May 16th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Bridge players are quick to quote the Law of Total Tricks to bolster their excuses for overbidding. In fact, this Law has become the foundation for a new approach to bidding which makes little reference to the high card content of the hands being bid. Of course, it is known that The Law is subject to many conditions and restraints, a major proviso being that the trumps suits represented are well stocked with honours, which they usually are on the basis of probability. On the occasions where they are not well stocked, The Law may overestimate the total number of tricks available. That has been the observation of experts, including Larry Cohen. On that basis we propose a Second Law of Total Tricks, subject to verification that goes as follows.

The Second Law: The more controls one holds in the opponents’ trump suit, the lower the expected number of total tricks.

That appears to be common sense, but the history of science has taught us not to put too much faith in common sense and logic. First and foremost one must collect and examine the data. The key word is ‘expected’, implying Law2 is not always true, but that it is true more often that not. I suspect it is most appropriate when both ‘best’ trump suits are 8 cards in length. Think of it as akin to the observation, ‘gentlemen prefer blondes’. Not always true, of course, but generally something a girl can work with.

We shall examine the effect at work in hands played in the recent 2012 USBF Trials. First a deal where NS bid and made game missing the AKQ of trumps. With inescapable losers in the trumps suit, the HCP evenly divided at 18 to 22, and a division of sides of 8-7-6-5 one would expect that there was no way declarer could emerge with 10 tricks.

Dealer: South Vul: NS	North ♠   AQ ♥   KJ642 ♦   8 ♣  JT432
West ♠   T632 ♥   AT9 ♦   AKJ62 ♣  K		East ♠   J974 ♥   84 ♦   T9 ♣  AQ986
	South ♠   K85 ♥   Q73 ♦   Q7543 ♣  75

In theory the game should be defeated with a heart trick added to the 3 certain trump tricks, but on the auction that defence is impossible to find. Hamman at some point has to lead a heart away from KJxxx. He began with the ♣J and Hampson failed to rise with the ♣A in order to pitch a heart from his hand. He won the ♣K and led a trump. Hamman still had time to play a heart, but he continued with a second club expecting to give Zia a ruff. Surprise! An impossible game made against a credible defence.

The point of this demonstration is that there is a difference between theory and practice. Players bid and play according to the odds one encounters in practice. The bidding has a great deal to do with the outcome, as the bidding provides the information on which the decisions of the defence largely depend. Logic doesn’t work in a vacuum.

One may consider Hampson’s choice eccentric, but experience has shown that opening 1NT with a singleton ♣K can win points. It is a common practice in China, where Hampson may have picked up on it. Perhaps more significant is the poor defensive bidding by Hamman-Zia. As we discussed in a previous blog with regard to a 2♣ overcall, the effectiveness of  certain bids depends on the efficacy of countermeasures available. If Zia had been given a chance to show heart support, the heart lead would have been easier to find. Suppose Hamman had bid an Astro 2♣, showing hearts and a minor, and Zia had bid 2♥ over a Greco double. Then there would be no story to tell.

During the Trials we observed many pairs making game on a major 4-4 fit missing high honours in their suit. It didn’t appear to be a concern. As in the above example, success often depends on having a good minor suit to provide discards. Here is another.

This looks bad for whoever wins the contract. The spades are missing AKJ, the hearts are missing AKJ, the diamonds are missing AKQ. Only the clubs have a high degree of quality. We guess Zia’s game bid in spades was based primarily on his holding in clubs. The division of sides is 9-8-5-4, with the expected total trumps being 18. So what are the total tricks according to Deep Finesse? West can make 1♥, 7 tricks and theoretically South can make 10 tricks in 4♠. The Law appears to be fairly accurate despite the disparity in HCPs, however, to avoid 3 trump losers, Hamman playing in 4♠ must lead a low trump from dummy and put up the ♠Q when East follows low. In practice Lall went up with the ♠K from AK3 on the first round and gave Hamman no choice but to make his doubled game.

What is most significant about this deal is that Zia-Hamman had no means available by which to punish 4♥, down 3, against a dubious 4♠. How much better if in a forcing pass situation Zia can bring himself to pass with bad spades so Hamman can double 4♥ and make it stick.  Otherwise, a double must of necessity cover a wide range of holdings, and a game bid becomes a shot in the dark. Here is another example from the Semifinals of a 4-4 major fit missing top honours being used successfully as a trump suit.

This time Zia-Hamman’s 4-4 major fit was missing ♥AKT, and the Lall-Milner 4-4 major fit, ♠AKQJ. Despite the lack of controls, and in the face of Milner’s double which presumably promised 4 hearts, Zia jumped to game on ♥Q432. The bidding was the same at the other table where Rodwell doubled and Justin Lall put Bathurst in game. From this we gather that the experts don’t put much weight on the need for a good trumps suit -  any 4-4 fit will do, provided one has a long minor that hopefully will provide tricks. In fact the heart game is better than 3NT which is vulnerable to an attack on the diamonds. The heart trumps provide protection in that area, while the club suit provides tricks.

Takeout doubles are non-descriptive these days, that is, they don’t promise favorable distribution. That is why they tend to be ignored by the opponents who bid their own values regardless. Here is an example from the Round of 16 featuring a solid citizen where getting into the auction with AK in an opponent’s suit proved expensive.

Dealer: West Vul: None	North ♠   A53 ♥   J72 ♦   AK84 ♣  Q64
West ♠   KT76 ♥   A9 ♦   QT73 ♣  A73		East ♠   QJ ♥   KQ854 ♦   J92 ♣  K52
	South ♠   9842 ♥   T63 ♦   65 ♣  JT98

Although one may opt to play in a trump suit missing the top honours, it is another matter to attempt to declare a hand when the main feature of one’s hand is controls in the opponent’s suit. Although it may be said that the doubler was unlucky to find the division of sides to be 7-7-6-6, the North cards are highly unsuitable for immediate action. After the redouble the scrambling began with nowhere to go.

The amazing feature of the deal was that the same double was employed by Justin Lall at the other table. He and Kevin Bathurst were successful insofar as they managed to play in a 7-card fit at the 1-level, rather than at the 2-level. Their -300 constituted a good save against a potential 3NT making 4. Bidding 3NT by EW is wrong in theory as the Total Tricks maybe less than 14 – the unexpected 3-3 heart split helps immensely.

A bad bid is less dangerous than it should be if the opponents are making the same bad bid. We see this effect time and again when both sides play the same flawed system. One of my favourite bad bids is 2NT by an opponent. It is a big winner in the long run for the side that can avoid it. Recently in a 7-board Team Match we won 23 IMPs on consecutive 2NT opening bids on my right, and there was nothing lucky about it. In one case the opponents reached 6♥ with 2 inescapable trump losers; in the other, 3NT with ♠x opposite ♠Jx, after a Puppet Stayman auction that failed to reveal the fatal flaw. Our teammates followed a different path and were successful in reaching 5♥ and 5♦, respectively. In the latter case, our teammate opened 1♦ because she didn’t fancy opening 2NT with a doubleton spade. A spade overcall then steered the partnership to the right contract. Information, information …. As David Burn so aptly put it, ‘where there is ignorance there is hope’, but actions shouldn’t be based mainly on hope.

Practical Percentages
It is obvious that there was a lot of hopeful bridge being played during the 2012 Trials, and it wasn’t until the latter stages that good bridge dominated. Earlier the bidding was largely ‘psychological’ in the opinion of a trans-Atlantic observer; it was a demonstration of style over substance. I equate the performance to that of a hedge-fund manager – praised when lucky, condemned when not. Justin Lall in a BBO conversation with ‘Mr Woolsey’ commented that he had learned from Kit’s articles that one should always play the percentages. We assume that his double defined above was considered to be the percentage action. The percentages take into account the possible reaction on the part of the opponents. If the opponents have no efficient way to cope with ill-defined bids, or misinterpret the bids, then the chances of getting away with bad bidding is increased.

A nebulous takeout double has low information content. The same applies to overcalls on bad suits. This means that the competitive bids on the opposition have to be flexible enough to cope on their own merits. One cannot count on the opposition having bid accurately and act according to that. Uncertainty has become their weapon. We see this effect in the hands above where players ignored the implications of a takeout double and bid their major 4-4 fits regardless. Ignoring the opponents’ bidding is not the best way to react – we need better methods than that. Flexibility is the key. I suggest an extension of the ‘forcing pass’ concept to part score bidding. In general that’s not the way it went, with partnerships snatching at games for lack of anything better to do.

The 2 Club Overcall and the Law of Limited Resources

May 9th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

When Edgar Kaplan famously noted, ‘we lost the club suit in the 1950’s…’, he was referring to the proliferation of artificial 2♣ bids that served as asking bids in a constructive auction, 2♣ Stayman being the chief example. In the modern era the natural 2♣ bid has come into vogue as an overcall. Whereas in a constructive auction the 2♣ bid is a space-saver, in a competitive auction the 2♣ overcall is a convenient way to remove the opponents’ space with a minimum danger to oneself, or so it seems to many.

At one time bridge authors advised not to overcall with 2♣ without a 6-card suit and opening points, otherwise it was deemed too dangerous. Nowadays it is too dangerous to pass with an average hand containing a 5-card suit. The 2-level has become the battleground for the part score, as many average players have learned for themselves through experience. You needn’t understand a disease in order to catch it – exposure is enough. It’s the cure that requires understanding.

I prescribe two changes to the classical counteraction: first, limited negative doubles to be freely employed for flat hands with the primary aim to compete for the part score; second, transfers (2♦ and 2♥) to be employed at the 2-level to disclose a long major, and (2♠) to show a balanced hand game try, stronger than the negative double. This scheme is a simple application of methods that are being adopted by many expert pairs.

Slush Doubles
Negative doubles, according to Marty Bergen, are a way to transfer the captaincy to the opening bidder. In his book, Negative Doubles, he states, ‘Once the responder has shown some values, the road is paved for opener to investigate the possibility of game.’ Today the primary aim is not to get to games, rather it is to win the part score battles. At teams, if game is anywhere near close, pairs will bid it regardless of the niceities.

One may conclude that slush doubles cover a range of 8-11 HCP. What of the dangers of getting caught at the 2-level if the advancer redoubles? Opener may ‘escape’ to the suit in which he opened. That might work. If with a bad card combination one fears the effectiveness of a redouble, one is not forced to double, but if one has the inclination to compete, one has a method a partner understands.

Uncertainty shouldn’t be scorned, as sometimes it acts in one’s favour when the opposition thinks you have found a good fit at the 2-level. Overbidding is less of a problem than underbidding. If you don’t overbid occasionally you won’t generate many tops.

Transfers in Competition
In his 2002 book, ‘Double! New Meanings for an Old Bid’, Mike Lawrence returns to an old problem which is this: what does responder bid after 1♦  (2♣) with these hands:

1) ♠ KJT84  ♥ A7 ♦ J53 ♣ T94    and  2) ♠ A6 ♥ KJT63 ♦ J63 ♣ T63 ?

His general rule is that responder with ‘the wrong shape’ can’t make a negative double unless he holds 11 points. He admits that he would lie and double with hand 1, as he can correct partner’s 2♥ rebid to 2♠. What will partner make of that? Lawrence would PASS with hand 2, because he has no safety if partner responds 2♠ to a double. As we have found from our own sad experiences, there is no reward for missing a 9-card fit. It is quite possible your side holds the majority of the HCP as well as a 9-card fit.

Hands with a long major can’t be ‘the wrong shape’ when one is competing for the part score, especially so when the overcaller’s values are questionable. A solution to an old problem is to transfer to the major. This gets both hands 1 and 2 into the auction, a very important attribute, and removes them from the double category. We remove the problem of whether a new suit at the 2-level is nonforcing, forcing to game, or forcing one round, a problem mulled over by Lawrence in his earlier book, ‘Contested Auctions.’  It also removes the problem of losing a major fit because one had to double with hidden length.

Example from a Recent Sectional
First we show how an overcall on a lousy club suit had the effect of removing a partner from the auction with the result that a good 4-4 major fit was missed.

Dealer: South Vul: BOTH	North ♠   AJT ♥   JT983 ♦   A8765 ♣  —
West ♠   Q542 ♥   Q542 ♦   K42 ♣   Q7		East ♠   K973 ♥   AK ♦   9 ♣  K85432
	South ♠   86 ♥   76 ♦   QJT3 ♣  AJT95

The auction proceeded without fireworks to the optimum contract. When the dummy appeared East, a retired math teacher who knows what he is doing, commented, ‘I guess you were hoping for a balancing double, Bob.’ I replied that I had given up such hopes long ago. The truth is that a balancing double may not improve the situation for NS. EW can escape to their best contract, 2♠, which is makeable. So the overcall opens up an otherwise dull prospect to some exciting possibilities.

From the point of view of the opening side, one might think that any action that ends up with an average score when an alternative action would have produced a big pickup should be considered a failure. This is too narrow a view, one that many adopt when all 4 hands are visible.  North could have made a balancing double, but the outcome it not certain.  Down 2 in 2♣* is quite possible, but it is also possible that 2♠* would make producing a bottom score for NS. North holds a 2-suiter, so does best to bid his suits. The void in clubs is a defensive liability. Also, if partner chooses to defend it is best if one holds top honours in the suit one has bid, which is the suit partner is most likely to lead.

The Law of Limited Resources
We have a simple observation that applies to the 2♣ overcall, which these days can be said to guarantee only 10+ HCP and 5+ clubs. We call it the Law of Limited Resources, a grandiose name for a simple arithmetic calculation that many ignore.

The more points you hold in an opponent’s long suit, the more points he holds in his short suits, and the lower the expected number of total tricks.

The above deal demonstrates this. South holds 5 HCP in clubs, and West holds 7 HCP in North’s heart suit, his announced trump candidate. South can assume North and East hold in total a minimum of 22 HCP. He holds 8 HCP, leaving West with 10 HCP. Clearly this is a part score deal where clubs are a bad fit for EW and hearts are a bad fit for NS. South can happily pass and await further action.

Opener is Allowed to Pass
 Responder may pass and hope for a balancing double from the opening bidder, but if there is no score to protect, a simple pass may be effective, as in the following specimen.

Dealer: East Vul: NS	North ♠   Q97 ♥   42 ♦   AJ2 ♣  AJ852
West ♠   AJ ♥   AK3 ♦   843 ♣  AT743		East ♠   5432 ♥   QJT965 ♦   95 ♣  6
	South ♠   KT86 ♥   87 ♦   KQT76 ♣  K9

On the previous board we had seen West overcall in hearts with ♥ K7632, so we had had a rehearsal of his style. John led ♦A – ♦J, which I overtook to switch to the ♣9. When the smoke cleared West was down 3. +150 was worth all 38 matchpoints for us.

I had opened on a minimal hand, and when partner passed it appeared we didn’t have a score to protect; even +100 might be OK. As I had the ♣K, if partner had values in clubs and wanted to see me double, there were many EW points scattered about in the majors. Who holds the hearts? Obviously, not NS. If 2♣ were going down, it would be unnecessary to double it. Yes! 3♥ would have produced 9 tricks for EW.

‘Why didn’t you double?’ complained my partner grumpily.
‘Why didn’t you bid hearts?’ complained the disgruntled declarer.
It’s a rare deal where both sides are unhappy.

On the next deal we missed our 9-card fit. A slush double would have helped immensely.

Dealer: WEST Vul: NS	North ♠   KJ ♥   AT5 ♦   KQ7532 ♣  52
West ♠   Q98754 ♥   QJ86 ♦   J9 ♣  K		East ♠   A6 ♥   9732 ♦   T6 ♣  AQT73
	South ♠   T32 ♥   K4 ♦   A84 ♣  J9864

Letting West score 110 was worth 2 out of 38 matchpoints, and setting 2♠* by 1 would have been worth 8. It can’t get much worse than that, a disaster at IMPs as well, as NS can make 3NT in a straightforward manner. It was not a question of whether I should have entered the auction, but when. In general, the sooner one enters the auction, the better, but using the old rules, I could not double 2♣ negatively without a 4-card major. The classical criterion for the negative double does not fit the requirements of the modern game. This is why a filthy 2♣ overcall so often presents problems to major suit orientated systems. It is better if a double of 2♣ states simply, ‘I would have bid below 2♣, either 1♥, 1♠, or 1NT’. There are more bids to come, and if you would have bid without interference, you should be determined not to get shut out by a dubious overcall. One’s methods must reflect that attitude.

From the USBF 2012 Final
Having considered the problem before the USBF 2012 Trials, I was pleased to witness the following deal which turned out to be one of the most amusing of the 120 deals played.  A poor 2♣ overcall provided Meckwell with a gain of 6 IMPs.

Dealer: WEST Vul: NONE	North ♠   AT ♥   K8 ♦   J732 ♣  AT652
West ♠   974 ♥   62 ♦   AKQ84 ♣  K74		East ♠   KJ32 ♥   AJT953 ♦   965 ♣  —
	South ♠   Q865 ♥   Q74 ♦   T ♣  QJ983

As West, Rodwell opened a nebulous Precision 1♦ as did his counterpart at the other table.  Moss felt a 2♣ overcall was in his best interest although he had no particular final destination in mind. As we shall see he was most unfortunate to find his partner with excellent support. Meckstroth was able to transfer to his best suit, planning, no doubt, to follow up with an exploration of the spade situation. Gitelman applied pressure with a 4♣ raise of the mixed variety; his major suit queens representing defensive potential. Forced to make a decision at the 4-level, Meckstroth happily chose game in his long suit. Perhaps he reasoned, ‘if they have a 10-card fit, we must have a good fit, too.’

Gitelman lead a diamond and got his diamond ruff, a reasonable plan, but that defence proved counterproductive as it cleared away declarer’s losers and left him with winners. Meckstroth had little difficulty wrapping up 10 tricks, even though the ♣K was a wasted value. A good guess, or was it routine given what the opponents had told him?

At the other table Hamman and Zia as NS passed throughout missing their 10-card club fit. Good for them. Without their help Hampson-Greco could got no higher than 2♥, making 170. If one provides information more useful to the opponents than to one’s partner, it is better done in a suit ranked above the one they are likely to bid next. A 2♣ overcall shouldn’t shut you out, and it may help a lot.

A Great Declarer in Action

April 24th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

What makes a great declarer? In a recent club game I watched my partner, John (or ‘Doc’), go about chewing up the local field to the tune of 87 out of 108 over 9 hands (81%). He does it time and time again. Later at home in an attempt to improve my own play, I looked through the hands to see how he does it. This is part of what I found.

First, there is an element that cannot be taught – the killer instinct. Here is my favourite.

Some would open 1NT on this hand, which I hate. My 3♣ cue bid showed general strength, not necessarily heart support. 3NT showed the texture of the hand, so 6NT was an easy bid given the limited nature of opener’s hand. A club was led. John later said, ‘I was about to claim 12 tricks, when I thought I should play it out and see what happened.’ As he ran the hearts, North discarded the ♠3 early. At trick 12 John played the ♠A and dropped the ♠K which North had bared from ♠K3 ♥ 6 ♦ T9643 ♣ Q8753.

As you can see, North was a player who bids on garbage, even vulnerable versus not. She calls Precision, ‘a crazy system’. As Sir Francis Bacon noted, the crafty abhor science, the wise use it. Even today there are those who would fight science with silliness. Left to their own devices, most EW pairs preferred to play in 6♥, so even a silly bid contains useful information if declarer is prepared to use it. Strange to say, 2 others achieved the same 1020, so it was not an isolated incident. Nuisance bidding that allows the eventual declarer to place the cards is counterproductive, provided that the declarer has the nerve to pull it off. John has nerve in abundance, an attribute that others lack.

Usually just being in the right contract is enough of an edge. Declarer has to realize he is in a favorable position and not take risks that might jeopardize a good result.

The field plays 1NT as 15-17 HCP, so West opens 1♣ and gets to play in 3♣, making 110. Thus 1NT has the potential of being a good contract if one can score 8 tricks. The defenders led 3 rounds of spades giving up a trick to the ♠Q. Declarer immediately led to the ♦K, which won. Thereafter he did not court disaster by repeating the diamond play. He cashed his 8 tricks and collected 10 out of 12 matchpoints. I would have repeated the diamond finesse and would have scored 9 tricks, this time. My profit would be small, my risk, great. Doc got the timing right and took no chances.

Some deals are played in a variety of contracts, so that any plus score is good. The result may reflect the inadequacies of competitive bidding as currently practiced. Here is such a deal with the HCP divided  21 -19 where any EW plus scored above average.

Dealer: North Vul: EW	North ♠  A5 ♥   AT7 ♦   KT42 ♣   A843
West ♠   J7532 ♥   53 ♦   Q86 ♣   KQ7		East ♠   KT4 ♥   KJ864 ♦   AJ53 ♣   J
	South ♠   Q98 ♥   Q92 ♦   97 ♣   T9652

 I avoid non-informative competitive bidding systems that make it easier for the opening side to get it right and for partner to get it wrong. An overcall that takes up no bidding space has to have a lot going for it otherwise. I detest a 2♣ overcall that can be misdescribed as showing ‘a one-suited hand’. This makes it easy for South to double to show clubs even on a poor suit. After asking some pointed questions about the meaning of my Astro-type bid, our South passed. John’s 2♦ bid told me, ‘I prefer diamonds to hearts’. North led a trump, and John played it well on the expectation that North held the 3 missing aces as well as the ♦K.  Yes, we missed our best fit in spades, but most NS pairs scored 110 in 3♣, their best fit. I can guess what happened at those tables.

The opening lead is often critical and the information provided by the auction may make a difference. This is fair, as it works both ways. After the Precision auction 1♦ – 1♠; 2♥ – 3♣; 3♦ – 3NT, what is your opening lead from ♠ QT93 ♥ JT8 ♦ K3 ♣ AT62 ? Next question, would it be different if the opponents were playing 2/1 where 1♦ followed by 2♥ is a strong reverse? Here is the full deal.

Dealer: East Vul: Both	North ♠   QT93 ♥   JT8 ♦   K3 ♣   AT62
West ♠   AT52 ♥   K9 ♦   T5 ♣   KJ973		East ♠   — ♥   AQ543 ♦   AQ9872 ♣   84
	South ♠   KJ864 ♥   762 ♦   J64 ♣   Q5

The information conveyed by the Precision auction is vastly different from what would be conveyed by the same auction under 2/1 rules where it normally shows 4 hearts, 5 diamonds, and 17+HCP. With Precision it can be 6-5 in the reds. I am not sure there is general agreement as to what 3♣/2♥ means. Those using 2/1 often apply Lebensohl 2NT after a reverse, so 3♣ would be natural and forcing as it was in our simple auction. To complete the description of my distribution I could have bid 3♥, but I felt on the evidence of a misfit a cautious 3♦ bid was better, a nonforcing bid that did not rule out reaching the optimum contract of 4♥ if partner were to bid again. 3NT had possibilities.

The opening lead was the ♥J run to the ♥K. This came from a player long familiar with Precision methods who has developed a liking for leading from 3-card heart suits against 3NT. Perhaps he thought it best to lead through the second suit bid by dummy. The ♦T was run to the ♦J. South could see the danger in leading a spade and giving declarer a free finesse he could not have taken for himself. He led the ♣Q to the ♣K and the ♣A. North continued clubs and declarer had the rest of the tricks. What made the defence difficult is that the spade honors were split between the 2 defenders, one holding ♠QT9 and the other, ♠KJ8. This is a possibility that defenders cannot ignore, even though it is difficult to project. Perhaps South should have overcalled.

The Bidding Advantage
From these hands I learned nothing that has not been written thousands of times in books and magazines: accurate card reading and good timing produce good results time and time again. Where do the tops come from? In theory one doesn’t score a top unless a defender makes an error. Not to be too negative about it, there is a skill in inducing such errors. There are successful predators who lie inertly on the sea bottom waiting patiently for a little fish, unaware of the danger, to swim by and get gobbled up. Camouflage is an essential component. That is not John’s way. Think ‘Jaws’. By way of contrast, good bidding constitutes an active approach that can generate tops regardless of the quality of the opposition.

In a recent article in the ACBL Bulletin about an international individual event, the winner, Chris Willenken noted, ‘With everyone playing a simple and uniform bidding system, … there were no random swings because of method. Matchpoint were generally gained and lost through bidding judgment and technical card play…’ I object to the tone of this statement. Because of the poor quality of the information provided by a simple system, such as SAYC, randomness is increased through lucky guesses in the face of high uncertainty. Swings can be generated by familiarity with the tendencies of one’s partner and/or the defects peculiar to the system itself. Let’s look at a deal where the Good Doctor demonstrated that great judgment and skill can be employed through straightforward use of an efficient bidding scheme. No guesswork was involved.

The Precision bidding was simple. 1♣ was strong, 2NT was limited and promised a flat hand, 3♠ showed spades, and 4♠ was intended to simplify the auction, a minimum raise, leaving further action to the stronger hand. John employed RKCB despite his void in hearts. The key card shown had to be the ♠A.  Why? Because with the ♥A and spades support, partner would have made an advanced cuebid of 4♥ – he wouldn’t be showing a long suit. 5NT asked for kings up-the-line, and the ♦K filled in declarer’s suit. There was enough information available to bid the Grand. Trump-wise the dummy may have been a bit of a disappointment, but the spades were strong enough to survive the normal 4-2 split. While drawing trumps John was careful to retain all 4 clubs in dummy. This proved necessary when the clubs split 4-1 with the ♣J onside. So, all-in-all, a fairly simple hand to play, but 7♠ was worth 37 out of 38 matchpoints at the recent Victoria Sectional.

I am not sure how one could get to 7♠ using SAYC, but I venture to say it would involve a great deal of chest-thumping masterminding. No pair reached 7♦. Reaching 7♠ was not sheer luck, for without the ♠J Doc would have employed a 3♣ ‘Stayman’ bid over 2NT to obtain more information concerning responder’s shape while keeping alive the chance of a 4-4 minor suit fit. In practice the 5-2 spade fit was superior to the 4-4 diamond fit, both candidate suits containing AKQJ.

Many pairs reached 6NT, making 1020, when the opening leader failed to take his ♥A, which serves as a poor demonstration of skill all ‘round. Should we laud the players who reached 6NT after an uncertain auction that induced a defensive error? Was John’s 7♠ to be considered a random disruption of normal events, or did it demonstrate that at least one player was able to reach the obviously correct contract by a not-too-arduous but subtle route?
It is wrong-headed to maintain that bad bidding promotes good card play. It might better be claimed that bad bidding promotes desperate card play. A good bidder is a good declarer who can project how the play may be pursued to a successful conclusion under a variety of possible conditions.

Slammin’ at the Sectional

April 18th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

It is acknowledged that Precision excels at slam bidding. Late in a session at the Victoria Sectional an acquaintance remarked to John and I, ‘you must be doing well, because there were so many slams.’  We were, ending a distant third. It is not well understood why Precision produces better results time and again. One of the main advantages is in the assignment of the captaincy, a weakness in 2/1 methods. When one partner takes charge, the chances of screwing it up are halved. Here is a failure in that regard.

The abnormal aspect of the hands is that the long major suit holdings do not include top honors. Responding 1♠ would be bad, one of the worse starts, the reason being that the priorities have not been established. Under that circumstance cooperative bidding practices may not be successful, as each player will downgrade because of the poor quality of his own suit, rather than upgrade because of his great support.

I supported immediately with a space consuming splinter, John made a mild slam try with a ‘Last Train’ 4♦ . I was happy to reveal my void, which acted adversely. John signed off, and I passed on fear his high card values were in diamonds, not spades. Believe it or not, taking 13 tricks resulted in a dead average board when everyone should have reached 6♥ .

I take the blame. As responder I can see it will be difficult for my partner to envision a slam when he is missing AQJT in the trump suit, therefore, rather than make a descriptive splinter, I have to take charge. My initial response should have been a takeover Jacoby 2NT, after which partner is obliged to describe his hand to me. I then decide.

This is crude, but sometimes crude gets the job done. 3♣ shows a 6-loser hand. There is no getting away from it, despite the bad heart suit. 3♦ and 3♠ show aces. It is much easier for opener to bid spades below game than above it. 4♦ shows second round control. Although the knowledge of opener’s hand is not perfect, responder knows enough to bid 6♥ . Precision limits the opening bid to at most 15 HCP, so it appears there are not enough spare controls lying around to attempt a Grand Slam. This is unlikely to be wrong, but if it is, we tip our hats to the better bidders, of which there were none.

The next deal was a bit of a mystery as getting to an obvious slam was worth 35 out of 38 matchpoints. The strong hand took charge and made the final decision.

West opened normally, so it seems initially that the slam depended on the happy placement of the ♣K, however, the chances are better than that; the opening lead can help. Indeed, the opening lead was a heart won by the ♥ K. West tried to cash the ♥ A, and the hand was over. Both minor suit kings were onside, so it merely saved time.

This result had nothing to do with Precision, but note the assignment of the captaincy. This is the way when a player opens a Big Club, which provides a partnership with a great advantage over those who have to share the responsibilities on an equal basis. A closely defined limited response can prove to be a great advantage.

This sequence is not going to win a bidding contest, but it scored 31 out of 38 matchpoints when the diamonds split 4-0. John said at the time, ‘it is the first time I was hoping for a bad split.’ If one thinks along the lines that 17+13 adds up to 30 HCP, then one is definitely off the track on this one. To bid the Grand Slam declarer needs to know is how many of those 13 HCP are wasted in spades. Finding out will not be easy. That is why so many players give up too easily on potential Grand Slams – they know that most will not get there, even if it makes. This is a sad state of affairs. Grand Slam bonuses should be increased to encourage the improvement of bidding methods.

We employ cooperative methods when called for. The captaincy can be resigned by the Big Clubber when he is at a loss of how to continue. I am good at that.

This time we bid a bad slam that made on imperfect defence. When opener doesn’t support responder’s suit immediately, we resort to ‘natural’ cooperative bidding. When John repeated spades, he was showing a 6-card suit, which I could support. I believe in the adage, ‘support with support’. This does not rule out the possibility of reaching 6♦ on a 4-4 fit, although admittedly it makes it harder. All-in-all it is better to bid simply early in the auction, and leave the clever stuff to later. John took over with RKCB.

The opening lead was a trump – some people never learn. Trumps were drawn using a diamond entry to dummy, and it was down to running off some spades hoping for a phantom squeeze or something nice happening in diamonds in a 7-card ending.

The ♦ 3 was played to the ♦ 8, losing to the ♦ J. The ♣A won the club return and the last spade was played in the hope that a squeeze may be taking effect. Judging from the accurate discarding that it had not, John discarded the ♥ 9 and played a diamond to the ♦ K. When these proved to have been dealt 3-3, he had 4 winners remaining, 12 in all.

No factual history is complete without its tragic event. It is part of the Theory of Chaos that a small slip can lead to a great catastrophe. Think of Tiger Woods: he would still be winning major tournaments if he hadn’t carelessly left his cellphone lying about the house. Here I slipped up by over-ruling the captain’s decision.

The major difficulty arose from the fact that my high-card controls were placed in my short suits. It is unusual for an 11-point hand to have 5 controls, the equivalent of 17 HCPs. The 1♣ opener usually delivers 6 controls, and with 7 controls opener is expected to make some move towards slam. I assumed our trumps were solid, partner held significant extras, and was inviting slam. Wrong. That would be normal, but good bidding is about revealing what is, not assuming what should be. I had shown my all and should have passed like a good member of the crew.

A heart was led and declarer had to decide which defender to play for the ♠QJ. Being conveniently in the dummy he finessed the ♠T, losing to the ♠QJ tight. Grrrr. Even if he had picked up the spades, he would have had to play his RHO for the ♣Q doubleton. The Goddesses of Bridge may be willing to favour you with an advantageous placement of the cards, but you still have to take advantage of their generosity. So the winning line was: ♥ A, ♠A, ♠K, ♠T, ♣A, ♣K, claim. Easy. Deep Finesse got it right.

Table Talk

Bob: I wonder why Phil Mickelson takes all those crazy chances.
John: You should know because you do the same.
Bob: That’s right! The difference is he is successful.
John: That’s one difference.
Bob: And the public loves him!
John: That’s another.

Lady; Do you play golf?
Bob: No, but I like to watch, just as I like to watch women, but take no action.
Lady: You’re showing your age.
Bob: I no longer feel the need to hide it.

Bob: I don’t see your husband playing today.
Lady: No, he was bending over in the garden and hurt his back.
Bob: He should know better by now, I mean, he is the unbending type.   (No laughter)

Man: You said you played Precision, but you didn’t alert any of your bids.
John: They were all natural.
Bob: Perhaps we all should start alerting those as well.
Man: True. (Laughter)

John:  That was one of my former patients who is still alive.
Bob: Not much longer – his wife will kill him if he keeps playing that way.

John: I wonder what the others are doing on that board.
Bob: Don’t ask, otherwise you may end up thinking just like them.

Queen from AQ

April 9th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

In The Dictionary of Suit Combinations by J.-M. Roudinesco there are tables that tell you how to play various card combinations to best effect. Here is one such combination:

JT86     opposite    AQ73

Both for safety and profit the best play is to run the Jack, guarding against length in front of the tenace. One might say that only a fool would lead the Queen towards the Jack-Ten. Call me a fool, but I once made this winning play in a team match, and was so happy with the result that I continue to do so whenever the opportunity arises. If the finesse is 50%, half the time it won’t cost a trick, and it can have the effect of opening the communications to the dummy while preserving control when there is a need to do so. There are 2 hands from the 2012 Vanderbilt that show fools are wise sometimes. The question is: when?

The 1♦ opening was Precision 1♦, 11-15 HCP, and 2♦ showed decent heart support – at the Vanderbilt a player will jump to 3♥ on the slightest of excuses. North had a maximum opening bid with a good spade suit, so he did not hesitate to jump to game despite the often unlucky 4-4-4-1 shape. The ♥2 was lead to the ♥A and hearts continued, ruffed in hand with the ♠3. Declarer played a club to dummy, winning, and led the ♠J in the approved manner hoping to escape a spade loser. Unlucky! East won the ♠K and played ♣A and a club promoting the ♠9 in his partner’s hand. Down 1. Here is the full deal.

Dealer: WEST Vul: BOTH	North ♠   AQ73 ♥   8 ♦   KQ75 ♣   KJ63
West ♠   942 ♥   AQT9 ♦   JT32 ♣   82		East ♠   K5 ♥   K6432 ♦   9 ♣   A9754
	South ♠   JT86 ♥   J75 ♦   A864 ♣   QT

Circumstances change priorities. Note that East was correctly in violation of the so-called ‘Garozzo’s Law’ when he failed to lead his singleton. If he had done so, we can be pretty sure declarer would not win with the ♦A and run the ♠J from dummy. More likely he would win in hand and cash the ♠A to guard against the ruff. He can afford to lose 1 spade trick, and with the alarm bells ringing it is safer to do so immediately.

When the lead is a normal heart and hearts are continued it is more difficult to foresee danger in the trump suit. If the game were Matchpoints, one might make 11 tricks by playing as declarer did. Presumably he hoped to save a trick in trumps if the spades split 3-2 with the ♠K onside. Let’s look at 3 possible distributions of sides, the actual one in the middle. The probability weights are given along the bottom.

Condition I is the most likely distribution of sides, so the matchpoint play of taking the spade finesse has likelihood on its side. The NS communications are fluid, so even if the finesse loses the hand is safe for 10 tricks. We know what can happen under Condition II.

As the BBO commentators constantly remind us, making one’s game is priority #1 at IMPs, so giving up a trick to increase the chances of making 10 tricks makes good sense. Under Condition II, playing the ♠Q from hand at trick 2 preserves the communications and keeps control even if East wins the ♠K and exits his singleton diamond. Declarer wins the ♦A in dummy, ruffs a heart, play the ♠A and gives up a club. That also covers the case of spades splitting 4-1 with the ♠K with West (Condition III), but only if West unwisely takes the first trump lead. ‘Beware Greeks bearing gifts’, and all that.

The reader might think, ‘West will not be so foolish’, but if you don’t give an opponent a chance to go wrong, he won’t. At the other table here’s what happened: West won the first trick with the ♥A and returned a trump, being somewhat in a hurry to get to a break, I assume. That gave declarer an easy road when he ducked to East’s King.

There are hands where declarer needs a break. When there are several possibilities, he has to choose the right one, usually the one with the greatest odds in its favor. Here is a hand from the final where a successful play was made: Queen from Ace-Queen.

After winning the ♥6 lead in hand with the ♥K Thomas Bessis faced a familiar problem – how to develop tricks quickly without letting South on lead to play a heart through. There are 3 Kings missing and 2 of them of necessity have to be in the North, not as bad odds as it may seem. If one assumes the ♦K is in the South, that is roughly a 1 chance out of 3, whereas if one assumes the ♦K is in the North, that is roughly a 2 in 3 chance.

The losing declarer hoped for the ♦K in the South hand. He played ♣A followed by the ♣Q, ducked. A diamond finesse would see him home if he could get to the dummy. Relying on a favorable placement of the ♠K, he continued with the ♠4, losing to the ♠K. Now the hand fell apart and he ended up down 2. Here is the full deal.

Dealer: EAST Vul: NONE	North ♠   T85 ♥   A876 ♦   K54 ♣  KT6
West ♠   AJ4  ♥   KQ5 ♦   AT86 ♣  AQ2		East ♠   Q63 ♥   94 ♦   QJ32 ♣  J953
	South ♠   K972 ♥   JT32 ♦   97 ♣  874

Bessis played for the ♦K in the North. He began with the ♦A, giving himself the slight chance of dropping the singleton ♦K while opening up communications in the diamond suit. He continued diamonds, the ♦T to the ♦J, and there he was in the dummy in position to take the club finesse. No need to do that, as he could put North on lead perhaps to lend a helping hand. He exited a diamond to North’s King. The ♠T was led: ♠T – ♠Q – ♠K – ♠A.  He might have gone to dummy with a diamond and finessed for the ♣K, but he didn’t. Instead he played the ♣Q to preserve his options. Yes, Q from AQ.

North’s defence was revealing as well as non-challenging, and Bessis read the cards correctly. Bessis won the spade return cashed the ♦Q in dummy returned to the ♣A poised to take a finesse for the ♣T if necessary, but the clubs were 3-3 and the ♣T popped up giving him his 9th trick. From the first he had seen the potential in dummy’s ♣J9. If the declarer at the other table had continued with a 3rd round of clubs and had not relied on a favourable location of the ♠K, he, too, could have succeeded, although on a less elegant line of play.

Decisions, Decisions, Decisions
There were some exciting hands being played that in the end determined the outcome of matches, but the most interesting hand for me was played early at the 1-level. Why the interest? Because each player at the table had a critical decision to make. It took some time in the playing, but I was on the edge of my seat through it all.

Dealer: SOUTH Vul: NS	North ♠   95 ♥   643 ♦   AJT85 ♣  T75
West ♠   7643 ♥   J85 ♦   76 ♣  AQ86		East ♠   KQT ♥   KQT ♦   Q9432 ♣  32
	South ♠   AJ82 ♥   A972 ♦   K ♣  KJ94

Fantunes play on the Zimmerman team (Monaco). At the other table Multon, in loyal samurai fashion, as North had sacrificed himself in 2♦, down 2 for -200. At this table Bathurst, displaying a keener feel for self-preservation, after much thought passed his partner’s 1♥ rebid. Perhaps Zagorin felt a bit peeved at this turn of events for he held a quite promising hand. Now it was Fantoni’s turn to give the situation much thought. At Matchpoints a player would be reluctant to pass this out despite the threat of a 7-7-6-6 distribution of sides, but this was Teams. Perhaps he thought, ‘I didn’t move to Monaco just so’s I could spit in the sea from my balcony’, or maybe, ‘I can’t wait to see Claudio’s face when he sees this dummy!’’ Either way, he balanced with a double. Zargorin expressed an opinion, Nunes bid what he thought Fantoni had promised, and Bathurst passed hoping the bidding had come to an end without his having to get further involved. No, Zargorin wanted blood, so Bathurst, after another pass, had to come up with the killing lead in what was now a tight situation.

BBO commentators thought that a trump lead should be automatic, and, indeed, it was the killing lead, but Bathurst decided to lead his partner’s suit, often a commendable act, but not here as it gave Nunes a chance. He won with the ♣Q and led a heart to open communications. Zargorin won the ♥A and continued hearts. Nunes ducked a diamond to the ♦K and Zarogin played a club. It wasn’t until the 8th round that trumps were belatedly led by the defence. In the 4-card ending declarer held ♠ 76 ♣86 with the lead in a dummy of ♠Q ♦Q43.  The play of the ♦3 assured him of 2 trump tricks in front of Zarogrin’s ♠ J8  ♣ K9. By playing insightfully to make his contract, Nunes had held the loss on the board to 1 IMP. Despite his Herculean effort, Monaco eventually lost the match. It was one of those hands where one had to be watching in real time to experience the tension and capture the full flavour of the battle of wits. Thanks, BBO.

Slammin’ at the Vanderbilt

March 27th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Before we look at some slam hands from the 2012 finals, we should again remind ourselves that the donor of the cup, Harold Vanderbilt, was a pioneer who invented the first bidding system that employed 1♣ as the opening bid with strong hands. Of the 8 pairs playing in the finals half were employing a Big Club system.

After several days glued to the screen watching the exciting matches played with great skill by the experts, my head began to ache. By the time the finals were in progress my brain whirled with the instructive details often presented by the BBO commentators – all in good faith, mind you, but in my fatigue the question arose – were the bidding details all that significant? Bob Hamman had said his victory in the Platinum Pairs little involved the bidding systems being employed at the tables at which he was engaged. In a sense that’s understandable. Suppose an opponent gets to a reasonable contract based on the information provided by the bidding around the table. Success or failure will depend more on the placement of the cards around the table than on the route by which he arrived at the contract. Bidding a good game doesn’t mean he will make it, and bidding a bad game doesn’t mean he will not. Having noted that, we still claim that success may very much depend on the route taken. We present evidence later.

With my head in a whirl of confusion there suddenly appeared on my screen a simple statement of fundamental truth that blew my mind. It was like in the old biblical movies when the sun burst through the parting clouds and a voice speaks to the sandal-clad hero, played by Charlton Heston or some other muscular goy, who is in a state of frustrated confusion. In my case the revelation came not from the Almighty but from 2 Canadian commentators, Andre Vallée and Allan Graves, who keeps to the basic truths.

A.G.  ‘Bridge is a gambling game first and foremost……they would easily have this auction on a different set of boards with similar values and end in a very good contract.’
A.V.   ‘Distribution is nearly always the determining factor.’
A.G. ‘Yes, and the location of the high cards for the fit.’

So there you have it in a nutshell – Plato and Socrates. If we are going to watch hundreds of hands being bid and misbid by experts with their exotic bidding agreements, we should keep these truths foremost in our minds. Furthermore, when we go to play bridge we should employ methods that facilitate the disclosure of the fundamental requirements for success. Thereafter, let the Fates decide. Here is an example from late in the Finals, where the winners got it right. We simplify their Precision bidding.

The 3♦ response is an old-time Precision bid showing shape and a good hand.
3♥ asks for controls in hearts and spades.
3NT promises an Ace and a King in the majors.

At this point opener know partner holds the ♠A and a major K, more likely in hearts. No matter, it is reasonable to bid 6♠ and no more. The major point to note is that opener holds a decent trump holding greatly enhanced by the presence of the ♠T&9. It is unlikely the opponents will lead a trump, but if they do a club finesse may be needed to provide an extra chance. In the event the lead was a heart and declarer was able to crossruff for an easy 12 tricks when the defender short in hearts was unable to over-ruff.

One might say the result was a lucky one as it depended on the location of the ♠K. Yes, partly true, but declarer had a reasonable chance of making his slam on a variety of hands and opening leads, a gamble based on the information made available by the auction which gave distribution exactly and the location of controls partially. In the end the player with the trump intermediates (Joe Grue) made the final decision.

Let’s contrast this success story with the slam failure that our 2 commentators were discussing. Here are the hands as bid at the table using 2/1 methods.

The slam depended on the club finesse and some luck in the trump suit. In the end it was down 2. The fundamental flaw in many slam contracts in a 4-4 fit is the quality of the trumps. One may get away with AK only in a 9-card fit, but in an 8-card fit, the quality has to be there in close contracts. On the hand discussed above, the trumps were no better, but the distribution was such that declarer might escape having a trump loser without having to depend on a club finesse. Such was not the case in this 6♥ contract.

So we must ask where in the auction was the opportunity to discover the trump situation? Can we put the blame on declarer? His trumps look good enough. Is it then wrong for the responder to react so emphatically with Qxxx when QJxx would be much better? A jump to 4♦, systemic or not, takes away the bidding space needed to discover the critical situation, and RKCB is not the solution. So 4♦ can’t be right for both Qxxx and QJxx.

As Allan Graves noted, the slam might make on a happier placement of the defender’s cards, but that avoids the problem of how to bid the hands so as to extract critical information on the trump holdings. The real question is this: is this the best auction available to describe the placement of the cards as held by the declaring side – an action over which the players have full control? As noted above, one might bid beautifully to a reasonable slam only to face a bad situation during the play, but that is not under one’s control. Getting there is. Let’s see the successful auction at the other table.

The purpose of the 2/1 rule (forcing to game) is to give more room below game for slam exploration. Thus Bessis was able to bid a comfortable 3♥ in a game forcing auction. Del’Monte was able to show some slam interest by an artificial 3NT bid that limited his hand while promising a spade control. The pair exchanged cue-bids then decided indirectly that their trump suit lacked inner strength. This is what we may term ‘psychological’ bidding, in which each partner has a chance to show enthusiasm by evoking RKCB. Bessis in the end didn’t value his good spade holding above his poor heart support. Good judgement in support of good practice gained 13 IMPs on the board.

When it appears to be merely a question of being in game or not, there is less need to exchange information. If the bidding were in Precision-style where the opening bid was limited to at most 15 HCP, it might go 1♠ – 2♣; 2♥ – 4♥. Responder has shown a club suit and 4 hearts, enough to gamble out a game on the chance that opener won’t lose 3 tricks in the trump suit. He would consider himself unlucky either to go down in game or to make slam, either of which is possible, both of which are unlikely.

Players who bid this way using standard methods don’t generally win the long contests. These types, often referred to as ‘good rubber bridge players’, have enough savvy to clobber the suckers, but don’t prevail against those who can control their own destinies within the limitations chance allows. The less control one exerts over the auction, the more one relies on the benefits of uncertainty.

During the recent PGA tournament, the commentator referred to Tiger Woods unflatteringly as a ‘control freak’. Tiger was spending considerable time before making his shot to the green, and stepped away from the ball when a gust of wind came up. Tiger, it seems, doesn’t like to shoot into the breeze which introduces an extra random element into the game. A bad player might think, as he hacks away without hesitation, ‘what-the-hell, the wind might straighten out my slice’. It might, but a player who has his game under control wants to minimize the element of chance. In practice, the trick is to control what you can, play aggressively, and calmly leave the rest to chance.

Unlike golf, bridge is a game where the opponents may purposefully introduce randomness and uncertainty. The more random the environment, the cruder the methods, and the more reliance must be placed upon normal likelihood. The winning strategy tends towards one of caution. Nonetheless, competitive auctions can still be approached with the same eye towards control, but the process is more complex, therefore, more interesting, at least for the players involved. Spectators may quickly tire of watching purely random swings from one side to the other. It would be like watching a series of meaningless scoreboard racing events as often seen during a late inning break.

The A Posteriori Par

March 12th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

Often one reads references to the ‘par result’, which is the optimum result obtainable when one can see all four hands. The bidding is not part of the calculation which depends only on the lie of the cards. There is also a practical par which derives from actual play after the opening lead is made and dummy appears. One might term this the a posteriori or conditional par. The odds have changed from the a priori values and the optimum result may have changed as well. That is what counts and what we must play for.

Imagine you are a pro playing in a PGA event. Your ball is on the edge of the green with the hole located 30’ away on a dangerous downward slope. Lying 2, the task before you is to get the ball in the hole with 2 putts. This is true whether you are playing a par 5 hole or a par 3 hole. On a par 5 hole it would be wrong to think, ‘I mustn’t putt too hard and overshoot the hole’ – that might lead to a cautious 3-putt and a lost opportunity.  On a par 3 hole it would be wrong to think, ‘I need this putt to make up for my error’ – that might lead to ending up on the fringe at the far side. In short, one has to put aside the idea of an a priori optimum result and deal with the real and present situation as best you can.

Everyone realizes they should take advantage of the favorable situations that arise, but not everyone knows that we have to play for the conditional par in what may appear to be an unfavorable circumstance. I know that is true because I am one of those who tend to get disheartened when it appears they may have missed a chance at the theoretical optimum result. My most costly errors come at that time. This is a bad habit, for one’s score depends not on the par result but on what the field can achieve under the limitation of uncertainty. Here is a recent example where my false assumption cost us a tie for first place in the final standings.

Dealer: West Vul: All	North ♠   987632 ♥   8 ♦   K6 ♣   J832
West ♠   J5 ♥   T963 ♦   T854 ♣   AQT		East ♠   AKT ♥   KJ ♦   A9732 ♣   K54
	South ♠   Q4 ♥   AQ7542 ♦   QJ ♣   QJT

It was with great foreboding that I opened one of a minor with 18 HCP. This seldom works for me when I play 2/1 methods, so I began with negative thoughts, always a bad start. The lead was the ♥5, and when dummy appeared I could see that we had misbid this hand badly. Surely all Wests would raise to 2♦ over the 1♥ overcall and East would bid 3NT with a better than sporting chance of making it. So it looked like a bottom score unless 3NT went down on an absolutely filthy break in diamonds.  Continuing to think negatively, I led a second heart to set up the ♥T in dummy, and achieved my objective, +120 on a sequence too painful to recall, must less to admit to. That is what comes from reading too many bridge books where a perfect double dummy result magically appears when one flips the page.

This 120 was a clear bottom. Only one pair reached 3NT, and that declarer made only 9 tricks. If I had kept my cool, I could have made 11 tricks to achieve a score of 10 out of 12. It is safe enough to go to dummy and lead a diamond, ducking on the unlikely event of North playing the ♦K. When North gets in with the ♦K on the second round of diamonds, he has no heart to return. I avoid the spade finesse, and the ♠Q falls in the end giving me 11 tricks in a contract of 1NT. What would be a disaster in theory, in practice would be a good result that was there for the taking on a simple line of play.

When the dummy appeared, I could judge only on the evidence at hand. Even if I had opened a Precision 1♣, there is no guarantee that we would have reached the theoretical par contract. This combination is better bid using 2/1 methods, given that South will bid as she did, but at other tables South may have preempted 2♥ making it more difficult to reach 3NT. The point to remember is that seeing the dummy I could judge accurately the a priori par result, but I was unable to judge accurately the conditional par result which depended on the bidding at the other tables.

There is another par contract to be considered at matchpoints, which is the most frequent contract achieved by the field. I call this the mode contract. Arriving at this contract is the objective of many players. They feel they can outplay their opponents so by this means they will gain on a majority of the hands. In a good field the mode contract may yield the a priori par much of the time, but in a poor field with few tables the two may not match that often. Accurate defence against a normal contract may condemn a declarer to a below average score. Against the weaker elements it is better to overbid to a high scoring contract and hope for a poor defence, just as one does in a team game.

Ensuring a Bad Result
At matchpoints, playing safe is like taking out life insurance: someone else ends up the benefits. Most of the time it pays to adopt an aggressive attitude and focus on what can go right. You might say that fortune favors fools. Here is an example where I took out some insurance, and the opponents collected the matchpoints.

The AKQ in hearts were a bad placement for half of my 18 HCP, and the 4333 shape further reduced my expectations, so I decided to open 1NT (15 -17 HCP), something an expert would never do. When dummy appeared, I formed a plan, which at our club mostly entails lining up the finesses and arranging to take them in the proper order. I saw that optimistic bidding might have led to 3NT which appeared to have good chances of coming home if the diamonds were favorably located. With a silent curse, I won the ♠Q with my ace and led a diamond towards the dummy hoping for a revealing honor – and I got it, the ♦K! How should I have proceeded from there?

The average player might think to finesse twice in clubs assuming that the percentages favour split honours.  Not me. The appearance of the ♦K marked the LHO with 4=4=1=4 shape or, more likely, 5=3=1=4, so my LHO held 4 clubs and my RHO just 2. It was against the odds she held the ♣Q, but if she did 3NT would make on the club finesse. Pessimistically I thought of what might happen in the likely event I lost a finesse to the ♣Q: a heart would come back, and a defender could hold up on the ♣K so I would be forced into having to play disadvantageously from my hand. 

To avoid an endplay in hearts, I played off the top hearts and exited a spade hoping to force my LHO into breaking the clubs. Making 120 should score well against 3NT going down. The endplay came to pass, but unfortunately the ♣Q was doubleton on my right, so 150 was available if I had gone for it. That would have been an average score as in 3NT some were making and some were going down.

As one cannot beat any pair in 3NT making, one must concentrate at matchpoints on beating those who like oneself are playing in a part score. Although it was against the odds for the ♣Q to be onside, it was even less likely that the defenders would come up with the perfect defence I feared.  That wasn’t Bob Hamman in the red dress and earrings on my left. At matchpoints, if the tricks are there for the taking, you have to take them.  If the opponents defend perfectly, what can you do but tip your cap to them?

Virtue – a Dubious Reward
Last week my humility was given a great boost. The hands did not suit me. In one session we were on opening lead 12 times and scored above average only once, that time being when the opponents were in 2NT making 5, not a top for us as some were in 6NT off 2 aces. One hand stood out as the most interesting I have encountered in some time. Partner opened 1♦ and the RHO opponent overcalled 1♥. What is the virtuous bid with the following cards: ♠ A94 ♥ 9632 ♦ JT ♣ A975?

There are hands which are difficult to get right. One may be virtuous at the beginning but there follow too many chances to go wrong, and one bad decision in a series of choices from either side of the table may lead to an embarrassing result. It may be better to take risks that force the opponents into making the final (bad) decision than it is to bid virtuously then find your defence lets you down. One thereby reduces the problem to a single decision on which success or failure depends.

I was delighted at having been given a chance to test the theory that tells us there are moderate hands where it is best to pass early and await developments. One only gets into trouble, the theory goes, if one pretends the hand can be reconfigured to fit one of the available categories. Partner can balance if distributional, but if he passes with length in hearts you may have virtuously avoided a bad situation – a misfit hand with nowhere to go. So it came to pass, and I was on lead against 1♥. When defending at the one-level the aim can hardly be to defeat the contract, so it is not the time to pursue an active defence. Both defenders will get a chance, perhaps several, to make the correct switch…. or both players will get a chance to screw it up. Remember, partner may not expect you to have many points. What is your lead?

Dealer: South Vul: NS	North ♠   KQ5 ♥   AKT74 ♦   Q4 ♣   J32
West ♠   76 ♥   Q85 ♦   AK32 ♣   Q864		East ♠   A94 ♥   9632 ♦   JT ♣   A975
	South ♠   JT832 ♥   J ♦   98765 ♣   KT

The ♣A would have been a killing lead, but I missed that double dummy choice when I went with the passive ♦J. In the confusion that followed West did not get his spade ruff. Interestingly, West must not cover the ♥J when it is led from dummy. Still, despite very bad defence that allowed 8 tricks, we scored 5 out of 12, above average for us on the day. Most Wests failed to open on their 9-loser 11-count, leaving it to hyperactive NS to bid to a failing contract. At least we beat the sensible ones who stopped in 3♠ making 140.

At matchpoints it is not right to play for averages, so in retrospect I feel my pass was impractical. This hand was going to be tough for most pairs, so NS could do with a push in the wrong direction. A nebulous negative double might have got a 2♣ response from partner (it makes) without increasing the danger that NS would find their productive spade fit. It would also have given the defence a better chance to succeed against a higher heart contract. Which raises the question: should West balance with 2♣ after my pass? The problem there is that my pass with values is a rare occurrence, so West does not relish giving North a second chance. And what of South’s timid pass which allowed no opportunity to improve the contract? So there you have it, contracts at the 1-level are often the most interesting as there are critical choices to be made all ‘round the table.

The Guessing Game

March 5th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

In a constructive auction one strives for accuracy by exchanging precise information with one’s partner. There is value in accuracy when the hand belongs to your side. It can be a different matter when the auction becomes competitive. If it is a battle for part score, or an attempt to steal a game, there is value to be got from uncertainty. This applies to both sides. Some bids are what may be termed two-way bids, representing either good sacrifices or possible makes. Part of the mix are ‘negative’ doubles – calls that represent a wide variety of conditions dependent on the previous actions.  Let’s look at one such auction that occurred last week at our club to illustrate the extremes which can be reached.

Partner opens 1♠, nonvulnerable versus vulnerable, the RHO doubles, and you have to find a bid with fine support the spade suit: ♠ AQ94 ♥ QJ3 ♦ 54 ♣ T984 – 8 losers. What is your bid?  Does it help if I tell you that in theory they can make 3♦ and your side can make 2♠?  Without interference I have an easy 3♠ limit raise showing 8-10 HCP, 4 spades and 8 losers, a perfect description of my hand under our rules, however, after interference can we be sure that the same rule applies? Is the proper bid 2NT, showing a limit raise, leaving 3♠ to show a weaker hand? That would enable the LHO to bid her minor after which I would have to bid again giving them a second chance. I ‘solved’ this problem by bidding 4♠ on the assumption that even down 2 would be better than letting them play in 3 of a minor, making 110. Here are all 4 hands.

Dealer: West Vul: NS	North ♠   K6 ♥   T9864 ♦   KQ972 ♣   A
West ♠   JT8752 ♥   AK ♦   T63 ♣   K6		East ♠   AQ94 ♥   QJ3 ♦   54 ♣   T984
	South ♠   3 ♥   752 ♦   AJ8 ♣   QJ7532

Against 4♠ North led the ♣A, South signaling with the ♣7. Perhaps thinking this might have suit preference implications, he switched to the ♥T. This provided declarer with a diamond pitch after he took the necessary spade finesse. This woeful performance was repeated at 4 of 13 tables. Putting 4♠ down 2, or 1 doubled, would have been a top shared with just 1 pair. Now let’s look at how the auction might have proceeded in a reasonable manner when East cautiously bids what his hand is worth.

In this setting South has enough to push in clubs, and North corrects to 3♦. His negative double methods allows for the possibility of an Equal Level Conversion. In other words, his negative double does not fit the normal requirements. If the opponents are fooled, so much the better. East can bid 3♠ showing signs of reluctantly taking the push.  Now if North can get the defence right, down 1, even undoubled, will result in a good score for NS ( 9 out of 12). He leads the ♣A and South signals for a diamond switch. The ELC auction has told the story, and the chance of getting the defence right has been greatly improved. Only one EW pair made 140 (♣A, ♦K, ♦A and a club ruff?)

We conclude from the results that the auctions were not informative enough for NS to prevail.  East players who try to bid accurately 2♠ then 3♠ are going to be punished, so most, but not all, players have learned not to bid in this pathetic manner. My 4♠ was a bit much, but my partner kindly commented that if I had bid 3♠, he would raise regardless of what 3♠ was supposed to convey. This is what I mean by a two-way bid: either it is a good save or it makes. By giving away less information, we improve our chances. Another way of getting a good score is if South over-reacts and bids 5♣ on the assumption that North for his double must hold 4+clubs. She knew her partner well enough not to attempt that.

Here is an example where the negative double can do damage to both sides.

Dealer: West Vul: NS	North ♠   J ♥   AQ93 ♦   J6 ♣   AKJ976
West ♠   AQ987 ♥   — ♦   A7532 ♣   853		East ♠   K ♥   T762 ♦   KT94 ♣   QT42
	South ♠   T65432 ♥   KJ854 ♦   Q8 ♣   –

I don’t like doubling on a bad 4-card major, but here it had the effect of keeping NS out of their heart fit; NS can make 140 in 3♥ and one made 620. Going down 1 was worth an average score. I had my chance to double for penalty when North, an aggressive type, raised himself unilaterally to 3♣. This is the situation where a penalty double can really pay off. There is a danger though: if South, seeing that 3♥ can hardly be worse, bids it, all will be well for NS. In practice my best tactic was to pass, and hope partner will allow us to defend. Scoring 300 in 3♣ undoubled will be a tied top. A balancing double is not advisable with the West hand – he knows they have a better heart fit. On the other hand if South takes out my double to 3♥, we can always get to diamonds at the 4-level and still make the same average score that we achieved without having any chance at doubling for a huge score. At IMPs scoring I think East should double and live with the consequences.

The point here is that if the opponents are in a bad contract, it may not be necessary to double for penalty allowing for an escape to a better spot. We often see writers adopt an attitude that one must punish the opponents severely in order to achieve a big swing on the board, but that is an approach that applies more to Teams than Matchpoints, and even then it may not be the best strategy. One example of this approach is the penalty double applied to overcalls of 1NT. It must produce a big swing occasionally, or players wouldn’t still be using it, but I can’t remember many occasions where it has worked either for or against me. One thing appears certain: it doesn’t deter players from making silly bids against 1NT, so the occasions for penalties are there, but they are not accessible with the double-for-penalty approach.

A better approach is the negative double after 1NT is overcalled. A player passes the overcall with values in that suit, but doubles negatively when he can expect partner to pass or double cooperatively any escape. Strictly on the basis of frequency, negative doubles are superior. Of course, if you can’t double for penalty and partner passes, your side may have missed a big score, but the loss is only a potential loss; on the actual result there may be a small swing either way – annoying but not critical.

Marshall Miles has some ideas on the subject of doubles of overcalls of 1NT, which he expressed in his work, Bridge at the Top, Book 1. After Partner’s 1NT is overcalled with 2♥, he suggests one should double on this hand: ♠ K42 ♥ Q97 ♦ K54 ♣ 8432.  One can classify this double as one showing cards, but less than the normal requirement for insisting on game, and flat with 7-9 HCP. Miles calls this an ‘optional penalty double’. I don’t like it, as it risks a game swing against a part score. There is no evidence here that the overcaller is in real trouble. It would be better to double with ♠ K432 ♥ 97 ♦ K54 ♣ 8432. Opener can pull to either black suit, but if he wants to pass for penalty there is scope for that option: ♠ A76 ♥ KJ84 ♦ AJ2 ♣ Q65,  a 7=6=6=7 division of sides. Opener can rely on there not being an 8-card fit in spades. We would not double on this hand with a suit worthless for defence: ♠ K43 ♥ 97 ♦ KQ3 ♣ 87432, a 6=6=6=8 division. One other point: if responder has a fistful of hearts, it may not be a tragedy to play in 2♥ undoubled when there is no game available, although it could be an opportunity missed.

There are now many popular methods of entering the auction over 1NT, and players do so with little fear or reservation. They prefer methods that introduce uncertainty, so lack specificity. DONT is one such method: showing the suit named, and a higher suit. With 2♣ there are 3 unknown suits, with 2♦ there are 2 unknown suits, so a negative double will be much more frequent than a penalty double in these cases. Also, some play that 2♣ shows ‘a single-suited hand’, which is a misdescription, as I have seen it bid with 5-4-3-1 shape. Nonetheless one doesn’t want to double 2♣ to show clubs, as this is premature – you’d rather double 3♣, wouldn’t you? So on some hands you can afford to pass and await developments, but with others it is better to double negatively, saying ‘I can’t double clubs, but I may be able to double another suit or support it, as the case may be.’

A defect of methods that require advancer to bid is that responder gets 2 chances to bid -  he can always pass and await developments being pretty well assured of a second chance to make his presence felt. One of the most dangerous situations for the overcaller is when he has a good hand, as in the following deal from a computer test of Lebensohl.

Dealer: North Vul: None	North ♠   AK ♥   KT65 ♦   QJ94 ♣   K96
West ♠   QJ532 ♥   943 ♦   8 ♣   7542		East ♠   T7 ♥   A8 ♦   AT7652 ♣   A83
	South ♠   9864 ♥   QJ72 ♦   K3 ♣   QJT

East has a fine hand for offense, so wants to get into the auction and stir the pot with a vague 2♣ ‘one-suited’ overcall. If South makes a negative double, West can pass to show tolerance for clubs and await developments. Opener may then bid 2♥, for a mediocre result. In such an auction the overcalling side has gained an advantage from the opening sides’ bidding. In the beginning South had the advantage, because he knows more about his partner’s hand than West knows of his partner’s hand.

If South has the patience to pass, West is obliged to bid 2♦ as his side may have a major suit fit. Over 2♦ South comes into the auction with a balancing double, and he doesn’t much care what North does at this point. North passes as there is no indication of a good heart fit – South might have doubled initially with a good offensive hand with the majors. The delayed double indicates values in clubs. The result of a pass is that East goes down 3 for a very bad score, and the defence can hardly go wrong. If West takes out to 2♠, he escapes for down 2, but there is also the possibility that North will now bid 3NT and make that. East would have done better to pass initially and defend a normal 2♥, making 3. If after East’s 2♣ bid, NS merely end up in 2♥, they have not taken advantage of a favorable situation which should have become evident from the competitive auction. The blame for that should rest largely with South.

Short Suit Leads

February 16th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

I blame television for the current epidemic of lying and deceit that has swept through our bridge club like a run of the latest ‘flu. The bids and plays have largely become emotionally motivated and erratic rather than coolly reasoned and structured, as they should be. What can one expect when most seniors have spent decades in front of the screen exposed to ads that appeal to our baser instincts? TV has got to the stage where the importance of the manipulative ads far outweighs the importance of the events on display. Game conditions have become irrelevant – a World Series played in a blizzard, a Stanley Cup final played in sweltering heat? You know it’s more that just a possibility. Stadiums are named after companies, and in future we may hear home-team fans cry ‘let’s go Weyerhaeuser Paper Products!’, or even, ‘Come on China Ploughshares.’

The ACBL should get on board and name the Nationals after sponsors’ products. How about the Amazon Dot Com Series or the Wells Fargo Games? Furthermore, we have to emphasize the Battle of the Sexes angle and arrange to have teams with names like the Purina Sexy Chicks and the Gillette Big Boys face each other in the finals. No more of this Cayne versus Nickell stuff! Games would be pre-recorded and shortened for TV viewing without the boring pauses for thought. I suggest hiring Nora Ephron as a witty and lively commentator, and Gore Vidal as special guest star to recall at half time the foibles of the famous during the golden age of Eisenhower, an avid bridge player, praised by Nixon as being ‘far more complex and devious than most people realized.’ After each big play participants would be called aside to describe their emotions: ‘I just said a itty-bitty prayer that the jack was onside, and the good lord took a likin’ to me’ or some other rot equally appealing to the masses. Before long we might see a handsome, clean shaven Justin Lall demanding a fee of $5 million per appearance, and getting it.

A Ju-jitsu Move
Bridge is a game of uncertainty. Before the action begins we have expectations based on the probable distribution of the cards as dealt. As the action proceeds, we obtain information that reduces the uncertainty. The information transmitted by the choice of the opening lead is of primary importance as it will be used by declarer in his planning, so if the lead is in some way deceptive he may start off in the wrong direction. Ideally a deceptive opening lead should mislead declarer to a greater degree than partner, who is also forming a plan. We begin a case where a short suit lead didn’t have this quality.

The principle of ju-jitsu combat is that one attempts to turn an opponent’s force against him. Similarly, if one is playing against a partnership known for their dubious actions, one plays on the resulting uncertainty felt within the partnership. Here is the situation.

As the reader may have noted, I ‘up-graded’ my 14 HCP to 15+ HCP. I am not a great believer in the 4-3-2-1 point count. The hand contains 5 control points, an equivalent far in excess of 15 ‘normal’ points. In fact, I was reluctant to pass the invitational 2NT, and when the dummy appeared with a 5-card minor, I feared we may have underbid this one.

On the bidding a major suit lead would be routine, but it was a surprising ♦T. A straightforward line was available: win the ♦J in dummy, play off the clubs and lead towards the spade tenace. This is flawed as one may end up in one’s hand eventually forced to break hearts, so the lead could prove a bit awkward. As the LHO had a history of making deceptive leads, an alternative plan came to mind: accept the inevitable and immediately lead a second diamond myself to see what happens. The ♦Q held!  Now I ran the clubs to apply the pressure and South discarded a diamond winner from an original holding of ♦98764. She had been taken in by her partner’s lead from ♦AT9. On a normal lead of a spade from ♠8652 I would have had to do some pretty good guessing to make 9 tricks. As it transpired the opponents had to do the guessing, and my +150 was worth 70%. This time deception for its own sake backfired. It works best when it is not merely habitual but has a plan behind it.

The Importance of Timing
In his article in February issue of the Bridge World, August Boehm, whom I greatly admire, advocated that a defender should adopt an attitude of ‘doing no harm’. Some interpret such advice as ‘do nothing’, which is wrong. Many sacrifice good timing in the name of safety. Boehm also notes, late in his essay, ‘to win tournaments one must take advantage of errors.’ I would carry this idea further and say that to win often a defender must create situations in which a declarer is most likely to make an error. Here is recent personal success story to illustrate the point.

Dealer: South Vul: None	North ♠   AJ98742 ♥   73 ♦   AQT2 ♣   —
West ♠   QT5 ♥   KJ854 ♦   K5 ♣   Q97		East ♠   8 ♥   6 ♦   J9643 ♣   AT8432
	South ♠   K3 ♥   AQT92 ♦   87 ♣   KJ65

The bidding was, shall we say ‘inelegant’, but it got the job done with South capable of taking 11 tricks in her optimum contract. The bidding forced Rob into choosing a short suit lead, the ♣7. I won the ♣A and switched to the ♦4 towards the double tenace in dummy in the hope of upsetting the timing. Rob put up the ♦K won by the ♦A in dummy. Perhaps thinking that 2 chances are better than 1, declarer played off the ♠K and ♠A, hoping for a 2-2 split. If the spades had split 2-2 she would have had 11 easy tricks, and maybe one more on a triple squeeze. Failing that intriguing possibility, she fell back on the tried and true method of finessing for tricks. The ♥T, lost to the ♥J. Rob returned the ♦5, declarer putting in the ♦T, losing to the ♦J. A club came back, the ♣J losing to the ♣Q. The ♠Q was cashed and a club returned to declarer’s ♣K. We still had a heart winner waiting in the wings, so in all we took 4 tricks more than our due: 2 clubs, 2 hearts, a spade, and a diamond for down 2. Declarer’s play was inelegant, but this was matchpoints where one error sometimes snowballs when declarer tries to recover from an early, costly misjudgement.

‘I decided to stay out of the auction this time,’ said Rob, normally an aggressive bidder.
‘Judging from the result,’ I replied, ‘you should try that more often.’

This amusing result shows that declarers do possess daemons and that it is our job as defenders to give those daemons full reign to create havoc. The potential of my diamond return was easy enough to recognize with the dummy in full view. It is more difficult to achieve when one is faced with making an opening lead, nonetheless, one may form a picture of the full deal based on the information provided by the bidding, and act accordingly, sometimes achieving a double dummy defence. This is rare. A more modest and realistic aim is simply to create a problem for declarer, as in the next example.

Creating a Problem
In a recent ACBL Bridge Bulletin Mike Lawrence was at pains to show that a lead from KJxx against a suit contract can be the logical choice. I agree with Lawrence: in the absence of a clear choice, one first chooses the suit, then chooses which card to lead.

The passive approach is to lead a trump and leave it up to declarer to make his way unaided by any impetuous action on our part. The diamonds will be held in check, and in the fullness of time one may hope to score the kings separately, the chance of being endplayed appearing remote. The alternative approach is to lead away from a king and hope for the best – just the sort of action that August Boehm has warned us against. First we count our points and calculate what can be expected from partner. He should have about 8 HCP, enough for an ace and some stuffing in a side suit. Inspired by Lawrence’s article I went even further. Deciding that hearts were most likely to be partner’s best suit, I chose the ♥7, not wanting to be too encouraging in that direction. Normally I would be leading through strength in the dummy. Here is the full deal.

Dealer: South Vul: None	North ♠   A95 ♥   AQT6 ♦   8 ♣   T5432
West ♠   T87 ♥   K73 ♦   T542 ♣   K86		East ♠   42 ♥   J942 ♦   A763 ♣   Q97
	South ♠   KQJ63 ♥   85 ♦   KQJ9 ♣   AJ

As far as the bidding goes, the situation was as expected: declarer had bid spades and diamonds and in those 2 suits sat the most of his points. Dummy held hearts in depth. I am not sure what declarer made of the heart lead; maybe he thought I was more likely to underlead a jack than a king as he played the ten losing to partner’s jack. A club came back and we were able to take 3 tricks on defence for a 75% score. One may say this was unduly lucky, but declarer was under pressure on the opening lead and got it wrong. If one doesn’t create a problem one is depending on declarer’s getting it wrong all by himself, but it is natural for him if left to his own devices to finesse with the ♥Q. One further note: with the ♥KJ7 to lead a heart under these circumstances would be ineffective as declarer could hardly go wrong and it is likely to cost a trick. Less can be more when partner is there to make up for a deficiency.

Solving a Problem
Given my penchant for short-suit leads, I was surprised at my irritation when my partner tried the same thing by leading the ♠J on the following deal, and failed.

Deep Finesse tells us no lead beats 3NT. This does not mean that the choice of lead is immaterial. Very often when the lead doesn’t matter in theory, it does in practice. I have never had any luck with speculative spade leads – the opponents might have explored more extensively with worries in that direction, and with 10 HCP or so partner made no move over 1♥ when he might have with a good spade suit. The ♠J lead gives up 3 tricks in spades on a routine holdup play (♠A743 opposite ♠K65) and, worse yet, gives declarer a tempo. When spades were continued futilely, declarer, who had started with just 6 tricks, had no problem in setting up 2 tricks in the minors and safely finessing in hearts. Giving up 9 tricks was worth a lowly 20% so some declarers didn’t have the contract handed them on a plate. I imagine they received a normal heart lead, and I see no reason for rejecting it.

On lead myself I wouldn’t expect to develop tricks in hearts, so with deception as my aim I would choose the ♥8 trying to look like someone trying not to give away a trick by leading through strength. (Dummy held ♥KQT6.) This may not fool declarer but is unlikely to give away something that declarer can’t get for himself. With partner holding some high cards declarer has work to do as my queens and jacks and tens are going to make it awkward enough for him.

In conclusion, we can agree with August Boehm while at the same time disagreeing. Be flexible, I say. When conditions call for it, go active. I have made many bad leads, but not every one of them has cost tricks, and many have gained in unexpected ways. The point is that we go with a plan based on the probable distribution of the cards as revealed by the bidding. Partner is aware of the implications of the bidding and should adjust his expectations accordingly. A lead that does not conform to those expectations must be given special attention. We try to please partner and create problems for declarer.

January 30th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Thomas Jefferson, the second richest president in US history and a slave owner, declared that all men are born equal and have an unalienable right to pursue happiness. What happens next is less certain. We know now that what his pen proclaimed publicly his penis applied privately through many an undiscriminating congress. The Jeffersonian paradox pretty well summarizes the current conflicted state of the union where the super rich can chase after pleasure in private jets while most citizens are stuck in the slow lane of a happiness highway that is greatly standin’ in the need of repair. Before the South Carolina primary I hadn’t realized that for powerful fat cats there are loopholes even in the Ten Commandments. Not being a great believer in elections I recall that Pontius Pilate called a snap election and Barabbas won it hands down. Let’s face it, even today slogans like ‘drive out the moneylenders’, ‘turn the other cheek’, and ‘render unto Caesar’ are not likely to garner many votes.

Call me a Socialist, but, as an individualist, I believe bridge partners were put on this earth to lend a helping hand in times of greatest need. To paraphrase Barack Obama, who is sounding more and more like a late entry into the GOP race, a partner is there only to do what a player cannot do for himself. They fulfill their responsibilities by providing trustworthy information through their bids and defensive signals. Exchanges of information may at times prove costly, but, as with the maintenance of a middle class through the education of its Youth, the short term costs are outweighed by the long term benefits. Good habits learned early pay off, whereas undisciplined behavior never produces lasting progress. So it is not a matter of humanistic principle, it is a matter of self-interest that principally drives such expenditures.

Let’s illustrate the current state of partnerships with some hands recently played at my local club. As North in fourth seat, both vulnerable, you hold this hand: ♠ AKT42 ♥ 8 ♦ Q74 ♣ K632. What would you bid after the sequence in front of you of 1♥ – Dbl – 1♠ ? What is your aim? Here was the full bidding sequence as it occurred and what North saw when the dummy appeared. It was obvious that something had gone horribly wrong.

NS had missed bidding a grand slam in any of 3 strains. The director was soon called and it transpired that my partner had bid 1♠ (and later bid 3♥!) on the following collection:  ♠ Q8 ♥ JT7542 ♦ 932  ♣ 84. This constituted what I would classify as an Obligatory Psych. If a famous sponsor bid that way, it might be termed ‘fanciful’ and if a great player did so, based on the final result it might be termed ‘brilliant’.

The interesting point about the hand is that North, an experienced player, never caught on and felt aggrieved. In my view, the reason this fake bid succeeded is that North could not trust her partner’s takeout double. In the old days a double of 1♠ was devoted to revealing the classical psych of this kind, but today one cannot rely on the nature of partner’s initial takeout double. Indeed, South’s double doesn’t appeal to me with all the points in the minors. Nonetheless an advance of 3♣ doesn’t get the job done with 2 cue bids available to show immediately the strength of the hand. Aren’t 12 HCP enough?

On different day I became the innocent victim of my own naivety with regard to takeout doubles. I opened 1♦ on ♠ KT5  ♥ KQ3 ♦ KQJT52 ♣ 8, overcalled with 1♥ on my left. Partner doubled, RHO passed and I was called upon to find a second bid. Your choice?

On the assumption that partner had shown the black suits by his double, I thought 1NT would play well, but I was wrong. The LHO led a club and the opponents ran off 5 club tricks, holding me to +90, when +130 was available in a diamond contract. Partner felt his double promised 4 spades and nothing else. It was a case of diminished responsibility – I was the one who was promising a club stopper along with a heart stopper. I myself with his hand would have bid 2♦ over 1NT. Why? Because if the opening bidder has a minimal flat hand with a club stopper and a heart stopper, where are the tricks to come from? Generally, holding aces I tend to opt for suit contracts – here anticipating spade ruffs in declarer’s hand and club ruffs in mine. Also note the ♥A with a heart stopper opposite should give rise to suspicions concerning the quality of the overcaller’s suit.

As with politicians, when my partners tell me something I want to believe them, even though I may have serious doubts. Here is a case where my partner didn’t follow that rule.

When the LHO opened 1♦ in 3rd seat it was obvious to me that her points lay elsewhere. A double followed by a NT bid shows my type of hand. The opponents kept bidding going, but that didn’t deter me in my quest for perfection. The remedy to overly active bidding on worthless suits is to place the contract in NT. Partner had other ideas. 2♣ was fair warning and would have made, but not 3♣. My feeling is that once you have warned partner and he persists, you should accept his decision, especially when you hold 3 HCP and he holds 19 HCP -  yet another example of where it is best to let the strong hand decide. Chances are partner heard you the first time. Another point: those 3 HCP are not in clubs, they are in spades where they are bound to be useful in a NT contract.

Similarly if one has adequately described one’s holding and asked partner to make a choice, stand by that choice. In other words, don’t second guess without just cause.

Partner made a nice balancing double, and should have passed 3♥, the optimum contract, as he had not promised any better hearts than what he had. 4♥ going down was a bottom.

So far we have shown examples that point to the fact that the trusting one’s partner should be, but isn’t, the cornerstone of today’s game of unleashed competition. To accept fully the opponents’ bidding is akin to buying poisoned assets. Not to say we are not in the market with our own flimsy offerings (as shown above). Call it the spirit of the times, but if we are to trust anyone, we should trust our partners. Next we see where inferences can be drawn from a partner’s defensive signals.

	North ♠   Q954 ♥   K32 ♦   K82 ♣   AT2
West ♠   AT83 ♥   Q6 ♦   T97653 ♣   J

Against a contract of 3♠ West leads the ♥Q which holds the trick, East playing the ♥8 and South the ♥7. EW are employing upside-down attitude, so the ♥8 discourages a continuation of hearts. What should West lead next? East is probably void in spades, so he holds a 2-suited hand and around 10 HCP. On the evidence of one’s own length in diamonds it is more than reasonable to assume he holds clubs and hearts. He can’t want a ruff in diamonds, so he must be encouraging a club switch. That appears a good choice as West’s ♠A controls the trumps. So the ♣J it is, won by the ♣A in dummy. A spade is led to West’s ace, as, sure enough, East discards a discouraging ♣2. A heart is led to partner’s ten, and he gives a club ruff, leading ♣3 his lowest remaining club. This is a superfluous suit preference signal indicating the ♦A to make up his 10 HCP. A diamond to the ace leads to a further club ruff. That defence would yield a decent score of +200 in a field where a contract of 4 hearts was rarely reached.

Unfortunately in practice West did not pause to draw inferences from the ♥8; he continued with a heart to the ♥T and on the ♥A discarded his ♣J as South ruffed in. The ♦A provided an entry to East’s hand and 1 club ruff was obtained, but not 2. Down 1 was an average result for a mediocre play. Although one may state that defensive signals are ‘suggestions, not commands’, they are suggestions that must be taken seriously. It is worthwhile to try to fit them into the context of the action so far and judge accordingly. A Republican might say that West should have got it right without a signal, while a Democrat could argue East should have signaled extravagantly with the ♥J. It is possible they are both right.

Now we come to my most recent harrowing experience at the bridge table. It had to do with a lead out of turn. Across North America there are self-proclaimed capitals of the world – the Fruitcake Capital of the World (Claxton), the Underwear Capital of the World (Knoxville), the Bird Dog Capital of the World (Waynesboro), the Safe Capital of the World (Hamilton), and the Cherry Capital of the World (Linden) are but a few of the undisputed ones. I propose my hometown be dubbed the Lead-Out-Of-Turn Capital of the World. I have contributed my fair share, but this time I was on the receiving end.

In the third round of a Victory Points Swiss, we needed a big score to get back into contention. On the last hand of the set the opponents bid to 7NT on the following auction: 2♣ – 2♠ (3 controls); 3♥ – 3♠; 4♦ – 4NT; 5♥ – 6NT; 7NT – Pass, and it was my bid holding the following hand: ♠ J87 ♥ 6 ♦ J632 ♣ AT872. I rechecked the bidding cards. Yes, it was certain my lead of the ♣A would defeat the contract and there was no way they could escape, so I doubled with a rare smile on my lips.  Imagine my horror when I looked up from the bidding cards to see my partner reaching into his hand for an opening lead. ‘No!’ I exclaimed firmly, but this was misinterpreted as meaning, ‘No questions, go ahead and make your lead’. Here is yet another example of making your intentions as clear as possible to a sleepy partner. It seemed as if in slow motion partner’s card turned in its transition from hand to tabletop. I could see it was the ♣9. One could admire the choice but not the manner in which it was exercised.

‘Stop it!’ I screamed too late, turning heads at neighboring tables. This was clearly an infraction of the Zero Tolerance Protocol, where one is supposed to say something like, ‘thank you, partner’, even when one is appalled, however, I feel that, just as with homicides, there are justifiable exceptions. No jury would find me guilty, if I could afford a good lawyer. The director was called, and she said, ‘you all know the options, so what will it be?’ Declarer forbade the lead of a club, and I was left to choose an alternate killing lead. Could there be more than one? I chose the ♥6 and this dummy appeared.

	Dummy ♠   KQT ♥   AKQT7 ♦   AKQT4 ♣   —
Me ♠   J87 ♥   6 ♦   J632 ♣   AT872

My hopes rose when declarer took a long time before playing the ♥T, losing to partner’s ♥J. Clearly declarer had chosen the wrong option. ‘Ah,’ I thought, ‘thanks to partner’s gaffe, we are now going to put this down 2.’ Unfortunately my partner must have felt the restriction against no club lead still applied, as he returned a spade into dummy’s tenace. Declarer quickly claimed 12 tricks as he held 5 spades and the ♥9. No problem, as our teammates were in 5♥ making 11 tricks, so we gained the much needed 20 VP. What happened next is another story.

With a result like that one can see why some experienced club players advise never to bid a grand slam no matter what. So why bid 7NT? It appears to me to be mainly a problem of psychology, as a counting of controls would have revealed that a black ace was missing. Perhaps he slipped a clog with 7♦ on his mind. With such an imbalance of power, this problem would have been avoided if the strong hand had methods by which he could maintain control of the auction, determine the lie of the cards, and make the final decision. The control response was a good beginning, but the clash of wills in the cooperative setting that followed led to an avoidable conflict over which player would make the final decision.

PS  I awoke this morning to hear that one of the GOP candidates has suggested putting an American colony on the moon within the next 12 years. This is not as crazy as it seems on first hearing. It is a Utopian proposal for the fulfillment of American Dream, a high-tech version of Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, as it were, only this time there are no indigenous populations standing in the way of progress and immigration can be more tightly controlled. Wall Street reacted favorably. The moon colony provides an answer to the difficult question of where to move to after Florida runs out of real estate. As with the Internet the US government would cover the development costs, so it would be a great investment opportunity for those who get in early and buy before the Chinese get their hands on it. Besides that, therein may lie the source of a breakthrough towards a Two-State Solution. All that needs be done is to persuade the Palestinians to trade peace for land on the dark side of the moon, which, I am told, closely resembles large tracts of the Gaza Strip during a blackout. Of course, water and mineral rights and right of access thereto would be retained by the USA and its allies, as reasonably one can’t be expected to give up something so valuable and get absolutely nothing in return.