows we shall look at some hands to see how a player may choose his bids in a way that gets around the limitations of a standard system in order to provide a better definition than is provided normally. I think of the technique as enlightened masterminding.

The Strong Hand Should Decide
How do we know when we start bidding what contract to aim for? This question arose in my mind when I read the opening sentence of Marshall Miles’ article, Powerhouse Opposite Lightweight, in the Nov, 2011 issue of The Bridge World.

‘ A two-club opening bid should be used as any other call, made any time it is the action most likely to reach the right contract.’

After opening 2♣ one would think that the best choice of bids would be in a structure where the opening bidder can ask the responder to provide relevant information that would allow the holder of the strong hand to make the final decision based on what he has learned – that is, some sort of asking sequence should be enabled to so opener can asks concerning what he needs to know. It’s bad enough when the holder of a powerhouse prejudges what appears to be best and biases his bidding towards that end, but in the current state of affairs with 2♣ opening bids the responder is allowed too much leeway in choosing his calls according to what he thinks might be the right contract. Here is an example from a recent team game that illustrates my point.

Bob	Bela
♠ AQ732	♠ J54	2♣	2♥*
♥ 8	♥ A7	2♠	2NT
♦ AKQ6	♦JT95	3♦	4♠
♣ AKQ	♣ J874	Pass	*2 controls

I had a powerhouse hand and my partner was able to provide relevant information immediately concerning the number of controls he held – one ace or two kings. I showed a spade suit and partner showed his shape. Over my 3♦ Bela made the best bid available to show what was likely to be, from his point-of-view, the right contract. He was correct in his assessment as I was warned not to proceed further in spades. Even if he had held 2 kings, the trump quality did not appear sufficiently robust – he had told me as much.

At the other table responder bid an unlimited waiting 2♦. Opener bid spades and was raised to game. With less information available than I had, opener evoked RKCB and ended in 5♠. This went down on a 5-0 trump split! That news made me especially happy as I am one of those who don’t like using 4NT as an ace asking bid except as a last resort.
The trouble with both auctions was that they focused on spades when the right contract was 6♦ played from the strong hand, which is pretty obvious when one can see both hands. To get to the right contract opener needed to know about the 4-card diamond support. I suggested to Bela that the best sequence would be:

2♣ – 2♥*; 2♠ – 2NT, 3♦– 3♠; 4♣ – 4♦; 5♣ – 5♥; 6♦ – Pass.

He couldn’t see why responder would choose to bid 4♦ after agreeing spades. The key word is ‘choose’. It is impossible for him to visualize my hand, so allowing him to choose a bid on the basis of what he thinks is most likely is clearly the wrong approach. It is difficult when one has to swim against the stream of one’s bidding system. The problem would be even more difficult if he had not already limited his hand by his 2♥ bid.

Choosing the Right Bid
Let’s pursue Miles’ assertion that the right choice of bid is the choice that is most likely to arrive at the right contract, whatever that happens to be. Here are 2 hands discussed in the previous blog that with only 28 HCP between them can deliver 6♠ on a dummy reversal. That’s unusual. Should the opening bid be 1♣ or 1NT (15-17 HCP)?

Bob 1	Bob 2	B1	B2
♠ AKT	♠ Q9864	1NT	2♥*
♥  KJ3	♥ AQ7	3♠	4♦
♦ K85	♦AQ64	4♥	5♣
♣ T974	♣ 2	5♦	6♠

If opener wishes to make the call that is most likely to reach the right contract, he does not begin with 1♣. Why? Because the hand is not about clubs. Naming a suit, even if the identification is based largely on length, will create an impression that is hard to overcome. Opening 1♣ on a bad suit has one advantage: if the hand is played in a NT contract, the opening leader may be inhibited from leading clubs. So there is a built-in bias towards 3NT, because responder, based on the probable location of club honors, may justifiably fear wasted values there, and even with slam in mind he can hardly cue bid later in clubs to show shortage – that is usually taken as showing a club honour.

Note that the opener holds only 14 HCP, but he upgrades with 5 controls, the equivalent of 17 HCP.  Opening 1NT rather than 1♣ takes the luster off the club suit, and when responder shows spades, it is rather timid not to ‘super-accept’ with a 3-card suit when half his points lie in the spade suit. Of course, the hand has no ruffing power, but the opening bid has said so. Now it is easy to bid to slam on this particular combination. Sheer dumb luck? Not at all – the opening bidder first limits his hand then makes bids that reflect the location of his controls in support of responder’s suit.

Standard methods are geared towards a normal expectation of the distribution of HCPs, that is, length and strength are correlated. Responder expects that, justifiably so. One has to take that into account when choosing the bid that best describes the character of a hand. Let’s assume a more normal distribution of HCPs and see how that works.

Bob 1	Bob 2	B1	B2
♠ AT6	♠ Q9864	1♣	1♠
♥  K63	♥ AQ7	1NT	3♦
♦ K85	♦AQ64	3♠	4♥
♣ KJ74	♣ 2	4♠	Pass

Following the normal procedures now leads to the right contract. From the perspective of the opening bidder, there is only a remote possibility that the contract should be played in clubs, but a 1♣ bid conforms closely to what responder will expect. The spades are nothing extraordinary. Responder correctly downgrades for wasted values in clubs.

Finding the 4-4 major fit
Here is another deal from our recent team game where Bela and I failed to reach the best contract by choosing our bids strictly according to the system guidelines.

Bob	Bela
♠ AT85	♠ KJ94	1NT	Pass
♥  K86	♥ QT93
♦ AJ9	♦5
♣ AT8	♣ J976

I held 16 HCP, but 7 controls are worth much more than what is normally expected in a 1NT opening bid. Bela passed (‘I had only 7 HCP’) where I would have evoked Stayman and raised 2♠ to 3♠. To my way of thinking, pass is not the call that is most likely to lead to the best contract – the chance of a 4-4 fit in a major is too great, in which case, add 3 support points. A diamond lead would appear to be a danger against a NT contract.

The problem would have been avoided if I had opened 1♣ so the auction could proceed:  1♣ – 1♥; 1♠ – 2♠; 4♠ – Pass. In the event on a heart lead I gained an IMP for +180 versus +150 by finessing twice in clubs. Our opponents had bid the hands in exactly the same way. Of course, I would not have to adjust according to circumstances if I were playing a Big Club system, 1♣ giving partner less scope for faulty evaluation.

Why Experts Upgrade and Don’t Downgrade
Some BBO commentators express frustration at the experts’ inclination to upgrade their hands and bid outside the HCP limitations imposed by the definition of their bids. Frequently it is seen that 1NT is opened on 14 HCP when the stated limits are 15-17 HCP. There are many factors that will promote the value of a hand – the expert wants to treat his hand as being equivalent in strength to what is normally expected from a strong 1NT opening bid. The effect of the upgrade is lessened if the ordinary hand with 14 HCP is included routinely as being within the range of 14-17 HCP. Experts don’t upgrade only because they think they can play the hands better than most – they upgrade because standard evaluation underestimates powerful suit combinations.

(In my most recent game imitating an expert I achieved 3 clear tops by opening anti-systemically on hands with extra playing strength:  1♠ on ♠ KQT965 ♥ Q64 ♦ Q863 ♣ –; 1♥ on ♠ 976 ♥ AQ985 ♦ KJ94 ♣ 7; and  2♠ on ♠ KJT987 ♥ 5 ♦ Q8643 ♣ 7.)

Experts don’t downgrade. There may be a temptation to downgrade from a standard 1NT if one holds a quacky 15 HCP within a 4-3-3-3 shape.  One may plan to open 1♣, say, and modestly rebid 1NT, however, partner will assume a hand with 12 HCP. In effect the downgrade is close to 3 HCP, equivalent to a king, whereas an upgrade may be a mere 1 HCP, equivalent to a jack. The same reasoning tells us why it is closer to expectations, hence less deceptive, to open on a good 10 HCP than it is to pass on a bad 12 HCP.