When Silence is Golden

January 20th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  1 Comment 

Recently my wife has been experiencing times when she can’t find her glasses, or forgets where she parked her car, or even why she has wandered into the bedroom in the middle of the afternoon.
 ‘What can I do to slow the aging process?’ she asked her doctor.
’Take up bridge,’ was the quick answer.
‘Oh, no! I won’t do that,’ she replied, ‘my husband has been complaining to me about bridge for 30 years and I don’t think it is something I would like to do.’

Fortunately there are many older ladies who have heeded their doctor’s advice and play a remedial game in the afternoons. Their participation has kept the game alive in my area. Naturally the best strategy against a pair of forgetful foes is not the same strategy one would employ against Meckwell. Mostly it pays to follow Jeff Rubens’ advice to try not to lose and leave it to others to hand over top scores. The pairs with the most plus scores have a good chance of coming out on top. Here is hand where my partner of the day scored a top by passing throughout where others found a bid or two along the way.

Dealer: West Vul: EW	Bonnie ♠   KJ54 ♥   KT8643 ♦   T ♣   94
Me ♠   AT962 ♥   Q ♦   AQ2 ♣   QJT8		Eustace ♠   3 ♥   AJ95 ♦   9643 ♣   K532
	Clyde ♠   Q87 ♥   72 ♦   KJ875 ♣   A76

The reader may criticize my doubles, but one must make an extra effort to prod a partner who occupies a warm seat beside the window on a sunny afternoon. I don’t make excuses, but note that EW can make 3NT. However, it is not about me but about Eustace who was the main architect of our top score of 12 out of 12. The opponents voiced their indignation at the result (-300), but as Eustace explained, ‘what was I supposed to do with 4-4-4-1 and no fit for spades?’ If a good result is proof of wisdom, he was wise.
That being said, there are players, who want to bid on every hand regardless of the merits of their holdings. They imitate today’s experts, and do especially well when timid opponents do not take advantage of the information on offer for free. There are women, grandmothers all, amongst the crowd who are willing by nature to risk everything on one call; these are the Lady Macbeths of our club. One is led to wonder how they spent their youth. The trick is not to give their bidding too much credence; they are not bidding as you or I or Stephen Hawking would have bid the hands, but they are not totally insane, either. Here are 2 hands from the local club where bad bidding gave declarer the clues needed to score tops. We shall present them in the form of a short quiz. Here is Problem 1. The lead is ♠2 to the ♠K. Do you see a reasonable approach to scoring 13 tricks?

Problem 2   Assume you open 1♣ playing Precision and reach 3NT as shown.

Many players are taught to preempt wildly over a Precision 1♣, but the attempt often backfires, as it did on this occasion. A low heart was led to my ♥Q, the RHO following disgustedly with the ♥8. You have been forced into 3NT when the field is most likely to be playing in 4♠. Hearts are split 6-1, so 4♠ may be defeated, but your aim is to make 10 tricks to beat any who score 420. Can you see a reasonable way to make 10 tricks? Hint: the preemptress is expected to hold the ♠A.

Problem 1 The bidding has marked the RHO with 5 spades and an ace; otherwise he hasn’t got a raise to 2♠. Because the LHO doubled for the majors, it is reasonable to assume she holds the ♥A and is short in diamonds. It is safe to get rid of the hearts in dummy by taking a ruffing finesse in spades, then drawing a round of trumps with the♦K and passing the ♣K for a ruffing finesse in the other direction. Fun!

I played the hand in a desultory fashion and took just 12 tricks, but then I was in 4♦ only.
Eustace broke his customary silence by opening 1♣ in first seat, and then fell into his old ways by passing with ♦KJxx in support. I suppose he was worried that if he bid 5♦, I would be sure to bid 6♦, and I would have done so, as taking 3NT out to 5♦ is not good matchpoint strategy. This is another case where if one opens light, one has to keep the faith that the hand is worthy of that initial assessment. By the way, only 1 pair out of 13 reached slam, 3NT being the contract of choice despite the 2 voids shown below.

Dealer: North Vul: None	Eustace ♠   — ♥   T72 ♦   KJ62 ♣   KQJT76
Lady M ♠   Q762 ♥   AJ95 ♦   3 ♣   9432		Banquo ♠   K8543 ♥   43 ♦   T94 ♣   A85
	Bob ♠   AJT9 ♥   KQ86 ♦   AQ875 ♣   —

Problem 2 The opening lead away from the ♥KJ indicates that the LHO has an entry just in case partner comes up with the ♥Q. It appears most likely she holds the ♠A, but she could hold the ♦K. To be safe, declarer can play the ♠Q hoping for a duck, but the LHO grabs her ace and continues with a second heart on which the now gloomy deuterogamist discards a club. Declarer clears away the ♣A and finesses in diamonds losing to the ♦K. A club comes back and the clubs are played to the following ending:

Dealer: South Vul: NS	Dummy ♠   T6 ♥   — ♦   A9 ♣   —
Kate ♠   — ♥   95 ♦   32 ♣   —		Petruchio ♠   J8 ♥   — ♦   K8 ♣   —
	Bob ♠   K7 ♥   — ♦   T3 ♣   —

A spade to the ♠K and a spade exit assures 10 tricks even if ‘Kate’ has been very naughty and holds the ♦Q as well. All other pairs were in 4♠, and more than half were going down, so once more a bad preempt led to a bad result. Yes, an opening diamond lead would have been best, but wild bidders are usually not great guesses: their minds don’t adapt well to the requirements of a passive defense.

Finally a problem for a defender who is in desperate straits when an Iron Lady stretches to a game that must be defeated. It is a situation where the matchpoint strategy matches the IMP strategy since letting declarer make her game results in a bottom score.

Problem 3 The 2♣ bid was 11-15 HCP with a club suit, The ♣2 is led and West (you) go up with the ♣A, dropping the ♣K from declarer. Partner can’t have much in the way of high card controls, but he might have 5 spades. Which free finesse do you choose to provide? A low club won’t fool her as that is one of her favorite ploys, a diamond looks equally dangerous, and a low heart risks losing to the ♥J in declarer’s hand.

Thinking of the problem in another way, how might West promote an extra trick in trumps? A tentative count of declarer’s hand places her with 5 spades, 3 hearts, 4 diamonds to the ♦A, and a singleton ♣K. (With 5-4 in the majors she might have given South a choice.) It may appear strange at first glace, but the only return to defeat 4♠ is a diamond. The ♦J wins, declarer cashes the ♠A getting the bad news, then leads the ♦J. West ducks this allowing partner to ruff the third round of diamonds and to return a club forcing declarer to shorten her trumps to the same length. The full deal is shown below.

Dealer: West Vul: EW	Iron Lady ♠   J9764 ♥   J65 ♦   AT94 ♣  K
John ♠   — ♥   QT3 ♦   K732 ♣  AQT973		Bob ♠   QT532 ♥   974 ♦   85 ♣  852
	Denis ♠   AK8 ♥   AK82 ♦   QJ6 ♣  J64

More on Mistakes

January 9th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  5 Comments 

Mistakes are hard to explain, because they defy reason. Picture this scene: over half a century ago proud parents gather in a one-room schoolhouse to watch their offspring perform feats of scholarship. Little Suzie Smart in a gingham dress, her red hair in pigtails, goes to the chalkboard at the behest of the teacher and writes in a fine round hand, ‘2+2=4’. Her relatives murmur approvingly. ‘Clever as her Uncle Ned’, notes her mother, ‘he always was good at arithmetic, being a success in the grocery business and all.’  Next in line comes little Tommy Trout wearing a checked shirt and corduroy pants with a patch in the seat. He scrawls on the chalkboard, ‘2+2=6’. Those gathered gasp, and red-faced parents can offer no explanation for this unjustifiable optimism. Later at home his mother wants to blame the pretty Miss Richards, but his father differs, noting little Suzie got it right. Even if the teacher was slack, Tommy might have taken the hint. One thing is agreed, the boy should not aim for a career in banking. “I see him more as a politician’, says his father. While many can explain why Suzie thinks 2 plus 2 is 4, no one can explain why Tommy thinks it is 6. Maybe he was thinking of 3+3, but that is merely a conjecture.

When it comes to the analysis of bridge hands, many can explain successful decisions that conform to reality, but they cannot see the reasons behind bad decisions that are matched poorly to the evidence at hand. Here is a hand from the 2011 French National Championships for which we may ask the reason why a veteran French champion took the wrong view.

Dealer: East Vul: EW	Fantoni ♠   AJ82 ♥   QT2 ♦   A76 ♣   KQ5
Levy ♠   KQ6 ♥   KJ84 ♦   KJ ♣   T874		Mari ♠   T753 ♥   A9763 ♦   — ♣   AJ32
	Nunes ♠   94 ♥   5 ♦   QT985432 ♣   96

It has been said repeatedly that success begets success as money begets money (Nicholas de Chamfort 1741-1794), so it is with Fantunes who have gained a reputation as one of the most successful pairs in the world. They are fiercely competitive, but the cards lie as the cards lie, and too often they can be seen to overstep the boundary of safety – seen that is by those who can view all four hands in play. At the table it is a different matter. Can we blame Christian Mari for bidding too high on the basis of his void in diamonds? Fantoni’s 3NT could have been pure bluff, but why assume that?

The fault lies in the agreements that the veteran pair employ. Disraeli observed, ‘as a general rule the most successful man is the man who has the best information’. This is demonstrably true in warfare. (The battle of Midway, the decisive battle of the Pacific War, was won largely because the American navy had broken the Japanese code.) We adopt the observation to bridge by claiming, ‘successful bridge decisions are made mostly by those who possess the best information’. How nice it would be if Mari could double to say, ‘partner, I want to bid 5♥’, and for Levy to pass, saying, ‘no you don’t’.

Fighting Uncertainty with Uncertainty
Fantunes’ Intermediate Two Bid show 5+card suit in an, unbalanced, limited hand (10-13 HCP). This agreement takes away a level of bidding available to players employing a natural bidding system. That has to be disadvantageous when partner holds a hand worthy of game exploration, but lacks the space in which to explore. The gain comes when the opposition overreact and treat the Intermediate Two Bid as they would a preemptive, Weak Two Bid. Many times they bid to a hopeless 3NT.

A reasonable competitive approach is to enter the bidding with unbalanced distribution with the main objective being to win the part score battle, much as one would compete over a strong NT opening bid. The emphasis must be on the major suits, especially with 2-suited hands. So, the strategy used against a Big Club can be adapted to: ‘Double for the Major(s), NT 2NT for the Major – Minor(s)’ It is futile to attempt to recover information capacity lost due to the higher than normal opening bid.

As an example let’s assume the opening bid is 2♣, a bid that has a great deal in common with the Precision 2♣, but which is more wide ranging in shape. A simple scheme of competitive bids is as follows.

Dbl both majors
2♦ strong takeout
2♥, 2♠  natural
2NT    diamonds and a major
3-level bids are transfers.

Similar schemes can be devised along the same lines for the other Intermediate Two’s.  If this seems too simple, let’s look at a key hand from the last segment of the 2005 Bermuda Bowl Final with Italy leading the USA by 10 IMPs with10 boards to be played.

Dealer: South Vul: Vul	Fantoni ♠   K86 ♥   KQ ♦   Q6432 ♣   QJ7
Soloway ♠   AQT92 ♥   J9753 ♦   75 ♣   2		Hamman ♠   3 ♥   AT842 ♦   KJ9 ♣   8643
	Nunes ♠   J754 ♥   6 ♦   AT8 ♣   AKT95

At the other table Rodwell opened the South hand with a Precision 1♦ and Versace bid 2♦ for the majors, as who wouldn’t. Lauria raised to 4♥ which made. The fact that Nunes was able to open at the 2-level inhibited Soloway, so he never go into the auction, losing 12 IMPs at this critical stage. If he could have doubled for the majors without promising game interest, Hamman would be in position to bid the game as did Lauria.

The hands on which one must take care are the balanced half-empty, half-full hands, such as the one held by Rodwell in the same 2005 BB Final.

Dealer: South Vul: Both	Rodwell ♠   J9 ♥   AKT4 ♦   K43 ♣   K976
Nunes ♠   AKT642 ♥   97 ♦   A62 ♣   54		Fantoni ♠   8 ♥   QJ8 ♦   QJ9875 ♣   QT2
	Meckstroth ♠   Q753 ♥   6532 ♦   T ♣   AJ83

Results at the other tables confirmed that 2♥ was make-able (8 tricks), but not 3♥. 2♠ was down 2, (6 tricks) for -200. The best fit for EW is in diamonds (8 tricks). At the other table Italy played in 2♥, so Rodwell’s decision to double 2♠ was a minus action costing 5 IMPs, a swing of 8 IMPs against 2♠ passed out. Meckwell had done well against Fantunes through the years by bidding aggressively in competition, but here I question the double opposite a passed hand. It is true that bidding has more ways to win than passing, but forcing partner to declare at the 3-level is overly optimistic, especially a partner who can open lighter than most. Note also that Nunes might hold only 5 spades.

We can test the second-seat action simply by examining the effect of an exchange of the East and South hands, which yields an equally likely configuration. Now as a 2-way shot East will raise to 4♠, which makes, and South may be tempted to save in 5♦, down 2 for a possible profit of 3 IMPs, the same gain one would obtain by passing in the real situation. There is a smaller profit from the bigger risk of bidding at the 5-level. In memory of kindly Miss Richards I award Rodwell a C+ for his effort.

The difficulty experienced by the opponents to the Intermediate Two is that their expectations rise unjustifiably because the bid is at the 2-level rather than the 1-level. It is largely a psychological problem in an atmosphere of uncertainty that must be overcome. Opening at the 2-level doesn’t make the hand better, and the result can be worse for Fantunes as they may be about to declare in the wrong strain.

The Power of Preempts
Fantoni play an aggressive-constructive system and are known to stick to their agreements, leaving it to their system to make the mistakes. Consistency is a major reason why they have done so well over the years. Because they use Intermediate Two’s, they cannot open a Weak Two, which cost them on this deal from the 2011 European Championship Cup Final.

Dealer: South Vul: None	Helness ♠   T2 ♥   K62 ♦   AJ5 ♣   QT942
De Wijs ♠   876 ♥   AJT874 ♦   62 ♣   J5		Muller ♠   KJ54 ♥   Q ♦   KQ83 ♣   A763
	Helgemo ♠   AQ93 ♥   953 ♦   T974 ♣   K8

West bid a descriptive 2♥ preempt with a decent suit and nothing of value outside. East made a disciplined pass with defensive values and a misfit in partner’s primary suit. Helgemo has one of those flat hands with enough HCP to tempt players to compete with the hope that partner will not bid 3♣, even though that is the most likely outcome. It is a reasonable expectation that partner will come up with 10 HCPs, which, indeed Helness possessed, but this was one of those deals with a 7-7-6-6 division of sides.

The winning bid by North is 3NT, which is hard to make as West may have an entry outside his heart suit. East gave North a second chance when he doubled 3♣, but Helness didn’t take the hint that the bulk of the points were with East. He might have thought, ‘in for a penny, in for a pound.’ So we may say that the great Norwegian pair lost the psychological battle on this deal. 3♣ went down 2 for a loss of 300 points.

West at the other table was Fantoni, who could not open a preemptive 2♥. He passed and Nunes opened an artificial 1♣, a stronger than normal bid. Fantunes ended up in 2♥, down 1, when NS passed throughout having been given sufficient warning of a misfit by the Fantunes auction. That could have been a triumph for Fantunes’ methods, if their teammates had been able to bid to the optimum 3NT contract. In the atmosphere of uncertainty created by the preempt, they couldn’t accomplish it.

There are 2 points to be made. First, balanced hands with scattered points can be valuable against a Weak Two, but their value is diminished against an Intermediate Two where the opening bidder probably has an outside entry, ruling out 3NT as a viable contract. Second, it is unproductive to talk of mistakes made by our top players in competitive situations where the information available is sketchy and/or misleading. It is better to consider risk versus gain within the context of what is probable based on what is known at the time at the table. That is how we should arrive at our own decisions. If we are to progress, it will come through better means of communication with one’s partner in competition that allow for changing conditions. There are limits to what can be achieved, of course, so uncertainty will remain an attractive and intriguing feature of the game.

Mistakes – Where the Good Scores Come From

January 4th, 2012  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

Happy the mishap that adds to my renown
 – from Hannibal  by Philippe Desportes (1546-1606)

Recently I noticed that my best results have been coming from mistakes – my mistakes. Of course, we all realize that we gain mostly from the opponents’ mistakes, but this was new. When you come to think about it, an unusual action, intentional or otherwise, will naturally produce an unusual result – either good or bad. Before we get to consider some successes of the renowned Italian pair, Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes, on a humbler level here are some of my mistakes that produced good board at the local duplicate.

Playing 2/1 our 2NT range is 20-21 HCP, but I have always found my partners have trouble after I open 1♣ and jump to 2NT, so, even though the hand is not worth the upgrade, I avoid stress and open 2NT. Partner transfers to hearts and bids 3NT, taking away any possibility of playing in 4♠ . This leads to a further mistake, because I expect him to hold length in the minors. Half-hoping for a spade lead, I pass 3NT which I regret as soon as dummy hits as it is obvious that 4♥ is the better game. A low diamond is led, and I duck in diamonds, my third mistake, as diamonds are split 4-4, so ducking can’t gain. To outscore those in 4♥ I should win the ♦Q, come to hand with the ♠ J and run the ♥Q. If it wins I can cash the ♠ AK and run the hearts to put on pressure in the hope of a defensive error leading to an extra trick in a minor. That would be a satisfactory outcome.

In the real world, I lose the heart finesse, but still emerge with 9 tricks on a successful spade finesse, which I expect to be a near bottom. Not so – we score 80% for our errant ways. This hand proved difficult for most pairs to reach game by following the standard rules for 2/1 bidding, so my whimpy play was cloaked in success. So it is some players exploit the weaknesses of standard methods by going against the field. The analytical ones will add special agreements ad nauseam striving for the elusive edge, whereas the individualistic oddball will bid on a whim and hope it all works out in the end.

Fantunes and ‘Mistakes’
Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes are one of the top pairs in the world, yet they play intermediate 2-level opening bids which are flawed in a constructive sense. The aim is to put pressure on the opposition and to induce errors. In order to attain great success it is not enough to play well, one’s opponents must play poorly as well. The intermediate two’s are merely one facet of their active approach. Fantunes like to bid when they can get in ahead of the opposition. Their 1NT bids are 12-14 HCP and include 4-4-4-1 and 5-4-2-2 shapes. The tendency is that an intermediate two bid shows a 5-4-3-1 shape, less frequently a 6-card suit. (They are less adventuresome with their defensive bidding.)

 If one plays an offbeat system, in the natural run of things it will generate some great successes to go along with some distinct failures. The following deal formed a part of their great victory over Bulgaria in the semi-finals of the 2009 Bermuda Bowl (Bulgaria withdrew). The deal was played at 8 tables in the semi-final matches for the Bermuda Bowl and the Venice Cup. At 7 tables North opened 1♥ and at 6 of these, East overcalled 1♠ , the exception being Sementa for Italy. I am sympathetic to the Italian style of passing the East hand with a topless suit, 9 losers, and Qxx in the opponent’s suit. No matter. After NS had shown their heart fit, West entered the auction and EW bid quickly to a vulnerable game in spades. Four North players took what appeared to be a sensible save in a nonvulnerable 5♥ bid, but, alas, 4♠ wouldn’t have made, and 5♥ was down a costly 500. So, another case of the 5-level belonging to the opposition, and another example of modern tactics at their worst, where a penalty double is no more than wishful thinking by the fans sitting on the sidelines.

The location of the ♠ K made it extremely awkward for the declarers in 4♠ . I see the problem as South’s raise with xxx in hearts and ♠ Kxx, giving North the wrong impression altogether. A 1NT response is closer to the mark and will serve to dampen North’s enthusiasm. Only Zia against China found the right approach – raise to 2♥ as a competitive move, then double 4♠ to suggest strongly that partner not take the push.

The one table at which North did not open 1♥ had Fantoni opening the intermediate 2♥. This changed the entire complexion of the bidding at his table, as shown below.

Dealer: North Vul: EW	Fantoni ♠   2 ♥   KJ9643 ♦   QJ94 ♣   AJ
Aronov ♠   A986 ♥   A ♦   KT853 ♣   973		Stefanov ♠   QJT53 ♥   Q72 ♦   A7 ♣   854
	Nunes ♠   K74 ♥   T85 ♦   62 ♣   KQT62

A quiet board, one concludes, and a negative position for Fantoni who went down 2. Nunes purposefully overbid as a possible save against 3♠ making, and, as we say at the local club, ‘no double, no trouble’. The correct attitude towards the intermediate two is to consider it as the first shot in a battle for a part score. It is normal to stop in a partial, so any game attempts by either side have to be based on extra strength. It was difficult for the opposition to enter the auction and cause problems. There was no clearly correct defensive action in the atmosphere of uncertainty created by the opponents’ system of limited bids.

Gaining a plus score in what is essentially a part score deal is not a bad result in itself, however, often one sees players sit on the sidelines during the auction then gloat when the opposition overbid in an uncontested auction, but when it comes to score the hand they are surprised at the inadequate reward that they receive for their tiny plus. If one doesn’t compete one doesn’t apply the same pressure one’s teammates are experiencing at the other table. Here the inactive Bulgarians experienced a loss of 9 IMPs, because at the other table, their teammates were pushed to the phantom save in 5 ♥, as follows.

The next example represents the other side of the coin – where an intermediate two incites the opponents to bid a game that others avoided after a normal 1♥ opening bid.

Dealer: South Vul: NS	Fantoni ♠   AJ52 ♥   T ♦   T8763 ♣   J62
Danailov ♠   QT ♥   KQ65 ♦   K42 ♣   K853		Karakolev ♠   K87643 ♥   93 ♦   J9 ♣   AQ7
	Nunes ♠   9 ♥   AJ8742 ♦   AQ5 ♣   T94

The normal auction was uncontested with NS bidding 1♥ -1♠ ; 2♥ – Pass. This contract had 6 losers, but it went down 2 in the Venice Cup semi-final when Deas led the ♣5 and later gave Palmer a diamond ruff. Catherine D’Ovidio also balanced with 2♠ , and her partner, Daniele Gaviard, let her play there. 2♠ made 140 on a passive club lead.

After Nunes opened 2♥, Fantoni left it to Karakolev to balance or not. Seemingly it mattered not, scoring 100 on defence or 110 playing in 2♠ , but his choice caused Danialov to take a further interest in the proceedings, and he punished his partner for his initiative by committing to a minus position. It is common enough that a player thinks that his initial pass somehow adds luster to his holding and makes the hand better than it really is. It is as if going to Confession makes one all the better prepared to go out and sin again. Down 3, thankfully not doubled, translated into a loss of 6 IMPs.

It is reasonable for East to balance with 2♠ , but West should judge that his aceless hand does not represent a great deal extra. The intermediate two is not a preempt, so if the opener hasn’t points in his main suit, he must have them elsewhere, presumably in the minors which may make it awkward to develop tricks outside the spade suit. Due to the internal weakness in the spade suit, in the end it was the diamond suit that doomed 3NT. Again, a Fantunes’ intermediate two bid had made something out of nothing.

Probability Considerations
If one can’t tell the true situation, one’s decision should be guided by the probabilities. Let’s compare conditions for a player who holds a top honour tripleton (A, K, or Q, denoted by H) in the major suit opened on his right and a player who hold xxx. Assume the opening bid was based on a 5-card heart suit of any quality. The probabilities of partner holding the designated number of top honours in hearts are given in the following table. The percentages are numbers that reflect common sense.

Thus, if one holds Qxx in hearts, as on the first Fantunes deal, the chances that partner has no ace or king in hearts is roughly 5 out of 9. If one holds xxx in hearts, the chances are very good (3 out of 5) that partner will hold at least one top honour in hearts.

An odd aspect of these probabilities is that they apply equally to the LHO. Partner may hold the perfect hand, but it is equally probable that the opponent holds it. There is no evidence to point one way or the other. Thus, if one holds Qxx in the opener’s suit, there is a 55% chance that the LHO hasn’t a top honour, and the threat of a penalty double with the queen trapped between the ace and the king is real, but not as great as one might imagine. Of course, the LHO knows whether or not he holds an honour, so it is good tactics to get partner to bid the NT contracts, putting the opening bidder on lead. A transfer scheme of overcalls may allow for this eventuality – for example, an overcall of 1♠ over 1♥ could, without commitment, ask partner to bid 1NT with a heart stopper, 2♣ without.

With traditional methods the ambiguity is such that a defender’s first action must be descriptive, giving information rather than applying it. That may benefit mostly the LHO who gets to bid next. Sementa’s pass was non-committal, in effect a nebulous waiting bid. Apart from the Italians, patience is a virtue not much in evidence at the top level, where the prevailing attitude is that anyone who bids is dangerous. (True!) If one employs transfers, one can show suit length without promising strength, thus increasing the opportunities for interference while adding to the communal confusion and mutual merriment.

Fantunes’ Intermediate Two’s

December 21st, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

When considering hands in the range of 8-11 HCP, Zar Petkov found justification for opening distributional hands expressed in a Zar points scale that included substantial contributions for shape. It is possible to define opening bids at the 2-level that accommodate these hands.  The system of Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes (‘Fantunes’) have opening 2-bids for shapely hands, but these are defined to be in the range of 10 to 13 HCP. As these hands would be opened normally at the 1-level, there are no additional hands being accommodated by this definition.  One is curious to see how this could be of value, so let’s look at some hands where such opening bids were employed without success. First, here is a hand from the 2011 Reisinger BAM finals.

Dealer: North Vul: None	Doub ♠   J743 ♥   7 ♦   Q92 ♣  KQ853
Nunes ♠   AQ6 ♥   J863 ♦   J8543 ♣  A		Fantoni ♠   952 ♥   AQT2 ♦   KT6 ♣  T62
	Wildavsky ♠   KT8 ♥   K954 ♦   A7 ♣  J974

The result at the other table was 3♦ making for 110, so Doub would have had to have been defeated by 2 tricks in order for Fantunes to win the board. One sees the Total Tricks (TT) add up to 17, but EW have a double fit which improves the chances for 18 total tricks. So, if 2♠ is down 2 (6 tricks), the Law of Total Tricks indicates EW can make game.  That is hardly a realistic assessment with the passed hand in the East.

In reality, 9 tricks can be made in clubs, diamonds, or hearts, so TT are 18. Should Nunes have pulled his partner’s double, and if so to what contract? I maintain that the problem was inherent in the opening bid on the given hand which has a very large departure from the expected distribution of 3-4-5-1 HCP. The departure of 13 is due to the fact that the 2 shortest suits contain 10 of the 12 HCP. EW were on track to get it wrong. As the cards lie 2NT by Nunes would have survived, even on a club lead, losing 4 clubs and the ♦A. The shapely distribution was offset by the unusual placement of the controls.  Here is a rearrangement of the HCP more in keeping with expectations.

Dealer: North Vul: None	Doub ♠   KJ43 ♥   7 ♦   Q92 ♣   KQ853
Nunes ♠   Q76 ♥   KJ86 ♦   AJ854 ♣   4		Fantoni ♠   952 ♥   AQT2 ♦   KT6 ♣   T62
	Wildavsky ♠   AT8 ♥   9542 ♦   73 ♣   AJ97

Now West can make 9 tricks in diamonds and hearts, while North can make 9 tricks in spades and 10 tricks in clubs. A penalty double of 2♠ is even farther offline, however, West has a hand for which the temptation of passing the double is greatly reduced.  The diamonds are rebiddable, and even a 3♥ bid has appeal. That is normal, but it is difficult to recover from circumstances that don’t fit the expectations.

 Another point to make is that the original West hand can be opened 1♦ in standard bidding and the 4-4 heart fit will not be lost, as it was after the space-consuming 2♦ bid. It is a drawback when responder hasn’t enough stuff to risk asking for clarification. If we allow a ‘light’ 1♦ opening bid on 26 Zar points, we will not miss our heart fit and will have a greater chance of landing on our feet in a competitive auction. With a lesser hand we can pass or preempt 2♦, defined as showing 8-10 HCP rather than 10-13 HCP.

With 12 HCP one is more or less obliged to open the bidding. If the system demands we open at the 2-level, we have no choice but to do so, even if the hand is not well described by one bid. It is self-preemptive, as we have less chance of being able to make a descriptive rebid. Here is an example from the 2009 Bermuda Bowl Finals.

Both declarers can make game, but only Meckstroth bid game. The opening bid needs refinement in its definition, and Rodwell was able to provide that, whereas Fantunes didn’t get it together. Nunes’ 2♠ was an artificial asking bid, and Fantoni showed his second suit in a (presumed) 5-4-3-1 shape. The fact that there was little wasted in hearts didn’t come across, so Nunes passed. Spades as trumps never entered the picture.

Useful Uncertainty
The Precision 1♦ is called ‘nebulous’ because the diamonds can be short. Information concerning the relative strength of the diamonds within the context of the hand is hidden. The Fantunes 2♦ shows at least 5 diamonds, presumably the opener’s best suit, but as we have seen, even though the length of the suit is confirmed, the strength of the suit is subject to variability. Which approach is better? In the cases where the search is on for a major suit fit, starting low is better. When the nature of the diamond suit is uncertain, the uncertainty may work in the opener’s advantage in a competitive auction, as the following deal for the 2009 Bermuda Bowl demonstrates in spectacular fashion.

Dealer: West Vul: NS	Katz ♠   875 ♥   8543 ♦   J862 ♣   93
Nunes ♠   T2 ♥   AJ972 ♦   97 ♣   K742		Fantoni ♠   964 ♥   T6 ♦   AKQT3 ♣   J86
	Nickell ♠   AKQJ3 ♥   KQ ♦   54 ♣   AQT5

Here Fantoni’s points lay in the suit he bid. Good! His 2♦ bid provoked the opposition into overbidding, the psychological advantage that such a bid may carry to overcome in part its constructive defects. Nunes has decent values, but could not see his way to doubling the final contract of 4♠, nonetheless, +200 seemed to be a decent result. Surprisingly it represented a loss of 5 IMPs. Here is the auction at the other table.

Meckstroth’s 1♦ could be as short as 2. Versace conveyed his power with a 2♦ cuebid, hitting his partner’s best suit. Although the diamond support was adequate the rest of the dummy was a disappointment. Down 4 translated into a loss of 400 points … the rest is not translatable. One might say that this was a once-in-a-partnership mix-up, but problems are common in the realm of uncertainty and not always solved satisfactorily.  Both results defy reason. Opposite a passed hand Fantoni hoped his 2♦ bid would cause discomfort, and it did, but so did Meckstrorth’s nebulous 1♦, and with less risk.

The Precision system allows 2♣ opening bids with 11-15 HCP and long clubs. Originally a 5-card club suit with a 4-card major was allowed, but it has been found that the competitive auctions are better treated if one requires the clubs to be at least 6-cards in length. An alternative bid of 1♦ is available. With the Precision 2♣, 2♦ is an economical ask, whereas the Fantunes 2-level bids are disadvantaged in that regard. So the Fantunes 2♦ bid which allows 5 diamonds and 4-card major is not likely to be successful.

Directing the Wrong Lead
If diamonds are one’s best suit, then opening 2♦, as Fantunes do, should prove beneficial when they end up on defence. That may not be true in the cases where the suit is thinly stocked with honours, as in the following hand from the 2009 BB Final.

Three Norths bid to 3NT and 3 Easts led a club, the result being down 2, -200. The exception was Fantoni. Nunes had opened 2♦ which influenced his partner to lead his singleton diamond, the result being 3NT making 4 for a loss to Italy of 13 IMPs. Generally Fantoni is committed to singleton leads in his partner’s suit (as recommend by Garozzo?) even though the opponents may hold more cards in the suit than partner does. On such a weak hand and with such a weak suit as this where the opponents are likely to bid spades, I prefer the options of passing or opening 1♥ in third seat.

Bids and Expectations

December 12th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

When it is not in our power to determine what is true, we should act according to what is most probable  -   Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650)

When partner opens the bidding he creates a first impression that may be difficult to correct. Suppose partner opens 1♠ within the context conservative 5-card major system. Although there are no guarantees, one expects, on the basis of probability, that he has at least one honour card in the suit, unless we ourselves hold all the top spades. How should one react to the bid? Of course, we should react according to what is most probable given what we can see in our own hand, but temper our actions according as the known variability. The bidding system may have solved that problem for us. It requires that we raise to 2♠ with 3 spades and 6-9 HCP. That is designed to be on average the best we can do given the expectations. The question is, what if, due to inherent variability, the hands do not conform nicely to expectations? In that case problems are likely to arise.

One may expect that partner will have opened 1♠ with 5-3-3-2 shape and (roughly) 13 HCP distributed between the suits in proportional to their lengths, that is, 5 in spades, 3 in each of the 3-card suits, and 2 in the doubleton. Here are some possible 1♠ opening bids.

The departure is the sum of the absolute differences between the number of HCP actually held in a suit and the expected length of the suit. Hands I and II have the most likely shape, but they are vastly different in their HCP distributions. If one opens a ‘light’ 1♠ with Hand I one may feel that the bid gives a good description of the holding as it is pretty much what partner can expect. The lack of an honour in the short suit is of minor concern. If one opens Hand II, there is a need for further clarification. Even though the HCP total is up to snuff, the distribution of HCP is far different from what partner will expect. It could be a case of ‘nothing wasted in spades’ in a heart contract, a fact that will require several bids to establish firmly. Despite encompassing only 10 HCP Hand III is the best offensive hand and fits well the expected distribution of HCP. In the subsequent bidding responder should be able to reveal the shortage in clubs in order to clarify the full playing strength of this combination without promising extra HCP strength. That facility is up to the system designer to provide, or not – the 5-4-4-0 shape is rare.

On opening bids with hands low on HCP but with good distribution, for constructive purposes it is important that the HCP be well distributed in the long suits – the short suits don’t matter as much. In a traditional bidding system where extra bids show extra strength, the hand may be worth one bid but not a continuation, so it is difficult to correct first impressions without overstating the overall strength. In a system where opening bids are limited and subsequent bids are ‘competitive’ in nature, there is more scope for painless clarification. (In the next blog we consider a bad arrangement – self-preemptive intermediate two bids as used by the Italian pair, Fulvio Fantoni and Claudio Nunes.)

When Push Comes to Shove
There is a great advantage to opening light with length in the spade suit, because to compete the opponents have to bid one level higher. It may be negative thinking to ask this question, but what happens if they win the contract? Obviously one of us is on lead, and the question arises as to whether we should lead a spade, the suit we bid so optimistically. Before we look at the probabilities, let’s look at a couple of hands where spade leads proved disastrous. The first comes from our local game.

Dealer: West Vul: North	North ♠   — ♥   A862 ♦   KT985 ♣   AT32
West ♠   JT832 ♥   Q7 ♦   Q ♣   KQJ96		East ♠   K74 ♥   KT43 ♦   A62 ♣   854
	South ♠   AQ965 ♥   J95 ♦   J743 ♣   7

The West hand has 26 Zar points, so is deemed worthy of an opening bid. North has his bid, and East won’t be criticized for wanting to compete, and South has a legitimate 4-card jump raise. West expects 4 spades opposite, so he bids to the level of his assumed fit. North continues his good work and East surely has the stuff to double. So by modern standards here is a perfect auction, so far. But it is wrong. The Total Tricks add up to 17, which one should expect to sit 9 with NS and 8 by EW. So EW do well to compete to the 3-level. Even though the tricks sit 10 with EW and only 7 with NS, down 2 undoubled should prove profitable. So the only error one can point to is the final double by East.

To be fair, can East expect the opening bidder to hold a topless spade suit after he has freely bid at the 3-level? More likely he holds 4 good spades and a doubleton diamond, reducing the number of Total Tricks. It appears then that this is the time to strike at those who bid on nothing. The next question is: what to lead? From East’s point-of-view a spade lead is surely safe, but in fact it is the only lead to allow declarer to pitch 2 losing hearts on the ♠AQ and cross ruff for an overtrick. The double didn’t cost, the lead did.

Let’s now go to the Seniors KO Semi-Finals at the 2011 Nationals in Seattle. Here we can expect reason to prevail, or can we? Might we not find that the Seniors are afflicted by the same disorder we observe at our local club, namely, undue affection for the spade suit regardless of its defective structure? You know it’s true.

Dealer: West Vul: NS	Schermer ♠   J6 ♥   J9652 ♦   AKQ5 ♣   52
West ♠   T4 ♥   Q43 ♦   JT7 ♣   KQT98		East ♠   K9872 ♥   A87 ♦   963 ♣   73
	Chambers ♠   AQ53 ♥   KT ♦   842 ♣   AJ64

John Schermer and Neil Chambers were cited by Bobby Wolff as being one of the best seniors’ pairs at the recent world championships in the Netherlands. They are the antithesis of the overly active players of the younger generation we see emerging on the scene. They may lose out by not acting when perhaps they could do so to advantage, but they gain by the trust partner can put in their action when they do act, as in the deal above.

East-West are up-to-date in their competitive structure which allows them to preempt with a multi-2♦ bid in 3rd seat with the garbage hand dealt to East. The bid promises at least 5 cards in a major- really. Well, Schermer is known to pass on some very good hands, so maybe a bit of preemption will have good effect. A BBO commentator claimed this convention has been shown to possess a 57% success rate. OK, but doesn’t the quality of the suit come into it? Apparently not, if the main aim is disruption.

Chambers has enough stuff to double without length in hearts, as he expects hearts to be the suit in which East is preempting. The preemption may about to work, or at least break even, but here comes West getting active and bidding what he hasn’t got, perhaps in a ‘pass or correct’ mode that risks misinterpretation. Schermer can transfer to hearts on the assumption that spades is the opponents’ best fit, and later suggests 3NT as the final contract. Necessarily brave bidding by a passed hand, based largely on partnership trust, partly on knowledge of the opponents’ proclivity towards light preemption.

One can hardly blame East for leading a spade, thus giving away the contract and losing 12 IMPs. At the other table, North opened 1♥ , East overcalled 1♠ and South ended up as declarer in 3NT. The contract can be defeated on the ♠T lead, but West felt no compulsion to lead his partner’s suit, not when he held such good clubs. At this table it all seemed reasonable, as it so often does in a seniors’ event. It was a difficult hand to play even with help from the opening lead – the hearts weren’t well placed for declarer.

The Honour Structure in an 8-card Fit
If one aspires to follow Descartes’ advice and play according to what is most probable, then it pays to know the odds when partner shows a suit of a given length. Let’s first consider the case where a player opens 1♥ and responder raises to 2♥ . What are the expectation that he holds at least one honour, A,K, or Q (denoted by H)?

If the opener has Hxxxx, the chances that responder has raised on Hxx or HHx is 64%, if we take the suit in isolation. One should play for that possibility. From the other side, if the responder holds Hxx, what are the chances that the opener has at least one honour? 78%. So when defending it is even more likely that a lead in the suit is called for from responder’s side. On the other hand, if responder holds xxx and opener has a 5-card suit, the opponents also hold 5 cards in the suit. It is even odds whether opener holds none or one or that he holds two or three honours. That could make the lead ineffective, so alternatives can be considered. In cases where a player considers bidding a 5-card suit without a top honour, he should take into account the resulting uncertainty in partner’s mind, as partner may not look for alternatives when he should. This applies more to overcalls than opening bids, however, with borderline opening bids the quality of the suit is an important consideration, if one is aiming to elicit cooperation from one’s partner.

If the aim is to disrupt, then one takes one’s chances without expecting partner to get it right. The more levels taken up by an overcall, the more disruptive it tends to be, an overcall of 1♠ over 1♣ being the most space consuming, so the most suspect. If it is judged that the overcaller is weak in HCP, the overcall should show a good suit, but if he is judged to have a good hand, the overcall may be of necessity in a weak suit. In short, the lighter the bid, the better the suit. 

If a pair has an 8-card fit, the chances are 69% that they hold 2 top honours, but the a priori odds change according as an opponent’s holding. If an opponent holds Hx, his partner will hold Hxx or HHx 49% of the time strictly on an a priori basis, which may encourage some and discourage others when contemplating a NT bid. Usually a top honour in the opponents’ suit is a bad omen for those who contemplate bidding one more.

Comments on Zar Points

December 5th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  2 Comments 

The 4-3-2-1 HCP scale has become a standard descriptor in the definition of opening bids. They represent hard information on the basis of which the opponents can make deductions on which to base their actions. The HCP content by itself is not a good method of hand evaluation in the case of a hand with shortage, so points have been added to the HCP scale that reflect that fact. These points do not represent hard information, as the opponents cannot know their source until after the hand is played. Thus, even a 2/1 player may open ‘light’ with 10 HCP upon occasion when the shape is particularly attractive. Some literally-minded opponents may be deceived as to the defensive potential of the opening bid and allow the opponents to steal the hand. Generally their protests fall on deaf ears, but they may still feel injured by a bid that did not fall within the limits prescribed on a convention card. It then becomes a question of how far a player may carry this action of adding points for distribution.

In the case of so-called Zar points, the answer is: a long way. Even a hand with 8 HCP can be given consideration for constructive action. For details of the development of the Zar point count process, the reader is referred to the reference by the originator, Zar Petkov of Ottawa (2003) available from the Bridge Guys site under ‘zar points’.

The Statistical Basis
Before we discuss the theoretical basis for the Zar formula, we will critique the arguments  that Petkov gives to justify his claims of superiority to the traditional Goren methods. First we should say that criticizing Goren is akin to beating a dead horse, as for years experienced have rejected it except as a very rough initial guide to hand evaluation.

Suppose TV reporters interview Occupy Wall Street protesters 100 of whom have beards. They ask the question, ‘do you support a special tax on CEO’s earning over $1 million?’ After the first 50 are questioned, the interrogators believe they are on to something as 49 have confessed that they do support such a tax. It was not surprising that 98 out of the 100 bearded protesters felt the same.

Armed with this information, those who do opinion polls decide to stop bearded men in the vicinity of Wall Street and ask the same question. Can they expect 98% accuracy in predicting that bearded men support such a tax? No. After a few no answers, the analysts add a modification: they exclude bearded men in suits who carry brief cases. Accuracy improves after the police release some protesters and a number of them return to the area. So there is some validity to the conclusion that bearded New Yorkers tend to support a super-tax, but it would be wrong to think it applies in most cases – that would constitute prejudicial judgement based on tainted evidence.

This is a simple example of how deductions from a test group cannot always be taken as predictors over a wider sample. The Petkov statistical results come from a narrowly chosen set of hands that satisfy a certain criterion. Let’s take as an example the set of 70,000 hands in which the correct contract is 3♥ or 3♠. By correct we mean that on a double dummy basis 9 tricks and only 9 tricks are made. The Goren points method overbids on 21931 boards (30%) whereas the Zar points method overbids on 2439 boards. In that sense the Zar method provides a much more accurate evaluation. However, there is an advantage to overbidding at IMP scoring where a vulnerable game should be bid with only a 3 out of 8 chance of success. At matchpoints, one gains by bidding impossible games that come home on a defence that falls short of double dummy status. The more uncertainty in the bidding, the better the chance of a faulty defence, so the Goren methods may work advantageously in practice. So if we choose a sample of 70,000 results from hands played by those with a wide variety of skills, we can expect quite different results with a greater degree of fluctuation.

The above arguments against the validity of statistical justification for Zar points as predictors does not mean that they do not constitute a good method of evaluation. There are theoretical reasons why they should work better than the Goren points, and we shall go into those next. The first advantage and perhaps the greatest, is that the method allows for light opening bids – a clear practical advantage. Petkov points out that there are more hands that fall in the narrow range of 8-11 HCP than as fall in the wider range 12 to 37 HCP. Traditionally the former fall in the category of an initial pass, while the latter are divided into 5 main categories of opening bids. On an information-theoretic basis, this is a bad arrangement. It is a better situation if those 8-11 HCP hands were also divided into 5 categories, which increase the average information of an opening call. This is not feasible, but the more passed hands that can be moved to opening bid status, the more informative the system becomes. This is a justification for aggressive systems in general – being aggressive also means being more informative, and more accurate in prediction as well. So, some special arrangements for those ‘good-bad’ hands have been made at the 2-level, while the HCP limits to 1-level bids have been lowered.

Zar Points and the Law
The Law of Total Tricks is a principle that is used by many to guide their bidding. A hand does not exist in isolation, so the playing potential depends on the degree of fit that one expects to encounter with partner’s hand. The most common division of sides is 8-7-6-5. The number of total tricks is the sum of 13 and the difference between the length of the longest combined suit (8) and the shortest combined suit (5), so the number of total tricks (TT) equals 16. Less than 16 and the hands do not fit well, greater than 16, and we are taught to bid ‘em up. Here are 3 examples with their a priori probabilities to consider.

8-7-6-5   TT=16   23.6%
8-8-5-5   TT=16    3.3%
8-8-6-4   TT=17    4.9%

The occurrence of the 8-7-6-5 division of sides greatly outweighs the other 2, and it is reasonable to base action on the assumption of this division, provided that it remains the most probable condition once one sees one’s own hand. To stick with this a priori assumption means that one will sometimes miss the opportunity to act on a more favorable division with a greater number of total tricks.

Judging a hand in isolation, one may consider the difference between the longest suit held and the shortest as an indication of playability in that it represents the maximum available contribution to TT. This sets a limit to what is possible. Thus, a 4-3-3-3 shape can contribute at most 1 to TT, whereas 5-4-3-1 can contribute up to 4, so has more potential.

Players have also learned from statistical studies that hands with a double fit play better than the TT predict. So when one considers opening a hand, one should take into account the probability that a double fit exists. Let’s consider the division of sides when one is dealt a hand with 5-5-2-1 shape.

♠ 5 – 3  (8)          ♠ 5 – 2    (7)
♥ 5 – 3  (8)         ♠ 5 – 3    (8)
♦ 2 – 3   (5)         ♦ 2 – 4     (6)
♣ 1 – 4   (5)         ♣ 1 – 4      (5)
Weight : 16           9

The probability that the division of sides is 8=8=5=5 relative to a division of 7=8=6=5 is in the ratio of 16 to 9 (64%). Based on which is more likely, it makes sense to act as if there is a double fit and the TT equal 17, not 16. That results in a greater than normal motivation to generate action.

Double fits enhance the playing strength of the combinations. In the case above one sees that the 5-5-2-1 shape readily produces a double 8-card fit. Overall the a priori chance of a double fit is 44%. For a 5-4-3-1 shape the chance is 34% and for 4-4-3-2, it is 22%. Petkov has taken this into account by adding as points the sum of the 2 longest suits, 10, 9, and 8, respectively. The greater the sum, the more likely that a double fit exits.

It is possible to calculate the probabilities of Total Tricks and double fits for any given shape of hand, but the problem remains as to how to rank the distributions and provide them with a number of points that will reflect their relative degrees of playability. Petkov has assigned points in a simple manner. 5-4-4-0 is ranked 1 point below 5-5-3-0. Is that a valid assessment when the former has a great probability of encountering a double fit? Is 1 point the correct differential?

Zar Points Formulation
In its simplest version we have this definition:
Zar Points =  Honour Strength + Distribution
     =    HCP + Controls + (Longest – Shortest) + (Two Longest)

Zar points are divided into 2 main categories: honour strength and distribution,  subdivided into the following four factors: the HCP on the scale of 4-3-2-1, the number of controls (Ace=2, King=1), the difference between the lengths of the longest suit and the shortest suit, and the sum of the 2 longest suits. These four are not independent. The sum of the first 2 results in a points scale of 6-4-2-1, which favors the aces and kings over the queens and the jacks. This is appropriate for hands that are distributional in nature and are suitable for play in suit contracts. The third term relates to the potential contribution to the TT, and the fourth term relates to the probability of a double fit. Thus, the basic elements of hand evaluation as described above are included in the Zar evaluation.

There is another factor that so far has not been considered: the losing trick count. This takes into account the placement of the honors. A combination of KQxx in one suit and xx in another counts as 3 losers, whereas a combination of Kxxx in one suit and Qx in another counts as 4 losers. Clearly the coincidence of the KQ in one suit is the more favorable situation. It is more likely that a suit with 4 card has been dealt 2 top honours than it is that a suit with 2 cards has been dealt one top honour, so on that basis alone if one looks at successful combinations more of them will be of the former type than of the latter. Generally hands for which game is likely have a suitable losing trick count, hence a well placed honour structure, so that factor is filtered out in the Petkov selection process.

Integration into a System
To bid is to release information. A major question is how partner can react systemically to the revelations. Opening light in third seat, even on a 4-card major, is a feature of 2/1 systems. The use of such bids has been justified on the grounds that partner has passed and will not over-react to a noise, or that the opponents may be about to enter the auction profitably with the balance of power. What Zar evaluation implies is that one shouldn’t wait for partner to pass – the idea is that one should pre-balance on speculation, as it were.

When a partner discovers a fit, he may jump preemptively (Bergen style) or he may ask for further definition through a check-back bid, such as Drury. So one merely moves Drury to the third seat and the best hand at the table may end up doing the asking. A problem may arise when there is no apparent fit. The probability of a fit with one of the longer suits has not been realized, which in the case of a shapely hand goes against the a priori odds. In this exceptional case more must be known of the distribution and relays may be an effective solution, but there is still a danger of getting too high. Once the Distribution Points are known, a lower limit is set on the total of high card points.

There are some, myself included, who will go against the strictures of the 2/1 system by occasionally opening light in first seat. One danger is that the opponents may overcall and the auction becomes competitive, in which case partner may feel obliged to double the opponents in a contract that may prove unbeatable. To guard against this happening I prefer to open light on suits that I want led, if it comes to that. The same applies to my overcalls. Another danger is that partner may take us to 3NT. Again, if I can provide a good suit that represents a potential source of tricks, I am more inclined to open light.

Zar points do not provide a means of distinguishing good suits and bad suits, so in that respect they share a fault with Goren points. My qualification for a light opening bid is to possess at most 7 losers and at least 3 controls in the long suits. The more points I have outside my best suit, the less inclined I am to take action with less than the normal compliment of HCP. Here is a hand given by Petkov that qualifies by my standards:  ♠ KQxxx ♥ KJxxx ♦ xxx ♣ —, 9 HCP, 2 controls, but only 6 losers.  I would be inclined to wait-and-see with this 7-loser hand: ♠ Qxxxx ♥ KJxxx ♦ Kxx ♣ —. One consideration: if we defend at a high level I am less sure that a spade lead will get us off to the right start.

What is a Void Worth?
To examine the difference in evaluation between a void and a singleton, let’s compare the 5-4-3-1 shape to the 5-4-4-0 shape by looking at light opening bids with 10 HCP.

Because of the void, the hand on the far right has one less loser. That should be worth about 5 Zar points because a game bid in hearts or spades (10 tricks) requires 52 Zar points. Well, the void represents a contribution of 5 points in that it applies to Zar points through the term (Longest – Shortest). That is almost as good as an ace on the 6-4-2-1 point scale. The singleton contributes 4 points, only 1 point less, as good as a king. What is the significance? The hand on the left is not an opening bid by Zar standards, but the middle hand is. The difference in these borderline hands lies in the number of controls held, 2 on the left and 3 in the middle. The void delivers the equivalent of a difference between an Ace and a King. Next we examine some frequent division of sides.

The a priori odds of at least an 8-card fit with a 5-4-3-1 shape is 74%, which is why it is generally considered a shape with which one strives to bid.  One sees the mundane 8-7-6-5 division of sides is common, and there is a danger of a misfit division, 7=7=7=5.

A common division with a 5-4-4-0 shape is 8-7-7-4. Overall the a priori odds of at least an 8-card fit is 84%, so the prospects are clearly better than for 5-4-3-1 by an average of 1 card. That one card extra in a fit is equivalent to one less loser. It is not clear that Zar points give sufficient weight to the difference at the game level. However, one must keep in mind that 3 losers (xxxx) is not typical of a 4-card suit, and that QTxx is much better.

Getting to the Right Contract

November 24th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  4 Comments 

Before we discuss how to get to the right contract we have to define what we mean by the ‘right’ contract. In an absolute sense, under the assumption that both hands are known entirely, it is the contract that has the highest average score at IMPs or the highest median score at matchpoints. Probability enters into it – we have all reached contracts with excellent prospects only to experience failure because of bad breaks, but that does not mean we weren’t in the right contract.

During a bidding sequence neither partner can know for sure what the right contract is – that can be judged only by looking at both hands. To reach the right contract consistently, one player has to know enough about his partner’s hand to judge accurately the potential of the two hands combined. That means relevant information has to be exchanged. One might conclude that the more information exchanged the closer the final contract will be to the right contract, but players are acting under constraints. There is a difference between the best contract possible and the best possible contract given the circumstances. There is practical merit in attempting to reach the right contract as a pair will score well on most (but not all) such contracts. Intellectually speaking, that is one of the attractive challenges of the game. Bidding contests are designed towards that end.

Popular bidding systems embody attempts to get the ordinary player to contracts that will score well most of the time. They will get you into the ballpark, but they may not get you into the best seats. Major suits are given precedence over minor suits because they score better. This puts a bias on common bidding sequences. We know that major suit slams are much easier to reach than minor suit slams, even though both carry a bonus over game contracts. This fundamental biasing of the bids in favor of certain contracts over others regardless of their theoretical merit influences the judgement of players who tend to add their own bias to the mix. We bid 3NT on speculation without a thorough investigation of better alternatives, because statistically it’s to our advantage. We see this effect in bidding contests when the contestants, who are good players, consistently bid to a hopeless 3NT when the right contract is a partial – their system makes them do it.

Because they are statistically based, standard bidding practices are limited in their ability to reach the right contract when the right contract involves a rare combination of assets. To do that the players must add rarely used bids that enable a more specific exchange of information. That helps, but there are still limits on accuracy because of the overall reliance on HCP evaluation. There are some players who prefer a simple system and are willing to take their chances by bidding what most often will be successful, given what they know. They rely on their own storehouse of statistical information. A loosely defined system allows freedom of movement. Not favoring a full disclosure, the shrewd player gets restless after just 2 rounds of bidding. They choose contracts in the hope that the circumstances are as expected and/or the defence will be kindly. In what follows we shall look at some hands to see how a player may choose his bids in a way that gets around the limitations of a standard system in order to provide a better definition than is provided normally. I think of the technique as enlightened masterminding.

The Strong Hand Should Decide
How do we know when we start bidding what contract to aim for? This question arose in my mind when I read the opening sentence of Marshall Miles’ article, Powerhouse Opposite Lightweight, in the Nov, 2011 issue of The Bridge World.

‘ A two-club opening bid should be used as any other call, made any time it is the action most likely to reach the right contract.’

After opening 2♣ one would think that the best choice of bids would be in a structure where the opening bidder can ask the responder to provide relevant information that would allow the holder of the strong hand to make the final decision based on what he has learned – that is, some sort of asking sequence should be enabled to so opener can asks concerning what he needs to know. It’s bad enough when the holder of a powerhouse prejudges what appears to be best and biases his bidding towards that end, but in the current state of affairs with 2♣ opening bids the responder is allowed too much leeway in choosing his calls according to what he thinks might be the right contract. Here is an example from a recent team game that illustrates my point.

I had a powerhouse hand and my partner was able to provide relevant information immediately concerning the number of controls he held – one ace or two kings. I showed a spade suit and partner showed his shape. Over my 3♦ Bela made the best bid available to show what was likely to be, from his point-of-view, the right contract. He was correct in his assessment as I was warned not to proceed further in spades. Even if he had held 2 kings, the trump quality did not appear sufficiently robust – he had told me as much.

At the other table responder bid an unlimited waiting 2♦. Opener bid spades and was raised to game. With less information available than I had, opener evoked RKCB and ended in 5♠. This went down on a 5-0 trump split! That news made me especially happy as I am one of those who don’t like using 4NT as an ace asking bid except as a last resort.
The trouble with both auctions was that they focused on spades when the right contract was 6♦ played from the strong hand, which is pretty obvious when one can see both hands. To get to the right contract opener needed to know about the 4-card diamond support. I suggested to Bela that the best sequence would be:

2♣ – 2♥*; 2♠ – 2NT, 3♦- 3♠; 4♣ – 4♦; 5♣ – 5♥; 6♦ – Pass.

He couldn’t see why responder would choose to bid 4♦ after agreeing spades. The key word is ‘choose’. It is impossible for him to visualize my hand, so allowing him to choose a bid on the basis of what he thinks is most likely is clearly the wrong approach. It is difficult when one has to swim against the stream of one’s bidding system. The problem would be even more difficult if he had not already limited his hand by his 2♥ bid.

Choosing the Right Bid
Let’s pursue Miles’ assertion that the right choice of bid is the choice that is most likely to arrive at the right contract, whatever that happens to be. Here are 2 hands discussed in the previous blog that with only 28 HCP between them can deliver 6♠ on a dummy reversal. That’s unusual. Should the opening bid be 1♣ or 1NT (15-17 HCP)?

If opener wishes to make the call that is most likely to reach the right contract, he does not begin with 1♣. Why? Because the hand is not about clubs. Naming a suit, even if the identification is based largely on length, will create an impression that is hard to overcome. Opening 1♣ on a bad suit has one advantage: if the hand is played in a NT contract, the opening leader may be inhibited from leading clubs. So there is a built-in bias towards 3NT, because responder, based on the probable location of club honors, may justifiably fear wasted values there, and even with slam in mind he can hardly cue bid later in clubs to show shortage – that is usually taken as showing a club honour.

Note that the opener holds only 14 HCP, but he upgrades with 5 controls, the equivalent of 17 HCP.  Opening 1NT rather than 1♣ takes the luster off the club suit, and when responder shows spades, it is rather timid not to ‘super-accept’ with a 3-card suit when half his points lie in the spade suit. Of course, the hand has no ruffing power, but the opening bid has said so. Now it is easy to bid to slam on this particular combination. Sheer dumb luck? Not at all – the opening bidder first limits his hand then makes bids that reflect the location of his controls in support of responder’s suit.

Standard methods are geared towards a normal expectation of the distribution of HCPs, that is, length and strength are correlated. Responder expects that, justifiably so. One has to take that into account when choosing the bid that best describes the character of a hand. Let’s assume a more normal distribution of HCPs and see how that works.

Following the normal procedures now leads to the right contract. From the perspective of the opening bidder, there is only a remote possibility that the contract should be played in clubs, but a 1♣ bid conforms closely to what responder will expect. The spades are nothing extraordinary. Responder correctly downgrades for wasted values in clubs.

Finding the 4-4 major fit
Here is another deal from our recent team game where Bela and I failed to reach the best contract by choosing our bids strictly according to the system guidelines.

I held 16 HCP, but 7 controls are worth much more than what is normally expected in a 1NT opening bid. Bela passed (‘I had only 7 HCP’) where I would have evoked Stayman and raised 2♠ to 3♠. To my way of thinking, pass is not the call that is most likely to lead to the best contract – the chance of a 4-4 fit in a major is too great, in which case, add 3 support points. A diamond lead would appear to be a danger against a NT contract.

The problem would have been avoided if I had opened 1♣ so the auction could proceed:  1♣ – 1♥; 1♠ – 2♠; 4♠ – Pass. In the event on a heart lead I gained an IMP for +180 versus +150 by finessing twice in clubs. Our opponents had bid the hands in exactly the same way. Of course, I would not have to adjust according to circumstances if I were playing a Big Club system, 1♣ giving partner less scope for faulty evaluation.

Why Experts Upgrade and Don’t Downgrade
Some BBO commentators express frustration at the experts’ inclination to upgrade their hands and bid outside the HCP limitations imposed by the definition of their bids. Frequently it is seen that 1NT is opened on 14 HCP when the stated limits are 15-17 HCP. There are many factors that will promote the value of a hand – the expert wants to treat his hand as being equivalent in strength to what is normally expected from a strong 1NT opening bid. The effect of the upgrade is lessened if the ordinary hand with 14 HCP is included routinely as being within the range of 14-17 HCP. Experts don’t upgrade only because they think they can play the hands better than most – they upgrade because standard evaluation underestimates powerful suit combinations.

(In my most recent game imitating an expert I achieved 3 clear tops by opening anti-systemically on hands with extra playing strength:  1♠ on ♠ KQT965 ♥ Q64 ♦ Q863 ♣ –; 1♥ on ♠ 976 ♥ AQ985 ♦ KJ94 ♣ 7; and  2♠ on ♠ KJT987 ♥ 5 ♦ Q8643 ♣ 7.)

Experts don’t downgrade. There may be a temptation to downgrade from a standard 1NT if one holds a quacky 15 HCP within a 4-3-3-3 shape.  One may plan to open 1♣, say, and modestly rebid 1NT, however, partner will assume a hand with 12 HCP. In effect the downgrade is close to 3 HCP, equivalent to a king, whereas an upgrade may be a mere 1 HCP, equivalent to a jack. The same reasoning tells us why it is closer to expectations, hence less deceptive, to open on a good 10 HCP than it is to pass on a bad 12 HCP.

There’s Something About Three

November 18th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

There are many bad connotations surrounding the number 3: ‘Two’s company, three’s a crowd’, misfortunes come in three’s’, ‘the three ravens’, ‘the three witches of Macbeth’ and more. The negative associations carry over to bridge: ‘the 3-card raise’, the 3-3 split’ and ‘a 4-3-3-3 shape’. On the other hand the number eight, a lucky number in China, has positive connotations: ‘an-8-card fit’, ‘an 8-control hand’. We’ll get to these when discussing hands below.

Italian players may have been disappointed to place third in the recent Bermuda Bowl after leading throughout the round robin largely due to 2 adverse slam swings in the last 16 boards of their quarter-final match against Netherlands. I am not that sympathetic, especially after watching members of the team performing in the Italian Mixed Teams Championship. Here is a quiz: which player found room to criticize his female partner on after the following deal.

A club was led to the ♣Q and ♣K. Declarer played the ♠ A and a low spade towards the dummy. When the ♠ J appeared from West, she could claim 12 tricks. In the other room the auction was similar: declarer opened 2NT, was transferred to spades, and accepted the invitational 4NT. She too received a club lead, but soon lost her way, succumbing to an urge for trickiness.  She led low to the ♠ Q which Buratti cleverly ducked holding ♠ K654 behind the dummy. So the declarer who made the straightforward play of leading the ♠ A gained 14 IMPs. Who received the criticism?

If you guessed the player who bid and made 6NT you were correct. Her partner voiced the opinion that she should have passed 4NT. The chances of the spades producing 4 tricks is around 5 out of 8, not a worthwhile margin for a nonvulnerable slam. Of course, I think she was right to accept, because 1) she had 9 controls, 2) slam might well be bid at the other table, and 3) his spades could have been better, ♠ QJ9xx having a 59% chance of producing 4 tricks. There is no dependency on the spades splitting 3-3.

It is bad psychology to blame a partner for bidding and making a slam. Better to wait for a more appropriate time. There may have been a carry-over effect on later hand.

The woman who had misplayed 6NT did not hesitate to raise her partner to 6♥ after he had jumped over a Multi-2♦ showing a preempt in an unnamed 6-card major. Well, that was one way to avoid confusion. The player whose partner had criticized her initiative, passed his jump to 4♥ even though she held 3 aces and very good hearts. What might her partner have for his jump to game? I think a confident partner might have found an acceptable way to move forward. Anyway, as I said, any sympathy directed towards the Italians was greatly diminished – maybe third place was where they belonged.

Good 3-Card Support

David Burn noted during the BBO broadcast of a 2011 Venice Cup match that a 4-3-3-3 is too often underrated by the player who holds it. True enough, as an 8-card fit is likely, but without any ruffing power the potential for a high number of Total Tricks is low. It is the hand opposite that must take up the slack, which means the ruffs are transferred to the hand with the long trumps in the classical manner of the dummy reversal.

It is common enough to raise on poor 3-card support once partner has shown a 5-card suit. This may lead to problems as a raise on xxx is really an inadequate description. On the other hand, a raise with top honors can be very useful, as in the following fanciful construction where the opener has a 3=3=3=4 shape.

Neither hand is especially strong, and the division of sides is a common 8-7-6-5 with 16 Total Tricks, but there is very good structure in the trump suit, and nothing wasted in clubs. The result is that there is transportation to be had in the red suits. Routine bidding will not get the pair to slam – responder must be at pains to show his shape and not be put off by a natural opening bid in his short minor. Once the opening bidder is informed of the shortage in clubs opposite, he can bid slam, because he expects tricks in the red suits and ample ruffing of the clubs. It is not easy.

Suppose a spade is led to cut down the ruffs, picking off the ♠ J. A club is lost and a second spade is led, won in dummy. Declarer can ruff a club immediately, and ruff 2 more clubs returning to dummy with a diamond and a heart. A second heart is won in dummy, the last trump is drawn and 2 more diamond tricks and the ♥ A bring the total to 12. Thus we have come to 12 tricks on 28 HCPs. The loser count is 13, so this process gains a trick over the normal expectation of 11 tricks, which is what you get if you draw trumps early, losing a club and a diamond when the diamonds split 4-2 as expected. (Note that even if declarer stops in 4♠ , the reversal process can gain many matchpoints against routine play.)

The Probability of a 3-3 Fit

A table of a priori probabilities is based on the possible combination of cards being dealt to 2 players. To calculate the probability of a 4-2 split relative to a 3-3 split when 6 cards are missing in a suit, one merely takes the ratio of the numbers of combinations available.
There are 2 components to take into account, the combinations within the suit and the
combinations outside the suit.
4-2 split:
 the number of combinations within the suit is 6! divided by 4!2!  (equals 10);
 the number of combinations outside the suit is 20! divided by 9!11!
3-3 split:
within the suit, 6! Divided by 3!3! (equals 15);
outside the suit 20! Divided by 10! 10!

The ratio of the numbers of combinations in favor of a 3-3 split is (3/2) times (11/10), so the probability of a 3-3 split in clubs, say, is much greater than the probability of a 4-2 split in clubs. However, the a priori tables include the possibility of a 2-4 split as well, in which case the probability of either a 4-2 split or a 2-4 split is greater than that of a 3-3 split by itself.

When one declares a hand it may be that one or the other 4-2 splits is eliminated from consideration, in which case a 3-3 split becomes the favorite. Here is an example where one wishes to estimate the chance of obtaining 3 tricks from a suit in this layout:

♣5432    opposite  ♣KQT

At the beginning the chances are slim – Roudinesco’s dictionary rates it at less than 20% – but often one is faced with making what one can with what one is given. A low club goes to the king, winning, and a second low club towards the tenace is won by the queen. What are the chances the ♣2 will set up at this point? With the ♣A and the ♣J the only 2 clubs outstanding there are 2 live possibilities to consider: AJ on the left, or A on the left and J on the right. (At my club no one behind the ♣KQ holds up the ♣A twice.) The probability of getting a third trick is the probability that the suit was dealt 3-3.

One cannot go to the a priori tables to obtain this probability. We are comparing one 4-2 split to one 3-3 split. The relative probability is the current ratio of the number of card combinations in the outside suits. Originally this ratio involved combinations of 20 cards in spades, hearts, and diamonds, but now the number of unknown cards has been greatly reduced with the comings and goings.  The number of vacant places must be taken into account. If there is no difference in the vacant places, the 3-3 split is more likely, and you’ll make that ♣2 more often than not, provided you can get back in hand to cash it. If there are 2 fewer vacant places on the left, it more likely than not that playing the ♣T will result in 2 clubs being cashed on the left. That could be good if it results in a suicide squeeze and/or an endplay.

As you may have gathered I am partial to the 3-3 split and the 3-card raise, but then I was brought up on The Three Musketeers.

The Division of Sides

An interested reader asked me how to calculate the division of sides. It is a basic characteristic of any bridge deal, so it is worthwhile to grasp the procedure. From Mathematical Theory of Bridge by Borel and Chéron we obtain these probabilities:

8-7-6-5   23.60%    7-7-6-6  10.49%     7-7-7-5    5.245%

The probability of one division relative to the other is the ratio of the number of card combinations that can be dealt under each condition. Let’s compare the numbers of combinations for 8=7=6=5 against those for 7=7=6=6, where the suits have been specified. We need to take into account all 52 cards.

Your Side 26! divided by  8!7!6!5!
Their Side the same,
    Or 26! divided by  7!7!6!6! the same.

The ratio is 16/9 in favor of the 7=7=6=6 division.
In addition there are the various combination of suits which may apply. There are 24 possible divisions of 8-7-6-5, and 6 of 7-7-6-6. Thus, overall with all combinations included, the 8-7-6-5 division is the more likely in the ratio of 9/4.

Next we compare the 7=7=7=5 division and the 7=7=6=6 division.

Your Side    26! divided by  7!7!7!5!
Their Side 26! divided  by 6!6!6!8!
    Or 26! divided by  7!7!6!6! the same.

The ratio of combinations is 4/3 in favor of the 7=7=6=6 division. There are just 4 combinations available to the 7-7-7-5 divisions, so the ratio overall is increased by a factor of 6/4. The 7-7-6-6 division is favored in the ratio of 2 to 1.

The above results can be verified by comparing to the ratio of the percentages given above. The absolute percentages are calculated by obtaining the probabilities of all possible divisions relative to one (say, 7-7-6-6), obtaining their sum, then dividing each element by the total, thus normalizing to a sum of 1. That is, the probability of one of these divisions being dealt must be 1, as all possibilities have been included.

Once the dummy hits the deck the division of sides is known exactly, so the a priori odds concerning the divisions are irrelevant beyond that point. There remain to be discovered the distributions of the suits within the division. The most likely splits are the most even splits that can produce the division under the constraint of what is already known, because these are the splits that have associated with them the greatest number of possible combinations.

Some Bermuda Bowl Slams

November 7th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  3 Comments 

Slam hands can play a large part in determining winners in a team match, and the 2011 Bermuda Bowl proved no exception. In the Semi-Final match between Italy and Netherlands, 2 slam swings in the final segment provided the bulk of the margin of victory for the Dutch. It was not all luck, and the following deal provides us with a fine demonstration of how not to go about looking for slam.

Lauria opened 2NT with 21 HCP and Versace employed Puppet Stayman in search of a 4-card major suit fit. 3♦ indicated a 4-card major was held and 4♠ sent the message that the suit was spades. 12 tricks were easy. There are 2 criticisms I would make on this approach. First, the hand is too strong to open 2NT, as with 9 controls the hand is worth much more than the 21 HCPs indicated; the hand is worth more like 30 HCPs, well outside the promised range. Second, the weaker hand gets to decide the final contract without transmitting any information that could indicate partner should upgrade.

The Dutch had a better approach even though the opening bid was the same misguided 2NT. Brink responded with a descriptive transfer to spades.

Drijver could upgrade on the basis of the known spade fit, and drove to slam. It was somewhat fortuitous that the fit in spades proved to be the critical element, however, it was better sequence than the horrid Puppet sequence provided above. Actually, this hand shows what the Big Club is all about, even without transfer responses.

1♣ is strong, 1♠ promises 5+ spades and 8+HCP, 2♠ agrees trumps, 3♣ shows one top spade honour, 4NT is RKCB,…. but opener could bid 6♠ straight up to save time.

Of course, even Precision players can miss a good slam if they allow the weak hand too much authority, as in this deal from the Bermuda Bowl Finals.

Justin Lall began with the Big Club and Joe Grue gave the negative response (0-7 HCP). Lall decided to make a descriptive Kokish-like call, 2♥ showing a big hand. (Here we are guessing.) Grue relayed and Lall revealed a very strong NT hand. Note that he had hidden his especially rich club suit. Grue applied a Stayman 3♣, and signed off in 3NT. It appears that the auction was geared to finding a major suit fit. Lall had forced the auction, so had little to guide him as to the potential in the responder’s hand.

It would have been better for Lall to reveal the nature of his hand with an old-fashioned single-suit slam try jump to 3♣ (4 losers or less, no 4-card major) to force responder to make a descriptive bid with 3♦ available as a second negative with regard to clubs. Responder has an easy 3♠ bid, and 6♣ will be bid by opener, sooner or later.

Pros and Cons of Opening Light

It is well known that there is a strategic advantage to opening the bidding when the high card content is fairly evenly divided between the pairs, the most likely situation, and when the auction might become competitive. The mathematical theory of information provides another good reason for opening light. The normal pass rate for traditional methods is around 50%. Opening light entails opening hands that traditionally would be passed, the net result being that the pass rate is reduced to around 40%, so, on average more information is being delivered over the full spectrum of possible calls. In effect, for active bidders a pass is better defined and a suit bid is more poorly defined than normal.

Defending against a light opening bid presents problems. The tendency for an opponent who plays a traditional system is to interpret the opening bid in terms of what he would promise if he were to open with that same bid. From his point of view it is the additional uncertainty with regard to the familiar bid that presents a problem. ‘How can you open with that garbage?’ he may ask. Traditional defences may prove inadequate, and there is a danger of being stolen blind. We often see complaints that light opening bids force an opponent to adopt the same strategy. The tendency is to make each deal subject to competition, a condition that favors those who open light. As we have noted in previous blogs, light bidders look very bad on some hands, but overall they hold an advantage.

There is a disadvantage to opening light when responder holds a good hand and the deal is not competitive in nature. The added uncertainty in the definition of the opening bid requires responses that can extract additional information and allow the contract to be played at its proper level. Games mustn’t be missed and slams especially become difficult to reach with confidence. Here is an example from the 2011 world championships where few succeeded in reaching slam and many failed.

This is a purely natural and descriptive French auction from the 4th round of the Seniors’ Bowl Final. Many would not find fault here, but one must say the bidding has not come to grips with the particular characteristics that make this deal special. The more likely it is that the 1♥ opening bid may be light, the less likely it would be that responder would contemplate trying for a slam. That is true in general, but when in the Venice Cup competition the Indonesian South, Dewi, opened 1♥, limited to at most 15 HCP and often light, her partner Murniati was able to bid a strong 2NT (16+HCP) and later jump to 6 ♦. For most pairs 2NT is a heart raise, so Indonesia had the right tools for the occasion.

In the Bermuda Bowl the Dutch bid to 6♦ and USA2 didn’t. In the Senior Bowl Peter Boyd and Steve Robinson got to the slam using a sophisticated version of 2/1 with relays, and we shall give their auction as it was fully explained on BBO, whereas the Dutch relay auction was not. Either would illustrate my point.

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We commend the veteran pair for the use of an efficient sequence that is part of a development over several decades. Here are 2 seniors with memories intact. I look for an easier approach that would rely to a greater extent on adaptive partnership cooperation. This is best when the 2 hands are balanced in HCP with neither partner having a clear advantage over the other. Playing Precision I would respond with an artificial 2♣, a common enough agreement these days, and adopt the Indonesian ladies’ approach.

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The hands fit better than they might with the sequence of diamond honours in the one hand and the ♥Q conveniently placed in the other, but the choices of bids would indicate to a fair degree that the values held are working under the current circumstances. Responder might have bid 3NT instead of 2NT if there was no interest generated by the diamond bid. A minor suit orientation is announced with the 2NT bid, and opener’s ♣Q appears to be a useful card worthy of full promotion. The presence of the ♠ AK also gives opener assurance that diamonds will have good support opposite. One can see the advantage of a limited opening bid, as the opener can jump to 4NT as a nonforcing limit bid without confusion. Of course, if one cannot do without RKCB, a bid of 4♠ might serve as a substitute, although it might not be clear what trumps are being referenced.

Having an agreement that 2♣ is an artificial game forcing bid does not solve all problems. I must admit that I can’t see the reasoning that led to failure in this all-too-common auction: 1♥ – 2 ♣*; 2♦ – 3♦; 3NT – Pass. In this case a raise of 2♦ to 3♦ should not be taken as a descriptive bid, allowing opener to make the final decision, but as a slam try agreeing diamonds as trumps and asking for outside controls. A reply of 3♠ stands out as a means below game to show where values are held. 3NT would appear to show better clubs and worse spades.

Usually in a slam auction it pays to establish trumps early, but in this case responder’s hand is rather modest in controls (5) and flat in distribution. The presence of the ♦AK guarantee that the opening bidder will not show much enthusiasm for a diamond slam and it will be difficult for him to show extra length in diamonds. In fact, he is rather endplayed in the bidding which has got too high. 2NT saves space and is descriptive of shape and soft outside strength. Diamond support may take the form of a delayed 4♦ bid, leaving 4NT as a resting place in the worst case scenario. With the given deal, a 2/1 opener can complete the picture of his hand by bidding 3♠ , kicking the can down the road. 3NT by opener should be reserved for garbage dumping.

The Cult of the Eight-Card Fit

November 4th, 2011  ~  Bob Mackinnon  ~  No Comments 

The Law of Total Tricks has had a profound influence on modern bidding practices. Players are willing to act on the belief that usually it is safe to enter the bidding on the priori promise of an 8-card fit and not much else. Distribution is everything. Most of the time they get away with bidding on less than the traditional HCP requirements. One danger is that about 1 time in 6 there is no 8+-card fit, so winning the contract may turn out to be a pyrrhic victory. Secondly, the long suits may be poorly stocked with honours, reducing the number of total tricks. If you hold top honors in their main suit, they are likely to be in the same position vis-à-vis your main suit. Thirdly, if an opponent becomes declarer, the defence may suffer on the opening lead, and knowledge of the distribution may aid him in bringing home a risky contract.

These 3 points should be the keystone to defending against active bidders. Under normal circumstances a player does well to adhere to the cult and bid to a contract that matches his potential with regard to total tricks. When values are evenly distributed about the table, the chances of being doubled in a partial are not great. After that level is reached, but not before, one may consider doubling for penalties if the opponents carry on dangerously. Obviously, within the realm of the new reality, one’s competitive bidding agreements must be geared towards this approach.

Here is an example from the Semi-Finals 2011 Bermuda Bowl where a player sought prematurely to punish overly active opponents who may have bid too high.

Dealer: West Vul: EW	Fleisher ♠ K7 ♥ KJ93 ♦ T763 ♣ KJT
Grue ♠ 853 ♥ 7 ♦ AK5 ♣ A97654		Lall ♠ AQ9 ♥ 8652 ♦ J98 ♣ Q32
	Kamil ♠ JT642 ♥ AQT4 ♦ Q42 ♣ 8

Grue’s 2♣ bid promised a 6-card suit, 11-15 HCP. Lall’s 2NT was a ‘good’ raise to 3♣ (as opposed to a raise based solely on the number of clubs held). Discretion being the better part of valor, Kamil could not double for takeout at this point, because 2NT included the (rare) possibility that Lall held a good hand without a club fit. Once it was confirmed that the opponents had bid to the level of their 9-card fit with the HCPs evenly distributed between the sides, Kamil felt he could make a balancing double to compete for the part score. He was assured of at least an 8-card fit with his partner.

The match had not been going well for Fleisher’s team, and he obviously felt in the need for a swing. We can see that gambling a penalty double on the basis of ♣KJT opposite a singleton was not the winning decision, as it resulted in a score of -870. The ♣KJT look promising but they produced just 1 trump trick. We surmise that normally Fleisher would have pulled to 3♥ which goes down 1 but which beats the result achieved at the other table, 4♥ down 2. If the opponents had continued mistakenly on to 4♣, then a penalty double might be called for, but it is not to be recommended here when there is no assurance that 3♥ makes and 4♣ doesn’t.

Again we see the propensity of Grue-Lall to avoid a direct raise when they have some semblance of high card power. Lall’s bidding 3♣ directly might make it easier psychologically for Kamil-Fleisher to compete effectively. The 2NT bid contained a poison pill: the threat of a strong hand with a misfit in clubs. However, this is rare, and an opponent should act on what is most probable, taking a risk that may occasionally cost a lot. The effect of these unlimited transfers in competition is to give the opponents extra bids with which to describe their potential in the face of dubious actions. So one should define the difference between direct action over a transfer and delayed actions against the expected weak sign-offs. I would define direct actions as strong, a direct double of 2NT being balanced takeout, and 3♣ as a game search with short clubs. Thus, when South passes 2NT and later balances against 3♣ with a double, the guidelines are set and North knows not to attempt a speculative double of 4♣, as discussed above.

A most amusing but instructive comedy of errors occurred in the Semi-Final match between the USA teams. It shows what can happen when both sides are bidding like crazy in an atmosphere of mutual misunderstanding.

Dealer: South Vul: NS	Grue ♠ AT65 ♥ K94 ♦ AKT8 ♣ 63
Weinstein ♠ KQ83 ♥ JT852 ♦ Q62 ♣ A		Levin ♠ — ♥ Q76 ♦ 9753 ♣ KJT542
	Lall ♠ J9742 ♥ A3 ♦ J4 ♣ Q987

Weinstein’s 2♦ was an ‘extended’ Flannery bid, possibly with 5-5 in the majors. One sees this is a good description on distribution, but a poor one on high-card placement as the advertised long suit has none of the 3 top honours and half the HCP lie in the minors. This bodes ill for a player who declares on this hand, but this is not a concern to the modern bidder. Grue has a value-showing double, and Levin makes a cheap raise, keeping hidden his long suit for the time being. Of course, he knows Weinstein is short in clubs. Lall makes what appears to be a natural, invitational call suggesting an exploration for 3NT, but Grue confesses he hasn’t the foggiest idea what 2NT means. Perhaps it is a weak Lebensohl transfer to 3♣?

After Grue transferred to 3♣, many observers felt that Levin should pass, knowing there was a NS misunderstanding, but Levin is made of sterner stuff, and he doubled the one contract he might expect to defeat. Lall is obliged to pass, but Grue has been warned, so he corrects to 3♦. Weinstein with defensive cards in the minors, and perhaps expecting more from Levin, doubles that. The moment of truth has arrived. Commentators expect Lall to read the situation and bid 3ª, but he retreats to 3NT, the Sanctuary of the Wholly Unknown that has provided protection for so many lost souls. Weinstein doubles that confident Levin will provide some assistance. He leads the ♥5 and 3NT is defeated eventually by setting up the suit. As noted by Kit Woolsey at the time, Lall’s one hope when in with the ♥A was to attempt to pass the ª7, but he led the ª9 which was easily covered by Weinstein. So 3NT was that close to making.

At the other table Wooldridge opened 1♥, Martel doubled and Hurd bid 3♣, a fit showing raise. Customarily this delivers some tricks in clubs, which it didn’t, and 4 hearts, which it didn’t. It should have come as no surprise that Stansby had enough to bid 3ª. Martel wasn’t going to stop there with his fine controls and singleton club. Well, if they were in game, I suppose it didn’t cost much to double Martel, who made 11 tricks, for a score of 790 and a gain of 15 IMPs on the board. The result might be considered a triumph for extended Flannery as it had stolen the NS spade fit, but IMPs would have been won even if Weinstein had passed throughout.

What does one board prove? In the end the brash Young Turks defeated the established experts by a substantial margin by applying constant pressure that eventually paid good returns. That means one must be prepared to put up a battle on every hand, fighting fire with fire. Uncertainty must be made to work for you as well as for them. Doubling a contract just because it rates to go down under normal circumstances doesn’t work well when the circumstances are unusual. There will be chances enough to double when it is obvious that the cards are badly placed, as their bidding takes little account of suit quality.

As a case in point we’ll finish with a look at this year’s world champions acting rather foolishly against the Italians, whom they ended up beating, of course.

Dealer: South Vul: NS	Drijver ♠ 8 ♥ AT9753 ♦ 653 ♣ J75
Versace ♠ A5 ♥ K ♦ AQJ972 ♣ KQ64		Lauria ♠ JT964 ♥ QJ8642 ♦ 4 ♣ A
	Brink ♠ KQ732 ♥ — ♦ KT8 ♣ T9832

The division of sides was 7=7=7=5 for EW and 6=6=6=8 for NS. The Total Tricks were 15. Clubs represented the best fit for NS, but they lacked the 4 top honors, and they split 4-1. EW might opt to play in spades or hearts, with the trumps splitting 5-1 or 6-0, respectively. The conditions were unusual, so there was opportunity lurking in the cards.

Sensing it was a good time to get active, Drijver preempted on the assumption there is no such thing as a bad 6-card suit. Circumstances alter everything. After years of thinking otherwise, in a flash Lauria was made aware of the defensive potential of the 5=6=1=1 shape. In the back of his mind he may have even wondered how to steer partner into bidding 3NT. Versace did well to balance with a double, just in case, and was rewarded when Lauria was able to convert to penalties. The Dutch easily found their 8-card fit, but to no avail. The contract went down 5 for1400 at a cost 17 IMPs.

At the other table, Wijs opened the bidding with a strong club. Bocchi sensed it wasn’t a good time to get active and the Italians lazily passed throughout. With much difficulty the Dutch reached 4♥, going down 1, after 6 frustrating rounds of relay bidding. They had missed their best game, 3NT! Even without the diamond finesse! Perhaps they should have seen that when their division of sides was revealed.